Roderick Talley v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2020 Ark. App. 461
Reason: I attest to the
accuracy and integrity of this
document
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
Date: 2021-07-15 10:25:54 DIVISION II
Foxit PhantomPDF Version: No. CR-20-134
9.7.5

OPINION DELIVERED: OCTOBER 7, 2020
RODERICK TALLEY
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
FOURTH DIVISION
V. [NO. 60CR-16-271]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE HERBERT THOMAS
APPELLEE WRIGHT, JR., JUDGE
AFFIRMED

ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge

Roderick Talley appeals the December 19, 2019 order of the Pulaski County Circuit

Court, which denied both his petition to seal a misdemeanor conviction and his motion to

strike the State’s response to the motion to compel. Talley argues on appeal that in so

ruling, the circuit court misinterpreted the Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act

(“CCRSA”) of 2013, which is codified at Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16-90-1401

et seq. (Repl. 2016 & Supp. 2019). We affirm.

I. Procedural History

Talley was charged with second-degree battery on January 28, 2016. On September

19, he entered a negotiated guilty plea to second-degree assault, a Class B misdemeanor,

and he was ordered to pay a $500 fine. On April 19, 2018, Talley filed a pro se petition to

seal the misdemeanor conviction and claimed that he had completed all the requirements of

the conviction and had no pending felony charges in any state or federal court.
On November 5, 2019, Talley filed an amended petition to seal his misdemeanor-

assault conviction and stated that he had one or more pending felony charges under Arkansas

Code Annotated as follows: section 5-54-111(b)(1) (second-degree escape); section 5-36-

103(b)(2)(A) (theft of property with value less than $25,000 but more than $5,000); section

5-13-211 (aggravated assault upon a law enforcement officer or employee of a correctional

facility); section 5-13-202 (second-degree battery); section 5-54-125 (fleeing); section 5-

54-125(c) (fleeing on foot); section 5-36-103(b)(4)(A) (theft of property); section 27-16-

303 (driving with an invalid license); and section 5-37-201 (forgery).

On December 6, Talley filed a motion to compel ruling on his petition to seal,

claiming that he had personally served a copy of his petition on the Pulaski County

Prosecuting Attorney’s Office on November 5. He alleged that pursuant to Arkansas Code

Annotated section 16-90-1413(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 2019), the prosecuting attorney may file a

notice of opposition to his petition to seal within thirty days from the date of filing.

Therefore, he claimed that when the State did not file any notice of opposition on or before

December 5, it waived any opposition to his petition to seal. He argued that section 16-

90-1413(b)(2)(B)(i) notes that when the State fails to file any notice of opposition, the circuit

court may grant the petition. He further cited section 16-90-1415(a) that “unless the circuit

court . . . is presented with and finds that there is clear and convincing evidence that

misdemeanor or violation conviction should not be sealed under this subchapter, the circuit

court . . . shall seal” the conviction. He argued that because the State did not file a notice

of opposition, the circuit court was not presented with clear and convincing evidence that

the conviction should not be sealed, and the statutes contain no other basis for a hearing on

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the petition other than the State filing notice. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-1413(b)(2)(B)(ii)

(if notice of opposition is filed, the court shall set the matter for a hearing). On the basis of

that argument, he claimed that the circuit court should grant his petition.

The State responded to Talley’s motion to compel on December 10 and alleged that

in Talley’s original petition to seal, he made false statements under oath by stating he had

no pending criminal cases when, in fact, he had two felony cases pending.1 The State argued

that because Talley had requested four continuances in the two cases, there still were no

resolutions to them. The State also claimed that on September 3, 2019, Talley was charged

with harassing communications and violating an order of protection, and the case was

pending in the Little Rock District Court; thus, the State was also waiting on a resolution

of this third criminal case before it filed its response.

The State argued that under section 16-90-1413(b)(2)(B), if the State does not file a

notice of opposition to a petition to seal a misdemeanor within thirty days, the court may

grant a petition to seal; however, there is no requirement that the court grant a petition to

seal if the State does not respond within thirty days. The State claimed that it did not believe

it could respond without knowing the resolution of the three pending criminal cases against

Talley. The State alleged that Talley’s own actions were the cause for the State’s delay in

filing written opposition to the petition to seal.

