Jeffrey Parsons v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 294
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CR-24-660

JEFFREY PARSONS Opinion Delivered May 7, 2025
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE SALINE COUNTY
V. CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 63CR-22-934]
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE HONORABLE RANDY WRIGHT,
JUDGE

AFFIRMED

MIKE MURPHY, Judge

Appellant Jeffrey Parsons brings this interlocutory appeal from the Saline County

Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss on the basis of double jeopardy. 1 Parsons was

on trial, accused of sexually abusing his former stepdaughter, MC. The trial ended when the

circuit court granted his motion for mistrial due to the victim’s mother’s testimony that she,

too, had been sexually abused by Parsons. On appeal, Parsons argues that the circuit court

erred in finding that the State did not intend to provoke a mistrial; thus, double jeopardy

barred a second trial under the standard set by the United States Supreme Court in Oregon

v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982). We affirm.

1
A double-jeopardy claim may be raised by interlocutory appeal because if a defendant
is illegally tried a second time, the right is forfeited. Zawodniak v. State, 339 Ark. 66, 68, 3
S.W.3d 292, 293 (1999).
On November 8, 2022, Parsons was charged with two counts of second-degree sexual

assault. The underlying alleged conduct occurred between January 2016 and March 2017.

The allegations were not reported to law enforcement until May 2022, when Amanda

Shelnut (Parsons’ ex-wife and MC’s mother) contacted police to inquire why her own

complaints of sexual assault by Parsons had not resulted in charges.

On January 4, 2024, a pretrial hearing was held to address multiple motions filed by

Parsons. Of importance to this appeal are Parsons’s request for discovery of Rule 404(b)

evidence and his motion in limine to exclude mention of previous allegations—specifically,

Shelnut’s report of marital rape. During the pretrial hearing, the State and Parsons agreed

that Shelnut would testify that she did not report MC’s allegations because she was scared,

but specifics would not be brought to the jury’s attention. The State further stated that it did

not anticipate introducing any Rule 404(b) evidence.

A jury trial was held on February 29. MC testified that on more than one occasion,

Parsons would come into her bedroom before she fell asleep under the guise of bringing her

a cup of water. She recalled that he would then lie in her bed and lift her nightgown and put

his hands in her underwear. MC did not recall when she told her mother about the abuse,

but she was interviewed about it in May 2022 when she was fourteen.

On cross-examination, Parsons inquired about the interview MC gave in 2022. MC

said she was around nine years old the last time Parsons touched her, but she could not

definitively recall when the last time occurred. She also could not recall how old she was

when he first touched her. In the interview, she could not recall if Parsons had touched the

2
inside or outside of her vagina, but at the hearing, she testified it was the inside. MC testified

that before she disclosed the allegations, her brother told her that Parsons had physically

abused Shelnut. During the interview, MC stated that once she found out about her mom,

she felt comfortable talking about her abuse. MC acknowledged that her brother was accused

of inappropriately touching her around this time but that he did not do it. Her brother

would have been around twelve or thirteen.

Shelnut testified next. She testified that she became aware of MC’s allegations once

Parsons moved out in March 2017. She said that at this time, Parsons had accused her eldest

son of inappropriately touching MC. During her testimony, Parsons’s counsel interrupted

and asked to approach once it sounded as if Shelnut was about to discuss how Parsons had

previously acted toward her. The State told the court that it was not trying to elicit Shelnut’s

testimony about how Parsons had acted toward her and that it would rephrase and be more

direct. Shelnut then testified that once Parsons had made the allegations about her son, she

questioned all the children, and they adamantly denied that it had happened. According to

Shelnut, it was during this questioning of the children that MC came out and said she had

been inappropriately touched by Parsons. Shelnut testified that she did not go to the police

because she was scared of Parsons and did not think she would be believed because Parsons

had been a respected officer with the City of Benton until he went to work for Union Pacific

Railroad.

Shelnut testified that in May 2022, she met with Captain Haworth at the Benton

Police Department. She had scheduled this meeting to discuss the outcome of Parsons’s

3
other trial involving his other ex-wife. Captain Haworth inquired about allegations that her

son had molested MC.2 At that point, Shelnut told Haworth that it was actually Parsons.

On cross-examination, Shelnut testified that the first time MC confided in her in

2017, MC said “she wasn’t honestly sure anything even happened.” When Shelnut was

interviewed about the allegations, she said that she saw Parsons in MC’s bed one time but

did not think it was inappropriate. Parsons asked her if a case had ever been brought

regarding her personal allegations against him, and she responded no. She had made her

allegations “some year and a half prior to the plea in” the ex-wife’s case. Shelnut testified that

she was invested in the ex-wife’s case because “[i]t would have been nice to see him pay for

how he treats women.”

Before conducting redirect examination, the State asked to approach the bench. A

bench conference was conducted to discuss whether Parsons had opened the door to

Shelnut’s allegations of alleged abuse. The State argued that it intended to get Shelnut to say

she was interested in the ex-wife’s case because she was a domestic-abuse victim herself and

not because she was a petty ex-girlfriend or wife. The court limited the State’s redirect to

inquiring about Shelnut’s being a victim of physical abuse by Parsons. The State told the

court that that would be the only question asked on that point and that it would then move

on.

2
Captain Haworth had learned of these allegations from an interview with the other
ex-wife. The ex-wife had mentioned in her interview that Parsons told her the reason he left
Shelnut was because she was allowing her son to molest her daughter and not doing anything
about it.

