State of Alabama v. Sylvia Shamel Scott

Rel: May 1, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
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CR-2025-0458
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State of Alabama

v.

Sylvia Shamel Scott

Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CC-21-975)

COLE, Judge.

The State of Alabama appeals the order of the Montgomery Circuit

Court dismissing with prejudice the indictment charging Sylvia Shamel

Scott with second-degree theft of property and second-degree domestic

violence, violations of §§ 13A-8-4 and 13A-6-131, Ala. Code 1975. For the

reasons discussed below, we hold that the trial court's dismissal of Scott's
CR-2025-0458

indictment with prejudice based on want of prosecution constituted an

abuse of discretion. Thus, we reverse the trial court's judgment and

remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Facts and Procedural History

On July 23, 2021, a Montgomery County grand jury indicted Scott

for second-degree theft of property and second-degree domestic violence

based on her commission of a second-degree burglary. Count I of the

indictment charged, in pertinent part, that "Scott … did knowingly

obtain or exert unauthorized control over a … gun, the property of Cory

Alexander Clay, with the intent to deprive the owner of the said firearm

… in violation of section 13A-8-4," Ala. Code 1975. (C.1 43.) Count II of

the indictment charged, in pertinent part, as follows:

"Scott … did commit the offense of Burglary in the Second
Degree, in violation of Section 13A-7-6(b) of The Code of
Alabama, in that [she] did knowingly and unlawfully enter
the lawfully occupied dwelling-house of … Cory Alexander
Clay, with he intent to commit a theft or felony therein, and/or
while effecting the entry or while in the said building or in
immediate flight therefrom, [she] did cause physical injury to
another person, Cory Alexander Clay, … and [he] was a
person with whom the defendant had a child in common, in

1"C." refers to the clerk's record in this case. "R." refers to the
reporter's transcript from the June 9, 2025, hearing. "SR." refers to the
reporter's transcript from the May 12, 2025, hearing.
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violation of section 13A-6-131 of the Code of Alabama, against
the peace and dignity of the State of Alabama."

(C. 45.)

On January 11, 2022, Scott's counsel moved for a mental evaluation

of Scott. The trial court ordered a mental evaluation on February 16,

2022. The Alabama Department of Mental Health submitted its report

to the trial court on January 31, 2023. A trial date was set for April 3,

2023. On February 15, 2023, Scott filed a motion to substitute counsel,

which was granted on February 20, 2023. On March 21, 2023, Scott's

new counsel filed a new motion for a competency evaluation, alleging, in

part, that Scott had "suffered a mental health crisis" and had been

"admitted to Jackson Hospital and then was supposed to be released to

Crossbridge for further treatment." (C. 91.) An order was entered on

April 28, 2023, scheduling Scott's case for trial on May 12, 2025. On May

6, 2025, Scott entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of

mental disease or defect.

On May 12, 2025, the State asked for a continuance because the

"investigators were unable to get subpoenas served." (SR. 2.) Scott

moved to dismiss the charges, but the trial court found that it was "not

the State's fault that the clerk's office didn't issue the subpoenas in a

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timely manner." (SR. 2.) Scott then contended that the victim knew

about the trial and could have come without a subpoena, prompting the

trial court to respond: "But he's not coming. Why are we doing this?"

(SR. 2-3.) When the State attempted to answer, the trial court

interrupted: "He doesn't want to do this. He's the victim. He doesn't

want this." (SR. 3.) The State explained that the State had a "compelling

interest" in pursuing the case regardless of the victim's wishes. The State

further noted that "an offer [had been] made [to Scott] that was for not

time," but Scott wanted "to proceed to trial." (SR. 3.) The State also

notified the trial court that if the victim "does not show up for trial [at

the next trial setting], then the State would be moving for a writ of

attachment." (SR. 3-4.) Scott's counsel then informed the trial court that

he had "an affidavit from the alleged victim" in which the victim

"specifically stated he doesn't want to proceed with this case." (SR. 4.)

