In re M.C., C.C., and M.P.

1
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
In re M.C., C.C., and M.P.
No. 25-501 (Wood County CC-54-2023-JA-65, CC-54-2023-JA-66, and CC-54-2023-JA-67)
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Petitioner Mother A.J.1 appeals the Circuit Court of Wood County’s July 22, 2025, order
terminating her parental, custodial, and guardianship rights to the children, arguing that the court
erred in adjudicating C.C. and M.P. as neglected children, in terminating her rights, and in denying
her post-termination visitation.2 Upon our review, we determine that oral argument is unnecessary
and that a memorandum decision affirming, in part, and vacating, in part, the circuit court’s March
5, 2024, and July 22, 2025, orders and remanding for further proceedings is appropriate, in
accordance with the “limited circumstances” requirement of Rule 21(d) of the West Virginia Rules
of Appellate Procedure.
The DHS filed a petition in March 2023 alleging that the petitioner neglected M.C.’s
educational needs, as evidenced by the child’s excessive absences from school, and failed to obtain
mental and behavioral health treatment for the child. The DHS further alleged that the petitioner
neglected M.P. by failing to follow through with Birth to Three services. Finally, the DHS alleged
that if C.C. had been in the home (and not “in [a] placement previously ordered through [a] Youth
Services case”), she would be similarly situated to her siblings. However, the DHS stated the
children were not in imminent danger and should not be removed.3
In June 2023, the circuit court granted the petitioner a preadjudicatory improvement period,
which required that she comply with DHS directives and ensure that M.C. received mental health
treatment. In September 2023, the DHS filed a report stating that the petitioner had failed to obtain
mental health treatment for M.C., despite the child’s recent disclosures that she was “seeing
demons and wanting to hurt other people.” As a result, M.C. was removed from the home due to
1 The petitioner appears by counsel Eric K. Powell. The Department of Human Services
(“DHS”) appears by counsel Attorney General John B. McCuskey and Assistant Attorney General
Lee Niezgoda. Counsel Courtney L. Ahlborn appears as the children’s guardian ad litem
(“guardian”). Father B.C. appears by counsel Travis Sayre.
2 We use initials where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case.
See W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e).
3 The DHS filed an amended petition in July 2025 to add M.P.’s unknown father.
FILED
October 14, 2026
C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA

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the child’s need for inpatient mental health treatment. At a hearing in October 2023, the court
placed the children in the DHS’s physical custody and set the matter for adjudication.4
At an adjudicatory hearing in January 2024, the investigating DHS worker testified
regarding M.C.’s neglect and removal because of her untreated mental health issues. The principal
of M.C.’s elementary school testified to the child’s frequent absences, her “erratic” and disturbing
behavior, and the school’s unsuccessful efforts to work with the petitioner. The hearing was
continued to February 2024, at which time the petitioner submitted a written stipulation stating
that “the children [were] neglected . . . within the meaning of . . . West Virginia Code [§] 49-4-101
et al.” However, the petitioner admitted only that she “failed to obtain appropriate mental and
behavioral health treatment for [M.C.]” and had educationally neglected the child. On this basis,
in an order entered on March 5, 2024, the court adjudicated the petitioner as a neglectful parent
and found all the children to be neglected children. The court granted the petitioner a
post-adjudicatory improvement period, which required her to participate in parenting and adult life
skills classes as well as individual therapy, maintain sobriety from drugs and alcohol, and submit
to random drug screening.
In July 2024, the DHS and the guardian moved to terminate the petitioner’s improvement
period for noncompliance, which the court denied. At a hearing in November 2024, the court
granted the petitioner an additional “dispositional improvement period.” The guardian moved to
terminate this improvement period in January 2025, which the court denied. However, at a hearing
in February 2025, the court took judicial notice of the petitioner’s two positive drug screens (for
opiates) in late January 2025 and set the matter for disposition.
In a pleading filed in May 2025 opposing the termination of her rights, the petitioner argued
that the circuit court’s adjudication of C.C. and M.P. was improper because it lacked an evidentiary
basis. Specifically, the petitioner argued that her “[s]tipulation [made] no admission of any factual
scenario [constituting] abuse or neglect toward[] the children other than [M.C.].”5 At a
dispositional hearing that same month, the petitioner admitted to her past alcohol addiction but
denied having a substance abuse problem and stated that she had been attending therapy. The
petitioner testified that one positive drug screen in January 2025 was not accurate and that the
other was caused by pain medicine she had been given at the hospital. She then denied altering her
medical records in an attempt to corroborate this claim. The petitioner attributed a positive screen
for alcohol in March 2025 to taking cough syrup, but admitted to testing positive for oxycodone,
without a prescription, in September 2024. She also acknowledged missing several drug screens,
including two screens in the days leading up to the dispositional hearing. The petitioner also
addressed a recording of a recent conversation she had with C.C. and M.C.’s father, which was
4 Sometime after the petition was filed, C.C. returned home and was residing with the
petitioner and her siblings.
