Cassandra Smith v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Children

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 54
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-24-634

Opinion Delivered February 5, 2025
CASSANDRA SMITH
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE INDEPENDENCE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 32JV-22-33]

HONORABLE LEE WISDOM
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HARROD, JUDGE
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR
CHILDREN AFFIRMED
APPELLEES

N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, Chief Judge

Cassandra Smith appeals from the order of the Independence County Circuit Court

terminating her parental rights to two children. On appeal, Smith challenges the circuit

court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interest. We affirm.

This case began in February 2022 when Smith’s two-month-old minor child (MC1)

was taken to the hospital with unexplained tears to her tongue and lip. Smith and MC1’s

putative father, Harlan Steinert, both appeared to be under the influence of drugs at the

hospital as evidenced by erratic behaviors and an inability to focus and answer questions.

Smith tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and buprenorphine, and she

had a prescription for Suboxone. The family had prior true findings relating to Smith’s two

other minor children, one-year-old MC2 and three-year-old MC3. The children were taken
into custody by the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS). MC3, who has a

different father than the other two children, was placed with his paternal grandparents.

MC1 was transported to Arkansas Children’s Hospital where it was revealed that she

had five healing rib fractures and three to four healing leg fractures. The adjudication

hearing was postponed because both parents were incarcerated on criminal charges related

to MC1’s injuries. The children were eventually adjudicated dependent-neglected based on

abuse and neglect, and reunification was set as the case goal. Due to Smith’s bond conditions

prohibiting contact with the children, visitation was initially not possible. By the time the

case was reviewed in August 2022, her bond conditions had been modified so that she could

have visitation. Smith was partially compliant with the case plan in that she had enrolled in

counseling and was in inpatient drug treatment.

At the permanency-planning hearing, reunification continued as the goal, but at the

fifteen-month review hearing in May 2023, the court changed the goal to adoption for MC1

and MC2. Guardianship was made the goal for MC3. The court found that Smith had

recently moved in with an individual who had a history with DHS and had not had

background checks. Furthermore, Smith’s criminal case was still pending.

The termination hearing was held in January 2024. 1 With regard to the criminal

charges Smith faced at the outset of this case, Smith testified that she did not know what she

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MC3’s paternal grandparents were granted a guardianship over him in August 2023.
Thereafter, he was no longer part of this DHS case. MC1 and MC2’s putative father,
Steinert, was dismissed from the proceeding at the beginning of the termination hearing
because he had no legal rights to terminate.

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had pleaded guilty to. Records showed, however, that she had pleaded guilty in August 2023

to endangering the welfare of a minor, a Class D felony, and was sentenced to five years’

probation. Smith testified that because she had used methamphetamine and accidentally

reported to her probation officer a week late, a petition to revoke her probation was filed,

and she went to jail for two weeks. A petition for revocation dated October 9, 2023, was

admitted into evidence and showed that Smith was alleged to have violated probation

conditions by using controlled substances, associating with known felons, not reporting to

her probation officer, and not paying her supervision fees. Smith testified that she went to

jail again in December for five days after failing an alcohol test. Smith testified that she went

to court the day before the termination hearing, and the prosecuting attorney gave her the

name of a drug-treatment program she planned to enter. She acknowledged that she was

not current on her financial obligations and said that her next court date was in March 2024.

Smith acknowledged that she is a drug addict but testified that she had not used

methamphetamine during most of this case. She admittedly relapsed in September 2023

after her mother had passed away, but she said that she had not used methamphetamine

since then. She said that she went to a drug class once a week and counseling once a month.

She hoped to enter the drug-treatment program for thirty days, and afterwards, the program

would help her find a job and a place to live. Although Smith had a prescription for

Suboxone, her behavior caused DHS to be concerned she was overusing it. DHS had

informed her not to use it during her visitations because they believed it impaired her ability

to parent.

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Smith testified that she had been in a relationship with David Stuart for almost two

years. She acknowledged her previous testimony that they had broken up, but she said they

married less than a month later. She said they married because her probation officer

indicated she would not get in trouble for associating with a felon if they were married.