1
The State filed its response to Talley’s motion to compel ruling under two case
numbers—60CR-15-3708 and 60CR-16-271. The circuit court granted the petition to
seal in 60CR-15-3708, which dealt with charges the State had nolle prossed; thus, Talley is
not appealing the court’s decision to seal the record in case number 60CR-15-3708.
3
On December 12, Talley filed a motion to strike the State’s “objection” as untimely.

He argued that the prosecution has only thirty days to file a notice of opposition to a petition

to seal a misdemeanor conviction. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-1413(b)(2)(A). He claimed

that because the State failed to file any notice of opposition on or before the thirtieth day,

December 5, the State waived any opposition to his petition. He argued that the State’s

response to his motion to compel ruling could only be construed as a written notice of

objection filed outside the thirty-day deadline. He urged the circuit court to look to the

substance of the pleading rather than the title, Mhoon v. State, 369 Ark. 134, 251 S.W.3d

244 (2007), and claimed that the State’s response is a late notice of objection to seal because

it accused Talley of lying under oath and noted that he had pending criminal cases.

II. Circuit Court Hearing and Order

At the December 18 hearing, the circuit court heard argument from counsel for both

parties. Regarding Talley’s motion to strike, he argued that regardless of the title of the

State’s response, the essence of the pleading is an objection, which was untimely and should

be struck under the statute. The circuit court denied the motion to strike the State’s

response to Talley’s motion to compel and did not make any findings regarding whether

the response was an “objection.”

Talley then argued that under the CCRSA, unless the circuit court is presented with

and finds clear and convincing evidence that a misdemeanor conviction should not be

sealed, the circuit court shall grant the petition to seal. He claimed that the State, having

not filed an objection, had not put on any evidence, “let alone enough to show by clear-

and-convincing evidence,” that the conviction should not be sealed. In response, the State

4
introduced exhibits 1–6, which are criminal records related to Talley’s 2018 and 2019

criminal charges and the sentencing order from 2016. Talley objected that “these are

untimely,” but the circuit court granted the State’s motion to admit the evidence. 2

The State argued that considering the evidence reflected in the exhibits, Talley

committed “false swearing under oath.”3 The State pointed to the pending felony and

misdemeanor violations and stated that its position was that “not waiting for the resolutions

of these to determine whether you are going to grant or deny the petition to seal is not a

good mode.” The State asked the circuit court to wait for the resolution of the cases to

2
State’s exhibit 1 is Talley’s record of first judicial appearance on the charge of
second-degree forgery, Class C felony, in the District Court of Cross County filed January
5, 2018, and related criminal record with an offense date of March 1, 2016.

State’s exhibit 2 is Talley’s April 19, 2018 verified pro se petition to seal records of
nolle prosequi in case number 60CR-15-3708 that states he had no pending felony charges
in any state or federal court.

State’s exhibit 3 is Talley’s April 19, 2018 verified pro se petition to seal
misdemeanors in case number 60CR-16-271 that states he had no pending felony charges
in any state or federal court.

State’s exhibit 4 is the December 26, 2018 criminal information accusing Talley of
second-degree escape, theft of property, aggravated assault on a certified law enforcement
officer, second-degree battery, fleeing in a vehicle, fleeing on foot, theft of property, and
driving on a suspended license all on November 14, 2018, the affidavit for probable cause
in that case, and the order for continuance on December 11, 2019.

State’s exhibit 5 is a warrant for Talley’s arrest served September 3, 2019, for violation
of a domestic order of protection and harassing communications and the supporting affidavit.

State’s exhibit 6 is the September 19, 2016 sentencing order on Talley’s negotiated
guilty plea for second-degree assault.
3
The State first argued that this argument related to the CR-15-3708 case but later
argued that Talley falsely swore in both petitions.
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determine whether “he is amenable to rehabilitation.” Alternatively, the State argued that

if the court were to make a decision, it could do so on the basis of Talley’s false swearing

under oath. The circuit court ruled that the petition was granted in relation to case No.

