Elizabeth Goode v. Jaya Nair

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 414
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CV-24-130

ELIZABETH GOODE Opinion Delivered September 10, 2025

APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FOURTH
V. DIVISION
[NO. 60CV-17-608]
JAYA NAIR
APPELLEE HONORABLE HERBERT WRIGHT,
JUDGE

AFFIRMED

ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge

Elizabeth Goode appeals from the September 19, 2023 final amended judgment

entered by the Pulaski County Circuit Court following a jury trial of a motor-vehicle-collision

claim involving injuries sustained by Goode. Goode argues that the circuit court committed

prejudicial abuses of discretion by excluding relevant evidence tending to discredit appellee

Jaya Nair’s medical expert and by imposing a twenty-minute time limit per juror panel during

voir dire. We affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

The case was tried to a Pulaski County jury on August 1–3, 2023. During the pretrial

conference immediately before voir dire, the circuit court informed the parties that each side

would have twenty minutes for voir dire for each of the two eighteen-member jury panels.

The circuit court allowed each side five peremptory strikes to be used between the two
eighteen-member jury panels. Through a hand-delivered motion to the circuit court, Goode

requested more time to conduct voir dire and identified the following five areas of inquiry

as the basis for why more time was needed to conduct meaningful voir dire for this motor-

vehicle-collision case:

1. The individual beliefs of all venire people on the applicable burden of proof
in civil cases (preponderance versus reasonable doubt);

2. The individual beliefs of all venire people on whether compensation should
be allowed for the aggravation of a preexisting condition (some believe any pre-
existing condition is disqualifying and admit they would follow their personal belief
and not the jury instruction requiring otherwise);

3. The individual beliefs of all venire people on the amount of compensation
that should be allowed (some are against jury verdicts for large amounts regardless of
the facts and admit they would follow their personal belief and not the jury
instructions requiring otherwise);

4. The individual beliefs of all venire people on the amount of compensation
that should be allowed for the pain and suffering element of damage (some are against
giving any money for pain and suffering because it is too speculative and admit they
would follow their personal belief and not the jury instruction requiring otherwise);
and

5. The individual beliefs of all venire people on the type of treatment Goode
received (chiropractic physician versus medical doctor).

The circuit court considered the motion and stated it would follow the twenty-minute time

limit, but the court agreed to give counsel leeway if more time for important issues was

needed and requested.

After Goode’s counsel worked through several of these questions with the first panel,

Nair’s counsel made a twenty-minute time-limit objection. The circuit court imposed the

twenty-minute time limit for the first eighteen-member panel despite Goode’s request for

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more time as per the circuit court’s previous order. As a result, Goode’s counsel was unable

to elicit any information from the first panel on the prospective jurors’ beliefs regarding the

type of treatment Goode received; specifically, whether the prospective jurors leaned one way

or the other regarding the weight they would give a chiropractic physician versus a medical

doctor. The second panel was questioned without incident related to the time limit, and two

individuals were struck for cause due to bias against chiropractic physicians.

Before trial, Nair conducted a video deposition of Dr. Wayne Bruffett, M.D., for use

at trial. Nair had retained Dr. Bruffett as a defense expert. During the deposition, Dr.

Bruffett testified that his medical-legal case documents were kept under the control of Zorian

Pride, his department manager. Dr. Bruffett agreed that after the deposition concluded, he

would have Ms. Pride provide certain requested documents that would be given to the court

reporter to attach as exhibits to his deposition. Specifically, Dr. Bruffett agreed to have Ms.

Pride produce his engagement letter with Nair’s defense law firm that hired him to be

attached as exhibit 5 to his deposition, which was completed as shown by the deposition

exhibit list.

Dr. Bruffett agreed that the financial information, including his payment under the

defense-law firm engagement letter (exhibit 5), would be provided by Ms. Pride and attached

as exhibit 6 to the deposition, showing how much the defense paid him in the case for his

medical-legal examination and report as well as how much he was paid to testify at the

deposition. A record showing payment of $6,000 to Dr. Bruffett’s clinic was provided and

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attached as exhibit 6 to the deposition; however, Dr. Bruffett did not attach documents

showing how much he was paid for his deposition testimony.

