Miranda Pilato v. John Samaniego, Sheriff of Shelby County

Rel: September 5, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SPECIAL TERM, 2025
_________________________

CL-2024-0844
_________________________

Miranda Pilato

v.

John Samaniego, Sheriff of Shelby County

Appeal from Shelby Circuit Court
(CV-22-380)

On Application for Rehearing

PER CURIAM.

The opinion issued by this court on June 27, 2025, is withdrawn,

and the following is substituted therefor.
CL-2024-0844

Miranda Pilato appeals from a judgment entered by the Shelby

Circuit Court ("the circuit court") affirming a decision of the Shelby

County Law Enforcement Personnel Board ("the LEPB") that affirmed

the termination by John Samaniego, the Sheriff of Shelby County, of

Pilato's employment as a Shelby County deputy sheriff. We affirm the

circuit court's judgment.

Background

Miranda Pilato began her employment with the Shelby County

Sheriff's Office ("the SCSO") on April 23, 2018. On June 2, 2022, Pilato

was informed by Sheriff Samaniego that the SCSO had initiated an

administrative investigation regarding her job performance and that,

pending the results of that investigation, Pilato would be temporarily

assigned to desk duty. On June 6, 2022, Pilato was provided written

notice that the SCSO had initiated an administrative investigation

regarding her job performance and informing Pilato of her rights and

responsibilities related to that investigation. On June 8, 2022, several

members of the SCSO met with Pilato to discuss her job performance

regarding events that had occurred on January 3, 2022, May 3, 2022, and

May 28, 2022. At the conclusion of that meeting, Pilato was informed

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that she could either resign her employment or that her employment

would be terminated. Pilato refused to resign, and, thus, Sheriff

Samaniego terminated her employment. Pilato filed a notice of appeal

requesting a hearing before the LEPB regarding the termination of her

employment.

On July 26, 2022, the LEPB conducted an evidentiary hearing. At

that hearing, Pilato denied that her actions in the three events had

violated the SCSO Policies and Procedures. Additionally, Pilato argued

that she had been denied due process because she had not been provided

a pretermination hearing and had not received 10 days' advance notice

of the charges against her before her employment was terminated. On

July 28, 2022, counsel for the LEPB notified Pilato and Sheriff

Samaniego that it had affirmed Sheriff Samaniego's termination of

Pilato's employment. On July 30, 2022, Pilato's counsel requested a

rehearing of the LEPB's decision.

On August 16, 2022, the LEPB entered an order that, among other

things, scheduled a rehearing to occur on September 20, 2022, and

instructed counsel for both parties to submit a written brief outlining

their respective arguments, positions, and supporting authority. On

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September 13, 2022, Pilato's counsel filed a brief in support of rehearing

in which he argued that the evidence regarding the January 3, 2022,

incident had been insufficient; that Pilato's actions on May 3, 2022, and

May 28, 2022, had been lawful and had not violated the SCSO Policies

and Procedures; that the due-process rights to which Pilato was entitled

under Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546

(1985), and Todd v. Kelley, 783 So. 2d 31 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000), were

violated when she was not afforded a pretermination hearing; that the

termination of Pilato's employment violated her due-process rights under

the SCSO Policies and Procedures because she was not provided written

notice of the charges against her in advance of the termination of her

employment; and that the decision of the LEPB to uphold the termination

of Pilato's employment had not been made by an unbiased decision

maker.

On September 20, 2022, the LEPB conducted a rehearing. Pilato's

counsel and counsel for the SCSO made arguments, but no witnesses

were called or examined. Pilato's counsel generally reasserted the

arguments that he had made in his brief in support of rehearing. The

SCSO's counsel countered that, as an elected official, Sheriff Samaniego

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and his deputies, who are alter egos of the sheriff, are exempted from the

protections of the Alabama Merit System Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 36-26-1

et seq., which requires a pretermination hearing. Thus, SCSO's counsel

asserted that Pilato's reliance on Loudermill and Kelley, neither of which

involved the termination of the employment of a county sheriff's deputy,

was misplaced. On September 23, 2022, counsel for the LEPB again

notified Pilato and Sheriff Samaniego that the LEPB had affirmed the

decision of Sheriff Samaniego terminating Pilato's employment.

On September 28, 2022, Pilato filed an appeal in the circuit court,

challenging the termination of her employment by Sheriff Samaniego

and the decision of the LEPB upholding that termination. On October 7,

2024, the circuit court entered an "Order on Appeal" affirming the

LEPB's decision upholding the termination of Pilato's employment.

