Public Law 119–82: To clarify the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, to appropriately limit the application of defenses based on the passage of time and other non-merits defenses to claims under that Act.

The intent of this Act is to permit claims to recover Nazi-looted art to be brought, notwithstanding the passage of time since World War II. Some courts have frustrated the intent of this Act by dismissing recovery lawsuits in reliance on defenses based on the passage of time, such as laches (for example, Zuckerman v Metropolitan Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2019)) or adverse possession, acquisitive prescription, or usucapion (for example, Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Foundation, 89 F.4th 1226 (9th Cir. 2024)) or on other non-merits discretionary defenses, such as the act of state doctrine (for example, Von Saher v Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 897 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2018)), forum non conveniens, international comity, or prudential exhaustion. In order to effectuate the purpose of the Act to permit claims to recover Nazi-looted art to be resolved on the merits, these defenses must be precluded.

This Act also is intended to allow claims in accordance with the procedures under this Act for the recovery of artwork or other property lost during the covered period because, or as a result, of Nazi persecution, including by a covered government (as defined in section 1605(h)(3)(B) of title 28, United States Code) or an agent or associate of a covered government, regardless of the nationality or citizenship of the alleged victim, notwithstanding the ‘domestic takings’ rule under Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 592 U.S. 169 (2021).”

Notwithstanding any other law or prior judicial decision, any civil claim or cause of action covered by subsection (a) shall be deemed to be an action in which rights in violation of international law are in issue for purposes of section 1605(a)(3) of title 28, United States Code, without regard to the nationality or citizenship of the alleged victim.”

With respect to any claim that is otherwise timely under this Act—

For a civil action brought under subsection (a) in any State or Federal court, process may be served in the judicial district where the case is brought or any other judicial district of the United States where the defendant may be found, resides, has an agent, or transacts business.”