Breanna Terry v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Child

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 247
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-25-793

BREANNA TERRY Opinion Delivered April 22, 2026
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 26JV-23-353]

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HONORABLE LYNN WILLIAMS,
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR JUDGE
CHILD
APPELLEES AFFIRMED; MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GRANTED

BRANDON J. HARRISON, Judge

Breanna Terry appealed the Garland County Circuit Court’s order terminating her

parental rights to her younger child, MC2, born 23 October 2023. Her counsel moved to

withdraw without completing a merits appeal because, as she explained in an accompanying

no-merit brief, the appeal would be wholly frivolous. See Linker-Flores v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.

Servs., 359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004); Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(j). We agree, grant

counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirm.

Breanna has a cognitive deficit or developmental delay that affects her ability to retain

information; she has a diagnosis of partial Down syndrome. When this case opened, she

already had a history with the Arkansas Department of Human Services (the “Department”

or “DHS”). The Department had opened a protective-services case in September 2022

involving MC1, who was about a year older than MC2, after it found that Breanna was not
providing food. The Department arranged in-home parenting classes and, as part of a safety

plan, required Breanna to reside with her mother to provide support and guidance in caring

for the baby. In July 2023, MC1 was placed in DHS custody for suspected abuse after

Breanna and Austin McAbee, MC2’s putative father, gave different accounts of how MC1

broke her femur. 1

The Department received a hotline report for neglect of MC2 on 24 October 2023,

when she was one day old. According to nursing staff at the hospital where Breanna

delivered, Breanna and Austin were not feeding or diapering MC2 despite encouragement

and several reminders. Because they were not feeding her at regular intervals, or not feeding

her at all, MC2’s glucose level became critically low on October 23 and 24. Hospital staff

continued to instruct them when and how to feed the baby throughout the day and night

of October 24, and still had to wake them twice to do it. They could not perform basic

cleaning of MC2 or the bassinet despite instruction from staff the previous day.

In response to the hotline call, DHS searched for previous DHS cases involving

Breanna or Austin. For Breanna, the search revealed the open protective-services case

involving MC1 that had begun with a similar failure to provide food. For Austin, it revealed

a “true” finding for sexual contact and sexual penetration of his developmentally delayed

sister. A home assessment revealed that the presumed parents had no supply of formula and

few other supplies for an infant. The home had water damage, poorly repaired flooring,

and a wall with a hole in it.

1
We affirm the termination of Breanna’s parental rights to MC1 in a related appeal
decided today, Terry v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2026 Ark. App. 249, ___
S.W.3d ___.

2
The Department petitioned October 31 to adjudicate MC2 dependent-neglected as

a result of abuse, neglect, and parental unfitness. The court entered an ex parte order

awarding temporary custody of MC2 to DHS the same day. On December 15, it entered

an agreed order adjudicating MC2 dependent-neglected due to environmental neglect

because Breanna and Austin lacked appropriate housing.

The court conducted a series of review hearings. At first the permanency plan was

to reunite MC2 with a fit and proper parent or explore placement with fictive kin. Breanna

made some progress with the case plan: she was receiving therapy and had completed

parenting classes. But the progress did not last. After a 21 May 2025 review hearing, the

court found she was not compliant with the case plan. She was not employed, had stopped

attending therapy, and did not have appropriate housing. And what parenting education

she received didn’t take. A DHS caseworker explained at the termination hearing that

Breanna “often needs concepts explained to her repeatedly and over and over” sometimes

within one conversation. That continued “week after week, month after month.” For

whatever reason, she said, Breanna “is not able to retain any education as far as taking care

of her children.” The caseworker believed that had contributed to her neglect of MC2 at

the hospital.

In October 2024, a Missouri man came forward contending he is the father of both

children. DNA testing confirmed that in January 2025. The case went into a holding

pattern by agreement of the parties while DHS and its Missouri counterpart assessed whether

MC2 could be placed with him. An Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children

(ICPC) request was denied; he and other residents of his home had disqualifying criminal

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histories, and conditions in the home were unsanitary. The circuit court reported the ICPC

denial in the May 2025 review order. In the same order, the court changed the case goal

to adoption following the termination of parental rights. After a DHS employee informed

the father of the custody denial, he stopped contacting her.

The Department petitioned in July 2025 to terminate Breanna’s parental rights on

the grounds that she had failed to remedy the conditions that caused MC2’s removal, Ark.

Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a) (Supp. 2023), and subjected MC2 to aggravated

circumstances in that there was little likelihood that continued services would result in

successful reunification. Id. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3)(A) & (B)(i). The petition focused

on the absence of any change to Breanna’s situation since MC2 was removed from her

custody. She had been unable to retain the skills acquired in parenting classes, still lacked

transportation and stable employment, and still lacked stable and appropriate housing.

Before the 10 September 2025 termination hearing, Act 518’s reorganization of the

Juvenile Code took effect. 2 On 16 September 2025, the circuit court entered an order

terminating Breanna’s parental rights to MC2. It found clear and convincing evidence for

the failure-to-remedy ground, Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(i)(a) (Supp. 2025),

formerly section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i). That ground required proof that (1) MC2 was

adjudicated dependent-neglected, (2) MC2 continued out of Breanna’s custody for twelve

months, (3) Breanna failed to remedy the cause for the removal, and (4) Breanna failed

2
See Act 518 of 2025. The Act reorganized the Juvenile Code but made no
substantive change that would be relevant here. Indeed, the General Assembly’s express
intent was that the Act “shall make only technical, not substantive, changes to the Arkansas
Code of 1987.” Id. § 1(3).

