Nicholas Hoffman v. City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System and the Board of Managers of the City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System (Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court: CV-23-900802).

Rel: August 23, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2024

_________________________

SC-2023-0803
_________________________

Nicholas Hoffman

v.

City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System and
the Board of Managers of the City of Birmingham Retirement
and Relief System

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-23-900802)

WISE, Justice.

Nicholas Hoffman appeals from the Jefferson Circuit Court's

judgment dismissing his mandamus petition against the City of

Birmingham Retirement and Relief System ("the System") and the Board
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of Managers of the System ("the Board") (collectively referred to as "the

respondents").

Facts and Procedural History

Hoffman worked as a firefighter for the City of Birmingham ("the

City") from 2009 until 2022, when he was released from duty because of

a medical condition. As a firefighter for the City, Hoffman was a

participant in the System. Hoffman applied for both extraordinary and

ordinary disability benefits. On December 14, 2022, the Board denied

both claims. On December 28, 2022, the Board sent two letters by

certified mail informing Hoffman of its decision.

On March 10, 2023, Hoffman filed a petition for writ of mandamus

in the Jefferson Circuit Court, seeking review of the Board's decision

pursuant to § 45-37A-51.139, Ala. Code 1975 (Local Acts, Jefferson

County). He requested that the circuit clerk serve the System and the

Board by certified mail. The petition included the following addresses for

the System and the Board:

"City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System
"Attention: Rachelle Christion[,] Payroll and Pension
"Administrator
"710 North 20th Street
"1st Floor-Office of Payroll and Pens[i]on Administration
"Room 194
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"Birmingham, AL 35203"
_____________________________

"Board of Managers
"City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System
"Attention: The Honorable Randall L. Woodfin, Cha[ir]man
"710 North 20th Street
"1st Floor Office of Payroll and Pens[i]on Administration
"Birmingham, AL 35203"

The clerk of the Jefferson Circuit Court recorded that the

respondents had been served with process by certified mail on March 15,

2023. The return receipts for the mailings indicated that an individual

named Terry Van Hooser had signed for the certified mail.

On May 3, 2023, Hoffman moved for a default judgment, arguing

that the respondents had been served on March 15, 2023, and that they

had failed to answer or respond to the petition.

On May 4, 2023, the respondents filed a "Motion to Quash Alleged

Service," arguing that they had not been served with process.

Specifically, they contended:

"2. Such alleged service was not done in accordance with
[Ala. R. Civ. P.] 4(c)(8) which requires service of the
Complaint upon: '... the chief executive officer or the clerk, or
other person designated by appointment or by statute to
receive service of process.'

"3. Alabama Code Sec. 45-37A-51.139[] requires that,
'The petition may designate the board as respondent or the
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members thereof as respondents. Each [r]espondent shall be
served with process, unless the respondent or his or her or its
attorney accepts service.'

"4. The [c]ertified [m]ail was signed for by an employee
of the City of Birmingham's Department of Finance.

"5. The City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief
System is a separate and distinct governmental entity from
the City of Birmingham.

"6. The City of Birmingham and employees in the
Department of Finance are not agents of service for [the
respondents] and have not been designated as such.

"7. No members of the Board of Managers signed for the
[c]ertified mail. The individual that signed for the certified
mail was not even an employee of the System.

"8. Neither the System, the Board, nor any members of
the Board, were ever served with process in this lawsuit.

"9. Any return of service was incorrectly reported to the
Jefferson County Circuit Court clerk's office."

On May 5, 2023, Hoffman filed a response to the motion to quash,

arguing that the respondents had failed to support their motion with

evidence demonstrating that the circuit clerk had improperly recorded

that service had been made on March 15, 2023. He also attached

screenshots from the City's website indicating that Rachelle Christion

was the "Payroll & Pension Administrator" and that listed Room 194 on

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the first floor of City Hall as the location for the office of pension

administration. He then argued:

"As the Court knows, the term 'administration' means
'performance of executive duties' according to the Merriam-
Webster dictionary. Therefore, the executive duties
(decisions, payments, and the running of the pension)[] are
performed at this office upon which service was made. It
appears to be a ruse then to argue that service was on the City
of Birmingham's Department of Finance when in fact service
was on the executives responsible for administering the City
of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System pension. If [the
respondents] intend for service to be upon some place or entity
other than the location of pension administration, then [the
respondents] should cease permitting such a representation
on the website and provide correct information."

He went on to assert that the respondents' motion to quash was merely

an effort to delay litigation; that he had mailed a courtesy copy of the

petition to the City Attorney's office; that he had subsequently contacted

the City Attorney's office about filing an answer to the petition; that he

had exchanged emails with general counsel for the City "in an effort to

see a response to the petition without the necessity of filing a default

judgment at the added expense" to Hoffman; and that the respondents'

counsel "has sought to delay matters and file the present motion."

