Ronald G. Adams v. Maurice A. Adams

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
March 26, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2025AP240 Cir. Ct. No. 2022PR126

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

IN THE MATTER OF VIRGINIA L. ADAMS REVOCABLE TRUST:

RONALD G. ADAMS AND JEFFREY W. ADAMS,

PETITIONERS-RESPONDENTS,

V.

MAURICE A. ADAMS AND STEPHEN T. ADAMS,

BENEFICIARIES-APPELLANTS,

ESTATE OF JAMES B. SCHOMMER,

TRUSTEE-RESPONDENT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Columbia County:
ROGER L. KLOPP, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Kloppenburg, Nashold, and Taylor, JJ.
No. 2025AP240

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. Maurice Adams and Stephen Adams appeal a
circuit court order approving a settlement agreement between Ronald Adams and
Jeffrey Adams, and the Estate of James B. Schommer.1 We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Ron, Jeff, Maurice, and Stephen are siblings and were beneficiaries
of a trust created by their mother (the Trust). The Trust’s assets included cash, as
well as shares in real estate and limited liability companies (LLCs). After their
mother died, James Schommer was appointed as trustee, and under the Trust he
was to divide the Trust’s assets into equal shares for Ron, Jeff, Maurice, and
Stephen.

¶3 Ron and Jeff brought suit against Schommer, alleging that
Schommer breached his duties as trustee by mismanaging the Trust, particularly in
order to benefit Maurice and Stephen, and to the detriment of Ron and Jeff.
Specifically, Ron and Jeff alleged the following. For purposes of distributing the
Trust’s assets, Ron and Jeff desired to receive cash, while Maurice and Stephen
desired to receive shares in LLCs and real estate. Schommer favored Maurice and
Stephen at Ron and Jeff’s expense by increasing the assets distributed to Maurice
and Stephen in order to account for estimated tax payments and selling expenses
that would be incurred in the event that Maurice and Stephen were to sell their

1
Because Ron, Jeff, Maurice, and Stephen share a last name, we refer to them by their
first names. Consistent with their briefing, we refer to Ronald as “Ron” and to Jeffrey as “Jeff.”

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shares in the future. Schommer also used outdated information in devising the
distribution plan, including using outdated and “substantially undervalued”
appraisals when determining the value of the Trust’s assets; failed to provide Ron
and Jeff with current information regarding the Trust; and did not maintain
adequate records regarding his administration of the Trust. In discovery
responses, Ron and Jeff also identified two categories of damages by reference to
an expert report that they had prepared by a forensic accountant: (1) amounts that
Schommer billed the Trust that they claimed were unsubstantiated; and
(2) amounts that they claimed Schommer improperly paid to Maurice’s son on
behalf of the Trust for management and consulting fees. After Ron and Jeff filed
suit, Schommer died, and his estate was substituted as a party.

¶4 Through mediation, Ron and Jeff reached a settlement agreement
with Schommer’s estate. Pursuant to the settlement, Schommer’s estate would
pay Ron and Jeff $250,000 to settle their claims. Maurice and Stephen, who were
not parties to the lawsuit, did not participate in mediation.2 As Maurice and
Stephen explain on appeal, they did not join the lawsuit against Schommer
because they did not believe that Schommer had done anything wrong.

¶5 Ron, Jeff, and Schommer’s estate moved the circuit court to approve
the settlement agreement. Maurice and Stephen opposed the motion, arguing that
the settlement proceeds should be paid to the Trust.

2
The settlement agreement initially required that Maurice, Stephen, and the trustee who
succeeded Schommer sign releases. That requirement was taken out of the final settlement
agreement after Maurice and Stephen refused to sign releases.

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No. 2025AP240

¶6 The circuit court approved the settlement agreement. The court
reasoned that “if Maurice and Stephen had wanted to join the action against the
Estate of Schommer, they should have done it at the time it was filed. In some
ways, it [would] almost be like an unjust enrichment where they would gain from
the actions of another party and they wouldn’t be entitled to it if they hadn’t
previously joined that action.” Maurice and Stephen appeal.3

DISCUSSION

¶7 Ron, Jeff, and Schommer’s estate argue that we review a circuit
court’s approval of a settlement agreement for an erroneous exercise of discretion,
citing Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 402, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982)
(reviewing a circuit court’s approval of a proposed release of the named insured
and his insurance company). Maurice and Stephen do not address the standard of
review for a court’s approval of a settlement agreement, and instead note that we
review de novo the interpretation and application of a statute to undisputed facts.
Putting aside the issue of whether the facts here are undisputed, because Maurice
and Stephen do not cite law disputing that the approval of a settlement agreement
is a discretionary decision that we review for an erroneous exercise of discretion,
we apply that standard of review here. See Charolais Breeding Ranches, Ltd. v.
FPC Sec. Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 97, 108-09, 279 N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1979)

3
The respondent’s brief submitted by Ron, Jeff, and Schommer’s estate does not comply
with WIS. STAT. RULE 809.19(8)(bm), which addresses the pagination of appellate briefs. See
RULE 809.19(8)(bm) (providing that, when paginating briefs, parties should use “Arabic numerals
with sequential numbering starting at ‘1’ on the cover”). As our supreme court explained when it
amended the rule, the pagination requirement ensures that the numbers on each page of the brief
“will match … the page header applied by the eFiling system, avoiding the confusion of having
two different page numbers” on every page of a brief. S. CT. ORDER 20-07 cmt. at x1.

