E.A. v. Houston County Department of Human Resources (Appeal from Houston Juvenile Court: JU-21-344.02).

Rel: March 21, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
_________________________

CL-2023-0794
_________________________

W.S. II

v.

Houston County Department of Human Resources
_________________________

CL-2023-0805
_________________________

E.A.

v.

Houston County Department of Human Resources

Appeals from Houston Juvenile Court
(JU-21-344.02)

On Return from Remand
CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

PER CURIAM.

In separate appeals, W.S. II ("the father") and E.A. ("the mother")

challenged a judgment of the Houston Juvenile Court ("the juvenile

court") terminating their parental rights to their child, E.H.S. ("the

child"), on the ground that the juvenile court lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction over the termination-of-parental-rights action under the

Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("the

UCCJEA"), § 30-3B-101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. On May 31, 2024, this

court, on original submission, concluded that the record was "without

sufficient information [for us] to conduct a meaningful review of the

jurisdictional question" and remanded the case with instructions to the

juvenile court to determine whether, under the UCCJEA, it had subject-

matter jurisdiction. W.S. v. Houston Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., [Ms. CL-

2023-0794, May 31, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2024). We

instructed the juvenile court to supplement the record on appeal with any

evidence on which it had relied from the earlier dependency action

involving the mother and the father and with any evidence it had elicited

from additional proceedings that it conducted following remand.

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CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

The juvenile court has made a return from remand and

supplemented the record as requested. Having now reviewed the record

as supplemented, we conclude that the juvenile court had jurisdiction

over the action of the Houston County Department of Human Resources

("DHR") to terminate the mother's and the father's parental rights. We

also conclude that, on the merits, the juvenile court's judgment is due to

be affirmed.

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Under the UCCJEA

The record following remand shows that the juvenile court held a

hearing on remand that consisted solely of arguments of the parties'

attorneys; the juvenile court did not receive evidence during that hearing.

After the hearing, the juvenile court entered a judgment in which it found

that it had "properly exercised jurisdiction in this termination action." To

reach that conclusion, the juvenile court wrote, it considered the

transcript of a June 23, 2022, hearing in the prior dependency action

involving the parents, the preprinted-form order of June 23, 2022, finding

the child dependent and transferring custody of the child to DHR, and

the initial preprinted-form order of shelter care entered on November 10,

2021, all of which are contained in the supplement to the record on return

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CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

from remand but which were not included in the record on original

submission of this matter. The shelter-care order included a handwritten

notation that the juvenile court had taken "emergency jurisdiction" over

the matter. On the form order of dependency, the juvenile court wrote

without elaboration that it had "jurisdiction based on facts presented."

The transcript of the June 23, 2022, hearing in the dependency

action indicates that, at the outset of that hearing, the juvenile-court

judge advised the attorneys that, on the issue of jurisdiction, "I think I

did attempt to get up with Judge Gay in Florida, and I don't recall if I

had a -- I'm pretty sure I never got a response back. I've called Florida

several times on many cases and I never get responses back." The

juvenile-court judge then said: "But the child is in Alabama, and I'm

going to find that Alabama has jurisdiction because the child is in

Alabama, and I have not had any contact with anybody in the Florida

judicial system regarding this child, so I'm going to find that I do have

jurisdiction."

The transcript from the hearing in the dependency action contains

little evidence that would be helpful in determining whether the juvenile

court had subject-matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. One witness

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CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

was called during that hearing -- Anna Starling, the DHR caseworker

assigned to work with the mother and the father. Neither the mother nor

the father was present at the hearing. Starling testified that the mother

was incarcerated immediately after giving birth to the child, that she had

not remained incarcerated in Houston County but had been incarcerated

in the "Baldwin County, Florida," jail upon her return to Florida, and

that Starling had not had any contact with the mother. She also testified

about her conversation with the father, whose paternity at that time had

not been adjudicated.

In its judgment following remand, the juvenile court found that the

mother gave birth to the child in Alabama "in an effort to prevent Florida

… from discovering the child's birth" and that she was then arrested and

removed to Florida. The mother's actions, the juvenile court found, "were

the direct cause of the placement of the child in foster care in Alabama

and effectively resulted in Alabama becoming the home state of the

child." The juvenile court further found that, because the mother and the

father had been incarcerated in Florida at various times since the child's

birth, "there is no home or support system for the child in Florida, nor is

there any reasonable expectation for such in the foreseeable future.

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CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

Indeed, there is no evidence of any connection this child has or had with

Florida or evidence that the child has ever physically been in that state."