Dr. Bruffett was also asked to provide—and attach as exhibit 8 to his deposition—the

billing and revenue generation from providing medical-legal defense examinations of injury

patients for the previous four-year period. Dr. Bruffett failed to provide these documents to

attach as exhibit 8 as shown by the deposition exhibit list.

After Nair played the video deposition of Dr. Bruffett for the jury during her case-in-

chief, Goode sought to introduce the deposition exhibits 1 through 8 that were

authenticated and discussed by Dr. Bruffett during his deposition, with the expectation that

the exhibits would be published to the jury. The circuit court denied the introduction of the

set of exhibits, which prevented the jury from seeing exhibit 6 and learning that the defense

had paid Dr. Bruffett $6,000 for a ten-minute medical exam, records review, and report

writing. The circuit court’s denial occurred after a series of proffers was made related to issues

involving the subpoenaed office manager rebuttal witness, Ms. Pride, being excluded by the

circuit court during a hearing held while the jury was taking a break. These proffered exhibits,

shown on the exhibit list attached to Dr. Bruffett’s deposition, included the following:

Exhibit 1: Subpoena served on Dr. Bruffett July 20, 2021, a year before his deposition.

Exhibit 2: Affidavit by Dr. Bruffett in response to the served subpoena stating he had
no documents responsive to the request for copies of records related to his medical-
legal case work for the previous four years, including list of cases referred to him and
by whom, 1099 forms showing payments received, and referrals received from the
defense law firm in this case. Dr. Bruffett’s affidavit was contradicted by his
deposition testimony that his department manager, Zorian Pride, had possession of
these business records involving his past medical-legal case work.

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Exhibit 3: Clinic forms completed and submitted by Goode before being examined
by Dr. Bruffett.

Exhibit 4: Lists provided by Goode to Dr. Bruffett during her ten-minute defense
medical exam, describing how her life changed after the collision to include things
that she can still do but which cause pain and problems later, things she rarely does,
and things she can still do but with difficulty or pain.

Exhibit 5: Engagement letter from Laser Law Firm to Dr. Bruffett dated January 3,
2019.

Exhibit 6: Partial payment ledger of payment made to Dr. Bruffett in the amount of
$6,000 on May 8, 2019. However, the remaining evidence promised by Dr. Bruffett
during his deposition to provide the documentation showing how much he was paid
for his trial testimony was never produced, and the jury was not allowed to know
about this fact.

Exhibit 7: Letter from Laser Law Firm dated January 15, 2020, to Dr. Bruffett’s clinic
with a $260 check issued by Farmers Insurance Company to reimburse for an
erroneous improper double billing of Goode’s health insurance company and co-pay
billing by Dr. Bruffett, in addition to the $6,000 charged for his ten-minute defense
medical exam, records review and report writing.

Exhibit 8: Listed on the exhibit list by the court reporter as: “Financial info and
revenue generated from Dr. Bruffett’s med-legal work from previous four years.” With
a note underneath: “(Reporter’s Note: Plaintiff’s Exhibit 8 was tendered but not
received.)” This evidence promised by Dr. Bruffett during his deposition was never
produced, and the jury was not allowed to know about this fact.

After Nair rested her case-in-chief and after Goode’s proffer to admit the above

exhibits was denied, Goode sought to call Ms. Pride, who was present in the courtroom as a

rebuttal witness pursuant to a served subpoena. Ms. Pride was asked to explain why she had

not provided the court reporter with the documents Dr. Bruffett agreed to provide and to

be attached as exhibits 6 and 8 to his deposition. This occurred after Dr. Bruffett testified

before the jury that Ms. Pride was the custodian of his records and would be the person to

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provide his records. However, the circuit court refused to allow Ms. Pride to testify on

rebuttal for the reason that impeachment is appropriate for cross-examination but not

rebuttal.

The jury found in favor of Goode, and an initial judgment awarding a total of $15,240

to Goode was entered on September 12, 2023. Following the entry of an amended judgment

on September 19, Goode timely filed a motion for new trial on September 26. The circuit

court denied Goode’s motion on October 26, and Goode timely filed a notice of appeal on

November 27. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

A. Exclusion of Evidence to Discredit Nair’s Medical Expert

We review evidentiary errors under an abuse-of-discretion standard, and the circuit

court’s findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been a manifest abuse of

discretion. Riley v. First State Bank, 2024 Ark. App. 142, at 7, 686 S.W.3d 44, 48–49.