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On June 13, 2023, before the trial court had ruled on the motion to

quash, Hoffman made a second attempt to serve the respondents, this

time by sheriff. The process was addressed to:

"BOARD OF MANAGERS CITY OF BIRMINGHAM
RETIREMENT AN[D], MAYOR RANDALL WOODFIN 710
20TH STREET N. 3RD FL, BIRMINGHAM, AL 35203"

(Capitalization in original.) On June 28, 2023, a return of service of

process was made by the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department

certifying that "Keyrah Smith -- Clerk" had accepted service.

On July 17, 2023, the trial court entered an order denying

Hoffman's motion for a default judgment. On that same date, the trial

court entered an order granting the respondents' motion to quash and

ordering Hoffman "to perfect service on the [respondents] within thirty

(30) day[s] of the date of this order or this case may be dismissed."

On August 2, 2023, Hoffman served the respondents with discovery

requests. On August 31, 2023, 45 days after the trial court had ordered

Hoffman to perfect service, the respondents filed a second "Motion to

Quash Alleged Service." In their second motion to quash, the

respondents argued:

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"4. The Return on Service filed with the Court certifies
that 'Keyrah Smith -- Clerk' was served with the [petition] by
'J.H. Smith.' ….

"5. Neither the System nor the Board employs any
'Keyrah Smith -- Clerk,' nor is such person a member of the
Board, nor is such person authorized or empowered to accept
service of process on behalf of the [respondents].

"6. The City of Birmingham is a separate and distinct
governmental entity from the System and the Board.

"7. The Alias Summons in this case was served on
[Keyrah] Smith, an employee in the City Clerk's office of the
City of Birmingham.

"8. The City of Birmingham is not agent for service of
process for the System nor the Board.

"9. Neither the City of Birmingham Retirement and
Relief System nor the Board of Managers of the City of
Birmingham Retirement and Relief System nor any members
of the Board[] were ever served with process in this lawsuit.

"10. Any return of service was incorrectly reported to the
Jefferson County Circuit Court clerk's office."

The respondents contended that Keyrah Smith was not an employee of

the Board, a member of the Board, or an individual authorized to accept

service on behalf of the respondents. They also contended that the return

of service was incorrectly reported by the circuit clerk. On that same day,

the respondents also filed a motion to quash discovery and a motion to

dismiss. Hoffman subsequently filed objections and responses to each of
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the respondents' motions. In his response to the second motion to quash

service, Hoffman asserted:

"The Jefferson County Sheriff's office has confirmed for
Counsel that the City Clerk is the designee of the Mayor to
receive service of process for the Mayor. The City Clerk
operates on the 3rd floor of City Hall with the Mayor and
saves the Mayor from disruption of his duties by accepting
service for him. Deputy Smith served the summons himself
in the same fashion and manner as he has served many other
summonses. In fact, the 'beat' of this deputy, or his area of
duty, is to serve the Mayor and other City officials."

On September 26, 2023, the trial court entered the following

judgment, dismissing the case, with prejudice:

"Upon due consideration of all of the pleadings in this case,
the MOTION TO DISMISS[] filed by CITY OF
BIRMINGHAM RETIREMENT AND RELIEF SYSTEM and
BOARD OF MANAGERS CITY OF BIRMINGHAM
RETIREMENT AND RELIEF SYSTEM is hereby
GRANTED."

(Capitalization in original.) On October 4, 2023, Hoffman filed a motion

to vacate the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., which the

trial court denied. This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

" 'Before the adoption of our current Rule 4(b), [Ala. R.
Civ. P.,] some Alabama cases evaluated a dismissal for
insufficient service of process under Rule 41(b), Ala. R. Civ.
P.' State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Smith, 39 So. 3d 1172, 1175
(Ala. Civ. App. 2009). 'Failure of a plaintiff to attempt to
8
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obtain service over the defendant within a reasonable time
may amount to a failure to prosecute the action, warranting a
dismissal of the case.' Crosby v. Avon Prods., Inc., 474 So. 2d
642, 644 (Ala. 1985); see also State v. Horton, 373 So. 2d 1096,
1097 (Ala. 1979) (same).

" 'The general rule, of course, is that a court has the
inherent power to act sua sponte to dismiss an
action for want of prosecution. However, because
dismissal ... is such a drastic sanction, it is to be
used only in extreme situations. Accordingly, this
Court carefully scrutinizes any order terminating
an action for want of prosecution, and it does not
hesitate to set one aside when an abuse of
discretion is found.'

"Burdeshaw v. White, 585 So. 2d 842, 847 (Ala. 1991)."