5 It does not appear from the record on appeal that the circuit court directly addressed this
pleading. However, at the conclusion of the dispositional hearing, the court noted that the petitioner
“was originally adjudicated for . . . medical neglect of [M.C.], and educational neglect of [M.C.]”
and that “the other two children, [C.C.] and [M.P.], were similarly situated since they were in the
home.”

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admitted into evidence. In this conversation, the petitioner threatened to kill the guardian and a
DHS worker. The petitioner acknowledged that it was her voice saying she was “going to shoot
[the DHS worker] between the eyes and have her [five-year-old] child watch” but claimed that she
did not remember making this threat. The petitioner also denied having an unauthorized,
unsupervised visit with C.C. in April 2025.
The parenting class provider testified that, despite consistent attendance, the petitioner had
not retained the information she was taught nor demonstrated the ability to make good parenting
decisions. Accordingly, the provider stated that she could not “in good conscience testify [that]
[the petitioner] could effectively parent.” M.C. and C.C.’s father testified that in April 2025, the
petitioner “just showed up” at his home, where C.C. was residing, to see the child. He also testified
that the petitioner’s threats toward those involved in the case had escalated since the last hearing.
Ultimately, the DHS recommended termination despite the petitioner receiving services for nearly
two years, noting her continued untruthfulness, violent threats, and failure to successfully complete
an improvement period. The guardian also recommended termination with no post-termination
visitation, despite C.C. and M.C.’s wishes to continue contact with the petitioner because “further
contact with [the petitioner] [was] not in the children’s best interest.” The guardian specifically
proffered that M.C.’s mental health treatment facility reported that contact between M.C. and the
petitioner was detrimental to the child’s care, as her behaviors worsened after contact and
improved once visitation ceased.6
Based on this evidence, the circuit court found that the petitioner had been dishonest
throughout the case. The court noted the petitioner’s positive drug screens, observing that she
“would not admit to any of it,” instead claiming to be sober and minimizing her use of unprescribed
opiates. The court determined that the hospital records the petitioner had submitted to explain one
of her positive screens were forged. Further, the court found that “there [was] adequate proof that
the [petitioner] . . . made explicit and specific threats toward the [guardian] . . . and the [DHS]
worker.” After observing that the petitioner also failed to complete her improvement period, the
court concluded that, even after receiving extensive services, the petitioner had not demonstrated
that she could safely or appropriately parent. Accordingly, the court found that there was no
reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect could be substantially corrected in the near
future and terminated the petitioner’s parental, custodial, and guardianship rights to M.C., C.C.,
and M.P. “based upon necessity for the welfare and best interest of the children.” The court also
denied post-termination visitation, finding that it would not be in the children’s best interest and
specifically noting that visitation had been detrimental to M.C. The petitioner now appeals from
this dispositional order.7
6 Prior to the dispositional hearing, the guardian filed a written report outlining this
recommendation, noting that although M.C. had expressed that she “wanted to maintain contact
with [the petitioner,]” the child’s treatment facility “reported that previous contact between [M.C.]
and [the petitioner] [had] a negative effect on [M.C.].”
7 The court also terminated the rights of M.P.’s unknown father. M.P.’s permanency plan
is adoption in the current placement. M.C. and C.C.’s father is nonabusing. M.C. is currently
placed in a residential treatment facility; her permanency plan is to return to her father’s custody
when her treatment concludes. C.C. reached the age of majority during the pendency of this appeal.

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On appeal from a final order in an abuse and neglect proceeding, this Court reviews the
circuit court’s substantive rulings for abuse of discretion, factual findings for clear error, and issues
of law de novo. See Syl. Pt. 1, In re K.S., -- W. Va. --, 930 S.E.2d 400 (2026). The petitioner first
asserts that the circuit court erred in adjudicating C.C. and M.P. based upon the petitioner’s
admission of neglecting M.C. and should not have proceeded to disposition for these two children.
