Andrea Montoya v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Child

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 87
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-25-415

ANDREA MONTOYA Opinion Delivered February 11, 2026

APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 72JV-23-665]

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HONORABLE DIANE WARREN,
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR JUDGE
CHILD
APPELLEES AFFIRMED; MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GRANTED

ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge

Appellant Andrea Montoya appeals the Washington County Circuit Court’s order

terminating her parental rights to her minor child, MC. Montoya’s counsel has filed a

motion to withdraw and a no-merit brief pursuant to our rules and case law stating that there

are no meritorious grounds to support an appeal. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9 (2025); Linker-Flores

v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004). After our court clerk

mailed certified copies of counsel’s motion and brief to Montoya’s last-known address

informing her of her right to file pro se points for reversal, she filed pro se points; however,

they were not timely filed. The clerk sent Montoya a letter notifying her that her pro se points

had not been accepted and informing her that she had the opportunity to file a motion

asking this court to accept her untimely pro se points for reversal. Montoya did not file that
motion; accordingly, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (“ADHS”) has not filed

a responsive brief. We affirm the termination and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

I. Background Facts

On November 3, 2023, ADHS was contacted by the Springdale Police Department,

which was actively attempting to provide crisis-intervention services to Montoya due to her

mental-health status. Montoya was talking about spirits and demons and did not have the

capacity to safely supervise and care for then five-year-old MC. After she became

confrontational with officers. Montoya was admitted to Northwest Medical Center–

Springdale for further psychological evaluation, which left MC without a caretaker. ADHS

placed a seventy-two-hour hold on MC.

A meeting was held on November 7, at which time Montoya admitted that she was

on a psychiatric hold with an unknown release date. Montoya also acknowledged that she

used methamphetamine daily, that she did not have stable housing or employment, and that

she was in a domestic-violence relationship with Sean White, with whom she resided. On

November 8, ADHS filed a petition for emergency custody and dependency-neglect of MC.

An ex parte order for emergency custody was issued on November 9.

ADHS filed an amended petition for emergency custody and dependency-neglect on

November 14. ADHS alleged that MC was dependent-neglected as a result of neglect and

parental unfitness due to Montoya’s mental-health issues, her daily methamphetamine use,

and her lack of stable housing or employment.

2
Montoya did not appear for the November 14 probable-cause hearing. The circuit

court found that probable cause existed at the time of MC’s removal and that the emergency

conditions that necessitated MC’s removal continued to exist.

Montoya likewise did not appear at the adjudication hearing, which was held on

December 5. MC was found dependent-neglected due to neglect and parental unfitness. The

goal of the case was established as reunification with a concurrent goal of adoption. The

court ordered that visitation would be at the discretion of ADHS and that, if Montoya was

dissatisfied with visitation, she could request a return to court over that issue. Montoya was

ordered to comply with the case plan and orders of the court.

Montoya was present for the April 2, 2025 review hearing. The court found that

ADHS had complied with the case plan and orders of the court and had provided, referred,

or otherwise offered services, including drug-and-alcohol assessment, individual counseling,

psychological evaluation, parenting classes, random drug screens, supervised family time, and

case-management services. It also found that Montoya had minimally complied with the case

plan and orders of the court. Montoya had just recently begun participating in the case and

in some services, but she had not completed her parenting classes, a drug-and-alcohol

assessment, or a psychological evaluation; and she had not participated in counseling. She

had neither stable housing nor sufficient employment to meet the needs of herself or MC,

had not demonstrated mental-health stability, and had unresolved criminal issues that had

arisen after MC entered ADHS care. The court found that Montoya’s mother had been

assessed as a possible placement option for MC but had been denied approval. Montoya was

3
awarded supervised visitation with MC under the condition that her partner, White, was

prohibited from participating in the visits. The court warned Montoya that she had to be

consistent in her visits with MC and noted that ADHS was authorized to suspend visitation

if she was not. The court continued the goal of the case as reunification with a concurrent

goal of adoption.

A second review hearing was held on July 9, Montoya did not appear and was found

not in compliance with the case plan or orders of the court because she had not completed

parenting classes, a drug-and-alcohol assessment, a psychological evaluation, or counseling.

Montoya had been in and out of jail and had not had contact with ADHS since her last

release from jail. The court suspended visitation between Montoya and MC.

