State v. Bonds

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

PRIDE RAYMOND BONDS, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0124
FILED 06-24-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. P1300CR202000405
The Honorable Michael P. McGill, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By Celeste Kinney
Counsel for Appellee

Zickerman Law Office, Flagstaff
By Adam Zickerman
Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. BONDS
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Pride Raymond Bonds ("Bonds") appeals his convictions for
possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia.
We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In February 2020, a narcotics officer obtained a search warrant
and placed a GPS tracker on Bonds' truck because officers suspected he
participated in drug crimes. About a week later, the GPS tracker indicated
Bonds had visited locations in Phoenix and Glendale and was returning
North on Interstate 17 into Yavapai County. The narcotics officer contacted
two sheriff deputies patrolling in the area and asked them to attempt to stop
Bonds' truck.

¶3 The deputies responded and saw Bonds' truck cross the
shoulder line on the right side of the road by about a foot. The deputies
stopped Bonds' truck after they saw the truck cross the shoulder line again
about a quarter mile later.

¶4 A deputy approached the truck from the passenger side and
identified Bonds as the driver. The deputy took Bonds' information and
asked him to step out of the truck. Bonds walked to the deputy's car and
sat on the guardrail while the deputy examined his driver's license and
other paperwork. The deputy asked Bonds if he had anything illegal in his
truck, which Bonds denied. Then the deputy immediately asked Bonds if
he had anything illegal on his person. Bonds replied "Nope, sure isn't. Help
yourself." The deputy asked if Bonds was consenting to a search and Bonds
agreed. The deputy then told the narcotics officer that Bonds consented to
a search and the officer told the deputy to wait for a drug-sniffing dog.
While they waited, Bonds asked the deputies "What seems to be the
problem?" Bonds did not object when the deputy said they were waiting
for a drug-sniffing dog. The deputy also searched Bonds and found
nothing on his person. While they waited, Bonds asked for permission to

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STATE v. BONDS
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smoke and asked the deputy to get cigarettes and a lighter from Bonds'
truck.

¶5 The dog arrived about 21 minutes after the deputy spoke to
the narcotics officer. The dog handler led the dog around the truck, and the
dog stuck its head through an open window. The dog gave an alert,
indicating the presence of drugs. The deputies moved Bonds' truck to a
nearby parking lot and searched it, finding a bag of methamphetamine.
After impounding the truck, police also found an empty syringe.

¶6 The State indicted Bonds for sale or transportation of a
dangerous drug and possession of drug paraphernalia. Bonds moved to
suppress the evidence seized from his truck, arguing that the deputies
illegally stopped Bonds' truck and held him longer than necessary to
complete a traffic stop. In March 2023, the superior court held a hearing
and denied the motion to suppress, finding the deputies had reasonable
suspicion to stop Bonds and that after the stop, Bonds consented to a search
and never revoked his consent.

¶7 Bonds filed a second motion to suppress, arguing that the
drug-sniffing dog putting its head through the window of Bonds' truck
constituted an illegal search. After a hearing, the court denied the second
motion, finding both that Bonds consented to any search and that the dog
momentarily putting its head through the window was not a search. Bonds
then filed a third motion to suppress, arguing he never gave consent for a
search of his truck. After a hearing, the court denied the third motion.

¶8 Trial began in May 2024. Just before the start of trial, the State
requested to change the wording of the preliminary jury instructions to
remove references to the sale of dangerous drugs, because the State only
intended to prove Bonds transferred dangerous drugs. Bonds agreed to the
change, provided the State would not deviate from its transfer theory
during the trial.

¶9 At trial, the State called the police officers involved in the
traffic stop and search of Bonds' truck. The State also presented body
camera footage from the officers and introduced the seized
methamphetamine and syringe as evidence. At the close of the State's case,
Bonds moved for acquittal under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure
("Rule") 20. The superior court denied Bonds' motion for acquittal on the
possession of drug paraphernalia charge but granted the motion for
acquittal on the transfer of methamphetamine charge. The superior court
stated that although the State had not proven transfer of

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methamphetamine, the jury could consider possession of
methamphetamine as a lesser included offense. Bonds objected, arguing
that permitting the jury to consider possession violated the agreement that
the State would not deviate from its transfer of methamphetamine theory.
The superior court overruled the objection. Bonds rested his case and the
jury began deliberating. The jury found Bonds guilty of possession of
methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia.

