Scott K. Matthews v. City of Madison

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
November 6, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2025AP335 Cir. Ct. No. 2024SC3767

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

SCOTT K. MATTHEWS,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

CITY OF MADISON,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Dane County:
ANN M. PEACOCK, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Graham, P.J., Blanchard, and Kloppenburg, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. The City of Madison appeals from a money
judgment in favor of Scott Matthews entered by the circuit court in this small
No. 2025AP335

claims case following a trial.1 The court credited Matthews’ claims that the City
excessively assessed the value of his single-family residential property for
purposes of collecting 2023 real estate taxes.

¶2 The City argues that the circuit court was not competent to hear
Matthews’ excessive assessment action using the procedures available for small
claims under WIS. STAT. ch. 799. We reject this argument because the City has
failed to ensure that there is an adequate record on appeal to allow us to review the
court-competency issue.

¶3 The City further argues that the circuit court erred in concluding,
based on the evidence presented during trial, that Matthews rebutted the
presumption created by statute that the City’s 2023 assessment of his property was
correct. As part of this argument, the City contends that the court erred in
crediting evidence presented by Matthews to reach a determination of a reliable
value for the property that was lower than that assessed by the City. We conclude
that Matthews met his burden to rebut the presumption of correctness, given
factual findings made by the circuit court that the City does not show were clearly
erroneous. We further reject the City’s contention that the court should not have
credited evidence presented by Matthews regarding a reliable value of his
property. Therefore, Matthews’ evidence supports the court’s resolution of his
excessive assessment claim in his favor.

1
Pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(a) (2023-24), appeals for cases subject to the
procedures in WIS. STAT. ch. 799 (2023-24), such as this one, are generally decided by one judge
of this court. In this appeal, however, after reviewing the appellate briefs this court determined
that it warrants consideration by three judges and the chief judge of this court ordered that it be so
decided. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.41(3) (2023-24).

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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¶4 The City also contends that the circuit court erroneously exercised
its discretion by entering a judgment in Matthews’ favor instead of allowing the
City to reassess the value of his property. We reject this argument because the
City failed to preserve the reassessment-related issue in the circuit court.

¶5 Accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶6 For purposes of determining Matthews’ property tax bill for tax year
2023, the City of Madison determined that his residential property had an assessed
value of $1,081,100. Matthews submitted an objection to the City’s Board of
Review, contending that this was too high. See WIS. STAT. § 70.47(7) (describing
procedure for tax objections submitted to municipal boards of review). An
assessor for the City prepared a report for the board of review that recommended
sustaining the original assessment.

¶7 In October 2024, the board voted to sustain the assessment.
Matthews sought review by the City’s common council, which rejected Matthews’
claim. See WIS. STAT. § 74.37(3), (4)(a) (permitting commencement of excessive
assessment claim only when claim is “disallowed,” meaning that the claim is
rejected, by the applicable taxation district, among other procedural requirements);
see also WIS. STAT. § 70.045 (defining taxation districts to include cities, such as
Madison, in which “general property taxes are levied and collected”).

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¶8 Relying on WIS. STAT. § 74.37(3)(d), Matthews commenced this
action in the circuit court.2 He did this by filing a summons and complaint form to
initiate a small claims action, in which he alleged that the City had excessively
assessed the value of his residential property. He alleged that he had paid his 2023
property taxes in full, that he had not received relief from the board of review, and
that he is entitled to a refund of $2,579.09.

¶9 Matthews’ complaint was dismissed by a circuit court commissioner,
and Matthews sought de novo review in the circuit court. The City moved the
court to dismiss Matthews’ complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief
could be granted under the procedures that apply in small claims actions
established in WIS. STAT. ch. 799. The City briefly argued that, under the small
claims procedures, the circuit court lacked competency to exercise jurisdiction
over Matthews’ excessive assessment action. On appeal, the parties do not dispute
that the circuit court denied the City’s motion. But the circuit court’s ruling is not
a part of the record. The clearest evidence of the court’s denial of the City’s
motion is an abbreviated docket entry that can be interpreted to mean that the court
denied the motion at a scheduling conference, but this docket entry does not reflect
the content of any argument by a party or the reasoning of the court.

¶10 The circuit court held a small claims trial at which Matthews and
several witnesses called by the City testified. Matthews did not dispute at trial that

2
The procedures for claims of excessive assessments in property tax collection are
established in WIS. STAT. § 74.37, which includes the right for a claimant to commence an action
in the circuit court to attempt to recover the amount of the claim when the claim is not allowed by
the taxation district. See § 74.37(3); State ex rel. City of Waukesha v. City of Waukesha Bd. of
Rev., 2021 WI 89, ¶17, 399 Wis. 2d 696, 967 N.W.2d 460 (explaining that pursing an action
under § 74.37 is one of three options for property owners to appeal an adverse board of review
decision).

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the court should begin with the presumption that the City’s assessment is correct,
consistent with WIS. STAT. § 70.49(1)-(2) (affidavit of assessor regarding real
property valuation properly included with taxation district’s assessment roll is
“presumptive evidence” that pertinent properties have been justly and equitably
assessed). The court ruled that Matthews overcame the presumption. The court
further found that Matthews had accurately determined the value of his property
for the 2023 tax year to be $940,000. Accordingly, the court granted Matthews a
judgment of $2,579.09, which the court determined represented the amount that he
was excessively taxed based on the City’s higher assessment.

¶11 The City appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶12 We begin by clarifying that Matthews’ claim is not in the form of a
certiorari challenge to the actions or decisions of the office of the city assessor, the
board of review, or the city council. Instead, it is an excessive assessment claim
under WIS. STAT. § 74.37. See, e.g., Regency W. Apartments LLC v. City of
Racine, 2016 WI 99, ¶21, 372 Wis. 2d 282, 888 N.W.2d 611 (appeals of excessive
assessment actions in the circuit court involve the review of the trial record created
in circuit court, not of a certiorari record of prior proceedings). With that
clarification, we address the three issues that the City raises in this appeal.