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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(unrefuted arguments are deemed conceded). “A circuit court erroneously
exercises its discretion when it fails to examine the relevant facts, applies the
wrong legal standard, or does not employ a demonstrated rational process to reach
a reasonable conclusion.” Borreson v. Yunto, 2006 WI App 63, ¶6, 292 Wis. 2d
231, 713 N.W.2d 656; see also Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 171-72, 560
N.W.2d 246 (1997) (“An exercise of discretion based on a mistaken view of the
law is an erroneous exercise of discretion.”). “The burden to demonstrate an
erroneous exercise of discretion rests with the appellant.” Winters v. Winters,
2005 WI App 94, ¶18, 281 Wis. 2d 798, 699 N.W.2d 229.

¶8 Maurice and Stephen argue that the circuit court erred when it
approved the settlement agreement because they contend that it was the Trust that
suffered harm but the settlement benefits only Ron and Jeff. However, Maurice
and Stephen do not argue that the court erroneously exercised its discretion or
frame their arguments under this standard of review. We construe their argument
to be that the court erroneously exercised its discretion by basing its exercise of
discretion on a mistaken view of the law. As we explain, Maurice and Stephen
fail to show that the court relied on a mistaken view of the law. Accordingly, we
affirm the court’s decision.

¶9 In arguing that the settlement proceeds belong to the Trust rather
than to Ron and Jeff personally, Maurice and Stephen rely on the nature of Ron
and Jeff’s claims as set forth in their pleadings, on the categories of damages
identified in the expert report, and on Ron and Jeff’s responses to interrogatories
regarding the damages sought. Maurice and Stephen argue that “the alleged
damages being settled stemmed from alleged overpayments by the Trust, and
therefore incurred by the Trust, not individually by Ron and Jeff,” and that there
“is no basis for Ron and Jeff to individually keep a settlement payment for damage

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No. 2025AP240

that was caused to the Trust and for claims they were pursuing on the Trust’s
behalf.” Maurice and Stephen also challenge the circuit court’s decision as
“unsupported.”

¶10 Contrary to Maurice and Stephen’s characterization of the
allegations, expert report, and discovery responses, the alleged damages were not
only to the Trust, but included damages specific to Ron and Jeff. For example, as
discussed, Ron and Jeff alleged that Schommer’s conduct favored Maurice and
Stephen while harming Ron and Jeff, and they specifically sought “[a] finding that
Schommer … committed a material breach of the Trust and … breached his
fiduciary duty to Ron Adams and Jeff Adams.” Ron and Jeff further pleaded that
they, “as beneficiaries, are entitled to compensation and other remedies from
Schommer … for his material breach of the Trust.” Maurice and Stephen do not
explain why the settlement proceeds do not compensate Ron and Jeff for the
damages specific to them.

¶11 In any event, Maurice and Stephen fail to show that the circuit court
applied a mistaken view of the law. Significantly, the only legal authority that
Maurice and Stephen provide in support of their argument that the settlement
proceeds belong to the Trust is WIS. STAT. § 701.1002(1)(a). Quoting this statute,
they argue that “the remedy for a trustee who commits a breach of trust … is a
judgment for the ‘amount required to restore the value of the trust property … to
what they would have been had the breach not occurred.’” This argument
overlooks that the first part of § 701.1002(1) states that “[a] trustee who commits a
breach of trust is liable to an affected beneficiary[.]” (Emphasis added.) Maurice
and Stephen do not explain how they were affected, to their detriment, by
Schommer’s alleged conduct. Nor do they explain how this legal authority
supports the proposition that a circuit court may not approve a settlement

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No. 2025AP240

agreement that benefits only the beneficiaries who brought the breach of trust
claim in order to resolve that claim.

¶12 Maurice and Stephen also assert that “[t]he Trust Code provides no
basis for a beneficiary to unilaterally retain benefits of a claim that belongs to the
Trust.” However, other than WIS. STAT. § 701.1002 discussed above, they do not
cite any specific statutory provision to support this assertion. Accordingly,
Maurice and Stephen fail to show that the circuit court relied on a mistaken view
of the law.

¶13 Maurice and Stephen additionally assert in a footnote that Ron and
Jeff, by claiming to be entitled to the settlement proceeds and “that the damages
are personal to them,” violated the doctrine of judicial estoppel by changing their
legal position. For judicial estoppel to apply, the party must convince a court to
adopt one position before subsequently asserting an inconsistent one. See Mrozek
v. Intra Fin. Corp., 2005 WI 73, ¶22, 281 Wis. 2d 448, 699 N.W.2d 54. Ron,
Jeff, and Schommer’s estate argue, and Maurice and Stephen do not dispute in
their reply brief, that this requirement is not met here—that is, Ron and Jeff did
not convince the circuit court to adopt a position contrary to their current position
that the settlement proceeds belong to them and not to the Trust. We treat Maurice
and Stephen’s failure to respond to this argument as a concession, and on that
basis we reject Maurice and Stephen’s reliance on the doctrine of judicial estoppel.
See United Coop. v. Frontier FS Coop., 2007 WI App 197, ¶39, 304 Wis. 2d 750,
738 N.W.2d 578 (failure by appellant to respond in reply brief to an argument
made in respondent’s brief may be taken as a concession).

¶14 In sum, Maurice and Stephen fail to show that the circuit court relied
on a mistaken view of the law. And Maurice and Stephen do not alternatively

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No. 2025AP240

show, or appear to even argue, that the court failed to examine the relevant facts or
did not employ a demonstrated rational process to reach a reasonable conclusion.
See Borreson, 292 Wis. 2d 231, ¶6. Accordingly, Maurice and Stephen have not
met their burden of establishing that the court erroneously exercised its discretion.

CONCLUSION

¶15 For the reasons stated, we affirm.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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