In Re Term of Parental Rights as to W.M.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO W.M.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0167
FILED 04-08-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD532965
The Honorable Peter A. Thompson, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Jamie R. Heller
Counsel for Appellant

David W. Bell, Attorney at Law, Mesa
By David W. Bell
Counsel for Child

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Ingeet Pandya
Counsel for Appellee Arizona Department of Child Safety
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO W.M.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Veronika Fabian and Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig
joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Ashley C. (“Mother”) appeals from the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights on the grounds of abandonment and six
months’ time-in-care. Because she has not shown the court clearly erred,
we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In April 2024, Mother gave birth to W.M.; he was born
substance exposed to marijuana. Soon after his birth, the Department of
Child Safety (“DCS”) petitioned for dependency as to Mother based on
substance abuse and mental health concerns. She did not contest the
allegations and the court found W.M. dependent.

¶3 DCS provided Mother with various services, including drug
testing, substance abuse treatment, parenting classes, and supervised
visitation. Throughout 2024, Mother’s participation in services was
sporadic; many of her referrals were closed out for lack of engagement and
she missed several supervised visits. Mother’s last visit that year with W.M.
occurred on December 12. After the visit ended early because of W.M.
crying inconsolably, a DCS case aide found what appeared to be drug
paraphernalia in the diaper bag Mother brought to the visit. Mother did
not have another visit or otherwise see W.M. until June of the following
year.

¶4 In March 2025, DCS moved to terminate Mother’s parental
rights to W.M. on the grounds of abandonment and six months’ time-in-
care under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1), (8)(b). DCS alleged in part that Mother
failed to maintain a normal relationship with W.M. by failing to maintain
regular contact, offer reasonable support, or provide normal supervision.
Mother did not appear at a pretrial conference in June. After noting Mother
was properly served and admonished about the consequences for not
appearing, the court proceeded with a termination hearing. Finding

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO W.M.
Decision of the Court

Mother’s failure to appear constituted an admission of the allegations in the
motion, the juvenile court concluded that DCS proved both grounds for
termination by clear and convincing evidence and that termination of her
parental rights was in W.M.’s best interests.

¶5 Mother moved to set aside the termination order, explaining
she was hospitalized at the time of the hearing. The court granted Mother’s
motion, setting another date for a termination hearing. Mother’s
engagement in services improved. She regularly attended visits with W.M.
as of June 26, and she participated in parenting classes. Yet she refused to
complete drug tests and her referrals for substance abuse treatment closed
for lack of engagement.

¶6 The juvenile court held a termination hearing in September
2025, and again Mother did not appear. The court determined Mother
lacked good cause for failing to appear and thus waived her right to
challenge the allegations in DCS’s motion. After hearing testimony from
the DCS caseworker, the court concluded that DCS proved the statutory
grounds for termination, which was in W.M.’s best interests. The court
made its findings orally on the record and later entered written findings of
fact and conclusions of law. Mother did not seek to set aside the order but
she timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A),
12-120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶7 Mother challenges the juvenile court’s findings on the
statutory grounds for termination and that termination was in W.M.’s best
interests. In reviewing a court’s order terminating parental rights, we
review factual findings for an abuse of discretion, affirming if the findings
are supported by reasonable evidence. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255
Ariz. 471, 478, ¶ 30 (2023). We will affirm the court’s legal conclusion that
clear and convincing evidence supports at least one statutory ground for
termination unless that conclusion is clearly erroneous. Id. at 478–79, ¶ 31.

¶8 Before addressing Mother’s arguments, we address Mother’s
failure to appear for the termination hearing. When a parent fails to appear
for a termination hearing, after being properly served and notified about
the consequences of failing to appear, the court may find the parent has
waived their legal rights and is deemed to have admitted the allegations in
the motion or petition to terminate. A.R.S. § 8-863(C); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct.
351(c)(2)(A). The court may proceed with the hearing and terminate the

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO W.M.
Decision of the Court

parent’s rights based on the record and evidence presented. A.R.S.
§ 8-863(C); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 353(f)(1)–(2).

