Ora Stevens v. Renita Danley

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 42
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CV-24-549

ORA STEVENS Opinion Delivered January 21, 2026

APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE LEE COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 39CV-22-100]

RENITA DANLEY HONORABLE E. DION WILSON,
APPELLEE JUDGE

REVERSED AND DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE

CINDY GRACE THYER, Judge

Appellant Ora Stevens appeals a Lee County Circuit Court order denying her motion

to dismiss and to set aside a default judgment rendered against her individually and in favor

of appellee Renita Danley. On appeal, she challenges the order, arguing that the default

judgment was void because (1) she was not properly and timely served, (2) the summons was

deficient, and (3) the complaint failed to state a claim from which relief could be granted.

Finding that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, we reverse and dismiss Danley’s

complaint with prejudice.

This case arises out of Danley’s claim of wrongful termination against the Lee County

Cooperative Clinic (the Clinic) and Stevens, “as its Chief Executive Officer.” In her

complaint, Danley alleged the following facts:
In April 2018, Danley served as the finance director for the Clinic and, at the time of

her termination, had served in that position for approximately one year. During that time,

Stevens was the Clinic’s chief executive officer.

On Friday, April 13, 2018, Stevens informed Danley that she was being moved to a

new position and directed her to leave and not return until Tuesday, April 17. Danley was

told to leave her keys and was escorted away from her work site and the Clinic’s premises.

When she returned on April 17, Stevens instructed her to contact the Clinic’s human

resources department where she was told to leave and return the following week.

Danley returned on April 25 and met with Stevens. At that meeting, Danley requested

written documentation regarding the reason she was sent home. Stevens denied her request.

Danley was again sent home for another five days.

On April 28, Danley initiated a grievance pursuant to the policy and procedures

adopted by the Clinic’s board of directors. Danley’s grievance related to her removal from

her finance position without explanation. In her grievance, she claimed that her removal

could require her to use personal time to account for the lack of hours worked at the Clinic.

Danley also requested a meeting with the personnel committee. During that meeting,

which took place on May 3, the committee “dispensed with all its guarantees of due process”

as stated in its employee handbook. Although the committee indicated it would provide a

written response to her grievance, it failed to do so, violating its policy and procedures.

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On May 17, Stevens unexpectedly called for a meeting with Danley and the Clinic’s

lawyer, Roy Lewellen.1 Lewellen questioned Danley extensively regarding the “budget” and

other matters pertaining to Danley’s duties in the finance department. At the meeting,

Danley again requested documentation regarding her removal from the finance department.

Her stated purpose was to understand the problems and issues so that she could perform her

new finance duties without further jeopardizing her employment. Her request for

information pertained to the same matters pending before the personnel committee. Instead,

Stevens terminated Danley during the meeting for insubordination due to her purported

refusal to answer questions. Danley alleged she was terminated without first being given an

explanation regarding her removal.

That same day, Danley was provided written notification of her termination. The

notice stated that Danley had been disrespectful to her coworkers and supervisors. The

notice also stated that Danley had abruptly left the meeting with Stevens and Lewellen and

slammed the door.

The next day, on May 18, Danley filed a wrongful-termination suit against both the

Clinic and Stevens, “as Chief Executive Officer” of the Clinic, setting forth the allegations

outlined above. In the complaint, Danley claimed that her termination was not the result of

insubordination as asserted in the termination letter but instead that it was the culmination

1
Stevens, in her opening brief, identified Lewellen as the Clinic’s former lawyer;
although he was not identified as such in any of the pleadings, Danley has not disputed
Steven’s characterization of his role.

3
of a coordinated effort between Stevens and “others” to create a pretextual reason for

terminating her. She alleged that the Clinic’s board of directors had adopted an employee

handbook and that her termination did not comply with the policies and procedures

outlined in the handbook. She claimed that Stevens, by her actions, had usurped the

authority of the personnel committee to decide the matters before it and had invalidated the

grievance process. Danley further claimed to have utilized the grievance procedures to make

her grievance known and to have relied on those procedures to her detriment. She further

alleged that the Clinic is a corporation providing health care services; that it receives state

and federal funds for its operational purposes; and that its receipt of those funds is

conditioned upon its compliance with various state and federal statutes and regulations.

