Curran v. Curran

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

JOSHUA JOSEPH CURRAN, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

BRITTANY LEE CURRAN, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0615 FC
FILED 04-21-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2017-093751
The Honorable Andrew J. Russell, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Joshua Joseph Curran, Phoenix
Petitioner/Appellant

Sloma Law Group, PLLC, Phoenix
By Sue A. Jones and Melinda M. Sloma
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
CURRAN v. CURRAN
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1 Petitioner Joseph Curran (“Father”) appeals the superior
court’s order denying modification of parenting time, granting Brittany
Curran (“Mother”) final say for medical decisions, modifying Father’s child
support payments, and awarding Mother a portion of her reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Mother and Father Divorce Via Consent Decree in 2018.

¶2 Mother and Father share two children. They divorced in 2018
and entered into a consent decree through which they agreed to exercise
joint legal decision-making and approximately equal parenting time.
Mother and Father went approximately six years without seeking
modification of their consent decree.

B. In 2024, Mother Petitions to Modify Legal Decision-Making
Authority, Parenting Time, and Child Support, and Later
Petitions for Contempt Sanctions Against Father.

¶3 In 2024, Mother petitioned to modify legal decision-making
authority, parenting time, and child support. Mother sought sole or final
legal decision-making authority, citing repeated difficulties working with
Father to obtain medical treatment for the children, even when
recommended by their pediatrician and required by their school. Mother
limited her request to modify parenting time to trying to find a schedule
that worked better with Father’s irregular work schedule. Father did not
oppose the request to modify parenting time.

¶4 Mother later petitioned the court to find Father in contempt
based on his failure to pay his portion of uninsured medical expenses and
agreed-upon extracurricular expenses related to the children.

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C. The Court Grants Father’s Counsel’s Request to Withdraw
and Denies Father’s Motion to Continue the Evidentiary
Hearing.

¶5 A final orders hearing was originally scheduled to take place
on February 7, 2025. In lieu of a final orders hearing, however, Mother and
Father engaged in unsuccessful settlement negotiations at the courthouse.
On February 10, 2025, the court rescheduled the final orders hearing for
April 17, 2025. On April 3, 2025, Father moved to continue the April 17,
2025 hearing. That same day, Father’s counsel also moved to withdraw
with Father’s consent, citing Ethical Rule 1.16(a)(3) — “the lawyer is
discharged” — and Mother objected to Father’s motion to continue.
Notably, although counsel moved to withdraw on April 3, 2025, Father’s
signed consent attached to the motion was dated March 4, 2025.

¶6 The court heard argument on Father’s motion to continue at
an April 10, 2025 status conference, at which counsel represented Father.
Father argued he needed more time to obtain substitute counsel before the
evidentiary hearing. The court noted, however, that Father’s counsel was
withdrawing per Father’s request. Mother argued against a continuance,
explaining further delay would harm the children, who were still waiting
on doctor’s appointments and school-mandated immunizations because of
Father’s opposition to them. Although Father argued he had a detailed
position as to vaccinations, he was not prepared to discuss it when the court
prompted him.

¶7 The court ultimately granted Father’s counsel’s request to
withdraw and denied Father’s motion to continue, stating it “reek[ed] of
delay.” The court reasoned that “[d]ue process goes both ways . . . and the
best interests of the children is the overriding concern.”

D. The Court Holds an Evidentiary Hearing and Issues Final
Orders Granting Mother’s Petitions in Part.

¶8 The court proceeded with the evidentiary hearing on April 17,
2025. Although without counsel, Father testified, presented argument,
cross-examined Mother, and made objections. Father agrees the court “was
very accommodating and tolerant.”

¶9 Shortly thereafter, the court issued a reasoned decision
granting Mother some of the relief she requested. The primary change by
the court was awarding Mother “final say” with regard to medical decisions
on behalf of the children. The court went through a detailed best-interests
analysis, ultimately finding that Mother “seeks to follow advice from

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medical professionals, including the pediatrician who has treated both
children their entire lives,” and “has a scientific, evidence-based position
that is in the children’s best interests.” Despite making this change, the
court found “no evidence suggests th[at] either [parent] should now be
removed from the decision-making process,” and that “[b]oth [parents]
have valuable information to add.”

¶10 The court also found Father in contempt “for his failure to
timely pay the medical expenses and extracurricular expenses identified in
Mother’s Contempt Petition.” The court relied on Mother’s timely
provision of receipts to Father and concluded that “Father’s refusal to pay
these amounts was petty and another sign of the difficulty he experiences
cooperating with Mother.”

¶11 Finally, the court awarded Mother a portion of her attorneys’
fees under A.R.S. § 25-324, finding that “Father has taken unreasonable
positions and acted unreasonably throughout this litigation,” and that
“Father’s actions and positions forced Mother to incur attorneys’ fees that
should never have been necessary.”