I. Inadequate Record Regarding the Court Competency Issue

¶13 The City argues that the circuit court lacked “competency to
entertain an excessive assessment claim under WIS. STAT. § 74.37(3) using the
procedures for small claims actions” contained in WIS. STAT. ch. 799. We reject
this argument based on the City’s failure, as the appellant, to ensure that this court

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has a complete record regarding the issue. We could only speculate about how the
issue was developed in the circuit court, including which arguments now made by
the City are preserved for appeal. In particular, as noted above, the parties’
arguments in the circuit court on this issue are not fully reflected in the record on
appeal and the reason or reasons that the circuit court gave for denying the City’s
motion are not at all reflected in the record. These omissions are dispositive in
resolving the competency issue.

¶14 The City’s motion to dismiss in the circuit court referred to the
concept that the court was not competent, but the City made only a cursory
assertion on this topic. The assertion was that a circuit court using small claims
procedure under WIS. STAT. ch. 799 “lack[s] the competency to fully proceed
under [WIS. STAT. chs.] 70 and 74.” The City’s argument consisted of one
paragraph of isolated references to aspects of pertinent procedures in ch. 799
(addressing how circuit courts are to handle trials de novo) and ch. 74 (addressing
how circuit courts are to handle excessive assessment actions), without explaining
how the ch. 799 procedures are incompatible with the ch. 74 procedures. A few
points on this topic were included in a letter from counsel for the City to the court,
although the added points were not robustly developed. It is unclear from the
record what, if any, additional arguments either of the parties made to the circuit
court at the proceeding at which the court denied the City’s motion. Given these
circumstances, we are not confident that we have a full picture of what either party
argued on this issue, and we lack any idea of what the court’s reasoning was.

¶15 “‘It is the appellant’s responsibility to ensure completion of the
appellate record and when an appellate record is incomplete in connection with an
issue raised by the appellant, we must assume that the missing material supports
the [circuit] court’s ruling.’” Gaethke v. Pozder, 2017 WI App 38, ¶36, 376

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Wis. 2d 448, 899 N.W.2d 381 (quoting State v. McAttee, 2001 WI App 262, ¶5
n.1, 248 Wis. 2d 865, 637 N.W.2d 774). It is true that the circuit court’s ruling
appears to have been rendered during a scheduling conference, and pertinent
supreme court rules do not require the creation of transcripts for scheduling
conferences. See SCR 71.01(2)(b), 71.04. Yet that was no impediment to the City
taking whatever steps it needed to take in order to ensure a record that reflects the
circuit court’s reasoning on this issue, nor does the City now address the complete
absence of any such record. This was the City’s responsibility if it wanted to
pursue it on appeal in the event that the City did not prevail in the circuit court.

¶16 It is also true that we review issues of circuit court competency de
novo, see City of Eau Claire v. Booth, 2016 WI 65, ¶6, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 882
N.W.2d 738, but under these circumstances we could at best merely speculate as
to how the competency issue was developed and resolved in the circuit court. For
example, we are not able to determine whether any or all of the City’s arguments
on appeal regarding this issue were sufficiently developed in the circuit court and
thus preserved for review on appeal. See id., ¶1 (challenges to a circuit court’s
competency to exercise its jurisdiction can be forfeited by a failure to timely raise
the issue). To cite one topic that may not have been preserved, the City now
argues that the existence of “charge back” procedures under WIS. STAT. § 74.41,
which are applicable when a taxation district is ordered by a circuit court to pay
back to a taxpayer an excessive tax, demonstrate that WIS. STAT. § 74.37 actions
are incompatible with small claims procedure, but this point does not appear in

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any filing in the circuit court.3 For these reasons, we reject the City’s argument
about competency here. See Gaethke, 376 Wis. 2d 448, ¶36; see also Local 2489,
AFSCME v. Rock County, 2004 WI App 210, ¶¶7, 29 n.8, 277 Wis. 2d 208, 689
N.W.2d 644 (noting the assumption that missing material can support the circuit
court’s ruling, in the context of discussing an issue that is reviewed de novo on
appeal).

II. Presumption of Correctness and Valuation of Matthews’ Property

¶17 In directly challenging the merits of the circuit court’s ruling
granting a money judgment to Matthews, the City argues that the court erred in
concluding that Matthews overcame the presumption of correctness that attached
to the City’s assessment. Further, the City contends that, even if Matthews
overcame the presumption, the court lacked a sufficient basis to assess the
property at $940,000 for the tax year 2023. We provide an overview of pertinent
legal standards, then additional background from the small claims trial. After that,
we explain our conclusions that, given the findings of the circuit court, Matthews
rebutted the presumption and provided sufficient evidence for the court to
determine that the value of his residence was $940,000.

3
We now briefly explain the “charge back” concept for context. The City’s argument is
based on procedures outlined in WIS. STAT. § 74.41, under which the Wisconsin Department of
Revenue helps tax districts, such as the City, recoup (“charge back”) portions of excessive tax
refunded to taxpayers as a result of, as pertinent here, WIS. STAT. § 74.37 actions from “tax
jurisdictions” that initially received the excess-tax revenue. See § 71.41(1)(c), (4)-(5); WIS.
STAT. § 74.01(7) (defining “tax jurisdiction” as “any entity authorized by law to levy taxes on
general property which is located within its boundaries,” for example, a school district).

