State v. Jacquelyn R. Harris

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
April 22, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2025AP489-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2022CF422

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

JACQUELYN R. HARRIS,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Ozaukee County: SANDY A. WILLIAMS, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Gundrum, Grogan, and Lazar, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. Jacquelyn R. Harris appeals from a judgment of
conviction and an order of the circuit court denying her postconviction motion.
No. 2025AP489-CR

Harris asserts the court erred when it denied her postconviction motion without
holding an evidentiary hearing. Based upon our review of the briefs and Record
and for the following reasons, we affirm.

¶2 In late 2022, the State charged Harris with theft in a business setting
contrary to WIS. STAT. § 943.20(1)(b) (2023-24).1 According to the Complaint,
Harris wrote several fraudulent checks exceeding $37,000 in total during her
employment as the office manager for Kaliber Collision Repair in
Port Washington. The officer manager that succeeded Harris, as well as Kaliber’s
owner, also discovered Harris made several purchases with the company credit
card without consent. Following a thorough plea colloquy, Harris pled no contest,
and the circuit court found her guilty of theft. The court sentenced Harris to five
years of initial confinement and three years of extended supervision, and as a
condition of extended supervision, it also ordered her to pay restitution in the
amount of $31,086 to Kaliber and $25,000 to Erie Insurance Company for an
insurance claim made.

¶3 Harris filed a postconviction motion asserting she did not enter her
plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. She argued trial counsel failed to
inform her of the rights she waived by pleading no contest, including her rights to
testify, to call defense witnesses and to confront the State’s witnesses, and against
self-incrimination. According to Harris, had she understood these rights, she
would have gone to trial and called a witness to testify on her behalf regarding the
validity of at least some of the checks at issue. Harris’s motion also asserted—
seemingly as a justification for informing the circuit court at the plea hearing that

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 2025AP489-CR

she understood the rights she was waiving despite now claiming she actually did
not—that the reason she did not proceed to trial was because she could not afford
to keep paying her counsel and that counsel had not informed her of the possibility
that the State Public Defenders Office (SPD) could potentially compensate trial
counsel under WIS. ADMIN CODE § PD 2.07 (Nov. 2024)2 if she was unable to
afford counsel’s services.

¶4 The postconviction court entered a written order denying Harris’s
motion without a hearing, concluding counsel did not perform deficiently and that
Harris acknowledged and affirmatively waived her rights during the plea colloquy
as well as through her completion of the plea questionnaire. The court also
concluded that Harris, in her brief, had “expresse[d] the real reason she didn’t go
to trial” was because “she allegedly was unable to afford to have trial counsel
represent her at trial; not that trial counsel was deficient in ‘not advising her.’”
Harris appeals.

¶5 “When a defendant moves to withdraw a plea after sentencing, the
defendant ‘carries the heavy burden of establishing, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the trial court should permit the defendant to withdraw the plea to
correct a manifest injustice.’” State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, ¶25, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816
N.W.2d 177 (citation omitted). Ineffective assistance of counsel is one type of
manifest injustice. Id., ¶26. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must prove both that counsel’s representation was deficient
and that she suffered prejudice because of that deficient performance. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

2
All references to WIS. ADMIN. CODE § PD are to the November 2024 Register.

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No. 2025AP489-CR

¶6 “A motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel does not
automatically trigger a right to a Machner[3] testimonial hearing[.]” State v.
Phillips, 2009 WI App 179, ¶17, 322 Wis. 2d 576, 778 N.W.2d 157. Where a
circuit court denies a postconviction motion without holding a Machner hearing,
we review the following issues de novo: (1) “whether the motion on its face
alleges sufficient material and non-conclusory facts that, if true, would entitle the
defendant to relief”; and (2) “whether the record conclusively demonstrates that
the defendant is not entitled to relief.” State v. Jackson, 2023 WI 3, ¶8, 405
Wis. 2d 458, 983 N.W.2d 608. If the “motion alleges sufficient and
non-conclusory facts which would entitle the defendant to relief and the record
does not conclusively establish otherwise,” the court has no discretion and must
hold a Machner hearing. Jackson, 405 Wis. 2d 458, ¶8 (emphasis added).
However, if “the defendant fails to allege sufficient facts in his or her motion, if
the defendant presents only conclusory allegations or subjective opinions, or if the
record conclusively demonstrates that he or she is not entitled to relief[,]” the court
has discretion as to whether or not to hold an evidentiary hearing. Phillips, 322
Wis. 2d 576, ¶17; Jackson, 405 Wis. 2d 458, ¶8. We will reverse a discretionary
decision only if the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion. Phillips, 322
Wis. 2d 576, ¶17.