Voltz v. Dyess, 148 So. 3d 425, 426 (Ala. 2014).

" 'Ala. R. Civ. P. 41(b) provides for the
involuntary dismissal of an action upon "failure of
the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with [the
Rules of Civil Procedure] or any order of [the]
court." Although dismissal for failure to comply
with a court order is a "harsh sanction," it is
warranted where there is a "clear record of delay,
willful default or contumacious conduct by the
plaintiff." Selby v. Money, 403 So. 2d 218, 220 (Ala.
1981). Because the trial judge is in the best
position to assess the conduct of the plaintiff and
the degree of noncompliance, his decision to grant
a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute will be
accorded considerable weight by a reviewing court.
Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp., 529 F.2d 943, 947
(9th Cir. 1976); Von Poppenheim v. Portland
Boxing & Wrestling Comm'n, 442 F.2d 1047, 1051
(9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1039, 92 S.
9
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Ct. 715, 30 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1972). Therefore we will
reverse that decision only upon a showing of abuse
of discretion. Selby, [403 So. 2d] at 220; Smith v.
Wilcox County Bd. of Educ., 365 So. 2d 659 (Ala.
1978).'

"Jones v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 604 So.
2d 332, 341 (Ala. 1991). Moreover, ' "[w]illful" is used in
contradistinction to accidental or involuntary noncompliance.
No wrongful motive or intent is necessary to show willful
conduct.' Selby v. Money, 403 So. 2d 218, 221 (Ala. 1981)."

Curry v. Miller, 261 So. 3d 1175, 1178 (Ala. 2018).1

Discussion

On appeal, Hoffman argues that the trial court improperly

dismissed his mandamus petition. Section 45-37A-51.139(a), provides, in

pertinent part:

"Any decision of the board denying a benefit claimed may be
subject to review by the circuit court, in the manner and
subject to the limitations herein provided. An employee may
secure a review of a decision of the board by mandamus
proceedings in the circuit court, which proceedings the
employee shall institute, in the court by filing therein a
petition for mandamus. The petition may designate the board
as respondent or the members thereof as respondents. Each
respondent shall be served with process, unless the
respondent or his or her or its attorney accepts service. The
petition for mandamus shall be barred if it is not filed within

1"This Court now uses the phrase 'exceeded its discretion' rather

than the phrase 'abused its discretion.' The standard of review remains
the same." Classroomdirect.com, LLC v. Draphix, LLC, 992 So. 2d 692,
701 n.1 (Ala. 2008).
10
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90 days from the date whereon the board of managers makes
its final decision on the benefit claimed, provided written
notice of such final decision of the board shall be given by
certified or registered mail, postage prepaid, and properly
addressed, to the claimant or his or her attorney within 10
days after such final decision of the board. If timely notice
shall not be given as provided in the last preceding sentence,
claimant shall not be barred from filing mandamus until the
expiration of 80 days from the mailing of notice as above
provided; but in no event, anything therein to the contrary
notwithstanding, shall mandamus be filed after one year from
the date of such final decision of the board …."

I.

On appeal, Hoffman argues that the trial court erred when it

granted the respondents' motion to dismiss because, he says, he properly

served them, as required by Rule 4(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.

Rule 4(c)(8) establishes the procedure for service of process on local

governments and other governmental entities. It provides:

"(c) Upon Whom Process Served. Service of process,
except service by publication as provided in Rule 4.3, [Ala. R.
Civ. P.,] shall be made as follows:

"....

"(8) Local Governments and Other
Governmental Entities. Upon a county, municipal
corporation, or any other governmental entity not
previously mentioned, or an agency thereof, by
serving the chief executive officer or the clerk, or
other person designated by appointment or by
statute to receive service of process, or upon the
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attorney general of the state if such service is
accompanied by an affidavit of a party or the
party's attorney that all such persons described
therein are unknown or cannot be located."

Rule 4(c)(8). Pursuant to § 45-37A-51.130, Ala. Code 1975 (Local Acts,

Jefferson County), the mayor of the City serves as the chair of the Board.

A.

First, Hoffman argues that the trial court erred in granting the first

motion to quash because, he says, proper service was made on the

respondents by certified mail. Rule 4(i)(2), which allows service of

process to be perfected using certified mail, provides, in pertinent part:

"(C) When Effective. Service by certified mail shall be
deemed complete and the time for answering shall run from
the date of delivery to the named addressee or the addressee's
agent as evidenced by signature on the return receipt. Within
the meaning of this subdivision, 'agent' means a person or
entity specifically authorized by the addressee to receive the
addressee's mail and to deliver that mail to the addressee.
Such agent's authority shall be conclusively established when
the addressee acknowledges actual receipt of the summons
and complaint or the court determines that the evidence
proves the addressee did actually receive the summons and
complaint in time to avoid a default."