Pilato did not seek postjudgment relief. On October 23, 2024, Pilato filed

a notice of appeal to this court.

Issues

On appeal to this court, Pilato first argues that the circuit court's

judgment affirming the termination of her employment is due to be

reversed because, she says, her rights to due process under the United

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States Constitution were violated when she was not afforded a

pretermination hearing. She also contends that the termination of her

employment violated her due-process rights under the SCSO Policies and

Procedures because she was not provided written notice of the charges

against her in advance of the termination of her employment and that

the decision to terminate her employment was not made by an unbiased

decision maker. Finally, she argues that the facts do not support the

termination of her employment.

Standard of Review

"Judicial review of administrative decisions like those of
the LEPB [Law Enforcement Personnel Board] is generally
governed by the enabling act that created the particular
administrative body or by the regulations governing the
particular administrative body. See, generally, Ex parte
Smith, 394 So. 2d 45, 48 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981). Typically, the
standard of review of administrative decisions requires that
the circuit court uphold the administrative decision if it is
supported by substantial and legal evidence. Ex parte
Personnel Bd. of Jefferson County, 648 So. 2d 593, 594 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1994), Board of Water & Sewer Comm'rs [of Mobile
v. Smith], 591 So. 2d [521,] 522 [(Ala. Civ. App. 1991)], and Ex
parte Smith, 394 So. 2d at 47; see also LEPB Rules and
Regulations § 10.07(f). This court has defined 'substantial
evidence' in the context of an administrative appeal as
'relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would view as
sufficient to support the determination.' Ex parte Personnel
Bd. of Jefferson County, 648 So. 2d at 594. When a circuit
court's judgment affirming or reversing the decision of an
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administrative body is appealed to this court, we apply the
same standard of review to the administrative decision as was
applied by the circuit court. Ex parte Personnel Bd. of
Jefferson County, 648 So. 2d at 594; see also City of Mobile v.
Personnel Bd. for Mobile County, 57 Ala. App. 516, 518, 329
So. 2d 570, 573 (Civ. 1976) (noting that the circuit court and
the appellate court are to apply the substantial-evidence test
to the administrative body's decision, not to the decision of the
appointing authority)."

Lawson v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 961 So. 2d 158, 161 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2007).

Discussion

Section 10.06 of the LEPB's Rules and Regulations provides as

follows:

"An employee with permanent status shall have the
right to appeal disciplinary action of dismissal, demotion, or
suspension, within the limits prescribed in the Rules. An
employee desiring to appeal shall, within ten (10) calendar
days after notice thereof, file with [the LEPB], in duplicate, a
written answer to the charges and request for a hearing. Such
answer shall contain:

"• The reason of dismissal, demotion, or
suspension.

"• An admission of denial or guilt.

"• Reasons why the dismissal, demotion, or
suspension should not take effect. Upon receipt of the
appeal, [the LEPB] shall forward a copy thereof to the
appointing authority."

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(Emphasis added.)

In her brief to this court, Pilato argues, just as she did in the

proceedings before the LEPB and in the circuit court, that her rights to

due process were violated when she was not provided with a

pretermination hearing as required by federal due-process law. In

substance, Pilato argues that her employment has been wrongfully

terminated in violation of federal laws. Pilato argues that the LEPB

should have considered her federal-law arguments when deciding

whether the decision of Sheriff Samaniego to terminate her employment

should have been affirmed or reversed.

Our supreme court has determined that county personnel boards

generally cannot consider federal statutory and federal constitutional

issues, which, the supreme court has said, are beyond their competence.

In Ex parte Boyette, 728 So. 2d 644 (Ala. 1998), our supreme court held

that a discharged employee could not raise in a proceeding before the

Jefferson County Personnel Board ("the JCPB") a claim that his

employment had been terminated in violation of the federal Age

Discrimination in Employment Act ("the ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.

The supreme court further held that the Jefferson Circuit Court could

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not consider the ADEA claim on appeal from the decision of the JCPB,

even though the enabling act establishing the JCPB authorized the

Jefferson Circuit Court " 'to review questions of law.' " 728 So. 2d at 645

(quoting Act No. 1945-248, Ala. Acts 1945, § 22, as amended by Act No.