Moreover, we will not find an abuse of discretion unless a circuit court acted improvidently,

thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. Id.

Goode initially argues that the circuit court’s refusal to admit relevant deposition

exhibits violated her right to cross-examination, which is fundamental to due process, citing

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970), and which is one of the safeguards to accuracy

and truthfulness, citing Davis v. Arkansas Best Freight System, 239 Ark. 632, 634, 393 S.W.2d

237, 238 (1965). She notes that our supreme court in Arkansas State Highway Commission v.

Dean, 247 Ark. 717, 722–23, 447 S.W.2d 334, 337 (1969), has held that proper cross-

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examination ensures the jury has an opportunity to give proper weight to the testimony of a

witness and that courts should be especially liberal and allow wide latitude for cross-

examination, and the failure to do has been held to be prejudicial and to constitute reversible

error.

Goode maintains that the circuit court abused its discretion by refusing to admit the

impeachment exhibits to Dr. Bruffett’s testimony into evidence after he finished testifying

before the jury, including evidence of a $6,000 payment to him for his ten-minute medical

examination, records review, and report writing. Goode submits that this exclusionary ruling

also rewarded Dr. Bruffett’s misconduct in refusing to produce his records showing how

much he was paid in total by the defense for his trial testimony as well as records showing

his case list for his medical-legal expert-witness work as a defense-hired doctor for the

previous four years.

Pursuant to the previously described agreement, Ms. Pride provided the court

reporter with a record that was attached to the deposition transcript as exhibit 6 showing a

payment of $6,000 to Dr. Bruffett for his examination of Goode, his records review, and his

writing a medical report to be used by the defense. However, contrary to Dr. Bruffett’s

agreement, no billing or payment records were provided for Dr. Bruffett’s deposition

preparation time or the time spent giving his deposition, which Goode claims amounted to

thousands of dollars that was not disclosed to the jury. Goode maintains that the circuit

court’s ruling prevented the jury from considering and weighing this evidence showing Dr.

Bruffett’s defense bias and prevented the jury from seeing that Dr. Bruffett was untruthful

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when he broke his promise to provide records showing the amount of his payment for giving

his courtroom testimony in this case and his revenue for the past four years for his defense

medical-legal case work. Goode argues that excluding the exhibits constitutes reversible error.

We disagree. Goode’s counsel argued that the deposition exhibits were relevant

because they showed that Nair’s insurance company paid for Dr. Bruffett’s independent

medical examination, i.e., that because Nair’s insurance carrier paid for the independent

medical examination, such payment allowed him to explore the involvement of the insurance

company in the litigation. Goode’s counsel noted that “what we have here is not a situation

where we just want to talk about insurance in general.” The circuit court rejected this

argument, ruling, “We’re not going to talk about who’s paying for the exhibit, other than

the defense.”

In Hively v. Edwards, 278 Ark. 435, 438, 646 S.W.2d 688, 689 (1983), our supreme

court analyzed the cases that have held that it is inherently prejudicial to inform a jury that

insurance coverage exists as well as exceptions to that theory. Those exceptions generally

revolve around attempts by a party to mislead the jury, and in Hively, the supreme court

upheld the circuit court’s refusal to allow counsel to ask a physician/witness what he would

charge per hour for giving a medical deposition, holding that the appellants had not shown

they were unduly restricted. Id.

Likewise, here, there is no assertion that anything Nair or her counsel did and

nothing that Dr. Bruffett testified to misled the jury. The sole assertion is that the fact that

an insurance company paid for an independent medical examination should have been

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revealed to the jury. Because there is no contention that Nair or Dr. Bruffett misled the jury

or otherwise acted improperly and Dr. Bruffett was cross-examined in-depth on the stand,

there is no basis for revealing the involvement of the insurance company.

Moreover, we hold that the insurance company’s payment for the independent

medical examination has little to no probative value in this case. Admissible evidence is that

which has probative value, i.e., evidence that has some relevance to the issues to be

determined at trial. See Ark. R. Evid. 401 and 402 (2024). Evidence that has no probative

value should be excluded. See id. Evidence is relevant if the item of evidence reasonably shows

that a fact is slightly more probable than it would appear without the evidence. Wheatley v.