Rule 4(i)(2)(C) (emphasis added). In this case, it is undisputed that

Hoffman requested that service be made on the respondents by certified

mail. It is also undisputed that the certified-mail return receipts were

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signed by Terry Van Hooser, an employee in the City's finance

department.

In their initial motion to quash, the respondents argued that

Hoffman had failed to properly perfect service on them because

employees in the City's finance department are not agents authorized to

accept service for them. On appeal, Hoffman argues:

"The presumption … that the employee was of suitable
age to accept service or was an agent for his superior who was
Treasurer of the Board and oversaw the System is not
rebutted with the conclusory assertion. 'The completion and
filing of a return of service is prima facie evidence that the
party to whom the service was sent has been properly served.'
Image Auto, Inc. v. Mike Kelley Enters., Inc., 823 So. 2d 655,
658 (Ala. 2001)."

Hoffman's brief at 16-17.

This Court has previously stated:

" 'In Insurance Management &
Administration, Inc. v. Palomar Insurance Corp.,
590 So. 2d 209, 213 (Ala. 1991), this Court held
that the clerk's notation of proper service creates a
presumption of proper service that can be rebutted
only by "clear and convincing evidence." In
Northbrook Indemnity Co. v. Westgate, Ltd., 769
So. 2d 890, 893 n.4 (Ala. 2000), this Court stated
that the Palomar Insurance presumption
established only that the "clerk mailed the process
and the person signing the certified-mail receipt
received the process." Palomar Insurance did not
establish a presumption as to whether the person
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signing the receipt was a proper person to receive
process or whether the place of service was the
defendant's "dwelling house or usual place of
abode." '

"(Emphasis added.)"

McDermott v. Tabb, 32 So. 3d 1, 4 (Ala. 2009) (quoting Truss v. Chappell,

4 So. 3d 1110, 1112 n.4 (Ala. 2008)). As in McDermott, in this case, the

certified-mail receipts established only that the certified mail addressed

to the System was directed to "Rachelle Christion"; that the certified mail

addressed to the Board was directed to "The Hon. Woodfin"; and that Van

Hooser had signed for both pieces of mail.2 They did not establish that

Van Hooser was authorized to accept service on behalf of the Board or

the System. Thus, Hoffman's argument that the signed certified-mail

receipts were prima facie evidence that service had been made on an

authorized agent is without merit.

Alabama law is well settled that, " '[w]hen the service of process on

the defendant is contested as being improper or invalid, the burden of

2In his brief, Hoffman argues that Van Hooser's superior was the

treasurer for the Board, but he did not present any evidence to support
that assertion. Additionally, Hoffman did not present any evidence to
establish that Christion was designated to receive service of process on
behalf of the System.
14
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proof is on the plaintiff to prove that service of process was performed

correctly and legally.' " McDermott, 32 So. 3d at 3 (quoting Ex parte

Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So. 2d 880, 884 (Ala. 1983)).

Hoffman argues that Van Hooser was an agent capable of accepting

service for the respondents because he "worked for an officer of the Board,

and head of the Finance [D]epartment which administers the pension."

Hoffman's brief at 16. However, he does not cite any authority to support

this argument, as required by Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P.

It was Hoffman's burden to prove that Van Hooser was a proper

person to accept service for the respondents. It is undisputed that Van

Hooser was not the chief executive officer of the Board or the System.

Additionally, Hoffman did not present any evidence to establish that Van

Hooser had been designated by appointment or by statute to receive

service of process for the Board or the System. See Rule 4(c)(8), Ala. R.

Civ. P. Thus, Hoffman failed to establish that his attempt to serve the

respondents by certified mail was proper pursuant to Rule 4(c)(8).3

3Hoffman also asserts that "[t]he Finance Department employee
[i.e., Van Hooser] was presumed to be a person of suitable age working at
the 'residence' of the Board and System. Ala. R. Civ. P. 4(c) permits
service by leaving the petition 'with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein ...' (Emphasis added.)" Hoffman's brief
15
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B.

Hoffman next argues that proper service was made on the mayor of

the City by the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department. Initially, he

contends:

"The Chai[r]man of the Board is the Mayor and he is
undeniably a proper person to receive service. The Board
contends that service was improper as it was on the City
Clerk, not the Mayor. However, [t]he above rule specifically
permits service on the Clerk."

Hoffman's brief at 19 (emphasis in original). As the Court of Civil

Appeals noted in Montgomery County Board of Education v. Addison, 3

So. 3d 885, 886 n.1 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008), "[p]resumably, the reference in

Rule 4(c)(8)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] to 'the clerk' refers to local governments,

such as municipalities, that employ clerks." However, the Board and the

System are entities separate from the City. See City of Birmingham v.