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A. Legal Standards

¶18 In the context of an excessive assessment action, “[v]aluation of real
estate for tax assessment purposes is governed by WIS. STAT. § 70.32.” Lowe’s
Home Centers, LLC v. City of Delavan, 2023 WI 8, ¶27, 405 Wis. 2d 616, 985
N.W.2d 69. Section 70.32 states that the taxable value of residential property is
based on its market value. Depending on the particular circumstances, one or
more of the three distinct “tiers” of assessment methods that are provided for in
§ 70.32(1) are used to estimate the market value of a piece of real property for
assessment purposes. Lowe’s Home Centers, 405 Wis. 2d 616, ¶28. Tier 1,
which provides “the best” indicator of a property’s fair market value, is an arm’s-
length sale of the subject property itself. See id., ¶29. Here, there is no dispute
that no such sale was available for analysis. In such cases, “the appraiser moves to
a tier 2 analysis, examining recent arm’s-length sales of reasonably comparable
properties,” which is known as the “sales comparison” approach. See id. There is
no dispute that tier 2 analysis applies here.4

¶19 As noted, there is no dispute that the City’s challenged valuation of
Matthews’ property enjoys the presumption of correctness under WIS. STAT.
§ 70.49(2). A taxpayer challenging an assessment that is subject to the
presumption bears the burden of rebutting it, and when the taxpayer fails to do so

4
We need not refer to the nature of “tier 3” analysis because there is no dispute that it
was not applicable here. Tier 3 is resorted to only “when both tier 1 and tier 2 are unavailable,”
see Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC v. City of Delavan, 2023 WI 8, ¶30, 405 Wis. 2d 616, 985
N.W.2d 69, or to “verify” that an assessment under tier 2 is not excessive, see Marathon
Petroleum Co. LP v. City of Milwaukee, 2018 WI App 22, ¶68, 381 Wis. 2d 180, 912 N.W.2d
117. Both parties here sought to establish the value of Matthews’ property based on recent sales
of what they argued were comparable properties (albeit different purported comparable sales),
and the City did not attempt to rely on tier 3 analysis to show that the assessment was not
excessive.

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the circuit court must uphold the assessment. See Bonstores Realty One, LLC v.
City of Wauwatosa, 2013 WI App 131, ¶10, 351 Wis. 2d 439, 839 N.W.2d 893
(failure to rebut presumption of correctness entitled taxing city to judgment based
on the presumption).

¶20 A taxpayer rebuts the presumption of correctness through proof that
the assessor did not “correctly apply” the Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual
or the Wisconsin statutes, or through the presentation of “significant contrary
evidence” to the evidence relied on by the assessor. Lowe’s Home Centers, 405
Wis. 2d 616, ¶32.5 “If … the failure to follow the Manual results in an excessive
assessment, then the presumption is overcome and the assessment must be set
aside.” See id., ¶37.

¶21 We review de novo whether the City’s valuation complied with the
Manual and the statutes. See Veritas Vill., LLC v. City of Madison, 2023 WI App
56, ¶17, 409 Wis. 2d 572, 998 N.W.2d 506, review denied, 2024 WI 33, 9 N.W.3d
276; Metropolitan Assocs. v. City of Milwaukee, 2018 WI 4, ¶24, 379 Wis. 2d
141, 905 N.W.2d 784. In contrast, we “defer to the circuit court’s findings of fact
and ‘will not upset the court’s factual findings, including findings involving the
credibility of witnesses, unless they are clearly erroneous.’” Veritas Vill., 409
Wis. 2d 572, ¶17 (quoted source omitted); Metropolitan Assocs., 379 Wis. 2d 141,
¶25. “‘In particular, it is within the province of the factfinder to determine the

5
We sometimes refer to the Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual as “the Manual”
and cite to it as WPAM. The Manual states that it is intended to serve “as the guide for uniform
property assessment throughout” Wisconsin. WPAM, Introduction (2023); see also WIS. STAT.
§ 73.03(2a) (granting state department of revenue duty and power to create the Manual); WIS.
STAT. § 73.32(1) (requiring real property assessors to value property “in the manner specified in
the Wisconsin property assessment manual”).

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weight and credibility of expert witnesses’ opinions.’” Veritas Vill., 409 Wis. 2d
572, ¶17 (quoted source omitted); see also Adams Outdoor Advert., Ltd. v. City of
Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶27, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803 (When the fact
finder is presented with “conflicting testimony the fact finder is the ultimate
arbiter of credibility” and the weight and credibility given to expert opinions is
“‘uniquely within the province of the fact finder.’” (quoted source omitted)).

¶22 The Manual instructs that, when using the tier 2 approach at issue in
this case, the assessor identifies recently sold properties that are reasonably
comparable to the subject property, and then makes “adjustments” to the value of
each comparable property based on differences between each comparable property
and the subject property, based on how certain attributes of the comparable
properties contribute more or less to their value relative to the subject property.
WPAM at § 9, pp. 24, 27, § 12, p. 6; see, e.g., Lowe’s Home Centers, 405 Wis. 2d
616, ¶67. For example, if a reasonably comparable property has three bathrooms
and the subject property only has two, the assessor adjusts the value of the
comparable property downward to account for the market value of the additional
bathroom. See WPAM at § 9, p. 27, § 12, p. 6 (“all adjustments are made to the
sale price of the comparable [property] to indicate the value of the subject”
property). Once all necessary adjustments are made, the assessor determines
which of the comparable properties are most comparable to the subject property
and then uses the adjusted values of those sales to estimate the value of the subject
property. Id. at § 9, pp. 27-28, § 12, pp. 8-9, 23-24.

¶23 The Manual provides a list of “basic elements of comparison.” Id. at
§ 9, p. 26. These are property attributes that should be considered as potential
bases for adjustments. As pertinent here, and not surprisingly, one such basic
element of comparison is the location of a comparable property compared to the

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location of the subject property. Id. at § 9, pp. 26-27 (“adjustments should be
made to reflect differences in value resulting from the location of property”). The
Manual gives examples of different kinds of location-based reasons for
adjustments. Most pertinent here, “the price of a home in one area may be higher
than that of a similar home in another area because buyers view one location as
more desirable than another.” Id. at § 9, p. 27. The Manual’s emphasis on the
relevance of property locations is echoed in the Manual’s more general guidance
regarding property valuation, outside of the Manual’s specific discussion of the
tier 2 approach. The Manual lists “physical factors” that are applicable in
assessing properties individually or en masse, the most important of which is
“location.” Id. at § 9, pp. 13-14. Similarly, in the context of valuing land
specifically, as opposed to improvements on the land, the Manual states that
location is “a primary factor in the value of any particular property,” meaning the
value of the property as a whole. Id. at § 9, p. 18.