Section 30-3B-201(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides that, except in

certain circumstances not relevant to this appeal, an Alabama court has

jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination in the

following circumstances:

"(1) This state is the home state of the child on the date
of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state
of the child within six months before the commencement of
the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a
parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this
state;

"(2) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction
under subdivision (1), or a court of the home state of the child
has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this
state is the more appropriate forum under Section 30-3B-207
or 30-3B-208 [of this chapter], and:

"a. The child and the child's parents, or the
child and at least one parent or a person acting as
a parent, have a significant connection with this
state other than mere physical presence; and

"b. Substantial evidence is available in this
state concerning the child's care, protection,
training, and personal relationships;

"(3) All courts having jurisdiction under subdivision (1)
or (2) have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that
a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to

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CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

determine the custody of the child under Section 30-3B-207 or
30-3B-208 [of this chapter]; or

"(4) No court of any other state would have jurisdiction
under the criteria specified in subdivision (1), (2), or (3)."

Regarding the first of these four bases for subject-matter

jurisdiction under the UCCJEA (home-state jurisdiction), the UCCJEA

defines "home state," in pertinent part, as

"[t]he state in which a child lived with a parent or a person
acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months
immediately before the commencement of a child custody
proceeding. In the case of a child less than six months of age,
the term means the state in which the child lived from birth
with any of the persons mentioned."

§ 30-3B-102(7), Ala. Code 1975. In H.T. v. Cleburne Cnty. Dep't of Hum.

Res., 163 So. 3d 1054, 1065 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014), this court, after

analyzing the term "lived from birth" and surveying decisions of other

jurisdictions, held that "a limited hospital stay in a state following birth,

without more, is insufficient to establish a home state for the child as

that term is defined by § 30-3B-102(7)[, Ala. Code 1975]." 163 So. 3d at

1065. In reaching that holding, we relied in part on In re D.S., 217 Ill. 2d

306, 317-18, 840 N.E.2d 1216, 1223 (2005), in which the Illinois Supreme

Court observed that "allowing a temporary hospital stay to confer 'home

state' jurisdiction would undermine the public policy goals of the

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CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

UCCJEA, which include ensuring that 'a custody decree is rendered in

that State which can best decide the case in the interest of the child. ' "

(Emphasis and citation omitted.)

Here, the dependency proceeding involving the child was initiated

within days of the child's birth. Neither parent had ever lived in Alabama

and there is no evidence indicating that either intended to live in

Alabama. The mother testified that she had no connection to Alabama

other than driving to Dothan once her labor started so that she could give

birth to the child in Alabama. Thus, the child did not live with a parent

from birth in Alabama before to DHR's commencement of its dependency

action, and Alabama was not the child's home state. See H.T. v. Cleburne

Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 163 So. 3d 1054, 1065-66 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014).

The parents suggest that Florida is the child's home state.

However, it is undisputed that the child was born in Alabama and has

never resided in the Florida, whether with a parent or otherwise. Thus,

under the plain language of § 30-3B-102(7), Florida could not be

considered the child's home state, and a Florida court would not have had

home-state jurisdiction over the child under § 30-3B-201(a)(1).

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CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

As noted above, under subdivision (a)(2) (significant-connection

jurisdiction), when the court of another state does not have home-state

jurisdiction over a child, an Alabama court can exercise jurisdiction over

the child when (1) the child and a parent or a person acting as a parent

has a significant connection with Alabama, and (2) substantial evidence

is available in Alabama concerning the care, protection, training, and

personal relationships of the child. The undisputed evidence indicates

that the only connection between either of the child's parents and

Alabama was the mother's delivery of the child in an Alabama hospital

while she was attempting to elude Florida authorities. Before the mother

left the hospital, she was arrested and held in jail until Florida law-

enforcement officials could pick her up to return her to that state. The

mother's brief physical presence in Alabama was not sufficient to confer

significant-connection jurisdiction on the juvenile court. See A.M. v.

Houston Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 262 So. 3d 1210, 1217-18 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2017).

We also cannot conclude that a Florida court would have had

significant-connection jurisdiction over the child. The record does not

disclose any evidence indicating that the child had a significant

9
CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

connection to Florida or that substantial evidence was available in

Florida regarding her care, protection, training, and personal

relationships. See A.M. v. Houston Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 262 So. 3d

at 1218.

The third basis for the exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction under

§ 30-3B-201(a) is triggered when a court of another state with subject-

matter jurisdiction over a child declines to exercise that jurisdiction

because an Alabama court is the more appropriate forum to determine

the child's custody. § 30-3B-201(a)(3). There is no evidence in the record

indicating that a court of Florida or any other state declined to exercise

jurisdiction over the child, nor is there any indication that the juvenile

court declined jurisdiction in favor of a court of another state. Thus,

neither the juvenile court nor a court of any other state could have

obtained jurisdiction over the child pursuant to subsection (a)(3).