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despite meaningful efforts by the Department to rehabilitate her and correct the conditions

that caused removal. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(i)(a)(1). The court highlighted

evidence that

[s]he has not completed any parenting classes since the removal of this child.
Her participation in family time has been sporadic. And, her home is not
appropriate for placement of a juvenile due to continuing concerns with
domestic violence and the fact that a sex offender is living in the home.

It found that termination was in MC2’s best interest after expressly considering the

testimony about the number of families interested in adopting a child like MC2 or a sibling

group like MC1 and MC2.

The termination decision was the only ruling adverse to Breanna. As withdrawing

counsel has carefully demonstrated, the court’s findings are supported by the record and

caselaw. The first two elements of the failure-to-remedy ground are beyond dispute. The

December 2023 dependency-neglect finding was by stipulation. MC2 was removed from

Breanna’s custody 25 October 2023 and—nearly two years later—had never returned. We

could not second-guess the circuit court’s reasonable-efforts findings before May 2025

because Breanna did not appeal them. Morton v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2015 Ark. App.

388, at 8, 465 S.W.3d 871, 876. The reasonableness of DHS’s later efforts to remedy the

conditions that caused removal is plain from the record. It referred Breanna to parenting

education through two separate providers, but she was dismissed for excessive absences. She

did not reengage in parenting education after the May 2025 review hearing. The

Department offered in-person family time sessions and transportation to them, but Breanna

declined.

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That brings us to the fourth factor—Breanna’s failure to remedy the conditions that

caused removal. She and Austin moved several times during this case, both within and

outside Arkansas—usually without telling DHS. Breanna joined and left the carnival at least

twice. The moves meant she had never been able to complete parenting classes for MC2.

When Breanna was traveling out of state, she was inconsistent with Zoom family-time visits.

When she was in Arkansas, she often canceled visits “for arbitrary reasons such as rain” or

because MC2 “had a cough last week and she was worried she would still have a cough.”

She declined DHS’s offer to transport her to Garland County from Paragould for in-person

visits because that would be too long to stay in the car. She was aware of the termination

hearing but did not attend. She never obtained a stable job, completed therapy, or

demonstrated the ability to retain parenting education.

She never demonstrated stable housing or a stable home life, either. Stable and

appropriate housing is one of a child’s most basic needs, and we have repeatedly held that

failure to obtain it supports termination. See Selsor v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark.

App. 182, 516 S.W.3d 314. As of the termination hearing, Breanna and Austin were living

with Austin’s brother, who is a registered sex offender. She had told DHS that she and

Austin had a trailer they could move into. But if they moved, the brother would be coming

with them. Austin was in jail for domestic battery at the time. A caseworker testified that

Breanna would “speak about Austin putting his hands on her or yelling at her, threatening

her,” then backtrack and say she was confused. During one family-time visit, a CASA

worker had to call police because he and Breanna were screaming and fighting. The

caseworker testified that DHS had done everything it reasonably could to reunify MC2 with

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Breanna. In her view, termination was in MC1’s and MC2’s best interest because “they

deserve a family that will choose them and spend time with them and desire a life with

them.”

On de novo review, we agree that clear and convincing evidence supported each

element of the failure-to-remedy ground, and there could be no merit in a challenge to the

court’s finding that grounds for termination existed. Campbell v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,

2023 Ark. App. 37, 660 S.W.3d 585 (standard of review in no-merit termination-of-

parental-rights cases). All that remains is the best-interest finding.

The Juvenile Code requires the circuit court to determine the child’s best interest

upon consideration of at least two factors: (1) the likelihood that the juvenile will be

adopted; and (2) potential harm to the juvenile’s health and safety caused by returning the

child to the parent or continuing contact with the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-

325(b)(3)(A). Potential harm “must be viewed in broad terms, and ‘potential’ necessarily

means that the court is required to look to future possibilities.” Bradley v. Ark. Dep’t of

Hum. Servs., 2026 Ark. App. 154, at 11, ___ S.W.3d, ___. The court is not required to

find that actual harm would result or affirmatively identify a potential harm. Id. Clear and

convincing evidence must support the conclusion that termination is in the child’s best

interest—not the individual statutory factors. Trogstad v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2020

Ark. App. 443, 609 S.W.3d 661; Renfro v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 419,

385 S.W.3d 285.

We require some evidence of adoptability. Solee v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017

Ark. App. 640, 535 S.W.3d 687. There was some evidence: a DHS adoption specialist

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testified there were 75 matches for MC1 and MC2 as a sibling group. For MC2 individually,

there were 204. The specialist was aware of no barriers to adoption for either child.

We hold that the circuit court had sufficient evidence upon which to find that it was

in MC2’s best interest for Breanna’s rights to be terminated and that a statutory ground for

termination existed. Thus, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the

termination of parental rights.

Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted.

TUCKER and WOOD, JJ., agree.

Elizabeth James, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.

One brief only.

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