4
The State then asked Shelnut why she was so interested in the other case against

Parsons, and Shelnut stated, “[B]ecause I had been abused by the defendant also.” Shelnut

was then asked what she had told the kids, to which she replied that the kids already knew

that Parsons had hit her. Parsons objected on the basis of speculation, and the objection was

sustained. The State then said, “Just tell us what you told them,” and Shelnut responded,

“That Jeff had hit me, that Jeff had sexually abused me.” At this time, Parsons’s counsel asked

to approach. The court immediately stated, “[T]hat’s not what—that’s outside the ruling.”

Parsons requested a mistrial, arguing that the testimony of sexual abuse was the evidence in

the file that he did not want referenced because it was overly prejudicial and that an

admonition would not cure the error. The State responded,

I am going to not ask another question and be done. And that is -- that is a million
percent not my intent. I was not trying to bring that up at all. I was trying to get to
what was told to the kids, and why that was done. And I -- that was my mistake. And
I think now if I ask -- I think I can ask -- say I asked the wrong question. I think I can
ask why did you do it? And that was my mistake.

The State went on to say, “I never had any intentions of bringing it up or making that an

issue. I was intending to just talk about the physical abuse that was asked about.”

The court reviewed the testimony and granted the mistrial. It prefaced the ruling by

saying,

[When the court tried cases I] would look back and go, I probably should have
discussed this after my ruling with the witness to make sure it didn’t happen, and that
just didn’t happen today. And it’s nobody’s fault. You’re both good lawyers. You do
a good job. Had a good trial. But at this point, the Court will grant the motion for
mistrial, as much as I hate it. I assure you. I don’t think it does a lot of good for
anybody.

5
After setting a new trial, the court again stated that “this just happens in the practice of law

and the way you try cases. And it’s not anybody’s fault. We just move on and deal with it

and go forward, so -- but in an abundance of caution, the Court is ruling for a mistrial at this

time.”

On July 12, 2024, Parsons moved to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds, claiming that

the State impermissibly goaded Parsons into asking for a mistrial. The court denied Parsons’s

motion, and he now appeals.

We review a circuit court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds

de novo. Winkle v. State, 366 Ark. 318, 235 S.W.3d 482 (2006). When the analysis presents

itself as a mixed question of law and fact, we give the factual determinations made by the

circuit court due deference and will not reverse them unless clearly erroneous. Id. at 320,

235 S.W.3d at 483. However, “the ultimate decision by the circuit court that the defendant’s

protection against double jeopardy was not violated is reviewed de novo, with no deference

given to the circuit court’s determination.” Green v. State, 2011 Ark. 92, at 4, 380 S.W.3d

368, 371.

In Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 672, the United States Supreme Court held that the Double

Jeopardy Clause does not bar the reprosecution of a defendant in cases in which

prosecutorial misconduct causes the defendant to move for a mistrial. The Court established

a narrow exception to this rule that “where the governmental conduct in question is

intended to ‘goad’ a defendant into moving for a mistrial,” the Double Jeopardy Clause bars

6
the retrial of the defendant. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676.3 The examination of the prosecutor’s

intent calls for the circuit court to make a finding of fact by inferring the existence or

nonexistence of intent from objective facts and circumstances. McClendon v. State, 2017 Ark.

App. 295, at 6, 523 S.W.3d 374, 377.

Parsons argues that the State intended to provoke him into moving for a mistrial

“given how terrible the alleged victim’s and her mother’s testimony had gone,” which he

contends is crucial for the State’s case that relies solely on credibility. Specifically, Parsons

directs us to MC’s testimony noting that she was unable to provide simple but important

details of the alleged touching and that her story changed, implying that she was not a

credible witness. Parsons also contends that Shelnut’s testimony was not beneficial to the

State’s case, citing testimony such as her failure to report the allegations until after law

enforcement questioned her about not reporting the allegations against her son. Parsons also

asserts that the prior allegations of sexual assault had been discussed multiple times and were

clearly a matter of importance in this case.

As the trial court found from the bench and reiterated in its order denying Parsons’s

double-jeopardy motion, the State’s mistake was unintentional. Indeed, the court said it was

granting the motion in an abundance of caution and that “it’s nobody’s fault” and “this just

happens.” As the State pointed out, asking Shelnut to “[j]ust tell us what you told them”

3
We are currently one of thirty-four states that have formally adopted this “Kennedy
standard.” Emily McEvoy, When Double Jeopardy Should Bar Retrial in Cases of Prosecutorial
Misconduct: A Call for Broader State Protections, 122 Colum. L. Rev. 173, 188 (2022).

7
was not a tailored question in hindsight, but the court determined that the prosecutor had

no intention of eliciting the improper testimony. The prosecutor crafted a poor question,

but it did not blatantly ignore the court’s ruling. Moreover, leading up to the question, there

had not been any indication or warning that continued misconduct could lead to a mistrial.

See 6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 25.2(b) (4th ed.), Westlaw (database

updated Nov. 2024) (explaining that in inferring intent, courts may may consider the

strength of the evidence, along with the timing of the misconduct, the immediate event that

provoked the misconduct, and whether it came after a trial court warning that continued

misconduct could lead to a mistrial).

Despite Parsons’s claims, MC’s and Shelnut’s credibility had not been jeopardized.

The State anticipated testimony concerning Shelnut’s delay in disclosure of the assault.

Further, it is entirely plausible that there would be lapses of memory in a case in which the

allegations had taken place over seven years earlier when the victim was under ten years old.

Parsons’s argument is a speculative assertion that the State believed the trial was going badly,

and the victim’s credibility had been damaged.

We defer to the circuit court’s factual determination that the prosecution’s error was

not deliberate. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s decision denying Parsons’s motion

to dismiss

Affirmed.

KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and ABRAMSON, J., agree.

Digby Law Firm, by: Bobby R. Digby II and Mathew R. Ingle, for appellant.

8
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Christopher R. Warthen, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

9