On September 12, Montoya moved to reinstate visitation, asserting that she had

graduated from Eagle Crest Rehabilitation on September 5 and was residing in a women’s

sober-living community. The attorney ad litem filed a response on September 20 alleging

that it would not be in MC’s best interest to reinstate visitation because Montoya was not in

compliance with the case plan, had not completed her court-ordered services, and had

exercised only two supervised visits with MC since November 14.

A permanency-planning hearing was held on October 15. Montoya had been to

residential treatment and then a halfway house, but she had relapsed and had not

participated in any ongoing treatment or support groups since. She did not have a residence

of her own and had not visited MC in several months. The court found that Montoya could

not function independently of methamphetamine use and had no stable housing or

4
employment. Montoya was not in compliance with the case plan and orders of the court—

she had not completed parenting classes, had not completed an updated drug-and-alcohol

assessment since her relapse, had not completed her psychological evaluation, and had not

consistently participated in random drug screens. She had also been in and out of jail. The

court found that Montoya had not made significant and measurable progress toward

rehabilitating the conditions that caused removal. The goal of the case was changed to

adoption. The court denied Montoya’s petition to reinstate visitation but authorized the

parties to agree to the resumption of visitation if Montoya was able to demonstrate that she

had re-established her sobriety.

On January 10, 2025, ADHS filed its petition for the termination of parental rights

(“TPR”). ADHS alleged six statutory grounds in support of its TPR petition: (1) MC had

been out of Montoya’s custody for twelve months with Montoya having failed to remedy the

cause for removal; (2) MC had been out of the home of a noncustodial parent for twelve

months with the parent having failed to remedy the cause for removal; (3) MC had lived

outside of the home of the parent for twelve months and the parent had willfully failed to

provide significant material support for MC or to maintain meaningful contact with MC;

(4) the parents had abandoned MC; (5) after the filing of the petition for dependency-neglect,

other factors or issues arose that demonstrate the placement of MC in the custody of

Montoya is contrary to MC’s health, safety, or welfare and that Montoya had manifested an

incapacity or indifference to remedy those subsequent factors; and (6) Montoya subjected

5
MC to aggravated circumstances, meaning there was little likelihood that services would

result in a successful reunification.

The TPR hearing commenced on March 31, 2025. At the outset, ADHS introduced

without objection its first eleven exhibits consisting of certified documents from the

proceeding, including prior orders and evidence reflecting service.

Tammy Kelly, the ADHS family service worker assigned to the case, testified first. She

noted that MC was now six years old and had come into the care of ADHS in November

2023 due to Montoya’s mental-health and substance-abuse issues. MC was adjudicated

dependent-neglected on the basis of those facts and circumstances. The court approved the

case plan developed for Montoya, and services were offered to Montoya as a requirement of

that case plan. ADHS’s court report was introduced as ADHS’s exhibit 12, and the case plan

was introduced as the ADHS’s exhibit 13, both without objection. The services outlined in

the case plan were designed to address the initial reasons that MC had come into care.

Kelly noted that Montoya’s visits with MC had been suspended by the court. Before

her visits were suspended, Montoya had only two visits with MC: on March 21 and March

29, 2024. MC asked to end the visit early on March 21. During the March 29 visit, MC had

become upset after Montoya talked about having White participate in the visits. MC had an

accident in his pants, which was unusual for him. Montoya also went to the restroom and

suddenly began acting differently during the remainder of the family time. The visits were

upsetting to MC.

6
Kelly testified that Montoya had been participating in individual counseling but had

not provided verification of her counseling. She had provided verification of having

completed six hours of parenting classes. She had participated in residential treatment in

August 2024 and completed it in September 2025. She had not maintained sobriety after

she was released from residential treatment, testing positive for methamphetamine and

amphetamines on October 11, 2024.

The first drug screen that Montoya had completed for ADHS was in March 2024.

She had completed two drug screens in March and then she did not complete another until

she got out of inpatient treatment in September 2024. She had taken four drug screens in

September that were negative, and then she had taken one drug screen in October that was

positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines. She stopped taking drug screens when

she tested positive in October and had not restarted them until January 24, 2025. She had

taken seven drug screens between January 24 and March 20, 2025, and had tested negative

during that time. And although ADHS had referred Montoya for a psychological evaluation,

she had not completed it.

Kelly explained that Montoya lived in Rogers in a residence she had moved into

toward the end of February 2025. The residence had only one bedroom, but it was clean.

Before that, she had been living with a friend for several months, and before that, she had

no stable housing.

