C.A.M. v. Mobile County Department of Human Resources (Appeal from Mobile Juvenile Court: JU-21-1551.04).

Rel: March 21, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
_________________________

CL-2024-0384
_________________________

C.A.M.

v.

Mobile County Department of Human Resources

Appeal from Mobile Juvenile Court
(JU-21-1551.04)

PER CURIAM.

C.A.M. ("the mother") appeals from a judgment of the Mobile

Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") terminating her parental rights to

C.M. ("the child"), one of her three children. We affirm.
CL-2024-0384

Background

In June 2023, the Mobile County Department of Human Resources

("DHR") filed a petition asking the juvenile court to terminate the

mother's parental rights to the child. In its petition, DHR alleged that

the mother had an extensive history of using illegal drugs, that she had

not completed a substance-abuse-treatment program, that she suffered

from mental illness, that she had not taken the necessary steps to obtain

treatment for her mental illness, that she had not maintained stable

housing, and that she had not maintained consistent employment. The

petition also stated a claim for an award of child support while the child

was in DHR's custody. The juvenile court entered an order appointing

counsel to represent the mother and appointing a guardian ad litem to

protect the interests of the child.

The juvenile court held a trial on October 17, 2023, and December

4, 2023, at which it received evidence ore tenus. The mother did not

appear for the first day of the trial on October 17. She appeared for the

second day of the trial on December 4 but did not testify.

Vincene Robinson testified that she was the current DHR social

worker assigned to the child. Robinson testified that, in December 2021,

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DHR had received a report that the mother and her three children were

being evicted from their apartment. DHR arranged for the mother and

her children to stay temporarily at a hotel. DHR subsequently received a

report that the mother had a history with the Florida Department of

Children and Families ("FDCF") because she had been using illegal

drugs. DHR then asked the mother to submit to a drug screen, which she

did. Her drug screen showed the presence of methamphetamine,

amphetamine, and cocaine. Robinson testified that DHR had learned

that FDCF had investigated reports that the mother was abusing alcohol

and was using illegal drugs and that those investigations had resulted in

findings that the mother had used alcohol, methamphetamine, opioids,

amphetamine, and marijuana. Robinson said that DHR learned that

FDCF had implemented a safety plan but was unable to obtain any other

information from FDCF regarding what action it had taken after it had

concluded its investigation. Robinson testified that, based on the

mother's testing positive for illegal drugs in the drug screen that DHR

had administered in December 2021, DHR had summarily removed the

child and her two siblings from the mother's custody.

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Robinson testified that, although the mother did not initially

identify the child's father, DHR received a report that M.R. was the

child's father. The mother gave DHR a telephone number for M.R., but

DHR's initial attempts to contact M.R. were unsuccessful. Robinson said

that, eventually, DHR was able to contact M.R. in 2023. Robinson

testified that M.R. had denied that he was the child's father and that he

had asked DHR not to contact him anymore.

When DHR removed the child from the mother's custody, the

mother was unemployed and, after her temporary stay at a hotel, which

DHR had arranged, she had begun sleeping in her automobile. Robinson

testified that DHR had assigned her to the child in April 2022 and that

she had reviewed DHR's records regarding the child. She testified that

she was familiar with what had occurred before she was assigned to the

child. Robinson said that, after DHR removed the child from the mother's

custody, it had offered the mother services to assist her in reunifying with

the child. Those services included counseling, a psychological evaluation,

a drug assessment, random drug screening, parenting classes, and

visitation with the child. Robinson said that DHR had held

individualized-service-plan ("ISP") meetings on December 16, 2021;

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December 22, 2021; January 12, 2022; July 26, 2022; October 13, 2022;

and April 14, 2022. Robinson said that the mother had completed

parenting classes but that she had not completed them until almost a

year had elapsed since the removal of the child from her custody. The

mother submitted to a psychological evaluation. Robinson testified that

the mother was supposed to have at least 10 counseling sessions with

Amy Turner but that she had attended only 4 before Turner discharged

her for failing to consistently schedule appointments for the sessions.

Robinson said that DHR had attempted to restart the mother's

counseling with Turner in April 2023. Turner contacted the mother about

restarting the counseling, but the mother told Turner that she could not

meet with Turner because the mother was living in her automobile.