Thomas, 220 So. 3d 333, 337 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016). Hoffman did not

present any evidence to establish that the Board or the System employs

at 18. His argument in this regard appears to be based on the language
in Rule 4(c)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., which deals with service of process on an
individual. Because this case involves service on a governmental entity,
the provisions of Rule 4(c)(1) do not apply.
16
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a clerk or that Keyrah Smith served as a clerk of the Board or the System.

Therefore, Hoffman's argument in this regard is without merit.

In his response to the second motion to quash, counsel for Hoffman

also asserted:

"The Jefferson County Sheriff's office has confirmed for
Counsel that the City Clerk is the designee of the Mayor to
receive service of process for the Mayor. The City Clerk
operates on the 3rd floor of City Hall with the Mayor and
saves the Mayor from disruption of his duties by accepting
service for him. Deputy Smith served the summons himself
in the same fashion and manner as he has served many other
summonses. In fact, the 'beat' of this deputy, or his area of
duty, is to serve the Mayor and other City officials."

However, Hoffman did not submit any evidence to support those

assertions. Rather, he relied solely on the assertions of counsel included

in his response to the second motion to quash service to support his

argument. However, this Court has held that " ' "arguments of counsel

are not evidence." ' " Ex parte Coleman, 861 So. 2d 1080, 1084 (Ala. 2003)

(citations omitted). Thus, Hoffman did not satisfy his burden of proving

that Smith was authorized to accept service on behalf of the mayor.

Accordingly, he has not established that the attempted service by the

sheriff was proper pursuant to Rule 4(c)(8).

II.

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Next, Hoffman argues that the "trial court abused its discretion in

not finding good cause as to Mr. Hoffman's efforts to prosecute this case,

and denying him further time to effectuate service, if service of process

was not valid." Hoffman's brief at 14. He also argues that the trial court

erred when it dismissed his case with prejudice.

"Under Rule 4(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., an Alabama court may
dismiss an action without prejudice if service of the summons
and the complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120
days after the filing of the complaint or may, upon a showing
of good cause, extend the 120-day period for perfecting service
of process for an appropriate period. Before the adoption of
Rule 4(b), however, a plaintiff's failure to timely serve a
defendant was evaluated under Rule 41(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., to
determine whether there had been a 'failure to prosecute.'
Rule 41(b) provides that a dismissal for failure to prosecute,
unless otherwise specified, generally 'operates as an
adjudication on the merits.' Furthermore, courts have
recognized that, even after the adoption of Rule 4(b), under
certain circumstances, the failure to timely serve a defendant
may result in a dismissal for failure to prosecute under Rule
41(b). Our Court of Civil Appeals has summarized the law on
this issue as follows:

" 'Before the adoption of our current Rule
4(b), [Ala. R. Civ. P.], some Alabama cases
evaluated a dismissal for insufficient service of
process under Rule 41(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., which
provides for the involuntary dismissal of an action
upon "failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to
comply with [the Alabama Rules of Civil
Procedure] or any order of [the] court." See State
v. Horton, 373 So. 2d 1096, 1097 (Ala. 1979)
(stating that "[f]ailure to serve process within a
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reasonable time may amount to a failure to
prosecute" and may warrant a dismissal under
Rule 41(b)); Crosby v. Avon Prods., Inc., 474 So. 2d
642, 644 (Ala. 1985) (stating that failure to
attempt to perfect service within a reasonable time
may amount to failure to prosecute an action,
warranting a dismissal); Hill v. Hawkins, 582 So.
2d 1105, 1106 (Ala. 1991) (same); Coulter v.
Stewart, 726 So. 2d 726, 728 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999)
(same); and Reynolds v. Reynolds, 491 So. 2d 968
(Ala. Civ. App. 1986) (affirming a judgment
dismissing an action more than nine months after
the complaint had been filed when the plaintiff
had failed to serve the defendant).

" ' " '[A] dismissal with prejudice [under
Rule 41(b) for lack of prosecution] is a
harsh sanction and should be used only
in extreme circumstances....

" ' " 'In Alabama and many federal
courts, the interest in disposing of the
litigation on the merits is overcome and
a dismissal may be granted when there
is a clear record of delay, willful default
or contumacious conduct by the
plaintiff.' "

" 'Burdeshaw v. White, 585 So. 2d 842, 847 (Ala.
1991) (quoting Selby v. Money, 403 So. 2d 218, 220
(Ala. 1981)).