Dixie Mall 2003, LLC, 2016 Ark. App. 94, at 10, 482 S.W.3d 760, 766. Here, the fact that

an insurance company had paid certain expenses incurred in relation to Nair’s defense had

no relevance to the issues being tried to the jury, but revealing the involvement of an

insurance company had a high probability of causing prejudice to Nair. Arkansas Rule of

Evidence 403 (2024) precludes the admission of even relevant evidence when its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Baker v. Trevathan, 2018

Ark. App. 135, at 6, 542 S.W.3d 231, 235. Therefore, the circuit court properly excluded

the documents in question.

Goode’s counsel was able to broadly cross-examine Dr. Bruffett about the key topics

that allegedly would have been revealed by admission of these exhibits. Dr. Bruffett testified

that the Laser Law Firm asked him to perform Goode’s medical examination. Dr. Bruffett

testified that he had performed other “defense medical examinations” for the Laser Law

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Firm. Dr. Bruffett confirmed that he has been doing legal-medical examinations for about

twenty years. He testified that he has a fee schedule and that fees paid for medical-legal work

go through the clinic. He acknowledged that if more money is received from his legal-medical

consultations, he would expect to draw more money out of the clinic. Dr. Bruffett even

acknowledged that he was paid by the Laser Law Firm but did not remember who wrote the

check. While Goode’s counsel did not elicit the exact amount of money Dr. Bruffett was

paid for his testimony—because Dr. Bruffett could not remember the amount—counsel did

fully explore Dr. Bruffett’s financial interests, and the jury was well aware that Dr. Bruffett

was compensated for his work and that he periodically participated in other independent

medical examinations, i.e., legal-medical work formed a reasonable share of his practice.

Goode’s cross-examination covered the topics requested. The circuit court prohibited

inquiry only into areas that would have been, at most, marginally relevant but that would

have been clearly prejudicial to Nair. Accordingly, no basis is shown for holding that the

circuit court abused its discretion by denying Goode’s request to admit the documents.

Goode also argues that the circuit court’s refusal to allow Ms. Pride to testify as a

rebuttal witness constitutes a prejudicial abuse of discretion. During a bench conference,

Goode’s counsel stated that the purpose of calling Ms. Pride to testify in rebuttal to Dr.

Bruffett’s testimony was to elicit information about the same exhibits that previously had

been held to be inadmissible. The reason for calling Ms. Pride was to find out why certain

records requested at Dr. Bruffett’s video deposition had not been produced.

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The circuit court noted that no motion to compel had been filed and that while the

material sought might have been appropriate for impeachment, it was not appropriate for

rebuttal. The circuit court announced that had Goode’s counsel filed a timely motion to

compel, it would have granted it, and Goode’s counsel could have re-deposed Dr. Bruffett,

then used the material for impeachment.

Arkansas appellate courts have held that “[g]enuine rebuttal evidence consists of

evidence that is offered in reply to new matters.” Mack-Reynolds Appraisal Co. v. Morton, 2010

Ark. App. 142, at 8, 375 S.W.3d 6, 11. Here, there were no new matters at issue. Goode had

been aware of the missing records for months, had failed to file a motion to compel, and

attempted at trial to call a witness for rebuttal as a means of discovering facts that could and

should have been determined by means of a motion to compel. Goode’s counsel all but

acknowledged that the facts that were being sought through the rebuttal witness—the amount

that Dr. Bruffett had been paid and information about the various exhibits to Dr. Bruffett’s

deposition—were the same facts that the circuit court had previously held were not admissible

through the exhibits. We hold that no basis has been shown that the circuit court’s decision

to refuse to allow Ms. Pride to testify was an abuse of discretion.

B. Imposition of a Twenty-Minute Time Limit Per Panel in Voir Dire

Goode next argues that the circuit court’s imposition of a twenty-minute time limit

per panel in voir dire prevented her from being able to intelligently exercise her peremptory

strikes, thus resulting in prejudice. And, as importantly, she cites Rosales-Lopez v. U.S., 451

U.S. 182, 188 (1981), in support of her argument that without an adequate voir dire, a circuit

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court cannot fulfill its responsibility to remove prospective jurors who are unable to

impartially follow the law and evaluate the evidence.