Turner told the mother that she would meet with the mother anywhere

that was convenient for the mother, but the mother still did not restart

counseling.

Robinson testified that the mother had been diagnosed with several

mental-health problems. Robinson said that, in April 2023, the mother

had called Robinson and told her that she did not know where the door

to the DHR office was located even though she had previously been to

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DHR's office on multiple occasions to visit the child there. Robinson

testified that the mother had told her that she felt that someone was

always behind her and that someone was always out to get her. Robinson

said that the mother had gone to The Shoulder, a drug-and-alcohol-

rehabilitation facility, in April or June 2023 but that The Shoulder

discharged her for a rule violation. Robinson said that The Shoulder

would not disclose to DHR the nature of the mother's rule violation but

that the mother had told Robinson that, while she was living in her

automobile, a man had attacked and raped her and that that man had

subsequently seen her in the parking lot of The Shoulder and had come

to the facility. Robinson said that the mother had told her that The

Shoulder thought she was putting other clients in danger because of her

attacker's coming to the facility and that that was why The Shoulder had

discharged her. Robinson said that she had asked the mother to provide

her with corroborating proof that a man had attacked and raped her and

that, although the mother had told her that she would provide the proof,

she never did. Robinson said that the mother was at The Shoulder for

approximately four to six weeks.

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Robinson said that, after The Shoulder discharged the mother, the

mother had started treatment at 7 Springs Ministries ("7 Springs"), an

in-patient rehabilitation facility. Robinson testified that the treatment

program at 7 Springs lasts 12 months and that the mother had an

expected graduation date in June or July 2024. Robinson testified that 7

Springs administers drug screens; that the mother had signed a release

allowing 7 Springs to report the results of the mother's drug screens to

DHR; and that the mother had tested positive for alcohol,

methamphetamine, and amphetamine in June 2023, when she first

entered 7 Springs. Robinson said that the mother had not had any

positive drug screens since June 2023.

Robinson testified that, before the mother had entered 7 Springs,

she had asked the mother to submit to monthly drug screens. Robinson

said that the mother had refused to submit to several of the drug screens

but that she had submitted to one in April 2023, and it was positive for

methamphetamine and amphetamine. Robinson testified that, since July

2023, 7 Springs had transported the mother to a facility run by

AltaPointe for mental-health treatment and that the mother had had

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monthly appointments at AltaPointe in July, August, and September

2023.

Robinson testified that the mother had had an apartment when

DHR assigned Robinson to the child's case in April 2022 and that the

apartment had been suitable for a child. Robinson said, however, that in

April 2023, the mother's landlord had evicted her from that apartment.

Robinson testified that the mother had held temporary service jobs

such as cleaning houses. She said that those jobs did not last more than

two months. Robinson testified that, in October 2023, the mother was

working part time at a fast-food restaurant, although she expected to be

made full time soon. She said that the mother's income from her job at

the fast-food restaurant was not sufficient to support her and the child.

Robinson testified that the mother had consistently visited the child, that

there had not been any problems during her visits, and that there was a

bond between the mother and the child.

Robinson testified that the mother had filled out a relative-resource

form listing as relative resources S.H. ("the grandmother"), the child's

maternal grandmother; M.R., the child's alleged father; and E.C., the

father of one of the child's siblings. Robinson said that she contacted the

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CL-2024-0384

grandmother and that the grandmother had filed a petition seeking

custody of the child but that the juvenile court had dismissed the

grandmother's petition for failure to prosecute because she did not

appear for trial. Robinson said that DHR had also done a Seneca Search,

which searches databases on the Internet, for relatives of the mother who

might serve as a relative resource. Robinson said that DHR had sent

letters to the relatives identified in the Seneca Search but that DHR had

not received a response to any of those letters. Robinson said that DHR

also performed a Federal Parent Locater search for relatives of M.R., the

alleged father of the child. The Federal Parent Locater search identified

M.R.'s address and the names and addresses of his relatives. Robinson

testified that DHR had sent letters to M.R. and to all his relatives that

the Federal Parent Locater search had identified. She said that one of

M.R.'s aunts ("the aunt") called her and that she and the aunt did a three-

way call with M.R. According to Robinson, the aunt told her that she was

too old to take care of the child but that she could possibly find another

relative who could care for her. Robinson testified that M.R. did not have

any interest in caring for the child. Robinson said that she asked M.R. if

he would submit to a DNA test but that he would not agree to do so. She

9
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said that M.R. had also told her not to contact him again, so she did not.

