Quintana v. Urbanek

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

ERICK QUINTANA, a single man, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

JAIME URBANEK, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0564
FILED 06-16-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. S1300CV202500744
The Honorable Tina R. Ainley, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

COUNSEL

Prescott Law Group, PLC, Prescott
By J. Andrew Jolley
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Jaime Urbanek, Cordes Lakes
Defendant/Appellant
QUINTANA v. URBANEK
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Jaime Urbanek (“Tenant”) appeals the superior court’s
judgment finding her guilty of forcible detainer and awarding immediate
possession of the real property at issue to Erick Quintana (“Owner”). For
the following reasons, we vacate the judgment and remand with
instructions to dismiss the forcible entry and detainer (“FED”) complaint.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In March 2022, Owner sold certain real property in Mayer to
a third party and secured the sale with a deed of trust. The purchasing third
party then executed a three-year lease agreement with Tenant, which began
in January 2023. In April 2025, after defaulting on his payments to Owner,
the third party signed a deed in lieu of foreclosure, conveying the property
back to Owner.

¶3 That same month, Tenant received two notices to vacate.
Owner first gave Tenant an oral notice on April 9, instructing her to vacate
the property by the following day. A few days later, Owner sent a written
notice to vacate within five days. Owner’s counsel then sent a third notice
on June 10, informing Tenant that her tenancy would end 30 days later on
July 11.

¶4 Tenant did not vacate the property, responding that the term
of her lease had not yet expired and she was not in default of its terms.
Owner filed an eviction action and alleged Tenant was guilty of forcible
detainer pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Section 12-1173.
The court held a hearing two weeks later and found Tenant guilty of
forcible detainer, concluded Owner had the right to immediate possession
of the property, and awarded Owner $1,905 in fees and costs.

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QUINTANA v. URBANEK
Decision of the Court

¶5 Tenant timely appealed, but we dismissed her appeal in
December 2025 because she failed to file an opening brief. Tenant then filed
a motion for reconsideration and a motion for leave to file her opening brief,
which we granted. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. Sections
12-120.21(A)(1) and -1182(A).

DISCUSSION

¶6 Preliminarily, we note Tenant’s lease ended in January 2026.
So regardless of the outcome of this appeal, she would no longer have a
lease and would not occupy the property. When a tenant no longer occupies
the property at issue in an eviction action, the issue of mootness arises.
Thompson v. Harris, 9 Ariz. App. 341, 344 (1969). Nevertheless, we “may
consider a moot issue where the collateral consequences of the order ‘will
continue to affect a party.’” Novak v. Novak, No. 1 CA-CV 21-0481, 2022 WL
2981764, at *2 ¶ 6 (Ariz. App. July 28, 2022) (mem. decision) (quoting
Cardoso v. Soldo, 230 Ariz. 614, 617 ¶ 9 (App. 2012)). As in Novak, “[b]ecause
the consequences of eviction will continue to affect [Tenant], the issue is not
moot.” Id. Thus, we address the merits of Tenant’s appeal.

¶7 Tenant raises several arguments, contending the court erred
in finding her guilty of forcible detainer. We address only Tenant’s
argument regarding her lease. Because we vacate the judgment and remand
on that issue, we need not address Tenant’s remaining arguments.

¶8 “[A] forcible detainer action is a summary, speedy and
adequate statutory remedy for obtaining possession of premises by one
entitled to actual possession.” Casa Grande Tr. Co. v. Superior Ct. In and For
Pinal Cnty., 8 Ariz. App. 163, 165 (App. 1968). As such, “the only issue shall
be the right of actual possession and the merits of title shall not be inquired
into.” A.R.S. § 12-1177(A); see also Montano v. Luff, 250 Ariz. 401, 405 ¶ 12
(App. 2020). Further, a defendant may not submit any counterclaims but
“may assert only legal defenses to a plaintiff’s claim of right of immediate
possession.” Colonial Tri-City Ltd. P’ship v. Ben Franklin Stores, Inc., 179 Ariz.
428, 433 (App. 1993).

¶9 Tenant argues the court erred by treating Owner’s acquisition
of the property as a foreclosure and finding her lease was not binding on
Owner. Inasmuch as Tenant raises genuine disputes that make this FED
action inappropriate for resolving the issue of possession, we agree.

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QUINTANA v. URBANEK
Decision of the Court

¶10 We have long recognized that a property owner cannot
convey to another greater rights than what the owner possesses at the time
of conveyance. See, e.g., Simpson v. Shaw, 71 Ariz. 293, 297 (1951) (“[A]n
individual can convey no better title to an item of property than that which
he himself possesses . . . .”); SWC Baseline & Crismon Invs, L.L.C. v. Augusta
Ranch Ltd. P’ship, 228 Ariz. 271, 280 ¶ 29 (App. 2011) (“A quit claim deed
conveys to the grantee no greater rights to the property conveyed than the
grantor possessed . . . .”).

