Boston Mountain Reg'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist. v. Benton Cty. Reg'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist.

Cite as 2019 Ark. App. 488
Digitally signed by Elizabeth
Perry ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
Date: 2022.08.05 10:41:28 DIVISION I
-05'00'
Adobe Acrobat version: No. CV-18-14
2022.001.20169
BOSTON MOUNTAIN REGIONAL
Opinion Delivered: October 30, 2019
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
DISTRICT
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE APPEAL FROM THE BENTON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 04CV-16-629]

BENTON COUNTY REGIONAL
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT HONORABLE XOLLIE DUNCAN,
DISTRICT JUDGE
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
REVERSED ON DIRECT APPEAL;
CROSS-APPEAL DISMISSED

RITA W. GRUBER, Chief Judge

This appeal arises from a dispute between two regional solid-waste management

districts over statutory fees related to the movement or disposal of solid waste within and

between districts. Instead of the equal division of fees called for in the code, the Benton

County Circuit Court found that the statutory fee division provided for an “unjust

enrichment” to the appellant Boston Mountain Regional Solid Waste Management District

and that the entire fee should be paid over to the appellee Benton County Regional Solid

Waste Management District. The Boston Mountain District appeals, arguing that the

statutory scheme should be enforced as written because the statute is presumed

constitutional. The Benton County District cross-appeals, arguing that the circuit court

erred in not declaring the statute unconstitutional. We reverse on direct appeal and dismiss

the cross-appeal.
I. Background Facts

A brief history of the legislation and this lawsuit is helpful. In March 1991, the

Arkansas legislature passed Act 752 of 1991 as part of an overhaul of the state’s solid-waste

management system and recycling programs. The Act renamed regional solid-waste

planning districts and solid-waste service areas as regional solid-waste management districts

to be governed by regional solid-waste management boards. Act 752 also greatly expanded

the powers and duties of the regional solid-waste management boards, which are the entities

responsible for providing solid-waste management systems for their districts. The Act gave

the boards authority to assess service fees for solid-waste collection services. See Ark. Code

Ann. § 8-6-714(b) (Repl. 2018). The Act was silent as to any limits on the amount of the

fees and whether they could be assessed on districts that disposed of solid waste from an

adjoining district. Section 8-6-714 was substantially rewritten by Act 209 of 2011. Pertinent

to this appeal, the boards were given authority to “fix, charge, and collect rents, fees, and

charges of no more than two dollars ($2.00) per ton of solid waste related to the movement

or disposal of solid waste within the district[.]” See Ark. Code Ann. § 8-6-714(a)(1)(A). As

amended, section 8-6-714(c)(3) further specified certain conditions and circumstances under

which fees may be assessed:

(A) Districts shall determine by interlocal agreement how the districts shall:

(i) Assess and administer the fee; and

(ii) Divide the fees.

(B) If districts cannot reach an interlocal agreement regarding the division of the
fees, then the fees shall be divided equally between the districts.

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Ark. Code Ann. § 8-6-714(c)(3)(A).

The parties once had an interlocal agreement dated May 26, 2011, that addressed the

distribution of the waste-assessment fees for waste originating in the Benton County District

and brought into the Boston Mountain District. The fees are paid to the districts by the

company hauling the waste load to the landfill through a contract with a municipality or

county government. Article 2 of the agreement provided that both districts at present had a

waste-assessment fee of $1.50 per ton on all solid waste generated in their respective district,

brought into their district from outside their district, or generated in their district and

transported outside their district or the state. Article 3 provided that the fee would remain

at $1.50 per ton unless both agreed to an increase. In Article 10, the districts agreed to leave

in place any contract for waste-assessment fees existing at the time of the agreement and that

the fee would be paid entirely to the generating district. The essence of the agreement is

that the district generating the waste receives the entire fee. The agreement was to expire

on May 1, 2016.

A private company, Waste Management, operates the Eco-Vista Landfill in

Tontitown, Arkansas, within the Boston Mountain District. The landfill is the destination

for solid waste generated within the Benton County District. There are no landfills in the

Benton County District.