She testified that she had subsequently read an article in a newspaper

stating that M.R. had been arrested on a murder charge in Pensacola and

that he had been released on bond.

Robinson testified that the concerns that were preventing

reunification of the mother with the child were the mother's inability to

maintain stable housing, her mental-health problems, her drug

addiction, and her inability to maintain consistent employment. She

testified that, because the mother had a part-time job, was receiving

mental-health treatment, and was receiving substance-abuse treatment,

Robinson had considered waiting until the mother had completed the 7

Springs program before petitioning the juvenile court to terminate the

mother's parental rights but that she had rejected that course of action

because, she said, she did not think that it would be in the child's best

interests because, she said, the child had already been in foster care for

almost two years and because, she said, the mother had a habit of

relapsing into the use of illegal drugs and losing her housing.

Robinson testified that, in her opinion, it would be detrimental to

the child to sever the bond between the child and the foster parents.

10
CL-2024-0384

Robinson testified that, in her opinion, the benefit to the child of

achieving permanency with the foster parents outweighed any harm the

child would suffer from the severance of the bond between her and the

mother. Robinson testified that termination of the mother's parental

rights was appropriate because, she said, the child had been in foster care

for almost two years; because, she said, the child did not have a parent

who was able to care for her; and because, she said, the child did not have

a relative who was willing to care for her. Robinson said that adoption by

the foster parents would provide the child with stability whereas the

mother could not provide the child with stability in her current

circumstances.

Robinson testified that the grandmother was the only maternal

relative that the Seneca Search had identified that she called or e-mailed.

She said that the mother had had visitation with the child twice per

month until DHR changed the permanency plan for the child from return

to parent to adoption by unidentified resource in April 2023. After the

change in the child's permanency plan to adoption by unidentified

resource, DHR reduced the mother's visitation to once per month. DHR

placed the child with the current foster parents in June 2023 and, after

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the foster parents indicated that they wanted to adopt the child sometime

thereafter, DHR changed the permanency plan from adoption by

unidentified resource to adoption by current foster parents.

Robinson testified that DHR's efforts to rehabilitate the mother

had failed. She testified that permanency for the child was in the child's

best interests. Robinson testified that DHR's goal with every child is to

achieve permanency, and permanency is not achieved if a child remains

in foster care.

The juvenile court accepted Jack Carney, PhD, a licensed

psychologist, as an expert in clinical psychology. Dr. Carney testified that

he had performed a psychological evaluation on the mother in April 2022.

He testified that, during his interview of the mother, she appeared to be

manic and even psychotic at times. He said that "she discussed things

that were concerning regarding hypersexuality, paranoia, plots against

her and her child, and very often the things that she would give as proof

of other people's malicious behavior made very little sense."

Despite the mother's behavior during her interview, Dr. Carney

opined that the results of the written tests he had given her were valid

and accurate. The tests he had given her indicated that she paid

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attention throughout the testing, that she put forth good effort, that she

was consistent, and that the test results were valid. The tests indicated

that she had an average IQ; in Dr. Carney's opinion, the mother did not

have an intellectual deficit that would have interfered with her ability to

understand the test questions or to respond appropriately.

Dr. Carney testified that the mother had told him that, in the past,

she had tested positive for multiple drugs including methamphetamine.

He testified that she minimized the importance of her drug use. He said

that people who use methamphetamine have a high rate of relapse and

that, therefore, they need a regimen of active substance-abuse treatment

and to sustain an extended period of sobriety to minimize the chances of

relapse. Dr. Carney testified that the mother did not appear to have much

desire to maintain sobriety.