Montoya had been arrested three times since the case had been opened. She was

arrested on December 23, 2023, for violating a no-contact order and assault involving White.

7
She remained in jail until January 10, 2024. She was arrested on January 20, again for issues

involving White, and was released on January 30. She was arrested for a third time on April

10 for a failure-to-appear warrant and violation of conditions of release and was released on

May 25.

Kelly confirmed that ADHS had investigated a family placement option with

Montoya’s mother, but her home was denied twice.

Kelly noted that MC had some behavioral issues in school but seemed to be doing

great in the foster home. Kelly testified that MC did not have any impediments to adoption;

any special needs; or any significant medical, physical, or emotional needs that might prevent

adoption. She opined that MC is adoptable.

Kelly testified that Montoya had not remedied the circumstances that brought MC

into ADHS’s custody. Her visitation had been suspended for almost a year, and she had not

provided any type of support for MC. ADHS had concerns about the health and safety and

the potential harm to MC if he were to be placed with Montoya. Montoya’s mental-health

issues had not been addressed, and there were concerns about a possible relapse because she

had relapsed after leaving inpatient treatment. Kelly concluded that TPR would clear the

path to permanency for MC and would be in his best interest.

Montoya testified on her own behalf at the TPR hearing. She stated that she had been

living in an apartment in Rogers since the end of February. She had been working since

February 29, 2025. She requested three additional months to work on getting MC returned

to her. Montoya testified that she was working, attending Childcare Aware classes, and

8
attending counseling through Eustasis. She stated that she had gone in for a psychological

evaluation with Eustasis and signed a consent for her records to be released, but she had not

been able to get those yet. She noted that in total, she had completed five and a half hours

of parenting classes, an additional coparenting class, and four hours of anger-management

classes. All of the classes she had completed had been done since January 2025.

Montoya admitted that she started off slowly in attempting to get MC back and that

she did not have her priorities in order. She confirmed that she was too wrapped up in her

own grief and battling her own flaws that she was not focused on MC’s battles. She noted

that she still has a lot of work that needs to be done because she was learning to care for

herself. When she became a mother, she did not realize it was such a dangerous, hard job to

defend and protect and provide for her child. She testified that she went into motherhood

expecting her child to love her unconditionally and not vice versa. She claimed to have good

intentions but acknowledged that she still was not ready to be a good mother. She hoped

that with a few more months she might be ready, but at this time she was not ready to provide

a home for MC.

Montoya acknowledged that she had previous diagnoses of borderline personality

disorder, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia. She had previously taken prescription

medication but said she was doing much better without the medications, so she was not on

any mental-health medications as of the time of the TPR hearing. She noted that she went

in for a psychological evaluation the week before the hearing, but she did not have access to

her mental-health records. She stated that she believed her mental health had improved. She

9
no longer blamed others for her shortcomings and no longer expected others to clean up her

messes or fix her mistakes. She believed she could get where she wanted to be in order to

have MC within ninety days.

Montoya acknowledged that she had pending criminal charges involving a domestic

dispute with White. She conceded that she and White were still in contact and that he was

one of her only points of support.

Brittany Ann Kaiser, MC’s foster mother, testified as the attorney ad litem’s sole

witness. She testified about her experience with MC while he had been in her care for the

past year. Kaiser testified that MC was doing well in school; he was testing well. She noted

that he had some behavioral issues in school, but that she believed MC is adoptable.

At the close of all the testimony and evidence, the circuit court granted ADHS’s

petition and terminated Montoya’s parental rights. The termination order was subsequently

entered on April 28, 2025. Montoya obtained an order of indigency for appeal and filed a

timely notice of appeal on May 2. Her appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw and a

no-merit brief; this appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

This court reviews termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. Butler v. Ark. Dep’t of

Hum. Servs., 2026 Ark. App. 36. An order terminating parental rights must be based on a

finding by clear and convincing evidence that the sought-after termination is in the child’s

best interest. Id. The circuit court must consider the likelihood that the child will be adopted

if the parent’s rights are terminated and the potential harm that could be caused if the child

10
is returned to a parent. Id. The circuit court must also find that one of the grounds stated

in the termination statute is satisfied. Id.

In dependency-neglect cases, if, after studying the record and researching the law,

appellant’s counsel determines that the appellant has no meritorious basis for appeal, then

counsel may file a no-merit petition and move to withdraw. The petition must include an

argument section that lists all adverse rulings that the parent received at the circuit court

level and explain why each adverse ruling is not a meritorious ground for reversal. Id.; see

also Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(j)(1)(A).

