Antelope Valley College Federation of Teachers (Stryker) (PERB 1624E)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
SALLIE STRYKER,
Charging Party,
V.
ANTELOPE VALLEY COLLEGE FEDERATION
OF TEACHERS,
Respondent.
Case No. LA-CO-1135-E
PERB Decision No. 	1624
April 	28, 	2004
Appearance: Sallie Stryker, on her own behalf.
Before Duncan, Chairman; Whitehead and Neima, Members.
DECISION
WHITEHEAD, Member: This case is before the Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB or Board) on appeal by Sallie Stryker (Stryker) of a Board agent's dismissal. The
charge alleged that the Antelope Valley College Federation of Teachers (Federation) violated
the Educational Employment Relations Act (BERA) 1 by removing Stryker from the negotiating
team because of personal conflict with the Federation's chief negotiator in violation of the
Federation's internal process. 	Stryker further alleges that the Federation's conduct was
discriminatory and retaliatory. 	Stryker alleged that this conduct constituted a violation of
EERA section 3543.6(b).
The Board's recent decision in California State Employees Association (Barker &
Osuna) (2003) PERB Decision No. 1551-S (CSEA), issued the same date as the dismissal
letter, is determinative of portions of this case. Upon review of the record and in light of our
1EERA is codified at Government Code section 3540 et seq. Unless otherwise
indicated, all statutory references herein are to the Government Code.

decision in CSEA, the Board affirms the Board agent's dismissal consistent with the discussion
below.
BACKGROUND
According to the charge, as amended, Stryker has been employed as an adjunct
professor of sociology at Antelope Valley College (College) since 1992. On October 22, 2002,
Stryker received a letter from Federation President Susan Lowry that the Federation's
executive council had voted 4 	1 to remove Stryker from the negotiating team. The
Federation pays negotiating team members for their participation. Stryker alleges that these
events were precipitated by the chief negotiator's threat to resign because of alleged insults by
Stryker. Stryker denies ever making the alleged comments and thus contends that she was
unjustly removed from the team.
The Federation's bylaws contain an internal dispute resolution procedure. 2 Stryker
alleges that the Federation's failure to follow this provision in its bylaws denied her
constitutional right to due process. She later amended her charge to allege, instead of denial of
due process, that the Federation had not established reasonable provisions for dismissal of
individuals from negotiating teams. She acknowledges that Section 5 of the Federation's
bylaws covers an internal union matter. Stryker argues, however, that the term membership in
2Section 5 of the Federation's bylaws, entitled Federation Review Panels, provides in
pertinent part:
The Executive Council hereby establishes a procedure for
selecting an arbitration panel to settle internal [Federation]
disputes. This panel shall be available to hear complaints from
member(s) concerning action by the Federation which the
member(s) alleges adversely affects his/her status or rights as a
member of AFT or of the bargaining unit. The complainant must
exhaust all remedies provided in the constitution and bylaws of
the Federation before bringing a matter to the Federation Internal
Review Panel.
2

EERA section 3543. l(a) should be applied more broadly to cover various types
of
membership, including membership on the negotiating team and so should apply here.
Stryker also alleges that the Federation has discriminated against her for her efforts to
advance programs benefiting minority teachers. She claims that the College violated the 60
percent rule, and when she complained, the Federation would not pursue her claim.3
She
alleges that few minorities teach at the College or are in the Federation and the American
Federation
of
Teachers (AFT) leadership, and that the Federation and AFT do not assist in
promoting an increased presence
of
permanent minority faculty at the College.
Stryker alleges that her removal from the team further violated Section 3543 .6(b)
by
interfering with her right to meet and negotiate with her employer and discriminating against
her for reasons which are very confused. 	She alleges that the chief negotiator, with
whom
she
had the dispute, was not removed from the negotiating team, and so Stryker was treated
differently from her. 	She further alleges that her removal from the team affects the employer-
employee relationship since she is an excellent negotiator and her removal occurred in the
middle
of
negotiations with the College. She again asserts that she was not afforded due
process by the Federation, that State agencies are subject to the federal and State constitutions,
and therefore, PERB has jurisdiction over her due process claim.
Stryker finally contends that she is filing this charge against the Federation as both a
member and an employee and thus alleges violations
of
both EERA sections 3543.l(a) and
3543.6(b).
In the dismissal, the Board agent found that Stryker did not state a prima facie case for
discrimination/retaliation since her removal from the negotiating team was an internal union
3Stryker explains the 60 percent rule as a requirement that part-time faculty who work
more than 60 percent time for 3 semesters must be placed in a permanent position.
3