We turn, then, to the fourth and final jurisdictional basis of § 30-

3B-201(a), that is, when "[n]o court of any other state would have

jurisdiction under the criteria specified in subdivision (1), (2), or (3) [of

this section]." § 30-3B-201(a)(4). As noted above, the record fails to

disclose a basis under subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3) for the exercise

10
CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

of jurisdiction by a Florida court over the child. Specifically, the record

indicates that Florida was not the child's home state, that the child did

not have a significant connection with Florida, and that the juvenile court

did not decline to exercise jurisdiction over the child in favor of a Florida

court. The record also fails to disclose a basis on which a court of any

other state could have exercised jurisdiction over the child. As a result,

we conclude that the juvenile court obtained jurisdiction over the child to

make an initial award of child-custody under § 30-3B-201(a)(4) and that,

having obtained that jurisdiction, it had continuing, exclusive

jurisdiction under § 30-3B-202 over DHR's petition to terminate the

parents' parental rights. See, e.g., A.M., 262 So. 3d at 1218.

In his special writing, Presiding Judge Moore reaches the same

result by a different path, concluding that the juvenile court properly

exercised jurisdiction over this matter because its temporary emergency

jurisdiction "ripened" into home-state jurisdiction when the juvenile

court entered its dependency judgment. We disagree.

There is no question that the juvenile court had temporary

emergency jurisdiction to award DHR custody of the child at the outset

of this matter. See § 30-3B-204(a), Ala. Code 1975. However, it is well

11
CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

settled that "a juvenile court exercising temporary emergency

jurisdiction under § 30-3B-204[, Ala. Code 1975,] does not have

jurisdiction to adjudicate dependency and award custody by virtue of the

limited jurisdiction provided to it." J.D. v. Lauderdale Cnty. Dep't of

Hum. Res., 121 So. 3d 381, 385 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013).

Section 30-3B-204(b) provides:

"If there is no previous child custody determination that is
entitled to be enforced under this chapter and a child custody
proceeding has not been commenced in a court of a state
having jurisdiction under Sections 30-3B-201 through 30-3B-
203, [Ala. Code 1975,] a child custody determination made
under this section remains in effect until an order is obtained
from a court of a state having jurisdiction under Sections 30-
3B-201 through 30-3B-203. If a child custody proceeding has
not been or is not commenced in a court of a state having
jurisdiction under Sections 30-3B-201 through 30-3B-203, a
child custody determination made under this section becomes
a final determination, if it so provides and this state becomes
the home state of the child."

(Emphasis added.) The phrase "a child custody determination made

under this section" refers only to an order that temporarily disposes of a

child's custody in an emergency pursuant to a juvenile court's temporary

emergency jurisdiction. Because a court's temporary emergency

jurisdiction, in and of itself, does not confer jurisdiction on a juvenile

court to decide subsequent issues of dependency, the legislature cannot

12
CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

have intended a later dependency judgment -- one that follows the

temporary order and to which § 30-3B-204(b) does not refer -- to serve as

the kind of order that can become a final custody determination under §

30-3B-204(b).

Relatedly, under § 30-3B-204(b), to become a "final determination,"

the emergency order providing for that temporary disposition must

provide, explicitly, that it is intended to be a final custody determination.

By relying on the finality of the juvenile court's later dependency

judgment as satisfying this requirement, Presiding Judge Moore's special

writing tacitly acknowledges that the juvenile court's temporary

emergency order did not, itself, provide that it was to be a final

determination as the plain language of § 30-3B-204(b) requires.

We recognize that Presiding Judge Moore's interpretation of § 30-

3B-204(b) enjoys the support of some appellate court decisions from other

jurisdictions. We are more persuaded, however, by the plain language of

§ 30-3B-204(b), which, in our view, does not permit a court's temporary

emergency jurisdiction to ripen into the kind of permanent jurisdiction

that would allow for a finding of dependency or a termination of parental

rights unless the initial emergency order itself -- not a later dependency

13
CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

order -- explicitly provides that it is a final determination. We note that

we are not alone in so holding. See, e.g., In re E.D., 812 N.W.2d 712, 721-

22 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) (holding that, even if it had been established that

no custody action involving the child was pending in another state or that

another state is not intending to initiate such an action, "the temporary

emergency order must provide that it becomes a final determination if no

such actions exist or are pending").

Having concluded that the juvenile court properly exercised

jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to § 30-3B-201(a)(4), we proceed to

a consideration of the merits of the parties' other contentions.

The Mother's Additional Arguments

The father's only contention on appeal is that the juvenile court

lacked jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. Having disposed of that

argument, we conclude that the juvenile court's judgment is due to be

affirmed relative to the father's appeal. The mother, however, raises

additional contentions on appeal, and we turn now to a consideration of

those arguments, starting first with a recitation of the relevant evidence.

In addition to the evidence relevant to the issue of subject-matter

jurisdiction, which we set forth in our opinion on original submission, the

14
CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

juvenile court elicited the following evidence at the October 30, 2023, trial

in the action to terminate the mother's and the father's parental rights.

Starling testified that DHR became involved with the mother and the

child when they both tested positive for illegal substances when the child

was born. The mother acknowledged that she abused methamphetamine

while she was pregnant with the child, and she confirmed that the child

tested positive for that drug when she was born.