CR15-3708—the nolle prossed charges.

The State then made its argument related solely to Talley’s petition to seal the

misdemeanor conviction under case number CR-16-271 and stated that the burden on the

State is to produce clear and convincing evidence that a misdemeanor should not be sealed.

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-1415. The State claimed that it had presented such evidence that

Talley filed a petition with a false statement under oath in order to manipulate the system

into sealing the case. Further, the State argued that it had shown that Talley had been

“subsequently charged with six felonies and five misdemeanors in three different cases in

two different jurisdictions since the filing of the petition to seal that contained actual false

swearing.” The State recognized that whether to seal the conviction is discretionary with

the court and asked the court to exercise its discretion and find that clear and convincing

evidence had been presented and that the case not be sealed.

Talley argued that the circuit court had no discretion under section 16-90-1415(a)

because the court was not presented with clear and convincing evidence that a misdemeanor

conviction should not be sealed. Talley claimed that the only vehicle whereby the State

could present the evidence to the court is to file a timely objection. Because he maintained

that the State waived its objection, Talley argued there was no evidence that the conviction

should not be sealed. He claimed that the court could not consider anything the State

6
submitted because it was not argued in a timely thirty-day objection, and the court had no

other choice under the statute, which states the court “shall seal the conviction.”

The circuit court denied the petition at the hearing, and the order filed December

19, 2019, states in pertinent part:

Turning first to the Defendant’s Motion to Strike, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-
1413(b)(2)(A) provides that “[t]he prosecuting attorney may file a notice of
opposition with the court for a petition seeking to seal a record of an eligible
misdemeanor conviction or violation setting forth reasons for the opposition to the
sealing within thirty (30) days after receipt of the uniform petition or after the
uniform petition is filed, whichever is the later date.” The statute goes on to say that
the court may grant the petition if the notice of opposition is not filed.

Neither the statute nor any case law reviewed by the Court would support
the argument that the State may not present information regarding the case if they
have not objected within the 30 days recited in the statute. The Court has the
inherent authority to hear from the State on any matter in which the State is a party.
To preclude the State from doing so would essentially create the right to a “default
judgment of expungement” if the State did not formally respond within the specified
window.

Under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-1415, the Court is to seal a misdemeanor
violation unless it is presented with and finds that there is clear-and-convincing
evidence that it should not be sealed. Regarding nolle prossed cases, that same statute
states that a nolle prossed case shall be expunged unless the State shows by a
preponderance of the evidence that expungement would place the public at risk or
fail to further the interests of justice. The Court would not be able to make these
decisions if the State were procedurally barred from responding to the Petition.
There is some conflict in the wording of Act 1460—for some provisions it is
anticipated that the Court “shall” seal a case, and in others it is specified that the
Court “may” take such action. Ultimately, the right to an expungement remains
discretionary for the Court, though the standard of review given to the Court varies
within the statute.

In any event, the Court finds that it cannot make such decisions without
hearing the State’s position. The Court does not grant a Petition to Seal over
resistance or objection from the State without at least a hearing. At least for the nolle
prossed case, the Court has to determine whether the State has shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that expungement would place the public at risk or
not further the interests of justice. With that in mind, the Court finds that the
Defendant’s Motion to Strike the State’s Response as Untimely should be denied.
7
Looking at the actual merits of the two Petitions, the Court finds that the
Petition in 2015-3708 should be granted and that the Petition in 2016-271 should
be denied. The State presented several exhibits at the December 18 hearing,
including evidence of the pending charges in Cross County and the initial versions
of the Petitions that the State alleges contained false affirmations. The State has not
met its preponderance burden in 2015-3708 by showing that the public would be
placed at risk or that the interests of justice would not be furthered by expunging a
case where the State has declined to prosecute and the statute of limitations has run.
The Defendant’s Petition in 2015-3078 should be granted.