The trial court then stated that, "if the subpoena was served and [the

alleged victim] didn't show up, [it] would dismiss this [case]." (SR. 4.)

The trial court, however, granted the State's motion to continue the trial

to June 9, 2025, because the subpoenas had not yet been served.

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On June 9, 2025, the State moved "for a writ of attachment on

witness Corey Clay," who had been served with a subpoena but had not

appeared for trial that morning. (R. 2.) Scott's counsel objected to the

writ, arguing that Clay had already made it known "that he didn't want

to proceed forward" and "filled out an affidavit stating as such." (R. 3.)

The trial court then asked the State's counsel: "[S]ince when do we do

this in domestic violence cases? Is something special happening that I'm

unaware of?" (R. 3-4.) The trial court additionally asked: "How many

victims have you all attached or asked for a writ of attachment … [when

the victim] did not want to go forward?" (R. 4.) The State's counsel

explained that the State considers the victim's position and the "totality

of the circumstances" in deciding to proceed and that, when the State

elects to proceed "against the victim's wishes," the State provides "an

offer [to the defendant] that takes [the victim's position] into

consideration." (R. 4.) The State's counsel sought a writ of attachment

because Scott had elected to proceed to trial. The trial court then

expressed its disagreement with the State's requiring a victim to testify:

"Hmm, interesting. You don't feel that somehow this makes
the victim victimized a little -- the alleged victim, because I
don't know if they're the victim, and I don't know any of the
facts at this point. But, isn't that a bit traumatizing to have

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the sheriff show up at your house and your job and put you in
the back of a car and cart you off to the --"

(R. 5.) When the State explained that the writ was sought only when

deemed "absolutely necessary," the trial court repeated its concerns from

the May 12, 2025, hearing: "And what makes this absolutely necessary?

They are saying they don't want to go forward. They're saying they don't

want to participate. They're saying this is no longer their desire to

prosecute her. Why are we doing this?" (SR. 4.) The State responded:

"The victim in this case has never said that [these crimes] did not occur."

(R. 6.) Rather, the victim's affidavit stated "[t]hat he no longer wanted

to prosecute." (R. 6.) However, the State noted that "it's not the victim's

place to prosecute; it's the State's." (R. 6.) The trial court responded:

"I informed you that your witnesses needed to be here. They
were not here at the last trial setting, and I gave you a
continuance, because the subpoenas had not been sent. And
you had said that you would send your … investigators out to
… try to get them here at the last trial setting. Here we are
again. … We're not going to do that [issue a writ to compel the
victim to appear]. We're going to do something else."

(R. 6-7.) When asked if the State had "[a]nything else," the State

responded that it was ready to proceed to trial without the victim's

testimony. (R. 7.)

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The trial court then asked whether Scott wanted a jury trial or a

bench trial, and Scott's counsel stated: "[W]e would ask for a jury trial."

(R. 7 (emphasis added).) However, the trial court responded: "Okay. Go

downstairs and get the panels, because I was ready for a bench trial now."

(R. 7 (emphasis added).) Scott's counsel immediately changed his

previous request: "Well, we'll do a bench trial." (R. 7.) The trial court

turned to the State: "All right. Call your first witness." (R. 7.) The

following exchange then occurred:

"[The State]: Okay. Judge, I would ask for time to get those
witnesses here, because I was --

"The Court: No, no, no. Now, I told you --

"[The State]: Hold on. I'm aware, Judge. But if I may. That
was for --

"The Court: No. I told you they had to be here.

"[The State]: Right, Judge. That was -- that was -- and we've
addressed that witness --

"The Court: I told you they had to be here.

"[The State]: Judge, if I may. As standard across this
courthouse --

"The Court: No, no, no.

"[The State]: -- we elect --

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"The Court: I told you they had to be here.

"[The State]: And, Judge, what was unclear to me was if you
meant all witnesses or this particular witness.

"The Court: I told you your witnesses had to be here.