III. Discussion

In her no-merit brief, Montoya’s appellate counsel asserts that after a conscientious

review of the record, she has determined that there are no issues of arguable merit for appeal.

Counsel identified the failure-to-remedy ground as having the least potential for arguable

merit. Because only one ground is needed for termination, she correctly maintains that any

argument regarding the remaining grounds is moot. See, e.g., Westbrook v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.

Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 352, 584 S.W.3d 258. The failure-to-remedy ground allows for

termination when a juvenile has been adjudicated by the court to be dependent-neglected

and has continued to be out of the custody of the parent for twelve months, and despite a

meaningful effort by ADHS to rehabilitate the parent and correct the conditions that caused

removal, those conditions have not been remedied by the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-

11
341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a) (Supp. 2023). With respect to the failure-to-remedy ground, the circuit

court stated, in part, as follows:

A lack of stability in mental health and substance abuse were primary issues that
resulted in the juvenile coming into the custody of the Department in November of
2023 and those issues continue to exist today. Andrea Montoya has failed to
participate in the necessary services designed to rehabilitate the conditions that
caused removal of her child from her home.

This ground requires that four findings be proved by clear and convincing evidence:

(1) MC was adjudicated dependent-neglected; (2) MC had been out of the custody of

Montoya for twelve months; (3) Montoya failed to remedy the cause of the removal; and (4)

the failure occurred despite meaningful efforts by ADHS to rehabilitate the parent and

correct the conditions that caused removal. Selsor v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App.

182, 516 S.W.3d 314; Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a).

The first and second elements clearly have been satisfied. The adjudication order was

entered as an exhibit without objection showing that MC was adjudicated dependent-

neglected by order filed January 19, 2024. The probable-cause order, which was also entered

as an exhibit, indicated that MC was removed from Montoya’s custody on November 5,

2023, with an ex parte emergency order placing custody of MC with ADHS on November

9. The adjudication order, review orders, and permanency-planning order all reflected that

custody of MC had remained with ADHS since that time. MC had been out of Montoya’s

custody for approximately sixteen months.

The third element required a finding that Montoya failed to remedy the cause of

MC’s removal. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a). The primary condition that

12
precipitated MC’s removal from Montoya’s custody was Montoya’s mental-health issues.

When ADHS first exercised a hold on MC, Montoya was being placed on a psychiatric hold

after having a psychotic episode in which she was talking about spirits and demons and told

officers that she would not do anything to hurt MC but that “there is darkness” where she

takes him. During a team decision meeting, Montoya said that the discharge date from her

psychiatric hold was unknown, and she further admitted daily use of methamphetamine and

instability in her housing and employment. MC was adjudicated dependent-neglected

because of neglect and parental unfitness due to these issues.

Here, Montoya undoubtedly failed to remedy these ongoing issues. Despite her

admission that she had previously been diagnosed with borderline personality disorder,

bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia, Montoya failed to complete her psychological

evaluation so that treatment for her mental-health issues could even begin. This was an

essential element of Montoya’s case plan. Montoya also admitted that she had been

prescribed medications for her mental-health diagnoses but was not currently taking any of

those medications. Montoya claimed that she had submitted to a psychological evaluation

with another provider “the week before last” but offered no proof of its completion. Even if

it had been completed immediately before the TPR hearing as Montoya testified, there was

no time for Montoya to follow any recommended treatment plan that would have inevitably

been included in the evaluation. Determining a course of treatment is the entire purpose of

having a psychological evaluation completed. Without the evaluation, there were no services

to facilitate a remedy. Similar circumstances have been upheld by this court as evidence

13
sufficient to support TPR. See Smallwood v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 598,

598 S.W.3d 253.

It was also unclear if Montoya had remedied her ongoing substance-abuse issues.

Although she completed inpatient substance-abuse treatment at Eagle Crest Recovery on

September 5, 2024, she then tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines on

October 11. She failed to submit to any drug screens after testing positive until the end of

January 2025. She provided negative drug screens from January 24 through March 20, 2025,

but that constitutes only approximately two months of sobriety with no evidence of any

ongoing substance-abuse treatment or a support system in place to help prevent a potential

relapse. Showing some progress on a substance-abuse issue does not prove the capacity to

remain drug-free. See Hollinger v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 458, 529 S.W.3d

242.

Finally, Montoya had not remedied the instability in her housing or employment.