1977-679, Ala. Acts 1977, p. 1176) (emphasis omitted). In Ex parte

Averyt, 487 So. 2d 912 (Ala. 1986), our supreme court held that the

Mobile County Personnel Board, and the Mobile Circuit Court upon

judicial review of the decision of that board, could not consider a federal

due-process claim, which, the supreme court said, must be asserted in an

independent and collateral suit filed in the circuit court.

Pilato argues that, in Averyt and Boyette, the discharged

employees had brought federal claims against their employers seeking

damages, which, she says, the personnel boards could not adjudicate but

that, in her case, she asserted federal law only as a defense to her

termination, i.e., as the "reason[] why the dismissal, demotion, or

suspension should not take effect." We do not find this distinction

noteworthy. In both Averyt and Boyette, our supreme court considered

the dispositive issue to be the lack of jurisdiction of a county personnel

board to decide questions of federal law. Regardless of whether federal

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law is asserted offensively or defensively, the LEPB does not have the

statutory authority to decide questions of federal law.

"The LEPB [Law Enforcement Personnel Board] was
created by Act [No.] 79-524, Ala. Acts 1979 ('the Act'), and it
is governed by that Act, as amended. A dismissed, demoted,
or suspended employee may appeal the disciplinary action to
the LEPB. LEPB Rules and Regulations § 10.06. The LEPB is
required to hold a hearing within 30 days of the employee's
notice of appeal and is to determine 'whether or not the
employee, by reason of his act or acts as charged and his
record of service, merits retention in the service or should be
dismissed or otherwise disciplined….' LEPB Rules and
Regulations § 10.07(a). The Act itself permits the LEPB to
'order [a dismissed employee] reinstated with back pay …, or
take or approve such disciplinary action as, in [its] judgment,
is warranted by the evidence and under the law.' Act No. 79-
524, § 16(b). Likewise, the LEPB's regulations permit the
LEPB to 'rescind, modify, or increase the penalty imposed by
the appointing authority as warranted by the facts at the
hearing.' LEPB Rules and Regulations § 10.07(d). Any party
aggrieved by the decision of the LEPB may seek review of the
decision in the circuit court. LEPB Rules and Regulations §
10.07(f). The LEPB's regulations further state that the circuit
court is to 'review questions of law and the question of
whether or not the decision or order of the [LEPB] is
supported by the substantial and legal evidence.' LEPB Rules
and Regulations § 10.07(f)."

Lawson v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 961 So. 2d at 160.

Like the rules of the JCPB at issue in Boyette, the LEPB Rules and

Regulations do not specifically authorize the LEPB to consider federal

law when reviewing the employment decisions within its purview. The

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LEPB Rules and Regulations do authorize a circuit court "to review

questions of law," but that language does not authorize review of

questions of federal statutory law beyond the competence of the LEPB.

Like the Mobile County Personnel Board in Averyt, the LEPB could not

review the question whether Pilato's employment termination violated

her right to due process under federal law, which right could be

vindicated only in an independent and collateral suit, not in an appeal

from the final decision of the LEPB.

In this case, Pilato did not commence a separate and collateral

action to assert her federal constitutional due-process claims; instead,

she attempted to raise those issues as a defense to the termination of her

employment before the LEPB and in her appeal to the circuit court. In

Averyt, our supreme court held that a collateral action is not only the

proper method for raising constitutional issues, but also that it is the

"only avenue available." 487 So. 2d at 913. We, thus, conclude that the

termination of Pilato's employment cannot be reversed based on any

alleged error by the LEPB or the circuit court in disregarding federal due-

process law.

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We next consider Pilato's argument that the decision to terminate

her employment was not made by an unbiased decision maker. Pilato

primarily frames her argument in terms of the requirement espoused in

Stallworth v. City of Evergreen, 680 So. 2d 229 (Ala. 1996), that a

pretermination hearing be conducted by an unbiased decision maker.

Pilato's reliance on Stallworth is, however, misplaced.

In Stallworth, a former employee of the City of Evergreen

commenced an action seeking a judgment declaring the termination of

his employment from the city to be invalid. 680 So. 2d at 230. The trial

court entered a judgment for the defendants. The employee appealed to

our supreme court. In reversing the trial court's judgment, our supreme

court determined that the employee's job as a personnel officer was under

the "merit system" and, thus,

"[i]n the context of the routine dismissal of a governmental
employee who has a legitimate right to continued employment
absent sufficient cause for termination, the United States
Supreme Court has held that 'all the process that is due [to
such an employee] is provided by a pretermination
opportunity to respond, coupled with post-termination
administrative procedures.' Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547-48, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1496, 84
L.Ed.2d 494 (1985)."