The circuit court implemented twenty-minutes per party for two eighteen-member

jury panels for voir dire, following a system developed to move criminal cases through the

court’s busy criminal docket. Goode submits that this criminal-case method is ill-suited for

civil case trials by forcing counsel to ask the same questions multiple times with each of the

two panels, wasting much of the twenty minutes arbitrarily allowed for each panel. Goode

urges that in this case, it resulted in her having insufficient time to explore all five critical

issues pertinent to this case. She argues that justice could have been better served by asking

the pertinent questions to all the assembled venire people over a forty-minute time period

instead of following the two-panel criminal-trial method of jury selection requiring

redundant questions.

During the questioning of the first jury panel, several potential jurors asked questions.

The circuit court ruled that jurors asking questions was improper and held this against

Goode’s counsel’s twenty-minute limitation, asserting without supporting citation that the

Arkansas Supreme Court has held it impermissible for potential jurors to ask questions.

Nair’s counsel subsequently objected to Goode’s counsel exceeding the imposed time limit,

and the circuit court denied Goode’s request for more time. Goode submits that as a result,

the circuit court prejudicially hampered her voir dire examination on critical issues in the

case that were identified, including not being able to inquire of the first panel whether the

venire people could give equal weight to the testimony of treating chiropractic physicians

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versus a defense medical doctor. Tellingly, the circuit court later dismissed two prospective

jurors for cause during questioning of the second eighteen-member panel because of their

bias against chiropractic physicians.

Goode acknowledges that the imposition of a thirty-minute time limit for voir dire

has been upheld by our supreme court, but she notes significantly that the time limit was

not mechanically imposed. See generally Britt v. State, 334 Ark. 142, 165, 974 S.W.2d 436,

447 (1998). Such is not the case here. The circuit court held it against Goode when the

venire people did their job in communicating information about their personal beliefs and

biases affecting their partiality involving key issues presented in this civil trial, which is

essential for a party to make preemptory challenges. Goode contends that in doing so, the

circuit court did not allow recognized wide latitude to test the legal qualifications and

competency of the jurors as required by Baldwin v. Hunnicut, 192 Ark. 441, 93 S.W.2d 131

(1936). Instead, she urges it did the opposite by strictly imposing an arbitrary twenty-minute

time limitation, which unfairly limited Goode’s right to seek twelve people who could render

an impartial verdict.

Goode submits that the circuit court failed to consider the issues she raised that

needed additional time for voir dire, which she claims should have been given significant

weight because of their particular relevance to this case. Alternatively, Goode argues that if

the circuit court did consider all the appropriate factors, it nonetheless committed a clear

error of judgment in weighing those factors. See Throneberry v. State, 102 Ark. App. 17, 18,

279 S.W.3d 489, 490 (2008). She claims the circuit court’s refusal to allow more time for

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voir dire examination during the first eighteen-member panel constitutes a prejudicial abuse

of discretion requiring reversal.

We disagree. Albeit in a criminal case, the Arkansas Supreme Court recently provided

instructive language regarding the standard of review in cases involving voir dire:

The extent and scope of voir dire examination of prospective jurors falls within the
circuit court’s sound discretion, and the latitude of that discretion is wide.
Accordingly, we will not reverse voir dire restrictions unless that discretion is clearly
abused. An abuse of discretion occurs when the circuit court acts arbitrarily or
groundlessly. The judge shall initiate voir dire by identifying the parties and their
respective counsel, revealing any names of prospective witnesses, and briefly outlining
the nature of the case. But beyond these four requirements, counsel may ask
additional questions only as the judge deems reasonable and proper. We will not
reverse for nonprejudicial errors in jury selection.

Nelson v. State, 2024 Ark. 24, at 11–12, 683 S.W.3d 177, 188–89 (internal citations omitted).

Nelson is the latest in a long line of decisions recognizing that the standard of review is one

of abuse of discretion. As a general rule, any appellant seeking to reverse a discretionary

decision of a circuit court must show prejudice. See, e.g., Barnes v. Everett, 351 Ark. 479, 486,

95 S.W.3d 740, 744–45 (2003). And our supreme court has indicated that the requirement

that an appellant demonstrate prejudice as a prerequisite to prevailing on appeal applies to

appeals involving voir dire. See Ark. State Hwy. Comm’n v. Dalrymple, 252 Ark. 771, 772, 480

S.W.2d 955, 956 (1972).