The child was the youngest of the mother and the father's seven

children. The parental rights of the mother and the father to their oldest

six children were terminated in Florida before the child was born. The

mother testified that the original allegation against her had been that

her younger brothers had burned her children with cigarettes, although

she had disputed that. She also claimed that she did not use

methamphetamine until after the oldest four children were removed from

her custody. She said that her fifth and sixth children were taken from

her because they tested positive for illegal drugs when they were born.

The mother testified that she was aware that the father was a

former drug dealer but, she said, he did not start abusing illegal drugs

himself until after the older children were removed from their home. The

15
CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

father acknowledged that he had used methamphetamine because he had

been going through a period of depression. Like the mother, the father

had served time in prison on drug-related convictions.

The mother said that, although they had never married, the father

and she had been in a relationship for 12 years. At the time of the trial,

she said, they were no longer together, although they remained friends.

However, the month before the trial, the mother posted on social media

that she was in a relationship with the father. She said that she did that

to show the father's girlfriend that the father still loved the mother.

The father testified that he had been released from incarceration in

Florida in May 2022 after serving time for violating his probation and

"running from the police." He said he had eluded the police because they

were trying to arrest him for something for which he claimed to be

innocent, and he did not "want to just go lay down" because he knew the

mother was pregnant. He said that the underlying convictions involved

charges of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, battery, and

resisting arrest. However, he said, he pleaded guilty to lesser offenses

that he did not specify.

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CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

At the time of the trial, the father said, he lived in Florida with the

girlfriend of a family friend and her young son. The family friend was in

prison. The father said he had lived with them for four months. He said

that he had rented a portion of their mobile home for $250 per month and

that there was room for the child to live with him there. The father

acknowledged that, in the past, his living arrangements had been

unstable and that he did not have transportation. He also said that he

had had two or three jobs in 2023. At the time of the trial, he said, he had

worked at a solar-panel company for about one month. Before that, the

father said, he had worked about seven months for a company that was

going through what he said was a "rough patch" and he had had to take

a cut in pay, so he left for a better job at the solar-panel company.

The father testified that he was turning his life around and that he

considered himself a role model for children. After being released from

jail, the father said that, on his own initiative, he had taken part in

individualized therapy and a substance-abuse assessment and parenting

classes at a facility in Florida. He also contacted DHR and visited with

the child when he could but conceded that he had missed numerous visits.

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CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

He also ended some visits early because, he said, he respected the child's

wishes to go with the foster parents.

The father said that he would participate in services offered in

Alabama to the best of his ability but that it was difficult because he was

a Florida resident and was not eligible for some services. Starling said

that, once the father's paternity was established in May 2023, DHR had

offered him several services and had attempted to make referrals for

services in Florida but that many places had not responded to the phone

calls DHR had placed to them. The father did make use of the services

offered by one of the facilities, Starling said, but it had not reported to

DHR that the father had completed assessments and services as it

usually did. She said that the concerns DHR had with the father were his

history of drug use and housing instability. Starling also testified that,

because the parents' parental rights to the older six children had been

terminated, DHR was not required to offer services to the father.

The father admitted the results of a hair-follicle drug test

administered to him in May 2023, less than six months before the trial,

indicated that he had used amphetamine and methamphetamine, but he

claimed that he had not used drugs since June or July 2022. He said he

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CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

had used methamphetamine once since being released from jail in May

2022. He also testified that he drank "a lot by myself" and that, at times,

he got "pretty lit."

Starling testified that DHR performed an Accurint search for

relatives of the mother and of the father and mailed letters to those

family members about serving as relative resources for the child. Three

of the father's relatives responded to the letters; however, Starling said,

the father's paternity had not yet been adjudicated so those people were

not eligible to serve as relative resources. She said that she had informed

two of those relatives that, if the father became the child's legal father,

they could contact DHR again. It is unclear from the record whether those

two relatives got back in touch with DHR. One of those three failed to

contact DHR after the father's paternity was established in May 2023,

she said. A fourth relative responded on behalf of her son and his fiancée,

but the relative herself said that she was not interested in caring for the

child. Another of the father's relatives who expressed an interest in the

child failed to respond to letters that DHR had sent her about completing

forms for an Interstate Compact for Placement of Children ("ICPC")

request.

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M.D., a cousin of the father, testified that in August or September

2023, before the October 2023 trial, she had contacted DHR about being

a possible placement for the child. She said that Kemeya Bolonas-Pile, a

foster-care supervisor, was interviewing her over the telephone when

Bolonas-Pile received an emergency call and had to end their

conversation. M.D. said that Bolonas-Pile never called her back. M.D.

also said that she never received paperwork regarding the ICPC even

though she had asked about it a number of times. M.D. testified that she

had known the child was in foster care for a year, but, because she was

in college in Arizona, she was initially unable to care for the child. She

said that she had moved back to Florida four days before the trial to help

with the child and said that she was still interested in being a placement

for the child. She said that Bolonas-Pile informed her that she was not

within the necessary degree of kinship to be considered a relative

placement but that she would be eligible to be a foster parent. Bolonas-

Pile testified that she spoke with M.D. in September 2023, a month before

the trial, and M.D. told her that she "was getting herself together" and

had some things she still needed to work on.