Finally, Danley claimed to have performed her duties in compliance with all state and federal

regulations and that her termination was in violation of public policy.

Stevens retired from the Clinic in June 2018.

On October 5, 2021, Danley nonsuited her claims against Stevens and the Clinic.

One year later, on October 5, 2022, Danley refiled the complaint against the Clinic

and against Stevens, “as Chief Executive Officer” of the Clinic. Once again, the complaint

alleged that Stevens was a resident and citizen of Lee County and was the duly acting chief

executive officer of the Clinic. Upon the filing of the complaint, the Lee County Circuit

Clerk issued two summonses—one to the Lee County Cooperative Clinic and one to Ora

Stevens—and both listed the defendants’ address as 530 West Atkins in Marianna, Arkansas.

4
On February 2, 2023, Danley filed a motion for extension of time to effectuate

service. In the motion, Danley stated that she had “been unable to serve the defendants” and

requested an additional sixty days to complete service. She noted that the complaint was

“with the process server for service but defendants have not been served.” The court signed

the order prepared by Danley’s counsel on February 6. The order stated, “From statements

of counsel and other matters, things, and proof before the Court, the Court does find that

for good cause shown, the time for serving the defendants shall be extended an additional

sixty (60) days.”

On March 21, Timothy McMahon, a process server, filed proof of service, stating that

service of the summons and complaint on Ora Stevens was completed on February 8. The

proof of service stated that the summons was for “Lee County Coop. Clinic Ora Stevens.”

As for the type of service, it stated that McMahon had delivered the summons and complaint

to “Ora Stevens (name), an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of

summons on behalf of Lee County Coop. Clinic (Defendant) on 2/8/23 (date).” It did not,

however, state that the summons had been personally delivered to Stevens as an individual—

another option on the proof-of-service form.

Neither the Clinic nor Stevens answered the complaint.

On April 4, 2023, Danley moved for default judgment, alleging that Stevens had been

served with the summons and complaint on February 8; that more than thirty days had

passed since service had been effectuated; but that Stevens had failed to file an answer or

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otherwise defend as required by the rules. One week later, Danley sought to once again

nonsuit her claims against the Clinic.

On April 12, the circuit court granted Danley’s motion for a default judgment against

Stevens and her motion to nonsuit her complaint against the Clinic. A hearing on damages

was set for September 8, after which the court awarded Danley $126,833.28 in damages from

“Ora Stevens.” A judgment in that amount was filed that same day.

On October 16, Danley filed a writ of garnishment on Stevens’s current employer,

the City of Marianna, and provided notice of same to Stevens.2 The City of Marianna

responded by letter dated November 13 that Stevens was paid biweekly and that it would

begin withholding funds for the garnishment from the next payroll on November 21. A

garnishment order was filed on February 1, 2024, ordering the City of Marianna to withhold

25 percent of Stevens’s net pay until the judgment is paid in full.

On the afternoon of February 26, Stevens filed a motion to stay enforcement of

default judgment. In the motion and brief in support, Stevens argued that the default

judgment entered against her was null and void and that its enforcement should be stayed.

In arguing that the default judgment was void, Stevens claimed that she had not been

properly served, that the complaint had not stated a cause of action as required by Rule

12(b)(6), and that the summons was defective because it did not list her correct address.

2
While there is no evidence of this in the record, the parties do not dispute that
Stevens became mayor of Marianna in January 2023.

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Finally, Stevens indicated that a separate motion to set aside the default judgment and to

dismiss was being simultaneously filed with the motion to stay. That motion seeking both to

set aside the default judgment and to dismiss the complaint was not filed, however, until

later that same day.