B. Additional Background

¶24 Matthews testified at the trial as follows. Matthews worked for the
City’s assessor’s office for about 20 years, the last several as the City’s “lead
residential appraiser,” before leaving the assessor’s office in 2019. Matthews
conducted a sales-comparison analysis for his own residential property for the tax
year 2023 that relied on the sales of properties that Matthews considered to be
reasonably comparable to his own. In doing so, Matthews relied on sales of
different properties from those relied on by the City in its assessment. Based on
this analysis, Matthews estimated the fair market value of his property to be
$940,000.

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¶25 Matthews arrived at this number based in relevant part on the
following reasoning.6 His property was unique for its neighborhood (“assessment
area 2”), and therefore he considered residential property sales that occurred
outside of his neighborhood which might be reasonably comparable to the value of
his property. Matthews identified five sales of residential properties in
“assessment area 100,” which is the Hawk’s Landing neighborhood, on the ground
that the Hawk’s Landing sales represented sales of properties more similar in
quality and size to his property than those in his own assessment area 2. The City,
like Matthews, looked outside assessment area 2 in order to identify the sales of
five homes that were more similar to Matthews’ property in quality and size.
However, four sales relied on by the City occurred in “assessment area 110,”
which is the Blackhawk neighborhood, and the City relied on only one sale from
Hawk’s Landing.7

¶26 Matthews testified that he derived an adjustment of seven percent
that should be used when evaluating the value differences between his chosen
comparable sales properties in Hawk’s Landing and his property in assessment
area 2. He testified that this seven percent adjustment was based on the market

6
Matthews presented to the circuit court at trial what he contended was a proper
comparative sales analysis based on the Manual’s principles and Matthews’ experience. This
analysis included numerous adjustments made to the comparable sales, including for the lot size,
year of construction, and home size. The City on appeal does not clearly develop arguments
challenging the accuracy or reliability of numerous of Matthews’ adjustments; the only
challenges by the City that we are able to discern are addressed further below in the text.
7
For ease of reference and following the lead of the parties at trial and on appeal, we
refer to the City’s tax assessment area 100 as the Hawk’s Landing neighborhood and to the City’s
area 110 as the Blackhawk neighborhood. The parties and the circuit court treated the relevant
boundaries as well-defined and not in dispute. As for the area in which Matthews’ property is
located, neither the parties nor the evidence presented at trial identified a similar neighborhood-
type reference and therefore we refer to that as “assessment area 2.”

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valuing the location of Hawk’s Landing more highly than his assessment area 2.
Matthews testified that he derived this percentage through the following method:
for each piece of property in his own neighborhood, assessment area 2, adding up
the values specific to parcels of land, not including the values of the associated
improvements on the parcels; dividing that number by the total land area for
assessment area 2; and then comparing that to the analogous ratio for Hawk’s
Landing (assessment area 100).

¶27 Regarding the City’s assessment, Matthews interpreted the City’s
assessor to have failed to make any location-based adjustments for any of the
City’s five purported comparable sales—that is, adjustments based on the
comparable properties being located in a different neighborhood from Matthews’
neighborhood. While aspects of Matthews’ presentation at trial are not entirely
clear to us, the circuit court had a reasonable basis to interpret him to argue the
following. There was evidence showing that the City’s approach was flawed for at
least the reason that it failed to make location-based adjustments that reflected a
“premium”—namely, the desire of property buyers, as reflected in sales prices, for
properties located in the Blackhawk neighborhood over their desire for properties
in the Hawk’s Landing neighborhood and properties in his own assessment area 2.
Thus, according to Matthews, although the Blackhawk housing and the Hawk’s
Landing housing was generally similar in nature, the market for Hawk’s Landing
properties was more comparable to the market for assessment area 2 properties
than the Blackhawk market was comparable to the assessment area 2 market. Put
differently, Matthews argued that Blackhawk’s location was substantially more
valuable than the location of Hawk’s Landing, which Matthews contended in turn
was more highly valued than the location of assessment area 2. As a result,
Matthews contended that the City should not have relied on Blackhawk properties

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for comparable sales—at least not without making significant adjustments based
on location—but instead should have relied on sales in Hawk’s Landing.

¶28 In support of Matthews’ proposition that the market placed a
premium on Blackhawk properties over Hawk’s Landing properties, Matthews
used three types of calculations to derive three estimates of the premium, ranging
from approximately 22% to 28%. One calculation was based on the sales of
vacant lots in the two neighborhoods in 2000 and 2001, and two others were based
on the sales of two-story residences from the two neighborhoods in 2023.

¶29 Matthews attributed the Blackhawk-over-Hawk’s Landing premium
to the fact that Blackhawk’s residences (where the City’s primary comparable
sales were) were served by a school district that tended to be more desirable to
buyers than the school district serving Hawk’s Landing (Matthews’ sole
comparison area), which was also the district that served assessment area 2.
Specifically, Matthews gave unrebutted testimony that students in both his
assessment area 2 and in the Hawk’s Landing neighborhood all attend the same
middle and high schools, which are in the Madison school district, while
Blackhawk is “primarily” part of the Middleton-Cross Plains school district. In
sum, Matthews could reasonably be understood to contend that the City’s
assessment was flawed in primarily relying on purportedly comparable sales in the
Blackhawk neighborhood, without making adjustments due to location-based
differences in value that Matthews attributed to the fact that Blackhawk and
Hawk’s Landing were not served by the same school district. This was especially
so, according to Matthews, given that similarly comparable sales were available
for analysis from the Hawk’s Landing neighborhood that were served by the same
school district as Matthews’ own neighborhood of assessment area 2.