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None of the people identified as the mother's relatives responded to

DHR's letters, and the mother did not provide DHR with the names of

any possible resources, Starling said. Additionally, Starling said, no one

from the mother's family came forward to care for the child. Starling said

that the fact that the parents' parental rights were terminated to their

six older children indicated that there may not have been any viable

relative resources. The mother opined that placing the child in the

father's custody was a viable alternative to terminating her parental

rights.

Starling testified that the child had lived with the same foster

parents since leaving the hospital and that she had found the child to be

comfortable in that placement. She added that she had observed an

attachment and filial bond between the foster parents and the child that

the foster parents wanted to be a "long-term resource" for the child, and

that the permanency plan for the child is adoption by the foster parents.

L.M., the foster mother, testified that she and her husband had bonded

with the child, loved the child, and wanted to adopt the child. She said

that the foster parents were the only family the child had ever known,

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and she believed that it would be unhealthy for the child for the bond

between them to be severed.

The mother said that she did not really know the child at all and

that the child, who was almost two years old at the time of the trial, had

likely bonded with the foster parents. However, she disagreed that

removing the child from the foster parents would be detrimental to the

child's health or happiness because, she said, the child had bonded with

the father. She said that the father had been able to visit the child several

times after he was released from prison about 18 months before the trial.

Starling disagreed with the mother, saying that she believed that

removing the child from the foster parents would be traumatic for the

child.

On October 31, 2023, the juvenile court entered a judgment

terminating the parental rights of the mother and of the father. It found

that the parents were unable or unwilling to discharge their

responsibilities to and for the child, that their conduct or conditions

rendered them unable to properly care for the child, and that their

conduct or conditions were unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

The juvenile court also determined that no viable alternatives less drastic

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than the termination of the parents' parental rights were available to

serve the best interests of the child. The mother and the father appealed.

Because the juvenile court conducted a bench trial at which it

received oral testimony, the ore tenus standard of review applies to this

appeal. Kennedy v. Boles Invs., Inc., 53 So. 3d 60, 67 (Ala. 2010).

According to that standard, "[w]hen a judge in a nonjury case hears oral

testimony, a judgment based on findings of fact based on that testimony

will be presumed correct and will not be disturbed on appeal except for a

plain and palpable error." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Skelton, 675 So. 2d 377, 379

(Ala. 1996). "The ore tenus rule is grounded upon the principle that when

the trial court hears oral testimony it has an opportunity to evaluate the

demeanor and credibility of witnesses." Hall v. Mazzone, 486 So. 2d 408,

410 (Ala. 1986). The ore tenus rule applies to disputed fact issues,

"whether the dispute is based entirely upon oral testimony or upon a

combination of oral testimony and documentary evidence." Reed v. Board

of Trs. for Alabama State Univ., 778 So. 2d 791, 795 (Ala. 2000). It does

not, however, apply to questions of law or the application of law to facts,

which we review de novo. Espinoza v. Rudolph, 46 So. 3d 403, 412 (Ala.

2010).

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"A juvenile court's judgment terminating parental rights must be

supported by clear and convincing evidence." P.S. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep't

of Hum. Res., 143 So. 3d 792, 795 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013). "Clear and

convincing evidence" is "[e]vidence that, when weighed against evidence

in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction

as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the

correctness of the conclusion." § 6-11-20(b)(4), Ala Code 1975.

When considering whether to terminate a parent's parental rights,

a juvenile court is required to apply a two-pronged test. Ex parte T.V.,

971 So. 2d 1, 4 (Ala. 2007). First, the juvenile court must determine

whether there are statutory grounds for termination. Id. Section 12-15-

319(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides:

"If the juvenile court finds from clear and convincing evidence,
competent, material, and relevant in nature, that the parents
of a child are unable or unwilling to discharge their
responsibilities to and for the child, or that the conduct or
condition of the parents renders them unable to properly care
for the child and that the conduct or condition is unlikely to
change in the foreseeable future, it may terminate the
parental rights of the parents."

The statute provides a non-exhaustive list of factors a court should

consider in determining whether to terminate parental rights. § 12-15-

319(a), Ala. Code 1975. Next, the juvenile court must determine whether

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there are viable alternatives to terminating the parent's parental rights.

T.V., 971 So. 2d at 4-5.

The mother does not contend on appeal that there were not

statutory grounds to terminate her parental rights. Instead, she focuses

on the second prong, arguing that clear and convincing evidence did not

support the juvenile court's finding that there were no viable alternatives

to the termination of her parental rights. In support of this contention,

she argues, in effect, that the father's parental rights should not have

been terminated and that the child should have been placed with him.

As noted above, in his appeal, the father challenged only the

juvenile court's jurisdiction over the case. He did not challenge the merits

of the juvenile court's judgment terminating his parental rights.