The Court does find that the State has presented clear-and-convincing
evidence that the Petition to Seal in 2016-271 should not be granted. The evidence
reviewed by the Court to make its decision is the same in both cases, but the
distinction lies in what expungement achieves in both cases. Even though the nolle
prossed case requires a smaller burden of proof, the evidence does not meet the
preponderance burden where the State chose not to prosecute. That same evidence
in a case where the Defendant was convicted, albeit only a misdemeanor, is more
compelling. The Court does not find that the Defendant’s assertion in his initial
Petition was a scrivener’s error, and the State’s assertion that this was false swearing
is a reasonable argument. The nature of the pending Cross County charges, which
are serious felonies in nature and also involve an allegation of assault, give the Court
pause when determining whether a misdemeanor assault conviction should be sealed.
The Court finds that, as of the time of this ruling, there is clear-and-convincing
evidence that the misdemeanor should not be sealed. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-1405
will permit him to file a new uniform petition after 90 days from the entry of this
Order, or whenever his Cross County cases have been disposed of.

Talley filed a timely notice of appeal from the order denying both his petition to seal

and his motion to strike, and this appeal followed.

III. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-1413 contains the procedure for sealing

records in pertinent part as follows:

(a)(1) A person who is eligible to have a record sealed under this subchapter may
file a uniform petition in the circuit court or district court in the county where the
offense was committed and in which the person was convicted for the offense he or
she is now petitioning to have sealed.

8
....

(b)(1)(A) A copy of the uniform petition shall be served upon the prosecuting
attorney for the county in which the uniform petition is filed and the arresting
agency, if the arresting agency is a named party, within three (3) days of the filing of
the uniform petition.

(B) It is not necessary to make the arresting agency a party to the action.

(2)(A) The prosecuting attorney may file a notice of opposition with the court
for a petition seeking to seal a record of an eligible misdemeanor conviction or
violation setting forth reasons for the opposition to the sealing within thirty (30) days
after receipt of the uniform petition or after the uniform petition is filed, whichever
is the later date.

(B)(i) If notice of opposition is not filed, the court may grant the uniform petition.

(ii) If notice of opposition is filed, the court shall set the matter for a hearing if
the record for which the uniform petition was filed is eligible for sealing under this
subchapter unless the prosecuting attorney consents to allow the court to decide the
case solely on the pleadings.

....

(c)(1) The court may not grant the uniform petition until thirty (30) days have
passed since the uniform petition was served on the prosecuting attorney, although
the court may deny the uniform petition at any time.

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-1413(a)(1), (b)(1)–(2)(B)(ii), (c)(1).

Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-1415 sets forth the burden of proof and the

standard of review for a petition to seal records as follows:

(a) For a uniform petition filed under § 16-90-1405, unless the circuit court or
district court is presented with and finds that there is clear and convincing evidence
that a misdemeanor or violation conviction should not be sealed under this
subchapter, the circuit court or district court shall seal the misdemeanor or violation
conviction for a person after the person files a uniform petition as described in this
section.

....

9
(d) A uniform petition filed under § 16-90-1409 or § 16-90-1410 [sealing records
of nolle prosequi] shall be granted unless the state shows by a preponderance of the
evidence that doing so would:

(1) Place the public at risk; or

(2) Not further the interests of justice.

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-1415(a), (d).

The correct application and interpretation of an Arkansas statute is a question of law,

which this court decides de novo. Bolin v. State, 2015 Ark. 149, at 4, 459 S.W.3d 788, 791

(standard of review in considering question of application and interpretation of CCRSA and

Community Punishment Act). The Arkansas Supreme Court has instructed as follows:

Moving to our review of the statute before us, “[t]he first rule in considering
the meaning and effect of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words
their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language.” Ortho-McNeil-
Janssen Pharm., Inc. v. State, 2014 Ark. 124, at 10, 432 S.W.3d 563, 571. The basic
rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Dep’t of
Human Servs. & Child Welfare Agency Review Bd. v. Howard, 367 Ark. 55, 62, 238
S.W.3d 1, 6 (2006). Additionally, in construing any statute, we place it beside other
statutes relevant to the subject matter in question and ascribe meaning and effect to
be derived from the whole. Lawhon Farm Servs. v. Brown, 335 Ark. 272, 984 S.W.2d
1 (1998). Statutes relating to the same subject must be construed together and in
harmony, if possible. Berryhill v. Synatzske, 2014 Ark. 169, at 4–5, 432 S.W.3d 637,
at 640.