matter and Stryker has provided no facts showing a substantial impact on the employer-
employee relationship so as to render the allegation within the purview
of
the Board. The
Board agent also found that Stryker failed to state a prima facie violation
of
EERA section
3543. l(a). The Board agent further dismissed Stryker's allegation that she was denied the
right to meet and confer with her employer since, under EERA, that right is afforded only to
employee organizations, not to individuals, and therefore, Stryker lacks standing to assert that
right. Finally, the Board agent dismissed the allegations that Stryker was denied her
constitutional right to due process and that Stryker was the victim
of
racial discrimination. The
Board agent explained that the Board lacks jurisdiction over such alleged violations.
DISCUSSION
Stryker did not appeal the Board agent's determination regarding her claim
of
discrimination based upon her protected conduct but instead focused her appeal on
discrimination based upon race. 4 The Board agent is correct that race and race discrimination
do not hold protected status under EERA. (California School Employees Association,
Chapter 245 (Waymire) (2001) PERB Decision No. 1448.) Rather, EERA protects the rights
of
employees "to form, join, and participate in the activities
of
employee organizations
of
their
own choosing for the purpose
of
representation on all matters
of
employer-employee
relations." (EERA sec. 3543.) EERA therefore does not protect against race-based
discrimination; and consequently, the Board lacks authority to decide these issues.
Stryker also argues that the Federation unlawfully removed her from its negotiating
team in violation
of
EERA section 3543. l(a). In so doing, she alleged that the Federation
violated EERA section 3543.6(b) by interfering with her protected rights. The Board recently
4As Stryker has not appealed the claim of discrimination under EERA, the Board will
affirm the dismissal of that claim but declines to adopt the Board agent's analysis.
4

ruled on similar facts and statutes in CSEA. In CSEA, the charging parties alleged that the
Association unlawfully removed them
as
chairpersons
of
their respective bargaining unit
negotiating councils (BUNC) in violation
of
the Ralph
C.
Dills Act (Dills Act) sections 3515.5
and 3519.5(b)5, provisions parallel to those allegedly violated in this matter. The Board held
that the Association did not violate Section 3515
.5
in that removal from membership
of
the
BUNC differed from suspension or dismissal from membership in the employee organization,
which is the essence
of
a violation
of
Section 3515.5. As a result, the Board also rejected the
charging parties' claim for interference with protected rights under Section 3519.5(b). In
CSEA, the Board confirmed its reluctance to interfere in the internal affairs
of
employee
organizations unless there was a showing
of
impact on the employer-employee relationship and
found no such showing in that case.
Applying CSEA to the instant matter, Stryker was removed from the negotiating team,
not from membership in the Federation. Therefore, she has not alleged a violation
of
Section
3543.l(a), and consequently, interference with protected rights under Section 3543.6(b).
Stryker however argues that her removal from the negotiating team had an impact on the
employer-employee relationship in that she no longer could meet and confer with the
employer. Under Board precedent, Stryker lacks standing to assert the right to meet and confer
with the public school employer as that right is solely afforded to employee organizations.
(Oxnard School District (Gorcey/Tripp) (1988) PERB Decision No. 667; State
of
California
(Department
of
Corrections) (1993) PERB Decision No. 972-S.) We also find that Stryker did
not allege specific facts to show that the remainder of the team was unable to represent adjunct
professors without her participation.
5The Dills Act is codified at Government Code section 3512, et seq.
5

One item not addressed by the Board agent in the dismissal was Stryker' s allegation
that since she was paid as a member of the negotiating team, she was filing the unfair practice
charge not only as a member of the Federation, but as a Federation employee. Public school
employer is defined under Section 3540. l(k) as:
[t]he governing board of a school district, a school district, a
county board of education, a county superintendent of schools, or
a charter school that has declared itself a public school employer
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 47611.5 of the Education
Code.
Under EERA section 3540. l(j), public school employee is defined as "any person employed by
a public school employer .... " Under PERB Regulation 32602,6 an unfair practice charge
may only be filed by an employee, employee organization, or employer against an employee
organization or employer. The Board thus lacks authority to adjudicate disputes against the
employee organization in its role as employer. The charge against the Federation in its role as
employer should thereby be dismissed.
In light of the above, we find that Stryker has failed to state a prima facie violation of
EERA and affirm the Board agent's dismissal consistent with the above discussion.
ORDER
The unfair practice charge in Case No. LA-CO-1135-E is hereby DISMISSED
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
Chairman Duncan and Member Neima joined in this Decision.
6PERB regulations are codified at California Code of Regulations, title 8, section
3 1001, et seq.
6