In re M.M.

25-835Wva14 ott 2026

Testo completo

1
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
In re M.M.
No. 25-835 (Upshur County CC-49-2025-JA-1)
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Petitioner Mother B.M.1 appeals the Circuit Court of Upshur County’s November 10, 2025,
order terminating her parental rights to M.M., arguing that the court erred in denying her motion
for a post-adjudicatory improvement period and in terminating her parental rights.2 Upon our
review, we determine that oral argument is unnecessary and that a memorandum decision
affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate. See W. Va. R. App. P. 21.
The DHS filed a petition in February 2025, alleging that the petitioner inappropriately
kissed then-fourteen-year-old M.M. while she and the child were standing in the middle of a road
and the petitioner was under the influence of amphetamines. According to the petition, the
temperature was around thirty degrees at the time of the incident and the child was not wearing
socks, shoes, or a coat. The DHS further alleged that the child was severely autistic and functioning
at the level of a four-year-old. The DHS further recounted the petitioner’s extensive history of
abuse and neglect, as she had been involved in four prior abuse and neglect cases. In 2003, the
petitioner voluntarily relinquished her rights to a child following allegations that she was unable
to care for the child due to her substance abuse. In 2009, sole custody of another of the petitioner’s
children was given to the child’s father following allegations the petitioner had emotionally abused
and neglected the child while abusing substances. In 2017, the DHS filed a petition concerning
M.M., alleging that the petitioner had neglected the child due to substance abuse and, as a result,
was convicted of child neglect creating risk of injury. The petitioner stipulated to the allegations
in the 2017 petition and regained custody of M.M. after she successfully completed a post-
adjudicatory improvement period and the case was dismissed. In 2019, the DHS filed another
petition concerning M.M., alleging that the petitioner drove under the influence of
diphenhydramine hydrocholoride with the child in the car, crossed the center line of the road, and
struck an oncoming vehicle. The petitioner stipulated to the allegations in the 2019 petition and,
once again, regained custody of M.M. after she successfully completed a post-adjudicatory
improvement period and the case was dismissed. In the current matter, the circuit court held an
1 The petitioner appears by counsel Jeremy B. Cooper. The West Virginia Department of
Human Services (“DHS”) appears by counsel Attorney General John B. McCuskey and Assistant
Attorney General Katica Ribel. Counsel Keith Skeen appears as the child’s guardian ad litem.
2 We use initials where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See
W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e).
FILED
October 14, 2026
C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
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adjudicatory hearing in May 2025, during which the court adjudicated the petitioner upon her
stipulation to the allegations in the petition. In September 2025, the petitioner filed a motion for a
post-adjudicatory improvement period.
The circuit court held a dispositional hearing in September 2025. A Child Protective
Services (“CPS”) supervisor testified to the petitioner’s extensive substance abuse history and the
petitioner’s four prior abuse and neglect cases. The court took judicial notice of all of the
petitioner’s prior cases and admitted the petitions and orders from the petitioner’s 2009, 2017, and
2019 cases. The CPS supervisor testified that the petitioner had completed all required drug screens
and did not test positive for any illicit substances. However, the supervisor testified that the DHS
recommended termination of the petitioner’s parental rights due to her pattern of relapsing after
complying with case plans in past cases in order to regain custody. Specifically, the petitioner was
adjudicated of abuse and neglect due to substance abuse in 2017 and 2019, successfully completed
improvement periods in those cases, but relapsed after the child was returned to her. Further, the
supervisor testified that the child was “extremely autistic” and required a high level of care. A
DHS caseworker also testified that, although the petitioner was participating in services on her
own, she received services in her previous cases and continued to relapse, resulting in the DHS
filing five abuse and neglect petitions against her since 2003.
The petitioner testified and admitted to using methamphetamine during the incident alleged
in the petition. However, the petitioner claimed that she was sober from amphetamine and
methamphetamine for nine years prior to that incident and had remained sober since the petition
was filed. She testified that in 2019, she did not relapse on methamphetamine but had accidentally
taken too much sleep medication (diphenhydramine hydrocholoride), causing the wreck that led
to the filing of the 2019 petition. Further, the petitioner testified that since the child was removed,
she participated in therapy, counseling, Narcotics Anonymous, and Alcoholics Anonymous;
remained employed; took 117 drug tests; remained clean from drugs; and participated in parenting
classes specializing in autism. A case manager for a service provider, Coordinating Council for
Independent Living, testified that she visited the petitioner’s home once a quarter from May 2023
until the 2025 petition was filed and that the petitioner appeared to adequately care for the child.
Further, several of the petitioner’s friends and family members testified that the petitioner was a
loving parent and it would be in the best interests of the child for the petitioner to receive an
improvement period and the child to be returned to her. Therefore, the petitioner requested that the
court grant her motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period.
The circuit court found that the petitioner had been the subject of multiple abuse and
neglect cases dating back to 2003, all of which stemmed from her substance abuse issues, and that
three of the abuse and neglect cases involved M.M. The court noted that the petitioner received
multiple services during her previous cases but continued to engage in a pattern of returning to