"[The State]: And, Judge, my notes --

"The Court: Are they here?

"[The State]: My notes --

"The Court: I'll hear what you have to say.

"[The State]: -- and my recollection are in fact that we were
told --

"The Court: Ma'am, I'm done with the arguing. I told you that
is where we are. Call your first witness."

(R. 7-8 (emphasis added).)

After a "brief pause," the State responded: "I am in the process of

calling my first witness." (R. 8.) The trial court then instructed the State:

"You have two minutes in which to call the witness." (R. 8.) After another

"brief pause," the trial court stated: "That's your two minutes. Where is

your witness?" (R. 8-9.) The State responded that "she … will be in at

12" and requested to have "until this afternoon, because as this protocol

in all other courtrooms in this courthouse, we elect panels, we select a

jury and then the State brings on their witnesses." (R. 9 (emphasis

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added).) The trial court responded: "[Y]ou can tell me what other

practices are, but my words were clear that your witnesses needed to be

in this courtroom." (R. 9.) The State attempted to object: "And again,

Judge," which the trial court interrupted by stating: "[T]hey are not

here." (R. 9.) The State attempted again, "The --" to which the trial court

again interrupted "--if I'm talking, you are not interrupting. And your

witnesses are not here, consequently, your case is dismissed with

prejudice for failure to prosecute." (R. 9.) The trial court then issued a

written order on June 10, 2025, stating: "At the date and time set for

trial, no witness was present for the State of Alabama. Therefore, this

case is hereby Dismissed with Prejudice." (C. 99 (emphasis added).)

On June 11, 2025, the State filed a motion to reconsider, noting

that, after the trial court denied the State's motion to attach the victim,

the State had been "ready to move forward with a jury trial." (C. 100

(emphasis added).) The State argued that, in ordering the State to call

its first witness, the trial court had not complied with Rule 18.1, Ala. R.

Crim. P. Specifically, the State complained that the trial court never

addressed Scott "personally, to ascertain if [she] was waiving her right

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently," as Rule 18.1 requires. (C.

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100.) Likewise, the State noted, "the State never consented" to the

waiver of a jury trial, which Rule 18.1 also requires. (C. 100.) The State

then argued that the trial court had abused its discretion by dismissing

Scott's case because witnesses were not present before a jury had been

selected. (C. 102.) The trial court did not rule on the State's motion. The

State filed its notice of appeal on June 13, 2025, and this appeal follows.

Standard of Review

When reviewing a trial court's decision to dismiss a case for want

of prosecution, this Court applies an "abuse of discretion" standard. See,

e.g., State v. Watts, 35 So. 3d 1 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009), and State v.

Stallworth, 337 So. 3d 1201 (Ala. Crim. App. 2021).

Analysis

On appeal, the State argues that the trial court abused its

discretion when it dismissed Scott's indictment with prejudice for want

of prosecution based on the State's failure to have a witness in the

courtroom when the trial court attempted to begin a bench trial without

complying with Rule 18.1, Ala. R. Crim. P. Conversely, Scott argues that

the trial court acted within its discretion in dismissing her indictment.

Scott also contends that the State waived its objection to proceeding with

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trial by announcing that it was "ready for trial" and because the State

"never actually objected" in court to the trial court's dismissal. (Scott's

brief, pp. 14, 15.)

As an initial matter, contrary to Scott's contentions, the State's

objection to the trial court's dismissal of Scott's case was preserved. "An

objection must be specific enough to put the trial court on notice of any

alleged error and provide the court with an opportunity to correct any

error if necessary." Nash v. State, 229 So. 3d 1112, 1113 (Ala. Crim. App.

2017) (citing Finch v. State, 715 So. 2d 906, 912 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997)).

"However, 'magic words' are not required as long as it is clear from the

record that the trial court was aware of the basis of the objection." Id.