¶12 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction over Father’s
appeal from the superior court’s orders, Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 9; A.R.S. § 12-
2101(A)(1), except to the extent Father appeals the superior court’s
contempt ruling. We lack appellate jurisdiction to review the contempt
ruling because “this court lacks jurisdiction ‘over an appeal from a civil
contempt adjudication.’” Eans-Snoderly v. Snoderly, 249 Ariz. 552, 555 ¶ 8
(App. 2020) (quoting Danielson v. Evans, 201 Ariz. 401, 411 ¶ 35 (App. 2001)).
In our discretion, however, we treat that portion of the appeal as a special
action and accept jurisdiction over it because Father has no adequate
remedy by appeal, the issue is fully briefed and can be resolved on the
existing record, and accepting jurisdiction here aids the efficient
management of this dispute. Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 11(e); Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act.
12(b)(5), (7).

DISCUSSION

The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion or Deprive
Father of Due Process When It Denied Father’s Motion to
Continue.

¶13 Motions to continue are within the superior court’s sound
discretion, and “[w]e will uphold a trial court’s denial of a motion for
continuance absent a clear abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice.”
State v. Barr, 217 Ariz. 445, 447 ¶ 6 (App. 2008). The superior court abuses

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its discretion when its ruling is “manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on
untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.” Quigley v. City of Tucson, 132
Ariz. 35, 37 (App. 1982). The superior court also abuses its discretion when
“the record fails to provide substantial support for its decision.” Files v.
Bernal, 200 Ariz. 64, 65 ¶ 2 (App. 2001). A legal error is necessarily an abuse
of discretion. Voice of Surprise v. Hall, 255 Ariz. 510, 513 ¶ 11 (2023).

¶14 Father argues the court erred and deprived him of due
process by denying his motion to continue. Father repeatedly refers to the
seven-day window between the court granting his counsel’s request to
withdraw and the evidentiary hearing, which he urges deprived him of the
opportunity to be heard in a “meaningful manner.” Mother responds that
Father had at least 44 days’ notice between the day he signed his consent to
counsel’s withdrawal and the date of the evidentiary hearing to either hire
alternate counsel or adequately prepare himself for the hearing. Mother
also points out that Father participated meaningfully in the evidentiary
hearing by testifying, making arguments, cross-examining Mother, and
making objections.

¶15 In related contexts, we have previously held that “[t]he court
did not abuse its discretion in finding that Father’s desire to hire new
counsel was not good cause for a continuance.” In re Z.L., 256 Ariz. 138, 142
¶ 16 (App. 2023); see also Evans v. Lundgren, 11 Ariz. App. 441, 445 (1970)
(where the party requesting a continuance “consented to the withdrawal of
their counsel and had had three months to obtain new counsel . . . the trial
court [did not] in any way abuse[] its discretion by denying the motion for
continuance”).

¶16 Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 34(c) requires the
party requesting the continuance to demonstrate:

(1) the basis for the good cause for a continuance;

(2) when the party learned of the circumstance(s) which
form(s) the basis for the good cause and why the motion was
not or could not have been brought at an earlier date;

(3) the party’s diligence and efforts in attempting to avoid
the circumstance(s) which form(s) the good cause for the
continuance;

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(4) the prejudice which may be caused to either party or
any children at issue in the action by granting the continuance
and by denying the continuance; and

(5) the continuance is sought in good faith and not for
delay or another improper purpose.

Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 34(c).

¶17 The court did not err in denying Father’s motion to continue
based on its findings that Father’s dismissal of his counsel was not good
cause for a continuance, that he likely brought his motion for the purpose
of delay, and that granting the continuance would prejudice the children.
He had more than two months’ notice of the evidentiary hearing and knew
at least 44 days prior to the hearing that he had consented to his counsel’s
withdrawal. Father’s failure to seek a continuance or substitute counsel at
an earlier date shows his lack of diligence and supports the court’s denial
of his motion for a continuance filed just two weeks prior to the evidentiary
hearing. And we attach no weight to Father’s insistence that his consent
was conditioned upon receiving a continuance to obtain substitute counsel,
or that counsel’s withdrawal was predicated on a conflict of interest,
because the record supports neither assertion. See ARCAP 13(A)(7).

¶18 Nor has Father demonstrated any resulting prejudice. The
court’s final order represents a balanced approach, taking both parties’
positions into consideration, largely preserving the parties’ prior joint legal
decision-making arrangement, incorporating stipulations from Father’s
pretrial statement, and lowering Father’s child support obligations. The
court’s reasoning supporting finding Father in contempt and awarding
Mother a portion of her reasonable attorneys’ fees primarily relate to his
conduct while represented by counsel and cannot reasonably be attributed
to the denial of the motion to continue.

¶19 Ultimately, Father had sufficient notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard, which are the primary tenets of due process. See
Huck v. Haralambie, 122 Ariz. 63, 65 (1979). And Father has not shown any
prejudice from the denial of the continuance — meaning he has not shown
the court’s order would have been different.

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CONCLUSION

¶20 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. We grant Mother her
costs as the prevailing party in this appeal, and her request for her
reasonable attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 25-324(A), subject to her
compliance with ARCAP 21.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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