¶10 After the verdict, Bonds moved for acquittal or a new trial
under Rule 20, arguing the jury should not have been allowed to consider
possession of methamphetamine as a lesser included offense of transfer of
methamphetamine. The superior court denied Bonds' motion. Bonds
appeals his convictions, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-
120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶11 Bonds argues the superior court erred by denying his motions
to suppress and by allowing the jury to consider the lesser-included offense
of possession of methamphetamine. We review the denial of a motion to
suppress for an abuse of discretion. State v. Angulo-Chavez, 247 Ariz. 255,
258, ¶ 6 (App. 2019). We "consider only the evidence presented at the
suppression hearing[] and view the evidence in a light most favorable to
sustaining the ruling." Id. We review amending an indictment for abuse of
discretion. State v. Buccheri-Bianca, 233 Ariz. 324, 329, ¶ 16 (App. 2013). We
will affirm a discretionary ruling of the superior court "if it is legally correct
for any reason." State v. Leyva, 241 Ariz. 521, 524, ¶ 6 (App. 2017).

I. The First Suppression Motion.

A. Basis for Traffic Stop.

¶12 A "person shall drive a vehicle as nearly as practicable entirely
within a single lane and shall not move the vehicle from that lane until the
driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made with safety."
A.R.S. § 28-729(A)(1). Law enforcement "may stop and detain a person as
is reasonably necessary to investigate an actual or suspected [traffic]
violation . . . ." A.R.S. § 28-1594. Under the Fourth Amendment, a law
enforcement officer must possess a reasonable suspicion that a traffic
violation has occurred to initiate a traffic stop. State v. Majalca, 251 Ariz.
325, 328, ¶ 12 (App. 2021). "An officer who has observed a traffic violation
has reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop." Id.

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STATE v. BONDS
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¶13 Bonds argues the deputies lacked a lawful basis to stop his
truck. He asserts that under State v. Livingston, crossing the shoulder line a
couple of times is not enough to justify a traffic stop. 206 Ariz. 145, 148,
¶ 10 (App. 2003). In Livingston, a police officer stopped a driver because her
right-side tires crossed the shoulder line once. Id. at 147, ¶ 4. The officer
noted that this happened on a "rural, curved, and dangerous" section of
road, that the driver did not "'jerk[]' her vehicle or over-correct" after
crossing the shoulder line, and that the deviation did not affect other traffic.
Id. at ¶ 5. This Court affirmed the superior court's finding that the officer
lacked a reasonable basis for a stop because the driver had not committed
a traffic violation. Id. at 148, ¶ 12.

¶14 This case is distinguishable from Livingston. In Livingston, the
Court concluded that an "alleged isolated and minor breach of the shoulder
line" did not constitute a traffic violation when the driver "otherwise drove
safely on a dangerous, curved road." Id. Here, Bonds' departure from his
lane occurred on an interstate, not a rural road. And the deputy testified
that the road where Bonds crossed the shoulder line was straight, not
curved and dangerous. Further, Bonds crossed the lane line twice. Unlike
the "isolated and minor breach of the shoulder line" in Livingston, id., Bonds'
repeated crossing of the shoulder line constituted a "continued violation of
the statute," State v. Alvarez-Soto, --- Ariz. ---, ---, ¶ 21, 579 P.3d 1227, 1232
(2025). The superior court did not abuse its discretion by concluding the
deputies legally stopped Bonds.

B. Length of Traffic Stop.

¶15 The duration of a traffic stop may not extend past the time
necessary to "effectuate the purpose of the traffic stop or any related safety
concerns." Angulo-Chavez, 247 Ariz. at 258, ¶ 7. Once the original purpose
of the traffic stop is complete, the law enforcement officer must allow the
driver to leave unless the encounter becomes consensual, or the officer
develops a reasonable suspicion the driver is engaged in illegal activity. Id.
An encounter is consensual, not a seizure, if, under the circumstances, a
reasonable person would believe he was free to leave. See State v. Gonzalez,
235 Ariz. 212, 214, ¶ 8 (App. 2014) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).

¶16 Bonds argues the deputies unlawfully prolonged the traffic
stop without his consent and without reasonable suspicion that he was
engaged in criminal activity. The superior court dismissed this argument,
finding the prolonged stop was a consensual encounter. We agree.

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STATE v. BONDS
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¶17 Bonds argues on appeal that he did not give consent, as
"[e]videnced by [Bonds'] brief answers to officer questions, failure to initiate
conversation, inquiry into what problem was prolonging the stop, and
expression that he was on his way to pick up his son in Prescott." But Bonds
never asked to leave. And the superior court watched the body camera
footage and noted that Bonds appeared "comfortable" during the stop and
"offer[ed] up information when asked freely," suggesting he consented to
the stop. We must defer to the superior court's assessment of video
evidence, Alvarez-Soto, 579 P.3d at 1234, ¶¶ 32-34, witness credibility, and
conflicting testimony, Angulo-Chavez, 247 Ariz. at 259, ¶ 10. The superior
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the stop became a
consensual encounter after Bonds agreed to allow a search.

