In Re Term of Parental Rights as to S.B.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.B.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0198
FILED 06-03-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD536153
The Honorable Jay M. Polk, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Office of the Public Advocate, Mesa
By Seth Draper
Counsel for Appellant Mother

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Toni Valadez-Kozub, Marika J. Hodge
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.B.
Decision of the Court

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 Jade S. (“Mother”) appeals from the juvenile court’s
December 2025 order terminating her parental rights to Sara (a
pseudonym). The juvenile court also terminated the parental rights of
Sara’s father, Semaj B., by separate order in October 2025, but he did not
challenge the termination and is not a party to this appeal. Because Mother
has not shown the court erred, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 At the time of Sara’s birth, in September 2024, Mother tested
positive for fentanyl, amphetamines, and methadone. The Department of
Child Safety (“DCS”) arranged for Mother to be discharged with Sara under
an in-home safety plan involving another adult supervising her contact
with Sara while Mother participated in substance abuse treatment.

¶3 For the next two months, Mother continued to use substances
and did not meaningfully engage in services. Between September 2024 and
December 2024, Mother drug tested six times, each time positive, including
for fentanyl, amphetamines, cocaine, methadone, and THC. She last tested
in December 2024, missing at least 85 opportunities to test between
September 2024 and August 2025.

¶4 By October 2024, DCS had determined the in-home safety
plan was no longer appropriate, so it removed Sara from Mother’s custody
and petitioned for dependency.

¶5 In December 2024, Mother pleaded no contest to the
dependency petition. The juvenile court adjudicated Sara dependent as to
Mother and approved a case plan of family reunification. DCS continued to
offer Mother reunification services, substance abuse treatment, drug
testing, supervised parenting time, transportation, and case management,
but Mother did not participate in substance abuse treatment with any
provider. She reported to DCS that she intended to enter a detox center but
never did. In March 2025, she began but never finished the intake process
at an inpatient program.

¶6 Mother also mostly ignored the other reunification services,
never responding to outreach efforts to help her with parenting and
housing resources. Her first two referrals for supervised parenting time
were closed because she cancelled or rescheduled visits or did not respond

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.B.
Decision of the Court

to the visit supervisor. On her third referral, in June 2025, she attended some
of the visits but often arrived late or appeared intoxicated.

¶7 In July 2025, the juvenile court changed the case plan to
severance and adoption, and in August, DCS moved to terminate Mother’s
parental rights on substance abuse and six-months out-of-home placement
grounds. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), (8)(b). Two weeks later, Mother was
arrested for possession of methamphetamine and attempting to sell
fentanyl to an undercover police officer. She pleaded guilty to possession
of narcotics and drug paraphernalia in September 2025 and was sentenced
to 180 days in jail with credit for 56 days already served.

¶8 In November 2025, the juvenile court held a contested
termination hearing. That morning, the sheriff’s office filed a disciplinary
report, notifying the court that Mother refused to be transported to the
hearing. After considering this report, the court found Mother failed to
appear without good cause and proceeded in her absence.

¶9 The DCS case manager testified that before her arrest Mother
did not engage in any substance abuse treatment and admitted to using
“the usual stuff,” but noted Mother began virtual visits with Sara in jail and
completed a workbook on substance abuse and relapse prevention. The
case manager also testified that Sara’s foster family was meeting all of her
needs and wanted to adopt her, opining adoption would be in Sara’s best
interests and give her permanency.

¶10 Due to Mother’s recent involvement in services, DCS
withdrew the six months out-of-home placement ground at the hearing.
The court then made findings on the record and concluded that DCS proved
the chronic substance abuse ground by clear and convincing evidence and
that termination was in Sara’s best interests. In December 2025, the court
entered a final order terminating Mother’s parental rights.

¶11 Mother timely appealed. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 603(a)(1)(A). We
have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶12 To terminate a parent-child relationship, the juvenile court
must find by clear and convincing evidence that a statutory ground for
termination exists, see A.R.S. § 8-533(B), and by a preponderance of the
evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests, Brionna J. v. Dep’t
of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 477, ¶ 20 (2023). We will accept the court’s
factual findings if supported by reasonable evidence and inferences and

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.B.
Decision of the Court

affirm the court’s legal conclusions on the statutory ground for termination
unless clearly erroneous. Id. at 478–79, ¶¶ 30–31. We will not reweigh
evidence or reevaluate witness credibility. Maria G. v. Dep’t of Child Safety,
253 Ariz. 364, 366, ¶ 8 (App. 2022).

¶13 Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by
terminating her parental rights because the court’s findings under the
chronic substance abuse ground were not supported by Arizona law or
sufficient evidence. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). She does not challenge the
court’s best interests findings, so we accept it and do not address it further.
Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 13 (2000).

I. The Juvenile Court’s Negative Inference Was Not an Abuse of
Discretion.

¶14 Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by
drawing a negative inference based on her failure to drug test during the
dependency because there was “no evidence or law to support” the court’s
finding.