Dr. Carney diagnosed the mother with schizoaffective disorder --

bipolar type, paranoid personality disorder, major neurocognitive

disorder, and traumatic brain injury. He diagnosed her with

schizoaffective disorder -- bipolar type because, he said, the mother "has

some emotional problems such as depression and anxiety, but then also

has some manic problems in terms of pressured speech, some potential

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CL-2024-0384

for pleasure-seeking that gets her into trouble at times, but then there's

also this component of where she's not quite reality based." He said that

the mother "moves fluidly from being reality based to almost being

psychotic to then maybe being floridly psychotic." He testified that the

mother's paranoid personality disorder is characterized by "long-term

contractible-type paranoia feelings that people are malicious and out to

get her and harm her in some way." Dr. Carney opined that the mother's

schizoaffective disorder -- bipolar type and her paranoid personality

disorder would impair her ability to meet the day-to-day needs of her

children. Dr. Carney testified that the mother's mental-health problems

did not seem to be amenable to treatment because, he said, the mother

had told him that she was taking Latuda, Trintellix, and Trazodone and

receiving counseling yet was still exhibiting the symptoms of her mental-

health problems during his evaluation of her. He testified that, even if

the mother received all the additional treatment he had recommended,

her prognosis was poor, and she was unlikely to be able to safely parent

children in the future.

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CL-2024-0384

On December 18, 2023, 14 days after the second and final day of the

trial, the juvenile court entered a judgment terminating the mother's

parental rights. In the judgment, the juvenile court found:

"1. That the … child is under the age of 18 years and is
within the geographical bounds of Mobile County, Alabama.

"2. That the mother was personally served by private
process server on June 27, 2023.

"3. That the child has been in the custody of [DHR] since
December 14, 2021, when the mother tested positive for
cocaine, methamphetamines, and amphetamines on a hair
follicle test after she and the children were evicted from their
home.

"4. That the mother has a significant history with
Florida Child Protective Services regarding drug abuse and
homelessness. Before moving to Alabama with her three
children, the mother was indicated for neglect and abuse by
the state of Florida relating to her drug and alcohol use.

"5. 'That the mother does not have custody of the …
child's two siblings. One of the siblings is placed with their
father and the other sibling is in foster care.

"6. That [DHR] offered services towards rehabilitation
and reunification for the mother which included the … child
in December 2021, January 2022, July 2022, October 2022,
and April 2023. Services offered included parenting classes,
safe and stable housing, psychological evaluation, counseling,
mental health treatment, drug screens, substance abuse
treatment, and visitation. (Pet. Ex. 1)

"• That the mother submitted to some, but not all, of
the requested drug screens. In June 2023, the

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mother tested positive for alcohol,
methamphetamine, and amphetamine. She has
tested negative on screens she has submitted to
since that date. The mother has failed or refused
to submit to drug screens on a regular basis when
asked.

"• That the mother submitted to a psychological
evaluation with Dr. Jack Carney on April 5, 2022.
Dr. Carney made the following treatment
recommendations: 180-day residential substance
abuse treatment, counseling, and mental health
treatment. (Pet. Ex. 8)

"• That the mother was asked to complete a 180-day
residential drug treatment program. She was
discharged from The Shoulder in April 2023 and
entered Seven Springs in June 2023. The mother
may have still been in the treatment facility on the
day of the first hearing in October 2023. No
evidence was presented as to whether she
successfully completed that program.

"• That the mother was referred to in-home family
counseling with Amy Turner. The mother only
completed four (4) of the required ten (10) sessions
before she was discharged for nonattendance. A
second referral was made but the mother did not
attend any of these sessions.

"• That the mother is consistent in attending her
mental health appointments with Alta Pointe.

"• That the mother has not maintained stable
housing or employment while the child has been in
[DHR] custody. The mother has been homeless
and living in her car. She has been evicted twice
since the child entered care.

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CL-2024-0384

"• That the mother participated in visitation with the
child once per month for one hour. The visits have
gone well, and the social worker observed a bond
between the mother and the child.

"• That the mother has been cooperating with [DHR]
since entering Seven Springs Treatment Facility
in June 2023. These last-minute efforts, however,
are unconvincing due to the mother's history of
relapse, homelessness, and mental and emotional
illness.

"• That the permanency goal for the child has been
adoption by current foster parent since August
2023. Although the social worker saw a positive
change in the mother, the social worker felt that
adoption by current foster parent was in the child's
best interest based on the amount of time the child
had been in foster care and the mother's history of
relapse.