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¶30 The City called three witnesses, each with experience and training
regarding the valuation of property for tax purposes, including the application of
principles described in the Manual. These three witnesses were: a former state
department of revenue employee who currently serves as a business systems
manager for the City’s assessor’s office; the supervisor of the City’s residential
assessment team, who sat on the board of review that rejected Matthews’ objection
to his assessment; and the assessor who prepared the City’s comparable sales
analysis underlying the City’s assessment of Matthews’ property. Summarizing
broadly, these witnesses testified about how the City assesses property generally
and also identified what they contended were weaknesses in Matthews’
comparative sales analysis and his calculations of a location-based premium for
Blackhawk over Hawk’s Landing.

¶31 The circuit court made the following findings. Matthews’ property
is unique within assessment area 2, and therefore a tier 2 analysis must necessarily
involve reasonably comparable sales that occurred in one or more neighborhoods
other than assessment area 2. Matthews identified sufficient evidence to show that
Blackhawk had “significant[ly]” higher land values than did both Hawk’s Landing
and assessment area 2.8 These significantly higher values were prevalent, whether
or not the disparity was due to the different school districts that serve the two
neighborhoods or due to other factors. The court further found that the City had
failed to take location into account in its assessment process.

8
To be more precise, in making this finding the circuit court explicitly referred to “the
subject property,” and not to assessment area 2 more generally. But we interpret the court to have
meant that Matthews had provided evidence that Blackhawk had significantly higher land values
than both Hawk’s Landing and assessment area 2 generally.

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¶32 Based on these findings, the circuit court determined that, in
assessing Matthews’ property, the City failed to properly apply the principles of
the Manual, and that therefore Matthews rebutted the presumption of correctness.
The court went on to find that the property should be valued according to
Matthews’ valuation of $940,000. The court found that Matthews’ methodology
was better than that of the City in valuing the property because Matthews adjusted
for location in his analysis and the City had not.

C. Rebuttal of Presumption Due to Failure to Follow Manual

¶33 We conclude that the City fails to show that the circuit court’s
findings of fact were clearly erroneous. Further, we conclude that these findings
provided a reasonable basis for the court to determine that Matthews overcame the
presumption of correctness based on the proposition that the City’s comparative
sales analysis did not properly account for the location of Matthews’ residence and
the locations of reasonably comparable sales as reflected in the difference in land
values between pertinent neighborhoods. This reasonably supported a conclusion
that the City did not follow the Manual’s direction to account for location as a key
valuation component. See WPAM at § 9, pp. 14, 18, 26-27; see also Lowe’s
Home Centers, 405 Wis. 2d 616, ¶32 (taxpayer rebuts presumption of correctness
by showing that assessor “did not correctly apply” the Manual).

¶34 One key feature of the circuit court’s apparent reasoning involved
the following determinations. The disparity in land values between Blackhawk,
on the one hand, and both Hawk’s Landing and assessment area 2, on the other
hand, provided significant evidence that the market valued Blackhawk’s location
more highly than either Hawk’s Landing or assessment area 2. Despite that, the
City failed to either make adjustments based on this land-value disparity for the

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City’s Blackhawk-based comparable sales or else explain—in a way that the court
found credible—why such adjustments were not necessary. In other words, the
court’s core analysis was that the City failed to properly determine, as it should
have, whether location-based adjustments were necessary.

¶35 The City does not argue on appeal that its assessment of Matthews’
property included adjustments based on the differences in land values between
Matthews’ neighborhood and the areas in which the City’s comparable sales
occurred. Nor does the City dispute that the Manual instructs assessors to consider
locations of properties as potential bases for making adjustments in a comparative
sales analysis.

¶36 Instead, the City argues that the trial evidence establishes that it
considered whether to make location-based adjustments and properly determined
that no location-based adjustment was necessary for its four Blackhawk
comparable sales. The City further contends that the circuit court clearly erred in
finding that the City needed to account for differences in land values, based on
testimony from City witnesses regarding the purported deficiencies in the land
value evidence. The City rests its arguments in part on the undisputed premise
that, although the Manual requires consideration of certain possible bases for
adjustments, such adjustments might not be necessary in a given case. To the
extent that the City means only that an adjustment might not be called for when
there is sufficient evidence that buyers and sellers assign similar values to
properties in pertinent neighborhoods, the point is surely sound as far as it goes.
When there appears to be no reason to adjust based on location then there is
nothing to adjust. Accepting that obvious point, we explain below why we reject
the City’s arguments. In a nutshell, we conclude that the City does not show that

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No. 2025AP335

the circuit court erred in determining that the City failed to properly evaluate
whether a location-based adjustment was necessary based on the evidence here.

The City’s Consideration of Potential Location Adjustments

¶37 Beginning with the City’s argument that it sufficiently considered
the potential for location-based adjustments in its comparative sales analysis, it
directs us to the following testimony of its assessor. The assessor testified
regarding the challenged assessment here that the assessor considered the option
of making a location-based adjustment for the comparable sales, but that the
assessor ultimately determined that such an adjustment was not necessary because
the increases in values of properties in recent years has been consistently
“dramatic[]” across Madison’s neighborhoods, including in the neighborhoods
containing Matthews’ property and all of the comparable properties—both those
relied on by the City and those relied on by Matthews. In a somewhat more
precise vein, the assessor supervisor, Scott West, testified that residential property
sales values in Blackhawk, Hawk’s Landing, and assessment area 2 had increased
by “similar percent[ages]” in calendar 2022.

¶38 The City appears to argue that this testimony demonstrated beyond
dispute that the market for single-family residences across Madison
neighborhoods had recently been so consistently strong that there was no point in
making adjustments based on location-based differences between individual
neighborhoods. In that sense, the City argues that this case is like Anic v. Board
of Rev. of Town of Wilson, 2008 WI App 71, 311 Wis. 2d 701, 751 N.W.2d 870.
Specifically, the City notes that in Anic this court upheld the circuit court’s
decision to credit the testimony of an assessor that the relevant market for
lakefront property “had grown so strong that factors other than beach length and

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No. 2025AP335

beach quality were being ignored by the marketplace.” See id., ¶17. In other
words, the only features of land or improvements that could call for adjustments
would be how long or how attractive a beach was.