" 'With the adoption of the current Rule 4(b),
if a plaintiff fails to perfect service within 120
days, a trial court may now dismiss an action
without prejudice pursuant to that rule. However,
in extreme circumstances, a trial court, pursuant
to Rule 41(b), may dismiss with prejudice an action
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for failure to effect service after the 120-day
window prescribed by Rule 4(b) has expired. See
O'Rourke Bros. v. Nesbitt Burns, Inc., 201 F.3d
948, 953 (7th Cir. 2000) (" 'If the delay [in obtaining
service] has been so long that it signifies failure to
prosecute -- or if the delay entails disobedience to
an order to the court -- then dismissal may be with
prejudice under Rule 41(b).' " (quoting Powell v.
Starwalt, 866 F.2d 964, 966 (7th Cir. 1989))); 4B
C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1137 (3d ed. 2002) (stating that, when
service has not been perfected within the 120-day
period and a district court has granted multiple
extensions, "a district court may well have to
decide between dismissing the plaintiff's action
with prejudice under Federal Rule 41(b) and
dismissing it without prejudice under Federal
Rule 4(m)"); and Wagner v. Ashcroft, 214 F.R.D. 78
(N.D.N.Y. 2003) (evaluating under both Rule 4(m)
and Rule 41(b) whether an action should be
dismissed when a greater than three-year period
elapsed without the plaintiff perfecting service).'

"State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Smith, 39 So. 3d 1172, 1175-
76 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
See also Voltz v. Dyess, 148 So. 3d 425, 426 (Ala. 2014)
(quoting Crosby v. Avon Prods., Inc., 474 So. 2d 642, 644 (Ala.
1985)) (' "Failure of a plaintiff to attempt to obtain service over
the defendant within a reasonable time may amount to a
failure to prosecute the action, warranting a dismissal of the
case." ')."

Kennedy v. Jessie, [Ms. SC-2022-0982, Oct. 27, 2023] ___ So. 3d ___, ___

(Ala. 2023) (plurality opinion).

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In his "Objection and Response to Motion to Dismiss," Hoffman

alleged:

"4. Second, service was made upon [the respondents]
within 30 days of the Court's order of July 17, 2023. The order
directed [Hoffman] to serve [the respondents] within 30 days
of the order, but it did not say within 30 days AFTER the
order. On June 13, 2023, [Hoffman], not desiring to see this
action further delayed, filed an alias summons, prior to the
Court's order, requesting the Jefferson County Sheriff's
Department to serve the Mayor. Service on the Mayor was
made on June 28, 2023. That date is within 30 days of July
17, 2023.

"5. Third, the Court's order of July 17, 2023 did not
purport to rule on any matter other than the first motion to
quash service that had been filed. [The respondents'] second
motion to quash service was not filed until August 31, 2023[,]
more than 45 days after the Court's Order. The [respondents]
are currently arguing that the Court's order of July 17, 2023
should be applied to matters in the future that were not the
subject of the motion ruled on. Certainly, the [respondents]
could have filed a motion to quash prior to the Court's July 17,
2023 order, as service was perfected on June 28, 2023.
However, [the respondents] chose to wait 56 days to contest
this second effort.

"6. Fourth, [Hoffman] had no notice of the need to
attempt any further service when both the Circuit Clerk[] and
the Sheriff's Department reported that service was made back
on June 28, 2023. [The respondents'] argument that Hoffman
must achieve perfection of service without notice that service
has not been perfected is illogical and unfair.

"7. Fifth, [Hoffman] has good cause to be permitted
additional time to perfect service. The motion to dismiss is
due to be denied based on Ala. R. Civ. P. Rule 4(b). [Hoffman]
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has good cause for the time frame that has passed and has
complied with the Court's Order. The rule states in relevant
part:

" '(b) Time limit for service. If service of the
summons and complaint is not made upon a
defendant within 120 days after the filing of the
complaint. the court, upon motion or on its own
initiative, after at least fourteen (14) days' notice
to the plaintiff, may dismiss the action without
prejudice as to the defendant upon whom service
was not made or direct that service be effected
within a specified time; provided, however, that if
the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure to
serve the defendant, the court shall extend the
time for service for an appropriate period.'
(Emphasis added).

"The facts as noted in the record are:

"a. [Hoffman] sought to serve [the
respondents] with the filing of the petition for
mandamus. Service was made on March 15, 2023.
There was no delay by [Hoffman]. Service was
reasonably believed to be proper as it was made on
the first floor of City Hall which is the same
location from which the pension decision was sent
to [Hoffman] by certified mail and was the same
location in which [the respondents] hold out as
being the base of pension operations on [their]
shared … website with the City.

"b. [Hoffman] also emailed a copy of the
lawsuit on March 10, 2023 to the City Attorney's
office, which was known to be Counsel for the
[respondents]. No motion to quash service was
filed until May 4, 2023, 55 days later.