The process began with the circuit court stating that each party would have twenty

minutes to conduct voir dire for each of the two panels. It reviewed a written motion, filed

by Goode’s counsel, which asked for additional time to conduct voir dire. After reviewing

the motion, the circuit court found that there was nothing “in here that changes my mind”

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concerning the length of voir dire. Counsel argued that the time limit was “mechanical,” to

which the circuit court responded, “Is there another time limit from mechanical, if I’m

setting a time?” After hearing additional argument from Goode’s counsel that he should

have additional time for voir dire, the circuit court agreed that if something came up that is

“a significant issue” or “outside the norm,” counsel could approach and ask for additional

time.

During voir dire of the first panel, Goode’s counsel explored that there had been a

significant delay between the date the accident occurred in 2014 and the date of the trial in

2023. Several jurors were troubled by this fact. The circuit court interceded and threw “a

little lifeline” to counsel, explaining the delay to the jurors and emphasizing that neither

party was at fault for the delay. Counsel also allowed potential jurors to ask questions during

voir dire, which led the circuit court to remark, “Mr. Chaney walked into this buzz saw, and

I’m going to have remove him [from the buzzsaw].” The circuit court stated that prospective

jurors could not question the attorney during voir dire and further noted, “I have tried to

give Mr. Chaney some leeway in his voir dire.” Later, Goode’s counsel was reminded by the

circuit court yet again that he could not answer questions from the potential jurors.

A review of the record indicates that Goode’s counsel asked approximately forty

questions during his voir dire of the first panel. During the twenty minutes allowed, counsel

addressed multiple issues enumerated among the five points included in his motion. After

Goode’s counsel’s twenty-minute time limit for voir dire had expired, a bench conference

was held in which Goode’s counsel again argued that the circuit court was imposing a

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“mechanical time limit” and asked for additional time for voir dire. The circuit court denied

his request, noting that Goode’s counsel’s voir dire was “all over the place” and that he

“violated three or four rules that have been objected to, so I haven’t called him down for

that.” The circuit court concluded that Goode’s counsel had “wasted his time” and refused

to grant additional time. Additionally, when the court asked each party whether the jury was

“good” for them, Goode’s counsel agreed that he was good with the jury.

We hold that Goode has failed to show sufficient evidence of a reversible prejudicial

abuse of discretion. To the extent Goode’s counsel failed to fully explore the enumerated

issues, it appears to have been an issue of poor time management of the twenty minutes that

he was allotted. Goode’s attorney knew the limitation in advance and failed to exercise

reasonable care to fully utilize the time allotted. Under these specific circumstances, we fail

to see how the limitation was so unreasonable as to constitute an abuse of discretion, nor is

there any showing that Goode did not receive a fair trial before an impartial jury because of

this time limit. Accordingly, we affirm.1

1
On August 29, 2025, Goode’s counsel filed a motion for oral argument, asserting
that oral argument in her case is authorized by Rule 5 of the Rules of the Arkansas Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals (2025). Yet, despite referencing Rule 5, counsel failed to comply
with the requirement that a request for oral argument must be made “contemporaneously
with” either Goode’s brief-in-chief or her reply brief. See Ferguson v. State, 342 Ark. 273, 26
S.W.3d 787 (2000) (per curiam). Here, Goode’s brief-in-chief was filed on August 28, 2024,
her reply brief was filed on October 31, 2024, and her August 29, 2025 motion was not filed
contemporaneously with either brief. The exhibit attached to that motion, which indicated
that an email requesting oral argument was sent to the clerk of this court on August 24,
2024, does not meet the contemporaneous-filing requirement of the request. Moreover, it is
clear that the briefs and record adequately submit the facts and legal arguments presented,

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Affirmed.

THYER and MURPHY, JJ., agree.

Chaney Law Firm, P.A., by: Don P. Chaney and S. Taylor Chaney, for appellant.

Laser Law Firm, by: Kevin Staten and Brian A. Brown, for appellee.

and granting an oral argument would not significantly aid the decision-making process. Ark.
Sup.Ct. R. 5-1(a)(3). The motion is therefore denied.

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