Each of the prior court orders stated that Montoya had never maintained stable housing or

employment throughout the case. At the time of the TPR hearing, Montoya had just moved

into an apartment and had secured employment only weeks before. Montoya’s inability to

secure stable housing is a sufficient basis on its own to show she failed to remedy the cause

of removal. See Selsor, supra.

Even considering all the improvements Montoya attempted to make in the two

months leading up to the TPR hearing—taking parenting classes, completing a four-hour

anger-management class, submitting to an independent psychological evaluation, obtaining

14
housing and employment, and testing negative for all substances—Montoya herself admitted

that she was still not ready to be a good mother to MC or provide a home for him. Montoya

testified that she hoped an additional ninety days would give her enough time to be ready to

have MC returned to her, but the court was not required to consider her eleventh-hour

improvements or give her more time on the basis of a mere hope that she might be able to

remedy her situation, especially when the evidence supporting TPR sufficiently

demonstrated her failure to comply and remedy her issues. See, e.g., Mills v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.

Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 197, 644 S.W.3d 256. The evidence before us supports the circuit

court’s finding that Montoya had not remedied the cause of removal.

The fourth and final element required to be proved by ADHS was that ADHS made

meaningful efforts to rehabilitate the parent and correct the conditions that caused removal.

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a). Throughout the proceedings, the circuit court

made findings that ADHS had made reasonable efforts to provide the family services and

finalize a permanency plan for MC. Those prior orders were not appealed, and this court

will not review reasonable-efforts findings regarding the time periods covered by prior orders

not appealed. Morton v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 388, 465 S.W.3d 871. Thus,

this court will consider only the time moving forward from the permanency-planning

hearing, which was held on October 15, 2024.

After the permanency-planning hearing, ADHS made additional referrals for

parenting classes, individual counseling, an updated drug-and-alcohol assessment, and a

psychological evaluation. Montoya did not complete any of these services. At the conclusion

15
of the TPR hearing, the circuit court found that ADHS had offered reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate the issues that caused removal.

Montoya did not argue that ADHS failed to offer her meaningful services. Instead,

she merely asked for additional time to work the services that had already been made

available to her. A failure to challenge prior reasonable-efforts findings and a failure to

request any specific services claimed as necessary to remedy the cause of removal are waived

on appeal. Peterson v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 75, 595 S.W.3d 38. There is

sufficient evidence to support the circuit court’s determination that ADHS made meaningful

efforts to rehabilitate the parent and correct the conditions that caused removal.

The record before us supports that there was clear and convincing evidence to satisfy

every element of the “failure to remedy” finding; as such, there is no meritorious defense to

the circuit court’s determination that statutory grounds existed.

In addition to finding the existence of at least one statutory ground to support TPR,

a court must also find that TPR is in the child’s best interest, taking into consideration two

statutory factors: (1) the likelihood of adoption if parental rights are terminated and (2) the

potential harm caused by continuing contact with the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-

341(b)(3)(A). Here, the court considered both statutory factors in light of the overall

evidence, finding that TPR was in MC’s best interest. Counsel contends that there are no

issues of arguable merit for reversal in challenging this best-interest finding. We agree.

Regarding adoptability, both ADHS’s family service worker and MC’s foster mother

provided testimony that MC is adoptable. MC has no special needs or impediments to

16
adoption. This court has held such evidence to be sufficient evidence to support the

adoptability consideration of the best-interest analysis. See Brabon v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,

2012 Ark. App. 2, 388 S.W.3d 69. Thus, there was sufficient evidence that the circuit court

had considered the likelihood of adoptability in accordance with Arkansas Code Annotated

section 9-27-341(b)(3)(A) in finding that MC is adoptable. Accordingly, there is no

meritorious challenge to this finding.

Regarding potential harm, the circuit court is not required to find that actual harm

would result or to affirmatively identify a potential harm. Ross v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,

2017 Ark. App. 503, 529 S.W.3d 692. Potential harm must be viewed in broad terms, and

“potential” necessarily means that the court is required to look to future possibilities. Id.

This court has frequently held that continued drug use, mental-health issues, and instability

demonstrate potential harm sufficient to support a best-interest finding in a TPR case. See,

e.g., Beaird v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 415, 585 S.W.3d 172; Murphy v. Ark.

Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 426, 560 S.W.3d 465; Robinson v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.

Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 262, 520 S.W.3d 322; Rossie-Fonner v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2012

Ark. App. 29, 388 S.W.3d 38.