Haile v. Johnston, 2016 Ark. 52, at 6–7, 482 S.W.3d 323, 326–27 (reviewing Ark. Code

Ann. § 16-90-1417 “effect of sealing”).

IV. Motion to Strike

Talley argues that the circuit court misinterpreted the CCRSA in denying his motion

to strike the State’s response. Pursuant to the statute, the prosecuting attorney has only

thirty days from the date of the petition’s filing to file a notice of opposition. Ark. Code

Ann. § 16-90-1413(b)(2)(A). If the State fails to file any notice of opposition, the circuit
10
court may grant the petition. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-1413(b)(2)(B)(i). If the State files

notice of opposition, the court shall set the matter for a hearing unless the prosecuting

attorney consents to allow the court to decide the case solely on the pleadings. Ark. Code

Ann. § 16-90-1413(b)(2)(B)(ii). Talley argues that under the statutory framework, there is

no other mechanism whereby a court may order a hearing on the merits of a petition to seal

a misdemeanor conviction.

Talley contends that it is the State’s burden to show why a misdemeanor conviction

should not be sealed by presenting clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-

90-1415(a).

[U]nless the circuit court or district court is presented with and finds that there is
clear and convincing evidence that a misdemeanor or violation conviction should
not be sealed under this subchapter, the circuit court or district court shall seal the
misdemeanor or violation conviction for a person after the person files a uniform
petition as described in this section.

Id. (emphasis added). He argues that the law creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of

sealing misdemeanors but also allows the State an opportunity to rebut that presumption by

objecting and presenting the circuit court with clear and convincing evidence that a

misdemeanor conviction should not be sealed. He contends that by failing to file notice of

opposition within thirty days, the State waived any right it had to a hearing on the petition.

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-1413(b)(2)(B)(ii). He asserts that the CCRSA contains no other

basis for a circuit court to hold a hearing on such a petition other than the State’s filing such

notice, and he contends that there is no mechanism within the CCRSA whereby the State

may receive an extension to file a notice of objection.

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He argues that the circuit court erroneously denied Talley’s motion to strike the

State’s objection as untimely because the State’s notice of objection was not filed until more

than thirty days after the petition was filed on November 5, 2019. Thus, he claims that the

State’s response should have been struck as untimely under the express language of the

CCRSA.

However, we note that there is nothing in the CCRSA that prohibits the State from

filing a response to a motion to compel. Further, the CCRSA does not prohibit the State

from objecting to, or presenting evidence against, a petition to seal if it did not file a notice

of opposition within thirty days. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-1413(b)(2)(A). Nor does the

statute prohibit the circuit court from holding a hearing if the State did not file a notice of

opposition. Section 16-90-1413(b)(2)(A) merely permits the State to file a notice of

opposition within thirty days, and section 16-90-1413(b)(2)(B)(ii) mandates that the court

hold a hearing on a petition to seal if the State files a notice of opposition. Because the

statute neither prohibits nor mandates a hearing when the State does not file a notice of

opposition, a circuit court, in its discretion, was permitted to hold a hearing on Talley’s

petition, as it can on any other motion filed in its court.

There is no rebuttable presumption in the statute in favor of sealing that the State

can only rebut by filing a notice of opposition. If a notice of opposition is not filed, the

court may grant the uniform petition. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-1413(b)(2)(B)(i). The

circuit court is not required to grant a petition to seal if the State does not file a notice of

opposition within thirty days. See Williams v. State, 347 Ark. 728, 756, 67 S.W.3d 548,

565–66 (2002) (“may” is usually employed as implying permissive or discretionary, rather

12
than mandatory, action or conduct); Smith v. Fox, 358 Ark. 388, 393, 193 S.W.3d 238, 242

(2004) (“shall” is mandatory). Therefore, the circuit court is permitted to grant the petition

if the State does not file a notice of opposition, but it is not required to do so. See Edwards

v. State, 70 Ark. App. 127, 130, 15 S.W.3d 358, 360 (2000) (explaining that by using the

word “may” in Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-1207 (Supp. 1993), the circuit court had discretion

to expunge defendant’s record upon the successful completion of his probationary period,

but the expungement was not mandated).