The DHS concedes this error, and we agree. Before a court may consider the dispositional
alternatives set forth in West Virginia Code § 49-4-604, it must first determine whether a child is
abused or neglected; “[s]uch a finding is a prerequisite to further continuation of the case.” Syl. Pt.
3, in part, In re R.M., 252 W. Va. 422, 923 S.E.2d 352 (2025) (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, State v. T.C.,
172 W. Va. 47, 303 S.E.2d 685 (1983)); see also W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(i); W. Va. R. P. Child
Abuse & Neglect Proc. 27. We recently clarified that, while “not a requirement for establishing or
maintaining subject matter jurisdiction[,]” a court must make “[s]pecific findings of fact explaining
how each child’s health and welfare is being harmed or threatened by the . . . neglectful conduct
of the parties named in the petition” prior to moving to the dispositional phase. In re R.M., 252
W. Va. at 425, 923 S.E.2d at 355, Syl. Pt. 4. Here, the petitioner stipulated only to medical and
educational neglect of M.C., and the DHS did not introduce additional evidence at adjudication
relating to either C.C. or M.P.8 And while “the statutory definition of an abused child allows the
abuse of one child to be automatically imputed to other children in the home, . . . the statutory
definition of a neglected child does not.” In re H.B., 252 W. Va. 350, 359, 922 S.E.2d 350, 358
(2025); see also W. Va. Code § 49-1-201. Because the petitioner admitted only to allegations
concerning M.C., and the circuit court made no factual findings explaining how either C.C. or
M.P. were harmed or threatened by the petitioner’s conduct, its adjudication of C.C. and M.P. was
improper.9 Accordingly, the court’s adjudicatory and dispositional orders cannot stand as to these
two children. See Syl. Pt. 5, In re Edward B., 210 W. Va. 621, 558 S.E.2d 620 (2001) (“Where it
appears from the record that the process established by the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse
and Neglect Proceedings and related statutes . . . has been substantially disregarded . . . , the
resulting order of disposition will be vacated and the case remanded for compliance with that
process.”). We therefore vacate the court’s March 5, 2024, adjudicatory order and its July 22, 2025,
dispositional order, in part, as each relates to C.C. and M.P., and remand this matter for further
proceedings, including the entry of an adjudicatory order setting out the requisite statutory findings
8 To properly adjudicate a parent based on a stipulation, Rule 26(a) of the West Virginia
Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings requires that the stipulation “include
both ‘(1) [a]greed upon facts supporting court involvement regarding the respondent[’s] problems,
conduct, or condition’ and ‘(2) [a] statement of respondent’s problems or deficiencies to be
addressed at the final disposition.’” Syl. Pt. 3. In re Z.S.-1, 249 W. Va. 14, 893 S.E.2d 621 (2023).
Although the petitioner’s stipulation contained a blanket statement regarding neglect of all the
children, the only facts and problems she admitted to related exclusively to M.C. We also note that
C.C. was not residing in the home when the petition was filed.
9 It is important to note that when “the home environment or other specific circumstances
demonstrate that a parent’s neglect of . . . one child harms or poses a threat of harm to another
child in the home[,]” a circuit court may adjudicate additional children on this basis; however, such
a determination must be “based upon specific factual findings which connect those environmental
or other circumstances to harm or a threat of harm to those other children in the home.” In re H.B.,
252 W. Va. at 360 n.15, 922 S.E.2d at 359 n.15.

5
as to whether M.P. meets the definition of an abused or neglected child, as alleged in the petition.
Because C.C. reached the age of majority during the pendency of this appeal, she must be
dismissed from the proceedings. See In re A.E., 253, W. Va. 11, --, 927 S.E.2d 447, 456 (2026)
(explaining that “when a child turns eighteen . . . , the child is no longer an ‘abused child’ or
‘neglected child’ for purposes of the Child Welfare Act, the State’s interest ends, and the case must
be dismissed”).
Given that the circuit court properly found that M.C. was neglected, it was permitted to
proceed to disposition as to this child, and in subsequent assignments of error, the petitioner
challenges the termination of her rights to M.C. First, she asserts that the circuit court erred in
failing to consider M.C.’s wishes at disposition in accordance with West Virginia Code §
49-4-604(c)(6)(C), which requires courts to “give consideration to the wishes of a child [fourteen]
years of age or older regarding the permanent termination of parental rights.” However, the
consideration of then-thirteen-year-old M.C.’s wishes was not statutorily mandated. Moreover, the
petitioner does not cite to any point in the record where she proffered or presented evidence to the
court that M.C. was of an age of discretion; nor did the petitioner object when the court did not
consider the child’s wishes at disposition.10 See W. Va. R. App. P. 10(c)(7) (requiring the
petitioner’s brief to include “citations that pinpoint when and how the issues in the assignments of
error were presented to the lower tribunal”); see also Shaffer v. Acme Limestone Co., Inc., 206
W. Va. 333, 349 n.20, 524 S.E.2d 688, 704 n.20 (1999) (“Our general rule is that nonjurisdictional
questions . . . raised for the first time on appeal, will not be considered.”). As such, the petitioner
is not entitled to relief.