The later-filed motion and corresponding brief in support further expounded on

Stevens’s claim that the default judgment was void. In them, Stevens again argued that

Danley’s complaint had failed to state a cause of action for wrongful discharge against

Stevens. First, she argued that she had been sued in her official, not individual, capacity and

that she was not Danley’s employer—the Clinic was; thus, the complaint failed to state a cause

of action for wrongful termination against her individually. Second, Stevens argued that the

complaint failed to identify what well-established public policy, statute, or regulation her

termination violated. Finally, Stevens argued that Danley had failed to allege how the

grievance process was similar to a “for cause” provision in an employment handbook thereby

shielding her from termination or reassignment. As a result, she argued that the default

judgment should be set aside and the complaint dismissed for failure to state a cause of

action.

Stevens also argued that the default judgment should be set aside because (1) she was

not properly served; (2) Danley failed to show good cause for the extension of time to

effectuate service; (3) the proof of service was not sworn; and (4) the address of the summons

was incorrect. As for service, she noted that the return did not indicate what was actually

served on her, and it stated it was served on her on behalf on the Clinic, not on her

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individually; as such, service was not proper. Additionally, in the affidavit she filed with the

motion, Stevens denied she had ever been served with a copy of the summons and complaint.

She further argued that Danley was required to show good cause to obtain an extension, and

the motion for extension of time did not provide one. More specifically, she argued that the

motion did not detail the efforts made to effect service prior to the request for an extension

and maintained that Danley had failed to explain why she had not contacted Stevens’s

counsel from the prior litigation between the parties to see if service could be waived or

accepted. Stevens’s affidavit also claimed that she had never evaded, or attempted to evade,

service of process. She further asserted the summons was invalid because the proof of service

was not sworn. Last, Stevens argued that the address listed on the summons was incorrect.

She claimed that the address listed on the summons was the address of the Clinic, that she

never lived at that address, and that she had not worked at that location since her retirement

in June 2018. More specifically, her affidavit provided:

The Summons lists my address as 530 West Atkins, Marianna, AR 72360.
This was my work address when I worked at the Lee County Cooperative Clinic. I
have not worked at the Clinic since my retirement in June 2018.

Danley responded on March 14, disputing each of Stevens’s claims. In support of her

claim that Stevens was personally served, Danley filed a supplemental affidavit of service in

which the process server stated that he personally delivered the summons and complaint to

Stevens at 45 W. Mississippi in Marianna. Danley further argued that Stevens had waived

her objections by filing her motion to stay enforcement of the default judgment two hours

before filing her motion to dismiss. Danley claimed the motion to stay acted as an appearance

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and request for affirmative relief, resulting in the waiver of Stevens’s Arkansas Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b) defenses.

Stevens replied three days later, reiterating her initial claims. She further argued that

she could have not been served at 45 W. Mississippi as indicated by the process server because

she did not work there, nor was she physically present at that location on that date.3 Finally,

Stevens argued that she had not waived her Rule 12 objections, arguing that she had not

requested affirmative relief and that her filing of a motion to stay enforcement of the default

judgment was not inconsistent with her assertions in the motions to dismiss and set aside.

She further asserted that, in any event, she had also raised those defenses in her motion to

stay.

After a hearing on the outstanding motions on March 19, 2024, the court entered

the following order:

1. The Court finds that the plaintiff has stated a cause of action against the
defendant, Ora Stevens, as Chief Executive Office[r] of the Lee County Clinic for
wrongful termination.

2. The Court finds that the plaintiff has served Ora Stevens as Chief Executive
Office[r] of the Lee County Cooperative Clinic pursuant to the dictates of
Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 4.

3. The Court also finds that the defendant, Ora Stevens, as Chief Executive Office[r]
of the Lee County Cooperative Clinic, in its pleading filed with the court titled
Motion and Brief in Support of Motion to Stay Enforcement of Default Judgment
did request affirmative relief and submit herself to the jurisdiction of the Court.

3
Stevens states in her brief that 45 W. Mississippi is an address once associated with
the Marianna City Hall but claims that city hall had not been located at that address for
several years. We note that this information was not included in her affidavit, nor is there
any other evidence of this in the record.

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4. The Court also finds that the Order of Extension of Time to serve the complaint
provided a good cause to Judge Chris Morledge, who extended the time for service
based upon the pleadings before him.