680 So. 2d at 233.

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Generally, the Merit System Act provides that certain classified

state employees have a protectable property interest in their employment

and that those classified state employees may be terminated only for

cause following a pretermination hearing. Ala. Code 1975, § 36-26-27(b).

However, as an elected official, a sheriff and, by extension, a sheriff's

deputies are exempted from the due-process protections provided by the

Merit System Act. Blount Cnty. Comm'n v. Sherrell, 77 So. 3d 1196 (Ala.

Civ. App. 2010); see Ala. Code 1975, § 36-26-10(a) & (b)(1) (providing that

officers elected by a vote of the people are exempt from the Merit System

Act). Thus, because Pilato is exempted from the Merit System Act and

therefore not entitled to a pretermination hearing, we find no merit in

Pilato's argument that she was entitled to a pretermination hearing

conducted by an unbiased decision maker.

Pilato also challenges the termination of her employment on the

basis that she was not provided the process to which she was entitled

under the SCSO Policies and Procedures because, she says, she was not

provided advance written notice of the charges against her. The SCSO

Policies and Procedures provide, in pertinent part, that employees are

entitled to due process, which, in the context of an administrative

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investigation, means that "the employee will be provided a written notice

of the investigation, reason for the investigation, and his/her rights

during the investigation"; however, that notice may be delayed by the

sheriff, at his or her discretion, based on the "depth of the investigation,

risk to others, coordination with other law enforcement agencies, or the

nature of the alleged violations." SCSO Policies and Procedures:

Administrative Investigations.

The record reveals that, on June 2, 2022, Pilato was informed in

writing that Sheriff Samaniego had initiated an administrative

investigation regarding her job performance and that, pending the

results of that investigation, she would be temporarily assigned to desk

duty. On June 6, 2022, Pilato was provided written notice that the SCSO

had initiated an administrative investigation regarding her job

performance and informing Pilato of her rights and responsibilities

related to that investigation. On June 8, 2022, Major Clay Hammac,

Captain Kevin Turner, Lieutenant Kevin Brand, and Lieutenant Joey

McGee met with Pilato and discussed her job performance regarding

events that had occurred on January 3, 2022, May 3, 2022, and May 28,

2022. Because the record indicates that Pilato was informed in writing

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that an administrative investigation had been initiated, the circuit court

could have reasonably concluded that Pilato had not been denied the due

process provided by the SCSO Policies and Procedures. In light of our

limited scope of review, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the

circuit court. See Lawson, supra.

To the extent that Pilato challenges the termination of her

employment on the basis that she was not advised of the disciplinary

action taken against her as required by the SCSO Policies and

Procedures, we disagree. To support her argument, Pilato cites the SCSO

Policies and Procedures: Discipline and Accountability, which establishes

the information the SCSO is obligated to provide to employees when

disciplinary action is taken. Her reliance on that provision is, however,

misplaced.

Because Pilato's employment was terminated, the SCSO Policies

and Procedures: Discipline and Accountability policy regarding notice of

termination is implicated. The SCSO Policies and Procedures regarding

"notice of termination" provide that,

"[i]f an employee's performance requires investigation, the
employee may be placed on administrative leave pending
outcome of the investigation. The employee may then be

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terminated. The terminated member will be provided with
information that includes:

"1. Reasons for the termination;

"2. Effective date of the termination;

"3. Whom to contact regarding status of fringe and
retirement benefits;

"4. Statement that the content of the personnel file,
relating to the termination, will be made available
to the member according to state public law, upon
request.

"5. Statement regarding the employee's right to file an
appeal, if any."

SCSO Policies and Procedures: Discipline and Accountability.

On June 8, 2022, several members of the SCSO met with Pilato to

discuss her job performance. At that meeting, Pilato was informed that

her employment with the SCSO was being terminated, the reasons for

the termination, and the effective date of the termination. Additionally,

Pilato was informed of whom she needed to contact regarding her

employment benefits, was informed that the contents of her personnel

file would be made available upon request, according to state law, and

was informed of her right to appeal her termination. Based on that

evidence, the circuit court could have reasonably concluded that Pilato

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had not been denied the due process to which she was entitled under the

SCSO Policies and Procedures. In light of our limited scope of review, we

cannot substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court. See Lawson,

supra.

Lastly, Pilato argues that the facts do not support the termination

of her employment. At the hearing conducted by the LEPB, several

witnesses testified regarding Pilato's actions on January 3, 2022, May 3,

2022, and May 28, 2022.