On April 28, 2016, the Benton County District filed its complaint for declaratory

and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged that the Boston Mountain District refused to

renew the 2011 agreement and, instead, proposed a new agreement that would pay the

Boston Mountain District $1 per ton for waste generated in Benton County and disposed

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of in the Boston Mountain District, with the remainder of the proposed $2 per ton fee to

be paid to the Benton County District. The complaint further alleged that the Benton

County District had not agreed to the new fee and that the Boston Mountain District did

not provide any services for which the Benton County District will be required to pay the

fees. According to the Benton County District, this amounted to an unjust enrichment of

the Boston Mountain District. The Benton County District sought to enjoin the Boston

Mountain District from the collection of the fees and that such fees be held in escrow during

the pendency of the action. The Benton County District also sought a declaration (1) of the

parties’ rights and obligations; (2) that the Boston Mountain District is not entitled to any

fees for services provided solely by the Benton County District; and (3) that Arkansas Code

Annotated section 8-6-714 is unconstitutional.

After its motion to dismiss was denied, the Boston Mountain District answered the

complaint. The Boston Mountain District admitted the historical facts surrounding the 2011

agreement but denied the material allegations of the complaint and asserted various

affirmative defenses.

The Benton County District filed a motion seeking to have Waste Management pay

the disputed fees into escrow pending resolution of the case. The circuit court ultimately

entered an order, as amended, providing that one-half of the disputed fees would be held in

escrow while the other half would be paid to the Benton County District.

The case was tried to the bench on April 25, 2017. The circuit court took the matter

under advisement and entered an order on September 11, 2017, finding that the equal

division of the fee was an unjust enrichment and directing the entire fee be retained by the

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Benton County District. The court found that (1) the fees collected by the Benton County

District were collected to provide required services for the citizens of Benton County; (2)

if the fees were reduced so as to allow the Boston Mountain District a portion of the fees,

the services provided by the Benton County District would be reduced and employees

would be terminated; (3) the reduction in services and elimination of employees would not

otherwise be provided to Benton County citizens; (4) the collection of additional fees by

the Boston Mountain District is not necessary to increase services to the landfill operated by

Waste Management; (5) any additional fees collected by the Boston Mountain District

would be used to fund its operating expenses and provide raises for staff or to increase

employees and services; and (6) allowing the Boston Mountain District to collect any fees

from waste generated in the Benton County District amounts to an unjust enrichment. The

court did not address the Benton County District’s request to find Ark. Code Ann. § 8-6-

714 unconstitutional.

The Boston Mountain District filed a timely notice of appeal on October 9. The

circuit court entered an amended order on October 10, adding a specific finding that the

Ark. Code Ann. § 8-6-714 is not unconstitutional. The Benton County District filed a

notice of cross-appeal on October 11.

II. Standard of Review

We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Williform v. Ark. Dep’t of Human

Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 314, 551 S.W.3d 401. The basic rule of statutory construction is to

give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Id. In determining the meaning of a

statute, our first rule is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and

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usually accepted meaning in common language. Id. This court construes the statute so that

no word is left void, superfluous, or insignificant, and meaning and effect are given to every

word in the statute if possible. Id. When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous

and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory

construction. Id.

III. Cross-Appeal

We start with the Benton County District’s cross-appeal in which it argues that the

circuit court erred in not finding section 8-6-714 unconstitutional. However, we hold that

the Benton County District failed to file an effective notice of appeal from the amended

order finding the statute constitutional. Whether an appellant has filed an effective notice of

appeal is always an issue before the appellate court, and absent an effective notice of appeal,

this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal and must dismiss it. Lindsey v. Green, 2010

Ark. 118, 369 S.W.3d 1.

In Lindsey, Green filed a notice of cross-appeal, appealing from the final order in the

case entered on January 20, 2009. However, on appeal, Green argued that he was appealing

the trial court’s order denying his motion for costs, which was not included in the final

order but was part of a separate order entered on January 23, 2009. Id. at 12–13, 369 S.W.3d

at 8. Relying on Rule 3(e) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure–Civil, the supreme

court held that Green had failed to file an effective notice of cross-appeal and dismissed the

cross-appeal. Id. at 13, 369 S.W.3d at 8.