5. The Court also finds that the defendant, Ora Stevens, did not raise the issue of
lack of good cause to extend service time of the complaint in her first pleading
filed with the Court, and thus the issue of no good cause to extend service time
of the complaint was waived by the defendant submitting to the jurisdiction of
the court by requesting affirmative relief.

6. The Court finds that the summons was properly served on separate defendant,
Ora Stevens, as Chief Executive Officer of the Lee Cooperative Clinic, pursuant
to Rule 4 through the process server and met all of the requirements of Arkansas
Rule of Procedure 4, as attested to by the Amended Affidavit of Service. The
Court also finds that the summons was not defective based on an incorrect
address.

7. The Court finds that the summons that was issued and the default judgment that
was granted shall be according to the pleadings filed and the judgment should be
reflected against Ora Stevens, as Chief Executive Officer of the Lee County
Cooperative Clinic.

8. If the Court has failed to address any issues that were raised by the defendant, Ora
Steves, as Chief Executive Office[r] of the Lee County Cooperative Clinic, please
notify the Court within five (5) days of the entry of this Order.

This timely appeal followed.4

On appeal, Stevens challenges the circuit court’s order, arguing that the underlying

judgment was void because (1) she was not properly and timely served, (2) the summons was

4
After the court entered its order and before the notice of appeal was filed, Stevens
filed a motion to clarify the court’s order. She noted that the circuit court, in its order, only
discussed Danley’s claims against her as chief executive officer of the Clinic and asked the
circuit court to clarify whether it would uphold the judgment and writ of garnishment issued
against her in her individual capacity. The court never ruled on her motion.

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deficient, and (3) the complaint failed to state a claim from which relief could be granted.

Thus, it should have been set aside and the complaint dismissed.

The standard of review for an order denying a motion to set aside default judgment

depends on the grounds on which the appellant claims the default judgment should be set

aside. Steward v. Kuettel, 2014 Ark. 499, 450 S.W.3d 672. When the appellant claims that

the default judgment is void, our review is de novo, and we give no deference to the circuit

court’s ruling. Id. In all other cases, we review an order denying a motion to set aside default

judgment for abuse of discretion. Id.

Stevens’s first two arguments fall under our de novo standard of review. Service of a

proper summons must be perfected within 120 days after the complaint is filed, or the court

fails to obtain jurisdiction, rendering any judgment void. See Jones v. Douglas, 2016 Ark. 166,

at 5, 489 S.W.3d 648, 651; McDonald v. Ft. Smith & W.R. Co., 105 Ark. 5, 8–9, 150 S.W.

135, 136 (1912) (“A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is void; and, to have

such jurisdiction, the court must have jurisdiction both over the subject-matter of the suit

and the parties thereto.”). However, “erroneous judgments are not necessarily void

judgments. If the court in which the erroneous judgment is entered has jurisdiction of the

subject matter and the parties thereto, such judgment is voidable but not void.” Fed. Nat’l

Mortg. Ass’n v. Taylor, 2015 Ark. 78, at 7, 455 S.W.3d 811, 815. Since it does not implicate

the court’s jurisdiction, Stevens’s third argument is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion

standard.

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We agree with Stevens that the default judgment should have been set side and the

complaint dismissed because, even assuming the summons was sufficient and service was

proper, Danley’s complaint failed to state a cause of action for wrongful termination against

Stevens, in any capacity. Thus, the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to do so.

A pleading must contain, inter alia, a statement of facts, in ordinary and concise

language, showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Ark. R. Civ. P. 8(a). A pleading is

deficient if it fails to set forth facts pertaining to an essential element of the cause of action.

Wiseman v. Batchelor, 315 Ark. 85, 864 S.W.2d 248 (1993). Arkansas is a state that requires

fact pleading, and a pleading that sets forth mere conclusions is not sufficient under the

Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. Mann v. Orrell, 322 Ark. 701, 912 S.W.2d 1 (1995).

Nevertheless, pleadings are to be liberally construed and are sufficient if they advise a party

of its obligations and allege a breach of them. Thomas v. Pierce, 87 Ark. App. 26, 184 S.W.3d

489 (2004).