¶15 We disagree. We previously affirmed juvenile court findings
based in part on implicit negative inferences. In one case, the court
concluded a mother’s drug abuse would continue to impede her parental
ability, citing her refusal to test during the dependency, along with her
failure to engage in services, and other positive drug tests even after the
case plan changed to severance and adoption. Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 287, ¶¶ 20–21 (App. 2016). In another case, the court
concluded a father’s addiction would continue in the future, citing a two
month period in which he did not submit to testing, along with his long
history of substance abuse and failure to complete treatment despite
knowing the case plan would change to severance. See Raymond F. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 379, ¶¶ 27–29 (App. 2010). And we have
explicitly endorsed the practice in three unpublished but persuasive
decisions specifically involving the failure to test. See In re E.V., 1 CA-JV
25-0122, 2026 WL 291092, at *3, ¶ 15 (Ariz. App. Feb. 4, 2026) (mem.
decision); Kara B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 1 CA-JV 21-0001, 2021 WL 2425907,
at *3, ¶ 15 (Ariz. App. June 15, 2021) (mem. decision); Megan M. v. Matthew
M., 1 CA-JV 18-0105, 2018 WL 4208992, at *2, ¶ 10 (Ariz. App. Sept. 4, 2018)
(mem. decision).

¶16 Relying on Melissa W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, Mother argues
no reasonable evidence supports the negative inference because she did not
refuse her last 18 drug tests but was incapable of testing due to her

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Decision of the Court

incarceration. 238 Ariz. 115, 117, ¶ 6 (App. 2015) (adverse inference is
proper when parent is in control of her participation but refuses to testify).
But Mother missed 85 drug tests between the start of the in-home safety
plan in September 2024 and her arrest in August 2025—evidence that
adequately supports the juvenile court’s findings. And the court only
considered her pre-arrest failure to test, observing Mother “failed to
meaningfully engage in services aimed at remedying her substance abuse”
during “the ten months prior to Mother’s current incarceration.” Because
the court’s negative inference is supported by reasonable evidence, the
court did not abuse its discretion. See Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478, ¶ 30.

II. Reasonable Evidence and Inferences Support the Juvenile Court’s
Findings Under the Substance Abuse Ground.

¶17 To terminate parental rights under the chronic substance
abuse ground, A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), DCS must present clear and convincing
evidence that (1) a parent has a “history of chronic abuse of controlled
substances,” (2) a parent cannot discharge parental responsibilities because
of his or her chronic substance abuse, and (3) “there are reasonable grounds
to believe that the [parent’s] condition will continue for a prolonged and
indeterminate period,” Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 377, ¶ 15. Mother only
challenges the juvenile court’s findings as to the third prong. She contends
that absent the negative inference, the court’s decision “would have gone
the other way” because of insufficient supporting evidence.

¶18 We disagree. The negative inference was significant but not
outcome determinative. It helped to establish Mother used substances in
the 10 months leading up to her incarceration. But the record contains
ample other evidence to support this finding. Mother tested positive for
substances at Sara’s birth and early in the dependency proceedings and
admitted to a probation officer that she was “using cocaine monthly and
methamphetamine and fentanyl daily leading up to her arrest.” So the
juvenile court could have reached the same conclusion without addressing
Mother’s failure to test.

¶19 Mother finally argues the juvenile court erred by finding her
engagement in services while incarcerated was “too little, too late” because
she was “fully engaged in services within a year.” She insists DCS must
prove a parent failed to engage in services for “a period of years” before a
juvenile court can make such finding.

¶20 To decide whether the parent’s substance abuse will continue
for a prolonged indeterminate period, the juvenile court must consider

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Decision of the Court

evidence of a parent’s history of drug use and failure to engage in services.
Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 378, ¶ 25; Jennifer S., 240 Ariz. at 287–88, ¶¶ 21, 25.
A parent’s failure to abstain from substances despite awareness of pending
termination proceedings is “evidence [the parent] has not overcome [the]
dependence on drugs and alcohol.” Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 379, ¶ 29. And
when a parent “has been unable to rise above the addiction and experience
sustained sobriety in a noncustodial setting, and establish the essential
support system to maintain sobriety, there is little hope of success in
parenting.” Id. at 378, ¶ 25.

¶21 The juvenile court rightly commended Mother for beginning
to engage in services while incarcerated but deemed the efforts “too little,
too late” because “[d]emonstrating sobriety in a controlled environment
such as a jail is vastly different than demonstrating sobriety outside of a
controlled environment.” The court also found her arrest “particularly
significant” because Mother abused substances knowing that DCS had
custody of Sara for about 10 months and had just moved to terminate her
parental rights. The court concluded that “[g]iven the at least nine years
that Mother has abused substances, her abuse during the duration of the
case, including the more recent use in August 2025, there are reasonable
grounds to believe her condition will continue for a prolonged
indeterminate period of time.” Mother’s prior convictions on
substance-related charges in Indiana back in 2016, her failure to
demonstrate any sobriety before her incarceration, her failure to participate
in treatment, and her arrest on drug charges two weeks after DCS moved
to terminate her parental rights support the court’s findings.

¶22 In the termination order, the juvenile court relied on In re
Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501568 to find Mother’s participation in
services was “too little, too late.” 177 Ariz. 571, 577 (App. 1994). DCS
concedes that case related to the withdrawn out-of-home placement
ground, not the chronic substance abuse ground. The court’s findings as to
the out-of-home placement ground were superfluous, but not an abuse of
discretion because the court supported its chronic substance abuse
determination with other detailed findings. Because all of the court’s
findings were supported by reasonable evidence, we find no error. See
Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478–79, ¶¶ 30–31.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.B.
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶23 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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