Regarding the January 3, 2022, event, the record reveals that the

SCSO had concerns that Pilato had been the last unit to arrive on scene

at a call regarding a domestic disturbance involving weapons and that

she had failed to "run code"1 en route to that disturbance. Pilato admitted

that she had failed to "run code" en route to the domestic disturbance.

She, however, opined that because there had been multiple units on

scene, she had properly exercised her discretion in determining that

public-safety concerns weighed against "running code" while en route to

that domestic disturbance. According to Pilato, because "running code"

1In the minutes from the LEPB's hearing, Lieutenant Brand
explained that to "run code" means to act with a sense of urgency and to
activate emergency lights and sirens on a law-enforcement vehicle.
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was not mandatory, she had properly exercised the discretion she had

been afforded under the SCSO Policies and Procedures in deciding not to

"run code" on that occasion.

Regarding the May 3, 2022, event, the record establishes that the

SCSO had concerns that Pilato had been on the scene of a call and that,

based on the statements Pilato had made in her incident report, she had

witnessed an act of domestic violence but had failed to arrest the alleged

perpetrator. Specifically, in the narrative portion of her incident report,

Pilato indicated that she had observed a male push a female that had

been attempting to respond to Pilato's questioning. Dash-camera footage

of the incident revealed that Pilato had instructed the alleged perpetrator

not to touch the female again. According to Lieutenant Brand and

Sergeant Smith, those facts constituted domestic violence and, therefore,

Pilato was required to arrest the perpetrator at that time.

Pilato denied that she had observed any criminal activity at the

May 3, 2022, incident but admitted that her report contained errors.

Pilato, however, excused the errors in her incident report as a poor choice

of words. Pilato also testified that she had attempted to amend her

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incident report shortly following the incident but that she had been

unable to do so.

Regarding the May 28, 2022, event, the record establishes that the

SCSO had concerns that Pilato had failed to assist in the pursuit of a

vehicle. According to Lieutenant Brand, a call for service to assist with

the pursuit of a vehicle had been issued by dispatch but Pilato had failed

to "attach" to the call by informing dispatch that she had been responding

to the call and had failed to assist the responding officers. According to

Lieutenant Brand, the SCSO Policies and Procedures provide that

"deputies choose" when to "run code" but that the "spirit of [the policy]

doesn't mean you can let someone else handle it, it means traffic

conditions or weather conditions, doesn't mean you can let someone else

handle it." Lieutenant Brand also said that other officers that had

assisted in that pursuit had also complained about Pilato's failure to

attach to the call and to render assistance.

Pilato denied that she had not joined the vehicle pursuit on May 28,

2022. According to her, after dispatch had notified her of the pursuit, she

had attempted to identify a location to deploy "spikes" to intercept the

fleeing vehicle. Pilato said that, before she was able to identify a location

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to deploy the spikes, dispatch had notified her that the driver of the

vehicle being pursued had wrecked his vehicle and had been taken into

custody along with a passenger in the vehicle. Pilato opined that it would

have been reckless for her to have run code since the suspects had been

apprehended. Pilato, however, admitted that she had failed to notify

dispatch that she had attached to the call and was rendering assistance.

The termination-of-employment letter that the SCSO provided to

Pilato indicated that her actions had violated certain provisions of the

LEPB Rules and Regulations as well as certain provisions of the SCSO

Policies and Procedures regarding rules of conduct. Regarding the LEPB

Rules and Regulations, Pilato's actions implicated Section 10.01, which

provides that employment is conditioned on the "satisfactory conduct of

the employee and continued, efficient performance of assigned duties and

responsibilities." According to the termination-of-employment letter, the

SCSO had identified three separate causes for discipline under Section

10.02 of the LEPB Rules and Regulations that were sufficient for

dismissal, demotion, or suspension, i.e., incompetence or inefficiency,

neglect of duty, and "for any other reason deemed to be in the best

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interest of the public service and not inconsistent with the intent of the

Act or the rules and regulations arising therein."

Regarding Pilato's violations of the SCSO Policies and Procedures

regarding rules of conduct, the termination-of-employment letter

indicated that Pilato's actions had implicated both Section One, which

generally pertains to obedience to orders, rules, and laws, and Section

Two, which generally pertains to an employee's attention to duty.