We hold that the circuit court did not misinterpret Arkansas Code Annotated section

16-90-1413(b)(2) by denying Talley’s motion to strike and by receiving evidence from the

State at the hearing.

V. Petition to Seal

Talley argues that the circuit court misinterpreted the CCRSA in denying his

petition to seal the misdemeanor conviction. This argument is premised on Talley’s

conclusion that the response to the motion to compel should have been struck. Given that

conclusion, Talley claims that the circuit court had no choice under the CCRSA but to

grant his petition to seal. Talley contends that the response filed by the State is, in reality,

a notice of objection, which was not filed within thirty days. He argues that the circuit

court may not find such evidence sua sponte; rather, the statute requires that the court be

“presented with and find” such clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-

1415(a). He contends that the statute requires presentation of evidence by one of the parties.

He argues that the State and the circuit court divined items from the CCRSA that

are not there. For example, he contends that there is no requirement that the defendant be

13
“amenable to rehabilitation” as argued by the State, nor is there a requirement that the State

know the resolution of the pending criminal cases against Talley. He argues the State had

a thirty-day window to respond, and it did not.

Talley contends that, contrary to the circuit court’s “assertion without citation to any

legal authority,” the circuit court lacks the inherent authority to hear from the State on any

matter in which the State is a party. He points to instances when the failure to respond in

a timely manner under a statutory or procedural requirement forecloses a party’s ability to

be heard on an issue: (1) failure to respond to a written request for admission within thirty

days, see Ark. R. Civ. P. 36(a); and (2) strictly construing a twenty-day deadline in Ark.

Code Ann. § 7-5-801, see Willis v. King, 352 Ark. 55, 98 S.W.3d 427 (2003).

Talley argues that the circuit court has no inherent authority to bend and twist a

statute to its liking but that it did so here. The circuit court found that precluding the State

from being heard just because it missed the statutory deadline to object would create the

right to a default judgment of expungement if the State did not formally respond within the

specified window. Talley argues that it precisely what the CCRSA makes clear. He claims

that if the State does not object, then there can be no way for the circuit court to be

presented with clear and convincing evidence that the petition should not be sealed. He

asserts that the State’s failure to file a timely objection to the petition to seal thus compels

the court to grant that petition. Talley argues that the circuit court had no discretion because

it is empowered by the CCRSA to deny a petition to seal a misdemeanor conviction only

upon the State’s filing a written notice of objection and presenting clear and convincing

14
evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-1413(b)(2). Without such objection, Talley contends

that the circuit court “shall” grant the petition. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-1415(a).

We hold that the circuit court did not misinterpret the CCRSA by denying Talley’s

petition to seal. The statute is clear that the circuit court may, in its discretion, grant the

petition when no opposition is filed. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-1413(b)(2)(B)(i). Nothing

in the statute prohibits the circuit court from hearing a petitioner’s motion to seal or motion

to compel. The State contends that it presented the circuit court with clear and convincing

evidence as to why the petition should be denied. The State claims that even absent such

evidence, the information in the petition to seal was enough for the circuit court to deny

the petition. We agree.

Pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-1413(c)(1), the circuit court

may deny a petition to seal before the State’s time to file a notice of opposition has lapsed.

Thus, the court may deny a petition to seal without the State’s filing a notice of opposition.

Even assuming that the State was prohibited from presenting evidence at a hearing because

it did not file a notice of opposition, the circuit court was still presented with clear and

convincing evidence by which to deny the petition to seal. Talley’s petition listed the

statutes under which he had pending felony charges. As the circuit court explained in its

order denying his petition to seal, Talley’s pending felony charges in Cross County were

“serious” and “involve[d] an allegation of assault,” which gave the court “pause when

determining whether a misdemeanor assault conviction should be sealed.”

Affirmed.

VIRDEN and WHITEAKER, JJ., agree.

15
Lassiter & Cassinelli, by: Michael Kiel Kaiser, for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Brooke Jackson Gasaway, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

16