Here, although the State's attempts at objecting to the trial court's

rulings were cut off by the trial court, the State's objection to being

required to immediately proceed with a bench trial instead of being

permitted to select a jury and proceed with a jury trial was made clear.

(R. 7-9.) At the end of the hearing, the State made one last request that

a jury be selected when the State said that the "protocol in all courtrooms

in this courthouse, we elect panels, we select a jury and then the State

brings on their witnesses." (R. 9.) Although the trial court had refused

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to attach the alleged victim at the State's request, the State's alternative

request, which would allow the State to call its witnesses after jury

selection, was also denied when the trial court reiterated that the

witnesses "are not here" and dismissed both charges. (R. 9.) It is equally

clear from this record that the State did not consent, as required by Rule

18.1, Ala. R. Crim. P., to Scott's counsel's waiver of Scott's right to a trial

by jury. Finding the State's argument preserved, we now consider

whether the trial court abused its discretion.

It is well settled that a trial court has authority and discretion to

manage its docket. As we recognized in State v. Watts, 35 So. 3d 1 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2009), a circuit court " ' "is vested with discretion in the

conduct of a trial, and the appellate courts will not interfere with the

exercise of that discretion unless it clearly appears that there has been

an abuse of discretion." ' " Id. at 4 (quoting Baker v. State, 906 So. 2d 210,

269 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (reversed on other grounds by Ex parte Baker,

906 So. 2d 277 (Ala. 2004)), quoting in turn Carden v. State, 621 So. 2d

342, 346 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)).

In Watts, this Court considered whether a trial court had abused

its discretion by dismissing charges without prejudice against a

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defendant based on want of prosecution because the victim and a witness

were not present for voir dire. We recognized that "the process of voir

dire examination remains within the sound discretion of the circuit

court." Id. (citing Clark v. State, 294 Ala. 493, 495, 318 So. 2d 822, 824

(1975)). However, we held that the trial court had abused its discretion

because it "could have imposed less stringent measures than dismissing

the charges." Id. at 7. In so holding, we noted that "Watts made no

showing of prejudice, on speedy-trial ground or otherwise, as a result of

the absence of the victim and witness for presentation to the venire; the

victim and the witness would be available to testify for trial; and there

was no indication of undue continuances." Id.

In State v. Stallworth, 337 So. 3d 1201, 1210 (Ala. Crim. App. 2021),

we again acknowledged a trial court's authority to manage its case

docket, which includes placing "reasonable time limits on the parties in

a case." However, as we explained, the trial court's exercise of discretion

in managing its docket "does not allow the court to interfere with the

State's duty to prosecute cases, which the dismissal of the indictment in

this case does." Id. Notably, in Stallworth, we found an abuse of

discretion even though the defendant moved to dismiss the case, the

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victim no longer wished to prosecute and disputed that any criminal

offense occurred, and the State failed to respond within seven days of the

motion as ordered by the trial court under threat of dismissal. Id. at

1203-04. In holding that the trial court had abused its discretion, we

explained that a trial court may not " 'impermissibly interfere with the

State's right to prosecute' " and should not exercise its discretion in an

" ' "arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable" manner.' " Id. at 1210

(quoting Watts, 35 So. 3d at 6). Accordingly, we held that

"the circuit court did not have the authority to grant
Stallworth's motion to dismiss the indictment against him
based on a factual determination of the evidence or for the
State's failure to object to the motion to dismiss the
indictment within a prescribed time, especially where the
delay in the filing of the objection was not unreasonable and
did not interfere with Stallworth's right to a speedy trial."

Id.