"7. That the mother suffers from emotional and mental
illness as well as excessive use of alcohol and drugs such as to
render her unable to care for the needs of the child and that
the mother's inability to parent is unlikely to change in the
foreseeable future. Dr. Jack Carney testified that he
conducted a psychological evaluation on the mother. He
diagnosed her with: Schizoaffective Disorder Bipolar type,
Paranoid Personality Disorder, Major Neurocognitive
Disorder, [Traumatic Brain Injury], Excessive use of
controlled substances, (cannabis, alcohol,
methamphetamines, opioid, and prescription use disorder)
and failure to maintain material needs. Dr. Carney gave the
mother a poor prognosis. The mother's recent attempts at
maintaining sobriety and treatment for her mental illness
would not change his opinion regarding her inability to care
for children. That opinion was based on the mother's inability

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to meet her own needs, a 70% chance of relapse and the fact
that even on medications she exhibited active symptoms of
paranoia. According to the testimony of Dr. Carney, the
diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder is long term and not
amenable to sustained change. (Pet. Ex. 8)

"8. That the mother has not contributed to the material
needs or provided financial support for the child since the
child has been in care.

"9. That there are no viable relatives known to the Court
or to [DHR] to take care, custody, or control of the child.

"• [DHR] attempted to contact the alleged father,
[M.R.]. He denied he was the biological father and
refused to submit to DNA [testing]. He requested
no further contact from [DHR].

"• The mother listed the alleged father, the siblings'
father, and the [grandmother] on the [relative
resource] form. The alleged father refused all
contact, and the [grandmother] filed a petition but
failed to follow through or have any further contact
with [DHR]. (Pet. Ex. 2)

"• [DHR] conducted a Seneca search and a federal
parent locator and mailed letters to possible
relatives. (Pet. Ex. 3, 4, 6). [DHR] received some
responses to the letters, but no one was willing to
be a placement resource for the child.

"10. That the child was placed in the current foster home
on June 2, 2023. At the time the child was placed, the
permanency plan was adoption with no identified resource.
One month later, the plan was changed to adoption by current
foster parents. (Pet. Ex. 7)

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"This Court finds that [DHR] has made reasonable
efforts to provide services to this family to avoid the filing of
the Petition for Termination of Parental Rights and finds no
viable alternative to termination of parental rights[,] which
will serve the best interests of the child. Wherefore, the Court
concludes that termination of parental rights and adoption by
foster parents is in the best interest of the child. Having
considered the ore tenus testimony and evidence offered on
the hearing date[,] the Court finds that the Petition to
Terminate Parental Rights is due to be GRANTED. This
Court specifically finds that there is clear and convincing
evidence competent, relevant, and material in nature that the
mother, [C.A.M.], is not willing or able to discharge her
responsibilities to and for the minor child. The Court further
finds that there are no viable alternatives to Termination of
Parental Rights and no potential relative resources available
for the permanent placement of this child. This Court finds
Adoptive resources have been identified for the minor child
and [DHR] hopes to finalize the adoption shortly. In making
the foregoing finding, the Court has considered the factors set
forth in Section 12-15-319 (a) of the Code of Alabama [1975].

"The Court further specifically finds the following:

"(l) 'That [the child] is without a parent or guardian
willing or able to provide for [her] support, training, and
education.

"(2) That clear and convincing evidence, competent,
relevant and material in nature has established that this
child is dependent and in need of care and supervision by the
state in that [her] legal parents are unwilling or unable to
discharge their responsibilities to and for the minor child; that
the conduct or condition of the parents renders them unable
to properly care for the minor child and that said conduct or
condition is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

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"(3) That [the child] is dependent and in need of the care
and Supervision of the State.

"(4) That [DHR] has investigated all viable alternatives
to termination of parental rights and the court finds that
there exist no other viable alternatives consistent with the
best interests of the child, other than termination of parental
rights.

"(5) That [DHR] has made all reasonable efforts towards
rehabilitation of and reunification with the legal parents and
such efforts have failed.

"(6) That [DHR] has made reasonable efforts to finalize
the permanency plan for [the child] which plan is: (a) Adoption
by foster parents following termination of parental rights.

"(7) The Court hereby approves the permanency plan
indicated above.