Although we question whether the mother has standing to argue that the

father's parental rights should not have been terminated, see B.H. v.

Marion Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 998 So. 2d 475, 477 (Ala. Civ. App.

2008), even assuming she is permitted to raise that issue as a necessary

concomitant to her argument that placing the child with him was a viable

alternative to terminating her parental rights, we conclude that the

mother's argument in this regard lacks merit.

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Among the factors a court should consider in determining whether

a parent's parental rights should be terminated is whether that parent's

parental rights to the child's siblings have been involuntarily terminated.

See § 12-15-319(a)(8), Ala. Code 1975. In this case, the father's parental

rights had been terminated to his six older children before the juvenile

court determined that his parental rights to the child at issue were due

to be terminated. Moreover, in addition to having his parental rights to

the six older children terminated, a hair-follicle drug test performed on

the father five months before trial was positive for amphetamine and

methamphetamine. Based on the father's history of drug use, the juvenile

court was free to question his contention that he had rehabilitated

himself to the point that he could resume having custody of the child. See

R.L.M.S. v. Etowah Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 37 So. 3d 805, 811 (Ala.

Civ. App. 2009). Additionally, the father failed to demonstrate that,

despite being out of prison for more than a year, at the time of the trial

he had transportation, stable housing, or stable employment. Thus, the

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CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

undisputed evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that grounds

existed to terminate the father's parental rights. 1

The mother also contends that the juvenile court failed to consider

placing the child in the custody of multiple paternal relatives,

particularly the father's cousin, M.D., who testified at the trial that she

was willing to serve as a relative resource for the child. The mother also

points out that, after the father's paternity was established, DHR failed

to reach out to some of the father's relatives who had expressed an

interest in serving as relative placements in 2021, when the child was

first placed in DHR's custody.

In the present case, the child has been in the foster parents' home

since only a few days after her birth, and the foster parents' home is the

only home the child has known. After the child's birth, the father waited

nearly a year and a half before taking steps to establish his paternity,

and, the evidence shows, he was not in prison for most of that time. There

1To the extent that the mother's argument can be construed to
assert that terminating the parental rights of the father was improper
because there were viable alternatives to terminating his rights, the
alternatives she posits -- placing the child with relatives -- do not support
her argument that the child should have been placed with the father,
and, thus, do not support her contention that reversing the termination
of the father's parental rights would inure to her benefit.
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CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

is no evidence indicating that, after DHR initially contacted the father's

relatives, any of them attempted to meet the child or to stay in contact

with the father or DHR in the event that the father's paternity was

established and they could then serve as relative placements. Meanwhile,

during the year and a half it took the father to establish his paternity,

the child and the foster parents became attached and emotionally bonded

with each other. The foster parents desire to adopt the child. It is worth

noting that none of the father's family members had custody of the older

six children as to whom the father's parental rights had been terminated.

Additionally, a juvenile court is not required to consider a relative

resource for a child if "[t]he relative did not attempt to care for the child

or obtain custody of the child within four months of the child being

removed from the custody of the parents or placed in foster care, if the

removal was known to the relative," and the current permanency plan is

adoption by the current foster parents. § 12-15-319(c), Ala. Code 1975.

Here, M.D. was aware that the child was in foster care, but she waited

until just a few months before the trial -- after she had finished school in

Arizona -- before putting herself forward as a possible relative placement

for the child. Given that lapse of time, coupled with the evidence

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CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

indicating that she was not within the degree of consanguinity to be

considered a relative resource, see § 12-15-301(11), Ala. Code 1975, we

cannot say that the juvenile court erred in refusing to award her custody

of the child as an alternative to terminating the father's parental rights.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the juvenile court

properly exercised subject-matter jurisdiction over this action under the

UCCJEA and that neither parent has demonstrated that the juvenile

court erred in terminating their parental rights. Therefore, the juvenile

court's judgment is affirmed.

CL-2023-0794 -- AFFIRMED.

CL-2023-0805 -- AFFIRMED.

Edwards, Hanson, Fridy, and Lewis, JJ., concur.

Moore, P.J., concurs in the result, with opinion.

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CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

MOORE, Presiding Judge, concurring in the result.

I agree with the main opinion that the judgment entered by the

Houston Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") terminating the parental

rights of W.S. II ("the father") and of E.A. ("the mother") should be

affirmed, but I disagree with the jurisdictional analysis contained in the

opinion. I write specially to address that issue.

The record that is now before this court upon return from remand

to the juvenile court shows that, on November 2, 2021, the mother, a

Florida resident, intentionally crossed state lines to give birth to E.S.

("the child") in a Dothan hospital to evade Florida child-welfare and

criminal authorities. After the mother and the child tested positive for

methamphetamine, and the mother was arrested, the Houston County

Department of Human Resources ("DHR") obtained protective custody of

the child and, based on those circumstances, DHR filed in the juvenile

court a dependency petition relating to the child on November 9, 2021.