In reviewing a circuit court’s decision on a motion to dismiss under Arkansas Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), this court treats the facts alleged in the complaint as true and views

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Parnell v. FanDuel, Inc., 2019 Ark. 412, at 2,

591 S.W.3d 315, 317. In testing the sufficiency of the complaint on a motion to dismiss, all

reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of the complaint, and the pleadings are to

be liberally construed. Id. at 3, 591 S.W.3d at 318. We look only to the allegations in the

complaint and not to matters outside the complaint. Henson v. Cradduck, 2020 Ark. 24, at 4,

593 S.W.3d 10, 14. We treat only the facts alleged in the complaint as true but not a

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plaintiff’s theories, speculation, or statutory interpretation. Id. The standard of review for

the grant of a motion to dismiss is whether the circuit court abused its discretion. Id. We

consider questions of law de novo. Brown v. Towell, 2021 Ark. 60, at 6, 619 S.W.3d 17, 20.

In Arkansas, an employer may terminate an employee for good cause, bad cause, or

no reason at all under the employment-at-will doctrine. Hice v. City of Fort Smith, 75 Ark.

App. 410, 58 S.W.3d 870 (2001). As a result, Arkansas’s at-will employment doctrine

generally bars an employee from recovering against an employer that has ended the

employment relationship. Cottrell v. Cottrell, 332 Ark. 352, 965 S.W.2d 129 (1998). Our

supreme court has, however, recognized two exceptions to the at-will doctrine. The first is

based on an “implied contract” theory; the second is rooted in public policy. McCabe v. Wal-

Mart Assocs., Inc., 2019 Ark. App. 566, 591 S.W.3d 335.

The implied-contract exception permits a lawsuit based on the theory that an

employer who promises an employee that he or she will not be discharged without cause

must honor that promise. Gladden v. Ark. Children’s Hosp., 292 Ark. 130, 728 S.W.2d 501

(1987). The employer must have expressly made such an agreement before this narrow

exception will apply. Id. An implied provision against the right to discharge will not be

sufficient to invoke the exception to the at-will doctrine. Hice, supra; see also Gladden, supra;

St. Edward Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Ellison, 58 Ark. App. 100, 946 S.W.2d 726 (1997). This narrow

exception must essentially reflect (in some manner) a guarantee of job security in an

employer’s personnel manual. See Crain Indus., Inc. v. Cass, 305 Ark. 566, 568, 810 S.W.2d

910, 911 (1991) (handbook statement that “in the event it should become necessary to

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reduce the number of employees in the workplace, employees will be laid off on a seniority

basis” was express provision against wrongful discharge that could be relied on by employee).

But see Smith v. Am. Greetings Corp., 304 Ark. 596, 600, 601, 804 S.W.2d 683, 685, 686 (1991)

(handbook statement that “[w]e believe in working and thinking and planning to provide a

stable and growing business, to give such service to our customers that we may provide

maximum job security for our employees” was not an express provision that defeated the at-

will doctrine). Employer policies that address grievance procedures, drug tests, and

progressive-disciplinary actions generally do not meet this exception. Faulkner v. Ark.

Children’s Hosp., 347 Ark. 941, 69 S.W.3d 393 (2002) (grievance procedure); Hice, supra (drug

testing); St. Edward Mercy Med. Ctr., supra (progressive-discipline policy).

Here, Danley alleged that the Clinic had grievance policies and procedures in place

that were adopted by the Clinic’s board of directors; that she initiated a grievance pursuant

to the grievance policies; and that the personnel committee dispensed with all its guarantees

of due process as stated in its employee handbook and failed to provide her a written

response to her grievance as required by the grievance policy. The complaint further alleged

that her termination did not comply with the policies and procedures outlined in the

employee handbook and that Stevens usurped the authority of the personnel committee and

invalidated the grievance process. However, Danley failed to quote in her complaint the

express “for-cause” provisions of the handbook or the grievance procedure that allegedly

exempted her from being considered an at-will employee, nor did she attach copies of any

such documents to her complaint. Because Danley is required to prove an express guarantee

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that she could not be discharged without good cause for this limited exception to apply and

because she has failed to quote, incorporate, or otherwise provide the language from the

employee handbook or grievance procedures that would give rise to an express guarantee,

her claim must fail on its face. Simply put, even when liberally construed, the pleadings fail

to state a cause of action for wrongful termination against Stevens in either her individual

or official capacity.