"(8) That the above-named child is Dependent and in
need of care and protection by the State of Alabama
Department of Human Resources and that it is in the said
child's best interest for [the] parental rights of the mother [to]
be terminated so that said child can be placed for adoption.

"(9) [DHR] is equipped to care for and has agreed to
receive the child upon commitment by final order of this court
and to seek adoptive placement.

"(10) That guardianship and permanent legal custody of
[the child] is hereby granted to the State of Alabama
Department of Human Resources for permanent placement
and adoption.

"(11) Upon the entry of a Final Order of Adoption by a
Court of competent jurisdiction, [DHR] shall immediately
notify this Court for closure of this case."

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The December 18, 2023, judgment did not adjudicate DHR's claim

for child support. The mother timely appealed from that judgment, and

this court docketed her appeal as appeal number CL-2024-0001. Because

the juvenile court's judgment did not adjudicate DHR's child-support

claim, we dismissed the mother's appeal without an opinion because it

was an appeal from a nonfinal judgment. C.A.M. v. Mobile Cnty. Dep't of

Hum. Res. (No. CL-2024-0001, Apr. 1, 2024). We issued our certificate of

judgment in appeal number CL-1014-0001 on April 19, 2024.

On April 23, 2024, the juvenile court entered a final judgment

denying DHR's child-support claim. The April 23, 2024, judgment also

reiterated verbatim the language of the juvenile court's December 18,

2023, order terminating the mother's parental rights.

On May 7, 2024, the mother filed a postjudgment motion in which

she asserted that the juvenile court's entering the April 23, 2024, order,

without holding a new trial, constituted a violation of § 12-15-320(a), Ala.

Code 1975, and Rule 25(D), Ala. R. Juv. P., both of which require a

juvenile court to enter a final order ruling on a termination-of-parental-

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rights claim within 30 days after the completion of the trial. 1 The

mother's motion also asserted that the juvenile court's entering the April

23, 2024, judgment, without holding a new trial, constituted a

termination of her parental rights that was not based on her current

conditions because, she said, four-and-a-half months had elapsed

between the last day of the trial on December 4, 2023, and the juvenile

court's entering its April 23, 2024, order, which reiterated verbatim the

language of the juvenile court's December 18, 2023, order terminating

the mother's parental rights. On May 21, 2024, the juvenile court denied

the mother's postjudgment motion without stating its rationale for doing

so. On May 27, 2024, the mother timely filed a notice of appeal.

Standard of Review

When a juvenile court bases its judgment on ore tenus evidence, a

presumption of correctness attaches to the juvenile court's factual

1In pertinent part, § 12-15-320(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides: "[In

termination-of-parent-rights actions,] [t]he trial court judge shall enter a
final order within 30 days of the completion of the trial."

Similarly, Rule 25(D), Ala. R. Juv. P., provides, in pertinent part,
that "[i]n termination-of-parental-rights cases, the juvenile court shall
make its finding by written order within 30 days of completion of the
trial."
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findings, and an appellate court will not disturb those findings unless

they are clearly erroneous, unsupported by the evidence, manifestly

unjust, or against the great weight of the evidence. See L.S. v. A.S., 272

So. 3d 169, 179 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018). An appellate court reviews a

juvenile court's conclusions of law and its application of law to the facts

under the de novo standard of review. See Key v. Allison, 70 So. 3d 277,

281 (Ala. 2010).

Analysis

A juvenile court may terminate a parent's parental rights if the

party seeking the termination proves, by clear and convincing evidence,

that one of the grounds for termination specified in § 12-15-319(a), Ala.

Code 1975, exists and that no viable alternative to terminating the

parent's parental rights exists. See R.H. v. Madison Cnty. Dep't of Hum.

Res., 383 So. 3d 667, 672 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023). To establish grounds for

terminating a parent's parental rights, the party seeking the termination

must prove by clear and convincing evidence

"that the [parent] of [the] child [is] unable or unwilling to
discharge [her] responsibilities to and for the child, or that the
conduct or condition of the [parent] renders [her] unable to
properly care for the child and that the conduct or condition
is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future."