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"c. The first notice that the service was
found by the Court to be insufficient was on July
17, 2023. There was no notice that [Hoffman]
must attempt further service until the Court ruled
on [the respondents'] motion to quash on that date.
[Hoffman] is not required to assume how the Court
will rule, and he did not delay.

"d. [Hoffman] attempted to be proactive,
however, to moot the service issue and perhaps
save judicial time. [Hoffman], more than a month
before the July 17th Order, sought service by
Sheriff on the Mayor requested on June 13, 2023.
Still prior to the Court's Order, the Jefferson
County Sheriff's Department served the Mayor on
June 28, 2023.

"e. Again, [Hoffman] had no notice that [the
respondents] or the Court thought this personal
service was insufficient. [The respondents] first
raised this contention that service was insufficient
on August 31, 2023. That delay is not attributable
to [Hoffman].

"f. [Hoffman] further attempted to
proactively move this litigation forward by serving
discovery on [the respondents] on August 2, 2023,
given that service of process was made on June 28,
2023[,] more than 30 days before.

"g. Long after [Hoffman] attempted service
by Sheriff, [the respondents] now contend that
service upon the City Clerk who routinely accepts
service of summons for the Mayor, based on
information reported by the Jefferson County
Sheriff's Department, is improper. [The
respondents] contend she is not an unauthorized

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[sic] person to accept service for the Mayor.
[Hoffman] did not delay.

"h. [Hoffman] has not delayed in this matter
at any point and has been frustrated by [the
respondents'] failure to provide any legitimate
address at which certified mail can be effectuated
by the United States Postal Service. Apparently
there are no employees for the [respondents] and
all Board Members are involved working in other
occupations. Despite the statute clearly
permitting service on the Board as an entity and
clearly permitting service by certified mail, the
same is unnecessarily difficult given [[the
respondents] may always contend that no City
employee may accept service, even at the very
location from which the Pension is administered.
As a governmental entity, [the respondents]
should be required to provide a specific address
and specific employee(s) authorized to accept
service by certified mail. No other [d]efendant in
litigation may hide within the cloak of City
government to prevent service.

"i. [Hoffman] has also been frustrated by [the
respondents] now challenging personal service by
a Jefferson County Sheriff's deputy who was
following the protocol he understood the Mayor's
office desired to follow. The relevant statute does
not provide any address at which personal service
of process can be made. The [respondents] are not
required to report this information to the Alabama
Secretary of State and have not. [The
respondents] utilize City employees routinely in
the operation of the pension benefit, and yet
simultaneously contend that the same employees
are not permitted to accept service. City
employees have a right to seek recourse for wrong

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decisions made by [the respondents], and such
rights are due better protection.

"8. [Hoffman] has established good cause under the
rule. In the event that the Court grants the second motion to
quash, [Hoffman] requests that the Court Order [the
respondents] to provide a person and address at which service
can be made, and/or grant Hoffman additional time to either
attempt service by a specially appointed process server,
and/or permit time for [Hoffman] to effectuate service upon
the Alabama Secretary of State[4] when supported by affidavit
from [Hoffman's] Counsel as allowed by the rules."

(Capitalization and emphasis in original.)

In this case, Hoffman argues that he "diligently prosecuted this

action," Hoffman's brief at 23, and that he established good cause because

"he exhibited a bona fide intent to serve the Board and System at all

times and did not delay." Hoffman's brief at 14.

The facts before this Court indicate that Hoffman filed the petition

for a writ of mandamus with the intent to immediately serve the

respondents and that Hoffman consistently sought to perfect service of

process. When the respondents filed a motion to quash service, Hoffman

attempted to effectuate service for a second time through the sheriff's

office "to moot the service issue and perhaps save judicial time." After

4Rule 4(c)(8), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides for service upon the attorney

general rather than the secretary of state.
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his second attempted service, Hoffman, who was under the impression

that the respondents had been properly served by the sheriff's office,

proceeded to move litigation forward by serving discovery requests on the

respondents. Moreover, in his objection and response to the respondents'

second motion to quash service, Hoffman asked the trial court to

"deny the motion to quash, or in the alternative that the Court
order that [the respondents] provide a definitive address and
person able to accept service for [the respondents], by certified
mail upon a designated employee through the U.S. Postal
Service, and by personal service from the Jefferson County
Sheriff's Department. Otherwise [Hoffman] will request a
special process server to attempt service personally on the
Mayor. If that fails [Hoffman's] Counsel may file an affidavit
that [the respondents] 'cannot be located' due to the
respondents' ability to hide within the cloak of the City and
will then serve the Attorney General for the State of Alabama
as provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure."