Smith testified that she did not remember being told by DHS that living with Stuart was a

problem. Smith was aware that Stuart’s children had been involved in DHS cases, and one

child lived with a relative as a result. Smith had never met his children. Smith and Stuart

lived together in a camper on property belonging to Stuart’s parents. She said that Stuart

was not currently working because he was trying to get into an inpatient drug-treatment

program; however, she claimed that he was sober because he had not failed drug tests while

on parole. The revocation petition alleged that Smith had admitted using

methamphetamine with Stuart, but she testified that he was not with her when she used.

She believed that going to treatment would help them get back on their feet financially and

save money to get a bigger place to live.

Family service worker Christine King testified that Stuart had signed forms for

background and child-maltreatment checks, and the results of those checks prevented DHS

from recommending that the children be placed in a home where he lives. 2 Additionally,

Stuart had not been drug tested by DHS or participated in the case. King testified that she

told Smith on multiple occasions that DHS would not recommend returning the children

2
King testified that she did not have access to the details of the checks, but she was
told they did not come back “good.”

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to her so long as she was with Stuart. King said that Smith got upset and left every time she

tried to talk about Stuart.

In addition to the above issues, King testified that another factor that prevents

returning the children to Smith is her parenting abilities. Smith had completed parenting

classes, but DHS had ongoing concerns about her parenting. The program assistant was

trained in parenting and had provided hands-on teaching during visits, but Smith still

struggled with watching both children at the same time. King did not feel that she could

properly supervise them and had a lot of concerns that they would not be safe. King testified

that MC1 and MC2 had been in the same foster home for the entire case except for two

brief unsuccessful attempts to place them with relatives. The current placement is interested

in adopting them, they have no significant health or behavioral issues, and there is a high

likelihood they will be adopted.

The circuit court terminated Smith’s parental rights upon finding that termination

was in the children’s best interest and that two statutory grounds had been proved.

We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. Everly v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.

Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 528, 589 S.W.3d 425. At least one statutory ground must exist in

addition to a finding that it is in the child’s best interest to terminate parental rights; these

must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A), (B)

(Supp. 2023). In making a best-interest determination, the circuit court is required to

consider two factors: (1) the likelihood that the child will be adopted and (2) the potential

harm to the child if custody is returned to a parent. Id.

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We will not reverse a termination order unless the circuit court’s findings are clearly

erroneous. Everly, supra. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to

support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. Credibility determinations are left to the fact-

finder. Id.

On appeal, Smith limits her arguments to the best-interest determination. She argues

that the evidence does not demonstrate that the children would be at risk of potential harm

if returned to her custody. She notes that she was sober for much of the case; that she

participated in parenting classes, counseling, and drug treatment; and that she intends to

enter inpatient treatment. Smith argues that DHS should have been able to detail what its

concerns were regarding Stuart and should have involved him in the case plan.

In assessing potential harm, the circuit court is not required to find that actual harm

would ensue if the child is returned to the parent or to affirmatively identify a potential

harm. Easter v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 441, 587 S.W.3d 604. Potential

harm must be viewed in a forward-looking manner and in broad terms, including the harm

the child suffers from the lack of stability when not in a permanent home. Id. Past actions

of a parent over a meaningful period are good indicators of what the future may hold. Id.

Smith maintained a relationship with Stuart despite DHS’s warning that her

relationship with him would impede her ability to regain custody of her children and despite

her knowledge that he is a felon, is a drug addict, and does not have custody of his own

children pursuant to a DHS case. The relationship threatened her sobriety and her

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probation status, and she did not attempt to have Stuart rehabilitate himself with DHS.

Although she claimed they are both drug-free, Smith testified that they both planned to enter

inpatient treatment to get back on their feet. Furthermore, despite parenting classes and

ongoing teaching, DHS still had concerns about Smith’s ability to properly supervise the

children. At the time of the termination hearing, the children were two and three years old

and had been in the same foster home for nearly two years. Given these facts, we cannot say

that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that termination was in the children’s best

interest.

Affirmed.

VIRDEN and HARRISON, JJ., agree.

Jennifer Oyler Olson, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.

Ellen K. Howard, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.

Dana McClain, attorney ad litem for minor children.

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