Next, the petitioner asserts that the circuit court erred in finding that there was no
reasonable likelihood that she could correct the conditions of neglect and in finding that
termination was necessary for M.C.’s welfare. West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) permits the
termination of parental, custodial, and guardianship rights upon findings that “there is no
reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the
near future” and that termination is “necessary for the welfare of the child.” There is no such
likelihood when the parent has “demonstrated an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of
abuse or neglect on their own or with help,” including circumstances where the parent has “not
responded to . . . rehabilitative efforts . . . designed to reduce or prevent the abuse or neglect of the
child.” W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d). Here, the record indicates, and the court found, that the
petitioner did not respond to the DHS’s rehabilitative efforts to improve her parenting deficiencies.
The petitioner did not complete her improvement period and, despite receiving services, was
unable to demonstrate that she could safely or appropriately parent—evidenced, in part, by the
petitioner’s violent threats toward the guardian and a DHS worker. The petitioner was also
deceptive and had several positive and missed drug screens throughout the proceedings. The record
also supports the court’s finding that termination was necessary for M.C.’s welfare, especially
since the child’s serious mental health challenges were exacerbated by contact with the petitioner.
Accordingly, we find that the circuit court did not err in terminating the petitioner’s parental,
custodial, and guardianship rights to M.C.
10 In fact, at disposition, the petitioner’s counsel specifically argued that the circuit court
must consider C.C.’s wishes regarding termination given her age. The petitioner did not suggest
any need for the court to do so for M.C.

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Lastly, the petitioner asserts that the circuit court erred in denying M.C. post-termination
visitation.11 We disagree, as “[a] court may grant post-termination visitation only if it finds that
such visitation is in the child’s best interests[.]” W. Va. R. P. Child Abuse & Neglect Proc.
15(b)(2)(A); see also In re Christina L., 194 W. Va. 446, 460 S.E.2d 692 (1995) (noting that the
evidence before the court “must indicate that [post-termination] visitation or continued contact
would not be detrimental to the child’s well being”). Courts are specifically instructed to consider
a guardian’s “oral or written recommendation on whether post-termination visitation is in the
child’s best interests” as well as the child’s wishes if she “is of sufficient age and maturity.” W. Va.
R. P. Child Abuse & Neglect Proc. 15(b)(2)(A)(i). Here, the guardian proffered that continued
contact with the petitioner would be detrimental to M.C.’s treatment and was not in the child’s
best interest. The guardian specified that M.C.’s treatment providers observed that the child’s
concerning behaviors improved after visitation with the petitioner ceased. As discussed above, it
was not argued (nor was evidence presented) that M.C. was of an age and/or sufficiently mature
to require the court’s consideration of her wishes, though the court was made aware of M.C.’s
desire for continued contact with the petitioner. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the
court did not err.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the portion of the circuit court’s July 22, 2025, order
terminating the petitioner’s parental rights to M.C. and denying her post-termination visitation
with that child. However, as to C.C. and M.P., we vacate the circuit court’s March 5, 2024,
adjudicatory order and July 22, 2025, dispositional order, and remand this matter for further
proceedings consistent with the decision.12 The clerk is hereby instructed to issue the mandate
forthwith.
Affirmed, in part; vacated, in part; and remanded, with directions.
ISSUED: October 14, 2026
CONCURRED IN BY:
Chief Justice C. Haley Bunn
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice Charles S. Trump IV
Justice H. L. Kirkpatrick
Justice James W. Flanigan
11 On May 9, 2025, shortly before the dispositional hearing and prior to the entry of the
circuit court’s dispositional order, this Court provisionally amended Rule 15(b) of the West
Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings to more clearly articulate
and adopt appropriate standards for consideration of post-termination visitation.
12 This memorandum decision does not vacate the rulings in the court’s March 5, 2024, or
July 22, 2025, orders relating to other adult respondents.