¶9 Here, the court found that Mother admitted the allegations in
the motion by failing to appear without good cause, and Mother has not
challenged this determination. Thus, we consider those admissions in
evaluating whether the court’s legal conclusions are supported by the
evidence. See Manuel M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 205, 213–14,
¶ 28 (App. 2008) (concluding the failure to appear concedes the factual
contentions in a motion to terminate, but not the legal question of whether
those factual allegations are enough to establish legal grounds for
termination).

A. Abandonment

¶10 The juvenile court found that DCS presented clear and
convincing evidence that Mother abandoned W.M. “Abandonment”
means “the failure of a parent to provide reasonable support and to
maintain regular contact with the child, including providing normal
supervision.” A.R.S. § 8-531(1). This includes a finding “that a parent has
made only minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child.” Id.

¶11 Reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s
abandonment finding. DCS records show Mother did not visit or see W.M.
between December 12, 2024, and June 25, 2025. True, Mother was
hospitalized from May 10 through June 6, 2025. But Mother’s visitation was
inconsistent before that period, as the DCS caseworker explained. The
record shows that Mother often failed to appear at scheduled visits through
July and August of 2024, and in September of that year her referral for
supervised visitation was closed out based on lack of engagement. When
DCS requested a new referral, the service provider was unable to schedule
a visit with Mother because DCS could not contact her, and another visit in
October was canceled. The juvenile court had sufficient evidence to
conclude Mother failed to provide reasonable support, maintain regular
contact, or make more than minimal efforts to support and communicate
with W.M. for a significant period of time. See Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of
Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249–50, ¶ 18 (2000).

¶12 Mother argues the court’s abandonment finding is
unwarranted because she had some contact with W.M. through visits in
2024, and she consistently engaged in visitation and parenting classes after
June 2025. We are not persuaded. A parent cannot defeat an abandonment
finding by having sporadic contact with their child; under A.R.S. § 8-531(1),

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO W.M.
Decision of the Court

a parent abandons their child by failing to maintain regular contact. The
record shows Mother’s visitation with W.M. was not regular from July 2024
through April 2025. We acknowledge that Mother resumed visits after June
2025 and engaged in some other services following her hospitalization. She
highlights the DCS caseworker’s testimony that Mother was consistently
prepared, implemented lessons she learned about parenting from other
services, and that Mother established a bond with W.M. Though
commendable, Mother’s post-motion efforts to re-establish a relationship
with W.M. do not absolve her failure to maintain regular contact with W.M.
for almost a year. Cf. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS–500274, 167 Ariz. 1,
8 (1990). Mother has shown no error. Because we affirm the court’s finding
on termination, we need not address whether sufficient evidence supports
the six months’ time-in-care ground.

B. Best Interests

¶13 Mother also argues the juvenile court failed to consider the
totality of the circumstances, specifically her efforts to re-engage with
services after her hospitalization, and in determining that termination of
her parental rights was in W.M.’s best interests. But the court found Mother
did not “significantly participate” in her case, which shows the court
considered Mother’s engagement in services in assessing the totality of the
circumstances.

¶14 Moreover, we presume the court made “every finding
necessary to support the [termination] order if reasonable evidence
supports the order.” Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 50,
¶ 17 (App. 2004). DCS’s motion alleged that termination would further the
plan of adoption for W.M., which would provide him with “permanency
and stability,” and that W.M. resided with his adoptive placement which
met his needs. Mother admitted these facts by failing to appear at the
termination hearing. The DCS caseworker testified that W.M.’s placement
met his needs, W.M. was bonded to and comfortable with the placement,
and the placement wanted to adopt him. The court had sufficient evidence
to find that W.M. would benefit from termination and thus conclude that
termination was in W.M.’s best interests. See Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety,
245 Ariz. 146, 150, ¶ 13 (2018) (“[T]ermination is in the child’s best interests
if either: (1) the child will benefit from severance; or (2) the child will be
harmed if severance is denied.”).

¶15 Even so, Mother contends the court erred by using findings of
fact and conclusions of law DCS submitted after the hearing, which
essentially track the allegations in the termination motion. She claims DCS

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO W.M.
Decision of the Court

“cannot merely cut and paste the allegations” from its own motion but
provides no authority supporting this position. The findings include the
same allegations Mother conceded through her failure to appear, and
reasonable evidence at the termination hearing supports those allegations.
Mother has not shown the best interests’ findings and conclusions are
clearly erroneous.

CONCLUSION

¶16 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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