¶11 Further, when a landlord leases property, the tenant receives
“the right of the grantor to the exclusive possession of the leased property.”
Genardini v. Kline, 19 Ariz. 558, 561 (1918); see also Klimkowski v. De La Torre,
175 Ariz. 340, 342 (App. 1993) (“[P]roperty law regards a lease as equivalent
to a sale of the premises for the term of the lease, making the tenant both
owner and occupier during the lease.”). The landlord is then left with “a
remainder [interest] commencing on the termination of the lease.”
Genardini, 19 Ariz. at 561. Alternatively, a tenant may lose the right of
possession before the lease term expires if they are materially noncompliant
with the lease agreement. A.R.S. § 33-1368(A). But when a landlord sells
property with an existing lease and a compliant tenant, the landlord cannot
convey the right of immediate possession because that right remains with
the tenant. See Genardini, 19 Ariz. at 561.

¶12 To visualize this principle, “[a] common idiom describes
property as a ‘bundle of sticks’—a collection of individual rights which, in
certain combinations, constitute property.” United States v. Craft, 535 U.S.
274, 278 (2002). As relevant to this case, if a landlord bestows the “stick”
representing the right to immediate possession to a tenant, then while that
tenant validly holds that stick, the landlord cannot pass that same stick to
anyone else. To be able to pass the right of immediate possession to another,
the landlord would first need to reacquire the “stick” of possession from
the tenant who holds it.

¶13 Here, the existence of Tenant’s lease agreement was
undisputed. But the court failed to acknowledge Tenant’s arguments
concerning her right of possession under that lease agreement. Instead, it
noted that Owner had not signed the lease, determined that the lease was
not binding upon him, and held that the third party’s conveyance via the
deed in lieu of foreclosure conferred on Owner the right of possession.

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QUINTANA v. URBANEK
Decision of the Court

But if Tenant’s lease was valid and Tenant was not in default, and assuming
the deed in lieu of foreclosure constitutes a normal conveyance rather than
a foreclosure that would have abrogated Tenant’s right of immediate
possession, a genuine dispute arises as to whether that deed could transfer
to Owner any right of possession, such having been allegedly transferred
to Tenant by the third party before the issuance of the deed in lieu.
Genardini, 19 Ariz. at 561.

¶14 Owner contends Tenant’s lease did “not automatically
translate into a right to possess . . . once the superior court determined the
lease did not bind him.” But this argument misses the cardinal point. The
court’s determination as to binding effect of the lease is tantamount to
resolving validity of the lease itself, including questions of privity,
succession, and even dimensions of title and maybe foreclosure. Such issues
are outside the scope of a forcible detainer proceeding. United Effort Plan Tr.
v. Holm, 209 Ariz. 347, 350–51 ¶ 21 (App. 2004) (noting forcible detainer
action “is not a vehicle to decide whether the parties have a landlord-tenant
relationship or were under a lease agreement”).

¶15 Owner’s request that we affirm, and thus decide the validity
and enforceability of the lease, highlights the problem with the judgment.
The validity of Tenant’s lease, and the derivative questions of (1) Tenant’s
compliance with that lease, (2) the authority of the third party to transfer a
right of possession in view of that lease, and (3) whether the lease is even
binding upon Owner, all raise threshold issues that cannot be resolved in a
summary forcible detainer action. See id. (“A real dispute regarding a
landlord-tenant relationship must be tried in an ‘ordinary civil action, in
which time periods are not accelerated, counter- and cross claims are
allowed, and there is an opportunity for discovery.’” (quoting RREEF
Mgmt. Co. v. Camex Prods., Inc., 190 Ariz. 75, 79 (App. 1997), superseded in
part by, A.R.S. § 33-1315(A)(2)).

¶16 Here, Tenant presented undisputed evidence squarely
placing those very issues into contest. When confronted by such
unresolved, yet critical, threshold issues within a forcible detainer case, the
court errs by not dismissing the FED complaint. See id. (“[T]he only
appropriate judgment is the dismissal of the complaint or the grant of
possession to the plaintiff.”); McGrew v. Brunet, No. 1 CA-CV 25-0315, 2026
WL 90070, at *2–3 ¶¶ 11–16 (Ariz. App. Jan. 12, 2026) (mem. decision)
(finding trial court erred by not dismissing FED complaint where a genuine
dispute between the parties regarding effect of a purported lease agreement
needed to be resolved in general civil action first).

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QUINTANA v. URBANEK
Decision of the Court

¶17 Because this case presents genuine disputes that are beyond
the scope of a forcible detainer action, the court erred in entering a
judgment of guilt against Tenant instead of dismissing Owner’s FED
complaint.

CONCLUSION

¶18 We vacate the court’s judgment and remand with instructions
for the court to dismiss Owner’s FED complaint.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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