Finally, counsel notes that, in addition to the TPR decision itself, she has reviewed

the record for all adverse rulings to Montoya made by the circuit court on all objections,

motions, and requests made at the TPR hearing in accordance with Arkansas Supreme Court

Rule 6-9(j)(1)(A). Counsel discusses the two adverse rulings the circuit court made with

respect to Montoya’s objections. During the direct examination of MC’s foster parent,

17
Brittany Kaiser, ADHS asked, “Does [MC]—when he refers to his mom—does he use certain

words to refer to his mom?” Montoya’s counsel objected on two grounds: first, that the

testimony would be hearsay, and second, that the question had already been answered. The

circuit court overruled both objections and allowed the testimony.

With respect to the hearsay objection, hearsay is a statement, other than one made

by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth

of the matter asserted. See Ark. R. Evid. 801(c) (2025). Hearsay testimony is generally

inadmissible. Ark. R. Evid. 802 (2025). A statement is not hearsay, however, if it is offered

against a party and is his or her own statement. Ark. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Here, the testimony

elicited was a statement made by MC to his foster mother. This court has held that

statements of juveniles in dependency-neglect cases are not admissions by a party opponent

under Rule 801(d)(2) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. See Wilson v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.

Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 666, 476 S.W.3d 816. The circuit court held that the statement was

not hearsay because the court did not believe the testimony was being offered for the truth

of the matter asserted; rather, it was being used as a “reference.” However, a review of this

testimony indicates that it was intended to prove the truth of the matter asserted, which was

that MC refers to his mom as “my crazy mom.” Counsel acknowledges this as hearsay and

that the circuit court erred in admitting the testimony. However, this court has stated that it

will not reverse a circuit court’s ruling on admissibility of evidence absent a manifest abuse

of discretion and a showing of prejudice. Id. Without a showing of prejudice, any judicial

error as to the admission of evidence is deemed harmless and is not grounds for reversing a

18
circuit court’s order. Id. As discussed below, Montoya cannot show any prejudice as a result

of the improperly admitted hearsay testimony.

Next, in accordance with Arkansas Rule of Evidence 403 (2025), evidence may be

excluded by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of

cumulative evidence. It is within the sound discretion of the circuit court to limit the

introduction of cumulative testimony. See Hutton v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App.

242, 646 S.W.3d 215. Below, the circuit court held that the testimony had not yet been

received, stating, “I don’t think that we’ve heard this before, so if I take your objection as

asked and answered, I don’t think that that’s the case either.” The circuit court was correct

that the testimony regarding what MC calls his mother had not been previously provided.

The circuit court was acting within its discretion to determine whether the testimony was

cumulative, and it did not abuse its discretion in determining, correctly, that the evidence

had not yet been introduced.

Our review indicates that neither of the adverse rulings resulted in prejudice to

Montoya because the circuit court did not rely on MC’s statement as a basis for any of its

rulings related to TPR. Moreover, the ADHS court report, which was introduced without

objection, contained similar statements made by MC including, “[MC] asked to end family

time early on March 21st. [MC] stated he didn’t want his mom to get crazy like she does a

lot.” Accordingly, the circuit court already had evidence of similar statements made by MC

that had been provided through a separate form without objection. And because there was

ample evidence to support the circuit court’s TPR order without this testimony, any error in

19
admitting the hearsay testimony was harmless and does not provide a meritorious basis for

appeal.

Finally, we hold that the denial of Montoya’s request for additional time does not

constitute a meritorious ground for reversal. The goal of the TPR statute is to provide

permanency in a child’s life when returning the child to the family home is contrary to the

child’s health, safety, or welfare, and the evidence demonstrates that a return to the home

cannot be accomplished in a reasonable period of time as viewed from the child’s perspective.

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(a)(3). A child’s need for permanency and stability may override

a parent’s request for more time to improve the parent’s circumstances. Morton, supra. Under

the facts and circumstances presented in this case, the need for MC’s permanency and

stability outweighed Montoya’s request for additional time, and the circuit court did not err

in denying her request.

IV. Conclusion

Having carefully examined the record and the no-merit brief, we hold that Montoya’s

counsel has complied with the requirements for a no-merit termination-of-parental-rights

appeal and that the appeal is wholly without merit. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion

to withdraw and affirm the termination order.

Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted.

ABRAMSON and BARRETT, JJ., agree.

Elizabeth James, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.

One brief only.

20