¶7 We must determine whether the circuit court erred when it denied
Harris’s postconviction motion without holding a Machner hearing. Harris
contends she sufficiently alleged trial counsel provided ineffective assistance and
points to her assertions that she did not understand the rights she was waving

3
State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979).

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No. 2025AP489-CR

because “the first and only time she was informed of the rights she waived if she
pled no contest was when trial counsel provided the plea questionnaire to her five
to ten minutes before the plea hearing” and because “counsel did not review the
form or explain the substance of the trial rights [she] waived by pleading no
contest.” We disagree.

¶8 Contrary to Harris’s assertions, the Record conclusively
demonstrates she is not entitled to relief, and the circuit court therefore did not err
when it denied her postconviction motion without holding a Machner hearing. At
the plea hearing, the court conducted a thorough plea colloquy in which Harris
affirmatively waived her trial rights. When the court asked Harris if she and her
attorney discussed the rights she was giving up by entering a no-contest plea and
whether she understood them, Harris confirmed they had discussed them and she
understood them. Harris also agreed she signed the plea questionnaire after
having discussed it with counsel, and when asked if she had checked the box by
each of those rights after having gone “through those rights with [her] attorney,
discussed them, and understood them[,]” she responded affirmatively. Harris then
denied having any questions about these rights, and she again confirmed she was
entering her plea voluntarily and “had enough time to discuss” not only her
“decision to enter the no contest plea with [her] attorney” but also “the case as a
whole and possible defenses[.]” It is clear from our review of the Record that
Harris had multiple opportunities to inform the court if she did not understand the
rights she was waiving or if she had any questions, but at no point did she avail
herself of the opportunity to do so.

¶9 Harris’s assertion that trial counsel provided her with the plea
questionnaire only “five to ten minutes before the plea hearing” is likewise
insufficient to establish she received ineffective assistance of counsel or that the

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No. 2025AP489-CR

postconviction court erred in denying her motion without a hearing as she has
failed to explain why this was not enough time to review the questionnaire or
discuss its contents with counsel. For example, Harris did not allege the form was
too long or complicated to read in that timeframe or that counsel declined to
discuss the meaning of the form or any questions she may have had (and she does
not allege she had any). And, despite her current suggestion that she did not have
sufficient time to discuss these rights with trial counsel prior to entering the plea,
when the court asked her directly at the plea hearing whether she “had enough
time to discuss [her] decision to enter the no contest plea … as well as the case as
a whole and possible defenses” with her attorney, she responded, “I have, Your
Honor.”

¶10 Despite having confirmed multiple times at the plea hearing that she
understood the rights being waived, that she had discussed those rights with her
trial counsel, and that she did not have any questions about those rights, Harris
effectively attempts to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in her
postconviction motion by asserting, at least implicitly, that her responses to the
circuit court’s questions were untruthful and that she lied to the court “because she
could not afford to pay her retained counsel to represent her if the case went to
trial and therefore did not think it mattered whether she understood her trial
rights.” She also says trial counsel was aware she could not afford to continue
paying him and that counsel did not advise her she may have been able to procure

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No. 2025AP489-CR

public payment for counsel via WIS. ADMIN. CODE § PD 2.07.4 Whether she could
afford to continue paying trial counsel or not, however, has no bearing on whether
trial counsel failed to inform her of the rights she waived by entering her plea. As
the Record shows, Harris repeatedly informed the court she understood the rights
she was waiving and that she had discussed those rights with counsel. We are
therefore satisfied the Record conclusively establishes she is not entitled to relief,
and the postconviction court therefore did not err in denying her motion without
holding a Machner hearing.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

4
Harris seems to assert, in conclusory fashion, that “she could not afford to proceed to
trial” and that retained counsel would have been compensated at public expense if only counsel
had informed her of that possibility. This proposition, however, ignores that public compensation
of privately retained counsel under WIS. ADMIN. CODE § PD 2.07 is not automatic and that
several statutory criteria must first be satisfied. In any event, whether she was even eligible for
public payment for counsel under this provision has no bearing on whether trial counsel failed to
sufficiently advise her in regard to the rights being waived by entering a plea.

7