¶39 One problem with this argument is that the City witnesses in their
testimony did not identify any dynamic clearly analogous to the striking testimony
in Anic about the beach-fixated market, and therefore the circuit court here lacked
anything like the record in Anic to consider. Beyond that, the court implicitly
found that the City failed to identify market trends that could justify the City’s
failure in conducting the assessment to account for land values as evidence of the
persistence of location-based differences in value between pertinent
neighborhoods.

¶40 Explaining further, implied in the circuit court’s reasoning was that
the court discerned a fundamental defect in the explanations of the City’s
witnesses regarding the City’s decision in conducting the assessment here that
adjustments based on the locations of Matthews’ property and of comparable
properties were not appropriate in the comparable sales analysis.9 The defect is
that the City’s approach failed to take the following basic dynamic into account.
Even if property values had generally risen at consistent levels across the City’s
neighborhoods in recent years, the properties in some neighborhoods ended up

9
Implicit findings of a circuit court may be used to support the affirmance of a ruling.
See Laughland v. Beckett, 2015 WI App 70, ¶20, 365 Wis. 2d 148, 870 N.W.2d 466 (citing
Johnson v. Merta, 95 Wis. 2d 141, 154, 289 N.W.2d 813 (1980)) (the court of appeals
“search[es] the record for evidence to support the court’s factual findings”); Liberty Milk
Marketing Coop. v. Nasonville Dairy, Inc., 2019 WI App 55, ¶39, 389 Wis. 2d 35, 934 N.W.2d
913 (“when a circuit court fails to make express findings of fact necessary to support its legal
conclusion, we assume the court made such findings in a way that supports its decision”).

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No. 2025AP335

with higher values after enjoying the same increases in values due to the fact that
those neighborhoods started out with higher dollar values.

¶41 The circuit court did not question that there had been, in recent
years, generally consistent percentage increases in property values across Madison
neighborhoods, with values in all neighborhoods rising at roughly the same
percentage levels. As is evident in the court’s questioning of City witnesses,
however, the court implicitly recognized that this City-wide trend was not,
standing alone, a sufficient basis to ignore potential location-based differences in
values among properties used as comparable sales in different neighborhoods.
This was because the City employees did not testify regarding the starting points,
or base levels, of property values before these generally consistent percentage
increases occurred. That is, evident in the court’s reasoning was that the City did
not account for the simple idea that the typical values of properties in different
neighborhoods could vary even after some years of similar percentage increases.

¶42 We conclude that the record reasonably supports the circuit court’s
implicit determination that the assessment approach testified to by the City
employees was defective in that it was premised in part on the proposition that the
City-wide trend data alone could show whether location-based adjustments were
necessary. This effectively left the City with no evidence establishing how it
determined whether a location-based adjustment was necessary for its assessment.
We now address the City’s arguments on appeal to the contrary.

¶43 The City does not come to grips with this implied reasoning when it
directs us to testimony by its assessor supervisor, Scott West, to suggest that, as
the City now puts it, “location is inherently considered and valued as part of the
trending process applied to residential properties to determine their initial

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No. 2025AP335

valuation.” The City fails to explain how this testimony supports an argument that
the circuit court erred in making the express and implied findings that we describe
above. As West acknowledged in his testimony, the City’s focus on similar City-
wide percentage increases in residential property values could fail to take into
account whether two neighborhoods experiencing similar value increases “start at
different places in the market,” with the result that the trends do not change the
result that a location-based adjustment could be necessary.

¶44 In a similar vein, the City notes that West testified about how the
City generally prepares comparative sales analyses, and the City submits that this
included testimony that the City in fact made a location-based adjustment for one
of its comparable sales in the assessment here. But this is not an accurate
reflection of the record. West noted that if the City were to make an adjustment
based on location, it would be shown as an “external influence.” By “external
influence,” West was apparently referring to any adjustment to a property’s value
based on phenomena affecting a property’s value based on evidence coming from
outside of, or external to, specific features of the land and improvements on the
property.10 This was not inconsistent with Matthews’ testimony about his
experience as a former assessor, which the circuit court appeared to credit.
Matthews testified that when the City conducted a comparative sales analysis it

10
The Manual directs assessors to look beyond the boundaries of the subject property:

Real property valuation does not exist in a vacuum. It is
not enough for the assessor to apply the principles of valuation to
a specific property. The assessor must also be aware of the
trends and factors that occur on the international, national, and
regional levels as well as those factors which have an influence
at the neighborhood and municipal levels.

See WPAM at § 9, p. 13.

22
No. 2025AP335

would make “influence” adjustments to account for “location or some other
external factor that’s separate from the property,” “such as high traffic, high noise,
or positive appeal for some reason.” The City notes that here, the City’s
assessment reflected that the assessor made an adjustment (five percent) based on
an “external influence” to only one of the comparable sales relied on by the City in
its assessment. But the City fails to address the fact that, in a report submitted by
the assessor to the board of review in this case, the assessor explained that this
single adjustment was due to the assessor’s view that the City’s sole comparable
sale from Hawk’s Landing required an adjustment “for the area[’s] uniformly
higher quality” homes. The City does not develop an argument that this single
adjustment establishes that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that the City
did not properly account for location in its comparative sales analysis. For
example, this still leaves Matthews’ challenge to the City’s reliance on the four
comparable sales the City identified in the Blackhawk neighborhood, and it does
not support the City’s failure to account for the land-value disparity between
Blackhawk and the other pertinent neighborhoods.

Circuit Court’s Reliance on Land Values

¶45 As noted above, the City argues that the circuit court erred in relying
on land values in determining that the City failed to sufficiently account for
location as a potential adjustment in the City’s comparative sales analysis. This
argument challenges various of Matthews’ calculations and also more generally
challenges Matthews’ reliance on land values as a means to measure location-
based differences in value. We address these two sets of contentions in turn.