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§ 12-15-319(a). Moreover, § 12-15-319(a) directs the juvenile court to

consider a nonexclusive list of factors in determining whether there are

grounds for terminating a parent's parental rights. Those factors include

whether the parent has an emotional illness, mental illness, or mental

deficiency or has engaged in excessive use of alcohol or controlled

substances of such a duration or nature as to render the parent unable to

care for the needs of the child (§12-15-319(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975) and

whether reasonable efforts by DHR to rehabilitate the parent have failed

(§ 12-15-319(a)(7), Ala. Code 1975)).

We consider first the mother's contention that the juvenile court's

April 23, 2024, entry of its final judgment violated § 12-15-320. That

section provides: "The [juvenile] court judge shall enter a final [judgment]

within 30 days of the completion of the trial [of a petition to terminate

parental rights]." See also Rule 25(D), Ala. R. Juv. P. As the mother

points out, more than four months had passed since the completion of the

trial and the juvenile court's entry of the final judgment.

This court has held that a juvenile court's failure to enter a

judgment within 30 days of the conclusion of a trial in violation of § 12-

15-320 does not, standing alone, compel a reversal of its judgment. See

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M.H. v. Cleburne Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 158 So. 3d 471, 476 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2014). Instead, a violation of that statute "requires reversal only if

the failure to comply impairs a substantial right of the appealing party."

See id.

As noted above, to terminate a parent's parental rights to his or her

child, a juvenile court must consider whether a parent is unable or

unwilling to discharge his or her responsibilities to and for the child or

whether the parent's conduct or condition renders him or her unable to

properly care for the child. § 12-15-319(a). " 'This court has consistently

held that the existence of evidence of current conditions or conduct

relating to a parent's inability or unwillingness to care for his or her

children is implicit in the requirement that termination of parental rights

be based on clear and convincing evidence.' " M.H., 158 So. 3d at 480

(quoting D.O. v. Calhoun Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 859 So. 2d 439, 444

(Ala. Civ. App. 2003)). Thus, one of the ways in which a significant delay

in the entry of a final judgment terminating a parent's parental rights

can impair the substantial rights of that parent is when the judgment

can no longer be said to have been based on the parent's current

circumstances. See, e.g., A.P. v. Covington Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 293

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CL-2024-0384

So. 3d 892, 901 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019); C.P.M. v. Shelby Cnty. Dep't of

Hum. Res., 185 So. 3d 461, 468 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015).

In those cases in which we have reversed a juvenile court's

judgment as having been entered too long after the conclusion of the trial,

we have relied on more than just the temporal delay; instead, we also

have considered whether the parent has demonstrated that his or her

circumstances have, in fact, changed to the extent that a result other

than termination of his or her parental rights may be obtained in light of

evidence of the changed circumstances. See, e.g., A.P., 293 So. 3d at 901;

C.P.M., 185 So. 3d at 468. See also Z.P. v. Mobile Cnty. Dep't of Hum.

Res., [Ms. CL-2024-0177, Sept. 27, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App.

2024) (distinguishing that case from A.P. and C.P.M. for, among other

reasons, parent's failure to file a postjudgment motion or otherwise show

a change in circumstances). Thus, to protect his or her right to a judgment

based on current circumstances, upon the delayed entry of a final

judgment, a parent should at least file a postjudgment motion alleging

that the circumstances have materially changed in the interim between

the trial and the entry of the final judgment so that, upon a consideration

of the evidence of current circumstances, the termination petition could

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be denied. See Z.P., ___ So. 3d at ___ (discussing the holdings in A.P. and

C.P.M.). Absent such a motion, or some similar proffer, the parent waives

any such violation by the juvenile court. See id.

In this case, on May 7, 2024, the mother filed a postjudgment

motion providing, in pertinent part:

"7. THAT the Court's record reflects that the trial in this
matter began on October 17, 2023[,] and concluded on
December 4, 2023[,] and that an Order was entered on
December 18, 2023. The Mother appealed that Order to the
Alabama Court of Civil Appeals. Upon review of that Order
and letter briefs being requested from and filed by the
Department of Human Resources and the Attorney for the
Mother, the Court of Civil Appeals issued an Order finding
that the Order entered on December 18, 2023[,] was not a final
Order and this case was remanded to this Honorable Court
for further proceedings.

"8. THAT, without a further Hearing or an opportunity
for the Parties and the Court to address any potential changes
in the situation of the Parties, this Honorable Court entered
an Order amending the initial Order. That Order was entered
on April 23, 2024.