The second exception—the public-policy exception—applies when the reason for the

discharge is “so repugnant to the general good as to deserve the label ‘against public policy.’”

Marine Servs. Unlimited, Inc. v. Rakes, 323 Ark. 757, 764, 918 S.W.2d 132, 135 (1996) (citing

Smith, 304 Ark. 596, 804 S.W.2d 683). It, too, is “a narrow bridge over the at-will moat.”

McCabe, 2019 Ark. App. 566, at 8, 591 S.W.3d at 341. This limited public-policy exception

does not, however, “protect merely private or proprietary interests.” Sterling Drug, Inc. v.

Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 249, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385. When a wrongful-termination claim seeks

only the redress of a private wrong, the public-policy exception does not apply. Smith, supra.

To invoke the public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, a plaintiff

must identify a public policy outlined in our statutes. City of Highfill v. Scantlin, 2025 Ark.

App. 242, 713 S.W.3d 501; see also Palmer v. Ark. Council on Econ. Educ., 344 Ark. 461, 472,

40 S.W.3d 784, 790 (2001) (“[A]n at-will employee cannot be terminated if he or she is fired

in violation of a well-established public policy of the State . . . , but . . . such public policy

must be outlined in our statutes.”).

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Here, the complaint alleges that the Clinic is a corporation providing health care

services and that it receives state and federal funds for operational purposes. It further alleges

that the state and federal funds are conditioned on the Clinic’s compliance with various state

and federal statutes and regulations. The complaint then states that Danley had performed

her duties in compliance with all state and federal regulations and that her termination was

against public policy. Danley, however, did not identify what state or federal statute or

regulation was at issue or was violated nor did she allege that she was terminated for refusing

to violate any state or federal statute or regulation; thus, she cannot demonstrate that her

termination on this purported ground violates an established public policy.

Finally, Danley’s claim for promissory estoppel (justifiable reliance) also falls short.

Promissory estoppel applies when a plaintiff can show that (1) the defendant made a promise;

(2) the defendant should have reasonably expected the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting

in reliance on the promise, and the plaintiff reasonably relied on the promise to its

detriment; and (3) an injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise. Fairpark, LLC

v. Healthcare Essentials, Inc., 2011 Ark. App. 146, at 12, 381 S.W.3d 852, 859. Here, Danley’s

employment was at will, and she provided no reasonable basis to conclude that she was

promised employment for some unstated time period. Because Danley could have been

discharged for any or no reason at all, she cannot recover for being terminated from her at-

will job. This court has before affirmed the dismissal of a promissory-estoppel claim in the

Rule 12(b)(6) context, albeit on a different set of facts. See McCabe, supra; see also Johnson v.

Blytheville Sch. Dist., 2017 Ark. App. 147, 516 S.W.3d 785 (affirming dismissal of promissory-

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estoppel claim). There is, in other words, no “promissory-estoppel exception” to the at-will

doctrine. It is not this court’s role to create what would be tantamount to a new exception

to the at-will doctrine—and a broad and open-ended one at that—on the record and

arguments now before us.

Applying the required standard of review, we hold that the circuit court abused its

discretion when it denied Stevens’s motion to set aside the default judgment. The complaint,

when liberally construed and deemed true, fails to state a claim for wrongful discharge against

Stevens in either her individual or official capacity. For this reason, we reverse and dismiss

Danley’s complaint. Because Danley has nonsuited her claims once before, the dismissal

shall be with prejudice pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

Reversed and dismissed with prejudice.

HARRISON and TUCKER, JJ., agree.

Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP, by: Khayyam M. Eddings and Kat Hodge, for appellant.

Don Etherly, for appellee.

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