Specifically, regarding the Section One violations, the termination-of-

employment letter informed Pilato that all employees are governed by

the established rules of conduct and that a violation of those rules of

conduct is considered sufficient cause for disciplinary action, including

termination of employment, see 1.1 Obedience to Orders, Rules and

Laws, SCSO Policies and Procedures: Rules of Conduct; that employees

are required to abide by the personnel policy and the general, special, and

tactical orders, rules of conduct, and other properly issued internal

directives of the SCSO, see 1.3 Adherence to Departmental Rules for

Employees, SCSO Policies and Procedures: Rules of Conduct; and that

Pilato's failure to act in accordance with her duties and her willful neglect

of her duties was unbecoming conduct that had adversely affected the

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efficiency of, had eroded public respect for, or had reduced confidence in

the government's service and was prohibited. See 1.11 Conduct

Unbecoming, SCSO Policies and Procedures: Rules of Conduct.

Regarding the Section Two violations, the termination-of-

employment letter informed Pilato that employees are required to be

attentive to their duties and are required to perform all duties assigned

to them even if such duties are not specifically assigned to them in any

departmental rules or procedures manual, see 2.1 Performance of Duty,

SCSO Policies and Procedures: Attention to Duty; that employees must

consider it their duty to be of service to the general public and to render

service in a kind, considerate, and patient manner, see 2.5 Responsibility

to Serve the Public, SCSO Policies and Procedures: Attention to Duty;

and that employees are required to promptly report all crimes,

emergencies, incidents, dangers, hazardous situations, and relevant

information that comes to their attention, and that employees are

prohibited from concealing, ignoring, or distorting the facts of such

crimes, emergencies, incidents, and information, see 2.11 Duty to Report

All Crimes and Incidents, SCSO Policies and Procedures: Attention to

Duty. The termination-of-employment letter concluded:

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"Due to your failure to act upon the crime of Domestic
Violence, when witnessed in your presence on May 3, 2022
(see case # 202202906), and due to your failure to actively
engage in the renderance of assistance to your fellow deputies
and appropriately render assistance to the public on January
3, 2022[,] in response to an active [d]omestic [v]iolence call,
and your failure to render assistance to the public and to your
fellow deputies during an active pursuit and follow-up
investigation on May 28, 2022[,] to wit, your violation of said
policies above, your employment with the [SCSO] is hereby
terminated on this date."

The termination of Pilato's employment was predicated on the

SCSO's determination that Pilato had violated the SCSO Policies and

Procedures and the LEPB Rules and Regulations. By terminating

Pilato's employment, Sheriff Samaniego implicitly determined that

Pilato had not been operating within any discretion provided by the

LEPB Rules and Regulations and the SCSO Policies and Procedures

when she failed to arrest the perpetrator of domestic violence or to render

support to fellow officers on the other two occasions at issue. That

implicit determination was affirmed by the LEPB when it upheld the

decision of Sheriff Samaniego to terminate Pilato's employment. In its

"Order on Appeal," the circuit court concluded, among other things, that

the evidence sufficiently supported the LEPB's decision that the

termination of Pilato's employment was due to be upheld based on her

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having engaged in conduct that violated the LEPB Rules and Regulations

and the SCSO Policies and Procedures.

We have previously stated:

"Neither this court nor the trial court may substitute its
judgment for that of the administrative agency. Alabama
Renal Stone Inst., Inc. v. Alabama Statewide Health
Coordinating Council, 628 So. 2d 821, 823 (Ala. Civ. App.
1993). 'This holds true even in cases where the testimony is
generalized, the evidence is meager, and reasonable minds
might differ as to the correct result.' Health Care Auth. of
Huntsville v. State Health Planning Agency, 549 So. 2d 973,
975 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989). Further, 'an agency's interpretation
of its own rule or regulation must stand if it is reasonable,
even though it may not appear as reasonable as some other
interpretation.' Sylacauga Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Alabama
State Health Planning Agency, 662 So. 2d 265, 268 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1994)."

Colonial Mgmt. Grp., L.P. v. State Health Plan. & Dev. Agency, 853 So.

2d 972, 975 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002). Thus, we affirm the circuit court's

judgment to the extent that it determined that the evidence sufficiently

supports the LEPB's decision to uphold Sheriff Samaniego's termination

of Pilato's employment.

Conclusion

Because Pilato has failed to raise an argument on appeal that

merits reversal of the circuit court's judgment, that judgment is affirmed.

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APPLICATION GRANTED; OPINION OF JUNE 27, 2025,

WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; AFFIRMED.

All the judges concur.

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