Likewise, the record in this case contains circumstances

establishing an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Beginning with the

May 12, 2025, hearing, when the State indicated that the alleged victim

had not been served with a subpoena to appear in court, but that the

State wanted to go forward with the case, the trial court questioned:

"[W]hy are we doing this?" (SR. 3.) This was despite the State's previous

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explanation that Scott had "picked up another [Domestic Violence] Third

and Criminal Trespass" while on bond in this case and despite the State's

accurate explanation that the State is charged with representing not only

the victim, but also the public at large, and that the public has a

legitimate interest in seeing criminal charges brought to trial. The State

also made the trial court aware that once the alleged victim was served

with a subpoena to appear, if he failed to appear, "then the State would

be moving for a writ of attachment." (SR. 3-4.) At the June 9, 2025,

hearing held on the morning that Scott's case was set for trial, the trial

court continued to indicate its surprise that the State would want to go

forward without the victim's blessings, even though the victim had

indicated only an unwillingness to prosecute, not that no crime had

occurred as in Stallworth. The trial court had denied the State's motion

to bring the victim to court via a writ of attachment. Then, when the

State indicated that it would proceed to a trial without the victim, the

trial court suggested a bench trial. The trial court's stated desire for an

immediate bench trial prompted Scott's counsel to change his request for

a jury trial, which he had just stated. When the State attempted to

object, the trial court repeatedly interrupted the State's counsel. The

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trial court emphasized that it had told the State that its "witnesses

needed to be in this courtroom," and the State responded that witnesses

were usually required to appear after jury selection and that the State

did not know which witness or witnesses, if any, were required to appear

before jury selection. (R. 8-9.) However, even if the trial court had

instructed the State to have witnesses present at the call of the docket,

the Montgomery County District Attorney's Office had no authority to

force the witness to be present in the courtroom at the call of the docket

because "the court's power to attach generally arises only when a

reluctant witness has been served with a subpoena and has failed to

appear. Jarvis v. State, 220 Ala. 501, 126 So. 127 (1930); Ala. Code 1975,

§ 12-21-182(a); Rule 17.5, Ala. R. Crim. P." Ex parte Murray, 588 So. 2d

924, 926 (Ala. 1991). The State's only enforcement mechanism,

attachment of the reluctant witness by the court, had been denied.

The trial court then, without engaging Scott in a personal colloquy

for her to waive her previously asserted right to a jury trial and without

the State's consent, which were both required by Rule 18.1, Ala. R. Crim.

P., attempted to begin the bench trial immediately, ordering the State to

call its first witness. See Rule 18.1(b)(1) ("[T]he defendant may waive his

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right to trial by jury, with the consent of the prosecutor and the court …

in open court upon the record and with the consent of the prosecutor and

the court. Before accepting a waiver, the court shall address the

defendant personally in open court and shall advise the defendant of his

or her right to a trial by jury, and shall ascertain that the waiver is

knowing, voluntary, and intelligent." (emphasis added)). See also State

v. Watkins, 914 So. 2d 922, 924 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that "the

trial court erroneously proceeded to try the appellee without a jury and

improperly dismissed the State's case against the appellee for lack of

prosecution after the State indicated that it could not proceed until a jury

had been sworn"), and Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1965)

(rejecting the argument that a defendant has the right to have a bench

trial regardless of whether the State consents to the waiver of a jury trial

and recognizing that "the Government, as a litigant, has a legitimate

interest in seeing that cases in which it believes a conviction is warranted

are tried before the tribunal which the Constitution regards as most

likely to produce a fair result"). In addition, as in Watts and Watkins,

the State indicated that the witness would be present after jury selection.

However, the trial court required that the State's witness be called to

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testify within "two minutes," and, after that time had elapsed, it sua

sponte dismissed Scott's indictment with prejudice. Although the trial

court had ordered the State to produce its witnesses, based on the

procedural posture of the case, this Court views the trial court's actions

as a pretrial dismissal, not as a midtrial dismissal for want of

prosecution.

Given the totality of these circumstances, the trial court's dismissal

with prejudice was both unduly severe and "unreasonable." We thus hold

that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing Scott's indictment

with prejudice.

Conclusion

The trial court's order dismissing Scott's second-degree-theft-of-

property and second-degree-domestic-violence charges with prejudice is

due to be reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Windom, P.J., and Kellum, Minor, and Anderson, JJ., concur.

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