¶46 The City notes that Matthews described to the circuit court three
methods of calculation to identify what he characterized as a “premium,” by which

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No. 2025AP335

he meant the greater values that the market placed on residential properties in
Blackhawk (the City’s primary comparison neighborhood) as compared to the
values in Hawk’s Landing (Matthews’ sole comparison neighborhood). To repeat,
we understand Matthews to have argued at trial that this premium was relevant in
showing that Hawk’s Landing was more comparable to assessment area 2, but also
more broadly to have underscored the flaw in failing to account for location-based
differences between Blackhawk and the other two neighborhoods. One of
Matthews’ methods was to compare the price per square foot of sales of
unimproved lots between Blackhawk and Hawk’s Landing in 2000 and 2001.
Another of his methods was to compare the price per square foot of 2023 sales of
properties in each of the two neighborhoods that had similar improvements, those
being all properties that were improved by completed, two-story residences. And,
in a variation on this last method, Matthews made the same comparison using the
same 2023 property sales, but excluded below-grade square footage, consistent
with what he described as a convention commonly used by the City.11 The result
of these calculations were three different estimates by Matthews of a Blackhawk-
over-Hawk’s Landing premium: approximately 22% based on the unimproved lot
calculation, and 23% and 28% for the 2023 sales calculations.

¶47 The City asserts that Matthews “did not provide any justification”
for using these methods of calculating the premium for Blackhawk over Hawk’s
Landing. This is not accurate. Matthews testified that the purpose for each of the
three types of calculations was to reveal a location-based premium for Blackhawk

11
Matthews testified that, in his opinion based on his experience as an assessor, it was
actually more accurate to include below-grade square footage, but he prepared the calculation
excluding it in case the City persuaded the circuit court that the convention should be followed.

24
No. 2025AP335

over Hawk’s Landing, both historically (in 2000-01, early in the neighborhoods’
development) and in more recent times (2023). And Matthews clearly stated his
opinion that the 2023 sales calculation that included below-grade square footage
was “the best indicator of the premium” between Blackhawk and Hawk’s Landing.
So far as the City shows, the circuit court was free to credit this testimony, which
supported Matthews’ position that, by failing to make location-based adjustments
that accounted for Blackhawk’s more valuable land, the City artificially inflated
the market value of Matthews’ property. The City does not establish that the court
clearly erred in crediting Matthews’ calculations for those particular purposes.

¶48 The City also challenges the reliability of Matthews’ seven percent
location-based adjustment to Hawk’s Landing comparable sales that he used in his
own analysis. Specifically, the City asserts that it is unclear from the record what
reliable data Matthews used to arrive at seven percent. Regarding the source of
the data relied on by Matthews, the City again ignores Matthews’ testimony at
trial. Matthews testified that he downloaded information from an online data
portal made publicly available by the City. Beyond that, the City does not provide
a supported argument demonstrating that the circuit court clearly erred in finding
Matthews credible regarding his methodology based on the sources of his data.12

12
In a thinly developed argument, the City asserts on appeal that Matthews’ calculation
of a seven percent location-based adjustment should be ignored because it was based on data
from sales that occurred in 2023. The City asserts that this is contrary to the Manual’s valuation
principles, given that the City’s assessment was meant to establish the value of Matthews’
property as of January 1, 2023. But the City forfeited any such argument based on its failure to
make it in the circuit court. See State v. Kaczmarski, 2009 WI App 117, ¶7, 320 Wis. 2d 811,
772 N.W.2d 702. We will not overlook this forfeiture for two reasons. First, the City
successfully sought to exclude from trial some exhibits offered by Matthews based on data from
after January 1, 2023, but at the same time the City explicitly disclaimed any objection to exhibits
submitted by Matthews explaining aspects of his comparative sales analysis, including the seven
percent adjustment. Second, overlooking the City’s forfeiture on this issue would be
inappropriate because Matthews and the circuit court never had the opportunity to consider
(continued)

25
No. 2025AP335

¶49 In an unclear argument, the City suggests that the testimony of its
assessor regarding land values in some manner undermined the reliability of
Matthews’ use of land values to arrive at his seven percent adjustment to the
Hawk’s Landing comparable sales. This involves the difference between the value
of the land and the value of any improvements on the land in assessing the total
value of a property. The assessor acknowledged that assessors are required,
pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 70.32(2)(a), to attribute separate values to land versus
improvements on a property. Nevertheless, the assessor testified, “it is hard to say
[what] meaning” this distinction between the two sets of values can have in
measuring the value of a property as a whole.13 It is not clear what the assessor
meant to convey regarding the reliability of the land values that the City is
required to assess. But, in any case, the Manual unambiguously instructs that the
comparative-sales approach depends on the analysis of how individual attributes
of a property contribute to differences in overall market value between compared
properties, potentially including attributes specific to the land or specific to
improvements. See WPAM at § 9, pp. 12-14 (listing “location” as “the most
important physical factor” for consideration in applying valuation principles that

reliability issues based on the age of Matthews’ source data. See State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21,
¶30, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612.
13
The assessor testified on this topic as follows:

[E]very single year, we do … mass appraisals.… [W]e consider
the total value of the house.… [T]hough we have two different
prices, … the land price and the improvement price[][,] ... it is
hard to say its meaning.… [W]e are more focused on the total
value of the house. So every year, just land prices … are …
automatically updated ….

[T]he most important to the total—the house value. And the …
features and ages[,] … we call the effective ages, how the
house…the outfit appear to… their ages.

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No. 2025AP335

include the principle of “contribution”). We do not discern a viable argument by
the City on this topic.

¶50 Also in support of its argument that land values used by Matthews
here were unreliable, the City notes that assessor supervisor West testified that the
City’s attributions of values to land versus values of improvements are subject to
potential inaccuracy in the following way. The ratios of total property values to
total land values in “newer subdivisions” “are probably up to date.” By contrast,
for neighborhoods developed in the 1950’s, such as Matthews’ own assessment
area 2, the land values used by the City “have only been … trending along
throughout the years.” This testimony was opaque. But it could be taken to mean
that the land values used by the City in older subdivisions tend to be the product of
automatic updating, with the result that more contemporary analysis would reveal
them to be inaccurate (although West did not suggest a trend line or direction in
which they would tend be erroneous).