On November 10, 2021, the juvenile court entered a shelter-care order in

which it determined that it had temporary emergency jurisdiction over

the case.

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CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

Pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and

Enforcement Act ("the UCCJEA"), Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-101 et seq.,

an Alabama juvenile court "has temporary emergency jurisdiction if the

child is present in this state and the child has been abandoned or it is

necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child, or a

sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to or threatened with

mistreatment or abuse." Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-204(a). No party

disputes that the juvenile court properly assumed temporary emergency

jurisdiction over the case. Pursuant to that jurisdiction, the juvenile

court awarded DHR "pendente lite" custody of the child, subject to a

determination of its jurisdiction to proceed further in the matter. DHR

subsequently placed the child with foster parents, who reside in

Alabama.

On June 23, 2022, the juvenile court conducted an adjudicatory

hearing on the dependency petition. At that hearing, the juvenile court

indicated that it had unsuccessfully attempted to contact the appropriate

Florida-court judge to ascertain whether a child-custody proceeding

relating to the child had been commenced in Florida. The juvenile-court

judge then orally determined that it had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA

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CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

"because the child is in Alabama, and I have not had any contact with

anybody in the Florida judicial system regarding this child." The juvenile

court subsequently entered a judgment finding the child dependent and

awarding custody of the child to DHR. In that judgment, the juvenile

court stated: "[T]his court has jurisdiction based on facts presented."

"When acting under [temporary] emergency jurisdiction, however,

a juvenile court may not adjudicate a child dependent or make an award

of custody, other than a pendente lite award of custody." C.H. v. Lamar

Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 324 So. 3d 391, 395 n.2 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020)

(citing M.B. v. B.B., 244 So. 3d 128, 132-33 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017), and R.S.

v. B.C., 248 So. 3d 10, 13 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017)). However, the UCCJEA

authorizes a court that has acquired only temporary emergency

jurisdiction over a child to make a final child-custody determination in

limited circumstances. See Official Comment to Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-

204. Specifically, § 30-3B-204(b) provides:

"If there is no previous child custody determination that is
entitled to be enforced under this chapter and a child custody
proceeding has not been commenced in a court of a state
having jurisdiction under [Ala. Code 1975, §§] 30-3B-201
through 30-3B-203, a child custody determination made
under this section remains in effect until an order is obtained
from a court of a state having jurisdiction under [§§] 30-3B-
201 through 30-3B-203. If a child custody proceeding has not

32
CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

been or is not commenced in a court of a state having
jurisdiction under [§§] 30-3B-201 through 30-3B-203, a child
custody determination made under this section becomes a
final determination, if it so provides and this state becomes
the home state of the child."

Section 30-3B-204(b) allows a juvenile court that has exercised

temporary emergency jurisdiction to make a final child-custody

determination when no other child-custody determination has been made

and no other child-custody proceeding relating to the child has been

commenced in another state with jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, so long

as the determination "so provides and this state becomes the home state

of the child."

In this case, the juvenile court originally awarded DHR only

"pendente lite" custody of the child, and it recognized that it could not

find the child dependent and award any other form of custody to DHR

without first obtaining jurisdiction to do so under the UCCJEA. Upon

finding that the child had been living in Alabama since his birth and that

no other child-custody proceeding relating to the child had been

commenced in Florida, the juvenile court determined that it could enter

a final judgment finding the child dependent and awarding DHR

permanent custody of the child. The juvenile court did not cite § 30-3B-

33
CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

204(b) in the dependency judgment, but it is apparent that the juvenile

court was relying on that provision when it determined that it had

jurisdiction to enter a final adjudicatory and a permanent custody order

in the dependency case.

Under 30-3B-204(b), "an emergency custody determination made

under this section becomes a final determination, if it so provides."

Official Comment to § 30-3B-204 (emphasis added). The juvenile court

did not expressly state in the dependency judgment that it was making a

"final child custody determination under the UCCJEA." However, in my

opinion, § 30-3B-204(b) is satisfied if the language and the context of the

judgment indicate that it is intended to be a final child-custody

determination under general Alabama law. See In re Saida A., 71 Misc.

3d 611, 624, 143 N.Y.S.3d 501, 511 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2021) ("[A]ny final

order of custody, including an order of placement with [the New York

City Administration for Children's Services], which this court may issue

in the instant case, will be a 'final determination' under the UCCJEA."

(citing Paul v. Paul, 161 A.D.3d 888, 891, 77 N.Y.S.3d 88 (2018)).

Although subject to exceptions inapplicable in this case, "in the context

of juvenile dependency orders, an order determining that a child is (or

34
CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

that a child remains) dependent coupled with a disposition of that child's

custody is a final judgment ...." Marshall Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res. v. J.V.,

203 So. 3d 1243, 1247 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016). The language of the

dependency judgment, when viewed in the context in which it was

entered, clearly shows that the juvenile court intended to and did enter

a final child-custody determination within the meaning of Alabama

dependency laws and the UCCJEA. See Rule 58(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. In

other words, the dependency judgment "provides" that it is a final child-

custody determination.