II. The Second and Third Suppression Motions.

¶18 The Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement officers to
obtain a warrant before conducting a search, "unless one of a few
well-established exceptions applies." State v. Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. 299, 302,
¶ 10 (2016). Consent is an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement. Id. at ¶ 11. "The state must prove voluntary consent by a
preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 302–03, ¶ 11. "A general consent to
search is unqualified, absent any announcement of the object of the search
or other express limitation, subject only to the bounds of reasonableness."
State v. Becerra, 239 Ariz. 90, 92, ¶ 9 (App. 2016).

¶19 Bonds moved to suppress the evidence seized at the traffic
stop twice more. Both motions dealt with whether the deputies illegally
searched Bonds' truck. In the second motion, Bonds argued the dog putting
its head through the window of the truck constituted an illegal search. The
superior court denied the motion, finding both that Bonds consented and
that the dog momentarily putting its head through the window did not
constitute a search. In the third suppression motion, Bonds argued the
deputies did not have Bonds' consent to search his truck. The superior court
disagreed and denied the motion to suppress. We find no abuse of
discretion.

¶20 We defer to the superior court's factual findings when they
are supported by the record. Alvarez-Soto, 579 P.3d at 1234, ¶ 31. The record
here supports the superior court's finding that Bonds consented to the
search of his truck. Bonds told the deputy he did not have anything illegal
in his truck or on his person, and that the deputy could "help [him]self."
The deputy confirmed Bonds was consenting to a search. Bonds suggests
he only consented to a search of his person and not his truck, but Bonds

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STATE v. BONDS
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never specified any limit on the consent he gave to the deputy. And when
Bonds asked the deputy "what seems to be the problem," the deputy
explained they were waiting for a drug-sniffing dog to check his truck.
Bonds did not object or tell the deputy he had not consented to a search of
the truck. And after the deputy searched his person, Bonds continued to
wait with the deputies and never asked to leave. Instead, while waiting for
the dog, Bonds asked the deputy to get his cigarettes from the truck and
had no problem with the deputy going through his truck to find them. All
of this supports the superior court's conclusion that Bonds voluntarily
consented to a search of his truck. The superior court did not abuse its
discretion by denying the second and third motions to suppress.

III. Amendment of the Charges.

¶21 Bonds argues the superior court abused its discretion by
allowing the jury to consider whether Bonds was guilty of possession of
methamphetamine after the superior court granted Bonds' Rule 20 motion
on transfer of methamphetamine. A charge may only be amended absent a
defendant's consent "to correct mistakes of fact or remedy formal or
technical defects." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.5(b). "An amendment corrects a
formal or technical defect, and is therefore permissible, if it does not change
'the nature of the offense charged or prejudice[ ] the defendant in any way.'"
State v. Fimbres, 222 Ariz. 293, 303, ¶ 38 (App. 2009) (quoting State v. Sanders,
205 Ariz. 208, 214, ¶ 19 (App. 2003), abrogated by State v. Freeney, 223 Ariz.
110, (2009)). The superior court's amendment here neither changed the
nature of the offense nor prejudiced the defendant. "An offense specified
in an indictment, information, or complaint is a charge of that offense and
all necessarily included offenses." Ariz. R. Crim P. 13.1(e). Possession of
methamphetamine is a lesser included offense of transfer of
methamphetamine. See State v. Cheramie, 218 Ariz. 447, 449, ¶ 22 (2008). In
Cheramie, our supreme court explained that "one cannot transport drugs
without possessing them." Id. at 449, ¶ 12. Similarly, one cannot transfer
drugs without possessing them. Under Rule 13.1(e), "the defendant is on
notice from the beginning of the proceedings against him that the jury may
be asked to consider any lesser included offenses supported by the trial
evidence." State v. Gipson, 229 Ariz. 484, 487, ¶ 14 (2012). Bonds argues that
his agreement with the State before trial that the State would only present
evidence to support a theory that Bonds transferred the drugs and not that
Bonds sold the drugs precluded consideration of the lesser included
offense. But the State's agreed transfer theory still required possession, so
his argument is unavailing.

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STATE v. BONDS
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¶22 Additionally, the superior court properly instructed the jury
on possession. Under Rule 21.4, "[o]n request by any party and if supported
by the evidence, the court must submit forms of verdicts to the jury for . . .
all offenses necessarily included in the offense charged." Ariz. R. Crim. P.
21.4(a)(1). The State asked for a lesser included offense instruction on
possession in its requested jury instructions. Bonds argues that the superior
court could not give this instruction, however, because after the superior
court granted his Rule 20 motion, sale or transportation of
methamphetamine ceased to be a charged offense. But Bonds offers no
authority for this contention. Bonds has shown no abuse of discretion in
allowing the jury to consider the lesser included offense of possession of
methamphetamine.

CONCLUSION

¶23 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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