drugs, acting inappropriately with the child, and putting the child’s safety at risk. Further, the court
found that although several witnesses testified on the petitioner’s behalf, none had knowledge of
the most recent incident of abuse and neglect that led to the filing of the 2025 petition. Therefore,
the court denied the petitioner’s motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period. Ultimately,
the court found that the petitioner was unable to remedy the conditions of abuse and neglect on her
own or with help and that termination of the petitioner’s parental rights was in the best interests of
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the child. Therefore, the court terminated the petitioner’s parental rights to M.M.3 It is from the
dispositional order that the petitioner appeals.
On appeal from a final order in an abuse and neglect proceeding, this Court reviews the
circuit court’s substantive rulings for abuse of discretion, factual findings are reviewed for clear
error, and issues of law are reviewed de novo. Syl. Pt. 1, In re K.S., -- W. Va. --, 930 S.E.2d 400
(2026). Before this court, the petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in denying her motion
for a post-adjudicatory improvement period. At the outset, we reiterate that the decision to grant
or deny an improvement period is in the sound discretion of the circuit court. See In re M.M., 236
W. Va. 108, 115, 778 S.E.2d 338, 345 (2015) (“West Virginia law allows the circuit court
discretion in deciding whether to grant a parent an improvement period”); In re Tonjia M., 212
W. Va. 443, 448, 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002) (explaining that a circuit court has the discretion to
deny a motion for an improvement period when no improvement is likely). Further, a parent may
be granted an improvement period if they “demonstrate[], by clear and convincing evidence, that
[they are] likely to fully participate in the improvement period.” W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B).
While the petitioner asserts that she complied with services and sought out treatment, the record
shows that the petitioner was afforded and successfully completed many services to address her
substance abuse in the prior abuse and neglect cases. Despite these opportunities, the petitioner
continued to abuse substances, which led to the repeated abuse and neglect of her severely autistic
child. Because of this pattern, the court denied the petitioner’s motion. We have “frequently found
improvement periods futile and . . . improper where parents have previously received services, yet
continue their behaviors unabated.” State ex rel. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res. v. Dyer, 242
W. Va. 505, 520, 836 S.E.2d 472, 487 (2019). Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in denying
the petitioner’s motion for an improvement period and proceeding to termination. See In re J.D.-1,
247 W. Va. 270, 279, 879 S.E.2d 629, 638 (2022) (concluding that the circuit court did not err in
denying an improvement period due to the petitioner’s history of completing improvement periods
then repeating the conditions of abuse and neglect after the children were returned to their care).
The petitioner also argues that the circuit court erred in terminating her parental rights
instead of implementing a less restrictive dispositional alternative. However, we have held that
“[t]ermination of parental rights . . . may be employed without the use of intervening less
restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood . . . that conditions of
neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected.” Syl. Pt. 5, in part, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va.
558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114
(1980)). West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d)(1) provides that there is no reasonable likelihood that
the conditions of abuse or neglect can be substantially corrected when a parent has “habitually
abused or [is] addicted to alcohol, controlled substances or drugs, to the extent that proper
parenting skills have been seriously impaired” and the parent has “not responded to or followed
through the recommended and appropriate treatment which could have improved the capacity for
adequate parental functioning.” Here, the circuit court’s finding that there was no reasonable
likelihood such conditions could be corrected in the near future is supported by the record. As
discussed above, the petitioner was subject to five abuse and neglect proceedings stemming from
her substance abuse issues, three of which involved M.M. The petitioner successfully completed
3 The father’s parental rights were terminated in a previous proceeding. The child is
currently placed in a residential facility for children with special needs.
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improvement periods in 2017 and 2019 but returned to abusing substances after those cases were
dismissed and the child was returned to her care. Therefore, we discern no error in the circuit
court’s determination. See In re G.L.-1, No. 25-608, 2026 WL 1244690, at *2-3 (W. Va. May 6,
2026) (memorandum decision) (affirming termination of parental rights when the parent
successfully completed two improvement periods in prior abuse and neglect cases but returned to
substance abuse once the children were returned to his care). In addition to finding that there was
no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect could be substantially corrected,
the court found that termination of the petitioner’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests.
See W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) (allowing a court to terminate parental rights “[u]pon a finding
that there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially
corrected in the near future and[] when necessary for the welfare of the child”). As such, the court
did not err in terminating the petitioner’s parental rights.
For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its
November 10, 2025, order is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
ISSUED: October 14, 2026
CONCURRED IN BY:
Chief Justice C. Haley Bunn
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice Charles S. Trump IV
Justice H. L. Kirkpatrick
Justice James W. Flanigan

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