The courts of other states have indicated that, in at least some

circumstances, a judgment should expressly state that it is intended as a

final child-custody determination in order to satisfy § 30-3B-204(b). See,

e.g., In re E.D., 812 N.W.2d 712, 721 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) (holding that,

because emergency-removal order did not expressly provide that it was a

final determination, the court could exercise only temporary emergency

jurisdiction); In re Z.H., 245 W. Va. 456, 468, 859 S.E.2d 399, 411 (2021);

In re Marriage of Wang & Zhou, 62 Cal. App. 5th 1098, 1107, 277 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 302, 308 (2021). On the other hand, some courts have construed

the same provision more broadly when the context shows substantial

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CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

compliance with the finality-determination requirement. See In re K.M.,

771 N.W.2d 651 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (table) (holding that order entered

based on temporary emergency jurisdiction ripened into permanent order

when no other state proceeding was maintained and case proceeded to

termination of parental rights as final determination); accord Terrell v.

Arkansas Dep't of Hum. Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 582, 4, 474 S.W.3d 90, 92

(2015); In re N.B., 289 N.C. App. 525, 533, 890 S.E.2d 199, 204 (2023)

(holding that court's temporary emergency jurisdiction may ripen into

home-state jurisdiction under the UCCJEA by mere passage of time

when no other child-custody proceeding is commenced in another state);

Interest of K.L.B., 56 Kan. App. 2d 429, 444, 431 P.3d 883, 894 (2018). It

would be helpful if an Alabama juvenile court would insert explicit

language tracking § 30-3B-204(b) when it is relying on that statute to

assert jurisdiction over the custody of a child, but I do not find that it is

necessary for it to do so when, from the context of the case, we can readily

ascertain its intention. This court has long recognized that it may infer

necessary findings to allow appellate review of judgments affecting the

custody of a dependent child to avoid delay in disposing of the appeal.

See, e.g., J.P. v. S.S., 989 So. 2d 591, 598 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) ("[I]n the

36
CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

interest of judicial economy this court may hold that a finding of

dependency is implicit in the trial court's judgment."). That principle

militates heavily toward treating the dependency judgment in this case

as a "final determination" within the meaning of § 30-3B-204(b).

The record further indicates that Alabama had become the home

state of the child before the entry of the dependency judgment. The

shelter-care order vested legal and physical custody of the child in DHR,

which exercised physical custody of the child through a foster-care

arrangement. Since November 10, 2021, DHR had been "a person acting

as a parent" toward the child within the meaning of Ala. Code 1975, §§

30-3B-102(12) and (13). Home-state jurisdiction attached six months

later.2 See Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-102(7). Therefore, the juvenile court

2I recognize that the term "home state" generally means "[t]he state

in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at
least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a
child custody proceeding." Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-102(7). However, in
the context of Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-204(b), the legislature obviously
intended that Alabama could become the home state of a child subject to
the temporary emergency jurisdiction of a court by living in this state for
six months with a person acting as a parent; otherwise, § 30-3B-204(b)
would have no field of operation. See generally B.F. Goodrich Co. v.
Butler, 56 Ala. App. 635, 647, 324 So. 2d 776, 787 (Civ. 1975) (holding
that individual statutes in one comprehensive act should be construed so
that each is afforded a field of operation).
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CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

had subject-matter jurisdiction under § 30-3B-204(b) when it entered the

dependency judgment.

Once the juvenile court entered the dependency judgment, it

retained continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over custody proceedings

relating to the child. See Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-202(a). The juvenile

court properly acted pursuant to that jurisdiction when it entered the

judgment terminating the parental rights of the mother and of the father.

As other courts have consistently held, when temporary emergency

jurisdiction ripens into home-state jurisdiction under § 30-3B-204(b), the

court acquires jurisdiction to terminate parental rights. See, e.g.,

Sha'quia G. v. Department of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 212, 488 P.3d 994

(Ct. App. 2021); Trevino v. Arkansas Dep't of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark.

App. 182, 645 S.W.3d 19 (2022); Terrell v. Arkansas Dep't of Hum. Servs.,

supra; Interest of K.L.B., supra; In re J.C.B., 209 S.W.3d 821 (Tex. Ct.

App. 2006).

The juvenile-court judge who presided over the termination-of-

parental-rights proceedings, who was not the same judge who presided

over the dependency proceedings, did not analyze the jurisdictional issue

exactly as I have in this special writing. However, subject-matter

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jurisdiction is a question of law that this court reviews de novo, and we

are not bound by the reasoning of the trial court as to that question. See

Taylor v. Paradise Missionary Baptist Church, 242 So. 3d 979, 986 (Ala.

2017). The juvenile court was correct in finding that it had subject-

matter jurisdiction over the termination-of-parental-rights proceedings,

regardless of how it reached that decision, so I agree that the judgment

is valid and that it should not be reversed for jurisdictional reasons.

39