Based on the record before us, it does not appear there was a " ' "clear record

of delay, willful default or contumacious conduct" ' " by Hoffman, Curry,

261 So. 3d at 1178 (citations omitted), or evidence of his " ' " 'disobedience

to an order of the court.' " ' " Kennedy, ___ So. 3d at ___ (citations omitted).

Thus, the trial court exceeded its discretion when it granted the

respondents' motion and dismissed Hoffman's petition with prejudice. 5

5Based on our disposition of this issue, we pretermit discussion of

Hoffman's argument that the trial court erroneously dismissed his
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Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the trial court exceeded its discretion when

it dismissed Hoffman's mandamus petition with prejudice. Accordingly,

we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this case for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Parker, C.J., and Stewart and Cook, JJ., concur.

Sellers, J., concurs in the result, with opinion.

petition without providing him with at least 14 days' notice, as required
by Rule 4(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.
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SELLERS, Justice (concurring in the result).

I concur in the result of the main opinion, which reverses the

Jefferson Circuit Court's judgment dismissing with prejudice Nicholas

Hoffman's mandamus petition against the City of Birmingham

Retirement and Relief System ("the System") and the Board of Managers

of the System ("the Board") (collectively referred to as "the respondents"),

based on lack of proper service. The record reveals that the Board sent

Hoffman two certified letters denying his claims for extraordinary

disability benefits and ordinary disability benefits, respectively.

Hoffman filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking review of the

Board's decision pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 45-37A-51.139, (Local

Laws, Jefferson County). That statute provides that the petition "may

designate the board as respondent or the members thereof as

respondents" and that "[e]ach respondent shall be served with process,

unless the respondent or his or her or its attorney accepts service." Rule

4(c)(8), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that service of process upon local

governments and other governmental entities is established by serving

the "chief executive officer or the clerk." Hoffman complied with the law

and attempted service by certified mail and also utilized the services of

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the sheriff's office to perfect service. Importantly, counsel for Hoffman

also emailed a copy of the petition for a writ of mandamus to Jay. P.

Turner, the city attorney for the City of Birmingham ("the City"), who

represents the respondents. Several email exchanges occurred between

the attorneys regarding the respondents' failure to file an answer or to

otherwise respond to Hoffman's petition. According to Hoffman, Turner

"brusquely responded [to Hoffman's counsel] that he would file a motion

to quash service." Hoffman's brief at 24. After Hoffman filed a motion

for a default judgment based on the respondents' failure to answer,

Turner did, in fact, file a motion to quash service. It is undisputed that

the purpose of service is to give notice of an action to a defendant. Hughes

v. Cox, 601 So. 2d 465, 470 (Ala. 1992). In my opinion, the actions of the

respondents indicate that they had actual knowledge of Hoffman's

petition seeking review of the Board's decision. Yet, rather than

exercising good faith and responding to the petition on the merits, the

respondents evidenced an intent to subvert justice, presumably by

allowing and designating employees to receive service and then arguing

that those employees had no authority to do so. As Hoffman points out,

he served the petition for a writ of mandamus by certified mail at the

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same address that was listed on the Board's letters denying his claims,

and the respondents use the same address as the City, share a telephone

number with the City, and share a website with the City. One of the

hallmarks of any going concern, like the respondents here, is the ability

to sue and be sued. Indeed, the nature of the respondents' work

anticipates that legal action will be necessary. Although a defendant has

no duty to make itself an easy target of litigation, governmental entities,

like the respondents here, should not make it difficult for plaintiffs to

perfect service by obfuscating the means to do so. Thus, if a large

organization, such as the Board or the System, does not have someone

officially authorized or otherwise designated to accept service, yet

someone within the organization accepts service or signs a receipt

acknowledging service, then courts should factor that into consideration

to find that service has been perfected. See Reeves v. Wilson Floor &

Wallcovering, Inc., [Ms. SC-2023-0410, Jan. 19, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___, ___

(Ala. 2024) (Sellers, J., concurring in the result) ("In my view, service of

process on a corporation via certified mail is perfected when an officer or

other agent authorized to accept service gets actual notice, which can be

substantiated through evidence, that the corporation is being sued.

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SC-2023-0803

Thereafter, the defendant should not be allowed to rely on a technical

defect in the certified-mailing procedure. To protect its rights and avoid

the entry of a default, a defendant with actual knowledge of an action

against it must answer the complaint or otherwise defend."). Accordingly,

in addition to reversing the judgment of the trial court dismissing

Hoffman's action with prejudice, I would direct the trial court to

acknowledge that service was perfected on the respondents and to

proceed to determining the merits of the case. I see no need to require

Hoffman to attempt service a third time. I thus concur in the result.

31