¶51 It is not clear what in this testimony the City contends would render
Matthews’ analysis unreliable or show that any of the circuit court’s findings were
clearly erroneous. Indeed, West’s testimony appeared to reinforce the idea that
land values assessed by the City for Blackhawk and Hawk’s Landing (the values
that Matthews used to derive his seven percent adjustment) tended to be more
accurate than older values. In any case, the City falls short of demonstrating that
the circuit court could not reasonably credit Matthews’ testimony as reliable
enough to identify and account for differences in land value between Matthews’
neighborhood and the Blackhawk neighborhood—particularly given that the court
found that the City failed to properly account at all for the factor of property
locations.

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No. 2025AP335

¶52 The City emphasizes that the Manual contains a warning about the
valuation of land in particular, as opposed to valuing improvements or the
property as a whole. The Manual states that land valuation is relatively more
“complex” than improvements valuation and that therefore “very careful research
and judgment” are required. WPAM at § 12, pp. 9-15. For this reason, the
Manual explains, assessors should rarely rely on only one means of calculating
land value. See WPAM at § 12, p. 9. But the City does not develop an argument
from these concepts that undermines Matthews’ approach to land values. For
example, the City does not come to grips with the simple fact that Matthews relied
on land values already calculated and made publicly available by the City itself.
Further, Matthews’ reliance on land values was only one part of his larger
comparative analysis. This leaves unchallenged other aspects of Matthews’
comparative sales approach, such as adjustments that he made for lot sizes and the
square footage of residences. See supra, note 6. As noted, we also do not discern
the City to argue that Matthews made a mistake in executing the details of his
comparative sales analysis that would render his final valuation faulty, or that the
circuit court made any math error in determining the excessive tax and costs
awarded to Matthews in the judgment.

D. Valuation of Matthews’ Property

¶53 Having determined that Matthews rebutted the presumption, the
circuit court set the City’s assessment aside and established the value of
Matthews’ property for 2023 tax year purposes. See Lowe’s Home Centers, 405
Wis. 2d 616, ¶37 (“If … the failure to follow the Manual results in an excessive
assessment, then the presumption is overcome and the assessment must be set
aside.”). The court credited Matthews’ comparative sales analysis as reliable
evidence of the value of his property. The City challenges the reliability of

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No. 2025AP335

Matthews’ analysis on multiple grounds. For the reasons noted above, we
conclude that the City fails to show that the court in its role as fact finder was not
free to place weight on Matthews’ testimony and analysis regarding valuation of
his property, and was not obligated for any reason to adjust the number upward.
See Metropolitan Assocs., 379 Wis. 2d 141, ¶25; Adams Outdoor Advert., 294
Wis. 2d 441, ¶27. Summarizing that reasoning, the City fails to show that
Matthews’ particular use of land values failed to follow the Manual’s principles,
or was otherwise so unreliable that the circuit court could not rely on it to
determine that it reasonably values Matthews’ property for tax year 2023.

III. Forfeiture of the Reassessment Issue

¶54 The City argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion when, after the court determined that Matthews’ property was
excessively assessed, the court failed to order that the City reassess the property
before deciding what money judgment he might be entitled to. “When a court
finds an assessment excessive, it must order a reassessment unless it finds that:
(1) proceeding to judgment is in the parties’ best interests; and (2) the court is able
to determine the amount of unlawful taxes with reasonable certainty.” West
Capitol, Inc. v. Village of Sister Bay, 2014 WI App 52, ¶52, 354 Wis. 2d 130, 848
N.W.2d 875 (citing WIS. STAT. § 74.39(3)). We conclude that the City has
forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in the circuit court, see State v.
Kaczmarski, 2009 WI App 117, ¶7, 320 Wis. 2d 811, 772 N.W.2d 702 (court of
appeals generally does not consider arguments not raised in the circuit court), and
we further conclude that the City fails to identify a sufficient reason to overlook
forfeiture under these circumstances.

29
No. 2025AP335

¶55 In its motion to dismiss, the City referenced what it referred to as the
circuit court’s “authority” to order a reassessment under WIS. STAT. § 74.39. In an
accompanying letter to the court, the City identified reassessment merely as “one
of the remedies available” for the court to use in an excessive assessment action.
But we discern no point in the record at which the City requested that the court
order that the proceedings be continued so that a reassessment could be performed.
See § 74.39(1) (“if the court determines that a reassessment of the property upon
which the taxes were paid is necessary, the court, before entering judgment, shall
continue the action to permit reassessment of the property”). The City’s motion
and accompanying letter did not reference the findings required for proceeding to
a judgment before ordering a reassessment. Nor did the City raise the topic of
reassessment during trial, which failed to alert the court to this possibility.

¶56 On appeal the City argues that reassessment under WIS. STAT.
§ 74.39 is not available under small claims procedures and that this created a
competency problem for the circuit court. As a result, according to the City, the
court lacked competency because it could not order a reassessment or make the
proper findings necessary to proceed to judgment as required by § 74.39.

¶57 The City does not directly address its apparent forfeiture of this
argument. The City may intend to argue that there would have been no point in
the City raising with the circuit court the potential for a reassessment because the
court’s decision to deny the City’s motion to dismiss and to proceed with the small
claims proceeding deprived the City of any chance of pursuing a reassessment.
But if this argument is intended, it fails for at least the reason that the City does
not direct us to any point in the record at which the City argued that small claims
procedures would be inadequate to address an excessive assessment claim like
Matthews’ due to procedural barriers such as the purported inability of a court

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No. 2025AP335

presiding in small claims to order a reassessment. In short, the City fails to show
that it alerted the court and Matthews to the issue, and we would have to ignore
policies underlying the forfeiture rule to entertain the argument on appeal. See
State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶30, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612 (one purpose
of enforcing the forfeiture rule is to provide incentives for parties to provide
opponents and circuit courts with proper notice of an issue and a fair opportunity
to address it).

CONCLUSION

¶58 For all of these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS.
STAT. RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

31