"9. THAT the severity and nature of these proceedings
are such that the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals and the
Alabama Supreme Court have held that at the time of entry
of a final Order terminating the Parent's parental rights the
Juvenile Court must consider the parent's 'current
circumstances.'

"10. THAT at the time the Amended Final Order was
entered, four and a half (4 1/2) months had passed thus

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presenting a need to re-evaluate the current circumstances of
the Mother.

"11. THAT without another Hearing to revisit this case,
it appears to the Undersigned that an Order entered four and
one half (4 1/2) months after the final Hearing would not be
based on the Mother's current circumstances.

"12. THAT prior to the final Hearing on December 4,
2023[,] the Mother had made significant efforts toward
rehabilitating herself since June of 2023.

"13. THAT the Social Worker testified at trial that there
is a recognizable bond between the Mother and the Minor
Child and that the Mother had made positive changes.

"14. THAT based on the foregoing and the Mother's
fundamental rights to parent her child, the Mother is entitled
to Hearing to address her current circumstances."

(Emphasis added; bold typeface omitted; capitalization in original.)

In her postjudgment motion, the mother alleged only that some

evidence at trial indicated that she was progressing in her rehabilitation

and that, potentially, that progress may have continued after trial so that

the judgment possibly may not reflect her current circumstances, and she

asked the juvenile court to reevaluate the case to determine if any

material change of circumstances had occurred. The mother did not

allege that, in fact, she had continued to progress in her rehabilitation

and that, in fact, her current circumstances showed that she was now

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CL-2024-0384

able to properly parent the child. The postjudgment motion contains no

factual allegations as to any developments occurring after the trial date

that would warrant a reexamination of the case. In the absence of such

concrete allegations, the juvenile court was not required to vacate its

final judgment and conduct a new trial to ascertain whether a material

change of circumstances had occurred. Thus, we conclude that the

mother's contention lacks merit.

The mother next contends that clear and convincing evidence did

not support the juvenile court's finding that there were grounds for

terminating her parental rights. Again, we disagree. The juvenile court

had before it undisputed evidence indicating that the mother suffered

from emotional and mental disorders that prevented her from caring for

the child for the foreseeable future. The juvenile court also had before it

undisputed evidence indicating that the mother's use of alcohol and

illegal drugs was of such a nature and duration that it would prevent her

from parenting the child for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the

juvenile court had before it undisputed evidence indicating that DHR had

made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the mother and that those efforts

had failed. Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court had before it

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CL-2024-0384

evidence from which it reasonably could have been clearly convinced that

there were grounds for terminating the mother's parental rights to the

child.

The mother next contends that the juvenile court erred in finding

that there were no viable alternatives to terminating her parental rights.

However, Robinson testified that DHR had thoroughly investigated to

determine whether there were any suitable relatives who could serve as

relative resources who could care for the child while the mother

continued her effort to rehabilitate herself. Robinson's undisputed

testimony was that there were no relatives who were both willing and

able to care for the child. Thus, we conclude that the juvenile court had

before it evidence from which it reasonably could have been clearly

convinced that there were no viable alternatives to terminating the

mother's parental rights to the child.

Finally, the mother contends that the juvenile court erred in failing

to conduct a hearing regarding her postjudgment motion. Although it is

error for a juvenile court to rule on a postjudgment motion without a

hearing when the movant has requested a hearing, it is not necessarily

reversible error. See Greene v. Thompson, 554 So. 2d 376, 381 (Ala. 1989).

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CL-2024-0384

A failure to hold such a hearing is harmless error where there is either

no probable merit to the grounds asserted in the motion or where the

appellate court resolves the issues presented therein, as a matter of law,

adversely to the movant, by application of the same objective standard of

review as that applied in the trial court. Id. In the present case, we have

concluded that there is no probable merit to the grounds that the mother

asserted in her postjudgment motion and, therefore, we conclude that the

mother's postjudgment motion had no probable merit. Id. Consequently,

we will not reverse the juvenile court's judgment based on its failure to

conduct a hearing on the mother's postjudgment motion.

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the judgment of the

juvenile court.

AFFIRMED.

All the judges concur.

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