The facts in Lindsey are nearly identical to those in the present case—in both cases,

the cross-appellants designated the final order as the one being appealed despite the fact that

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the issue they wanted to argue was not addressed until a later separate order not named in

their notices of cross-appeal. Therefore, we dismiss the Benton County District’s cross-

appeal.

IV. Direct Appeal

On direct appeal, the Boston Mountain District argues that the statute should be

enforced as written because there is no basis for it to be ruled unconstitutional and that

unjust enrichment does not apply in this case. Benton County District argues that the statute

is an illegal exaction and the circuit court correctly found that there was an unjust

enrichment.

All statutes are presumed constitutional, and we resolve all doubts in favor of

constitutionality. Brennan v. White Cty., 2019 Ark. App. 146, 573 S.W.3d 577. The party

challenging a statute’s constitutionality has the burden of proving that the act is

unconstitutional. See id. It is a well-established principle that courts are bound to apply an

unambiguous statute as it is written. Kan. City S. Ry. Co. v. Pledger, 301 Ark. 564, 785

S.W.2d 462 (1990); Chandler v. Perry-Casa Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 286 Ark. 170, 690 S.W.2d

349 (1985).

Further, we do not believe that unjust enrichment has any application to this case.

Unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine. See Campbell v. Asbury Auto., Inc., 2011 Ark.

157, 381 S.W.3d 21. It is the principle that one person should not be permitted unjustly to

enrich himself at the expense of another, but should be required to make restitution of or

for property or benefits received, retained, or appropriated, where it is just and equitable

that such restitution be made, and where such action involves no violation or frustration of

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law or opposition to public policy, either directly or indirectly. Id. The existence of a

contractual relationship between the parties that addresses the subject in dispute generally

precludes recovery on a theory of unjust enrichment. Id. “The reason for the rule that

someone with an express contract is not allowed to proceed on an unjust-enrichment

theory, is that such a person has no need of such a proceeding, and, moreover, that such a

person should not be allowed by means of such a proceeding to recover anything more or

different from what the contract provides for.” Id. at 23, 381 S.W.3d at 37 (quoting United

States v. Applied Pharm. Consultants, Inc., 182 F.3d 603, 609 (8th Cir. 1999)); see also Friends

of Children, Inc. v. Marcus, 46 Ark. App. 57, 61–62, 876 S.W.2d 603, 605–06 (1994);

Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 2(2) (Am. Law Inst. 2011).

Here, the parties do not currently have a written contract—an interlocal agreement that

addresses the division of fees; however, section 8-6-714(c)(3) does provide a default rule for

such a situation—that the districts equally divide the fees. The fact that it is a statute instead

of a written contract that supplies the disputed term does not change the result. Otherwise,

the Benton County District would receive more than it is entitled to under the statute.

Campbell, supra.

We hold that the circuit court erred in applying the doctrine of unjust enrichment

in the circumstances of this case. As discussed above, there was no basis for the application

of unjust enrichment. Instead, the court should have applied section 8-6-714 as written.

That would have forced the two districts to either negotiate an interlocal agreement

acceptable to both regarding the division of the fees or, in the absence of such an agreement,

equally divide the fees.

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Also, the Benton County District argues that the application of the statute is unfair

to it. However, that is no reason for the circuit court not to apply the statute in this case.

Worth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of El Dorado, 294 Ark. 643, 746 S.W.2d 364 (1988); see also

C.I.R. v. Asphalt Prods. Co., Inc., 482 U.S. 117, 121 (1987) (“Judicial perception that a

particular result would be unreasonable may enter into the construction of ambiguous

provisions, but cannot justify disregard of what Congress has plainly and intentionally

provided.”). This is not to say that the Benton County District does not have options;

however, those options are best addressed to the legislature, not the courts. Sw. Bell Tel. Co.

v. Roberts, 246 Ark. 864, 440 S.W.2d 208 (1969).

Reversed on direct appeal; cross-appeal dismissed.

WHITEAKER and VAUGHT, JJ., agree.

Harrington, Miller, Kieklak, Eichmann & Brown, P.A., by: Thomas N. Kieklak, for

appellant/cross-appellee.

Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, P.C., by: Curtis E. Hogue and M. Scott

Hall, for appellee/cross-appellant.

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