Mount Diablo Education Association (Scott) (PERB 2127E)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
DOUGLAS W. SCOTT,
Charging Party,
v.
MOUNT DIABLO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
Respondent.
Case No. SF-CO-722-E
PERB Decision No. 2127
August 17, 2010
Appearances: Douglas W. Scott, on his own behalf; California Teachers Association by
Ballinger G. Kemp, Attorney, for Mount Diablo Education Association.
Before Dowdin Calvillo, Chair; McKeag and Wesley, Members.
DECISION
DOWDIN CALVILLO, Chair: This case is before the Public Employment Relations
Board (PERB or Board) on exceptions filed by Douglas W. Scott (Scott) to the proposed
decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ). The complaint issued by PERB' s Office of the
General Counsel alleged that the Mount Diablo Education Association (Association) breached
its duty of fair representation by failing to take various actions on Scott's behalf. The ALJ
dismissed the complaint after an evidentiary hearing, finding that neither the Association's
individual failures to act nor the totality of its conduct constituted a breach of the duty of fair
representation.
The Board has reviewed the proposed decision and the record in light of Scott's
exceptions, the Association's response, and the relevant law. Based on this review, the Board
affirms the ALJ 's dismissal of the complaint for the reasons discussed below.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Scott is a science teacher at College Park High School in the Mount Diablo Unified
School District (District). Scott has taught in the District continuously since 1991.
Mark York (York) has been the executive director of the Association since 2002. 	In
2003, York authored an Association flyer that informed unit members of their right to union
representation in meetings with management that could result in discipline. The flyer pointed
out that the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Association and the District
requires that a unit member receive a copy of a written complaint against the member before
attending a meeting about the complaint. 1 The flyer also stated that if a District administrator
requires a unit member to attend a meeting without providing the written complaint, the unit
member is "not required to say or sign anything at such a meeting, and [the Association] will
immediately file a grievance on [the unit member's] behalf."
The formal complaint procedure is set forth in CBA Article 23.5, which states, in
relevant part:
23.5.1 Any formal complaint or criticism (other than of a
criminal act indicating a need for investigation) concerning a unit
member shall be brought to the attention of the unit member
involved in a timely manner provided the administrator decides
that action is warranted. A copy of the complaint, in writing,
shall be provided to the unit member.
23.5.2 If requested by the unit member and deemed appropriate
by the administrator, a conference shall be scheduled among the
unit member, the administrator, and the person making the
compiaint or criticism. The unit member shall at his/her option
have representation at any conference.
23.5.4 No written report or entry in a unit member's personnel
file will be made based on a complaint or criticism if the unit
member has requested a conference, the prinicipal/
program administrator agrees, but the person making the
complaint refuses.
2

York represented Scott regarding complaints made against him in December 2003,
February 2006, and June 2006. In 2003 and again in September 2006, York wrote to the
District asserting that the District had failed to provide the written complaint to Scott as
required by CBA Article 23.5.1.
In early December 2006, a parent complained that Scott had thrown two boxes
of
razor
blades in her daughter's lap during class. 	Scott testified that he believed Barbara Oaks (Oaks),
the principal
of
College Park High School, had investigated the complaint and found it
meritless. Scott admitted, however, that Oaks "never got back to me on her findings."
On December 12, 2006, Oaks, along with the school's vice principal, came to
Scott's
classroom just before the end
of
the school day and asked him to excuse his class early. 	After
Scott did so, Oaks produced a handwritten note stating that a particular student "is an asshole."
Oaks asked Scott
if
he wrote the note. 	Scott testified that he could not remember what he said
in response; he also testified that he did not answer any
of
Oaks' questions.2 Oaks
immediately placed Scott on paid administrative leave pending further investigation.
The following day, York filed a grievance on Scott's behalf alleging that the District
violated Article 23 .5. i
of
the CBA by failing to provide a unit member with a copy
of
a
complaint before being questioned by an administrator and then being placed on administrative
leave. The grievance stated that the Association had reminded the District
of
the CBA
requirement in writing "several times in the past in regard to their management interactions
with the grievant and other affected unit members." The grievance further contended that the
meeting violated the unit member's right to union representation pursuant to section 3543
of
The record contains Oaks' typed summary of the day's events involving Scott,
including a detailed recounting of Scott's statements to Oaks during her classroom visit.
Because resolution of this case does not turn on whether Scott answered Oaks' questions, we
need not resolve this factual dispute.
3

the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA).3 Nowhere did the grievance
mention
Scott by name. Per
York's
usual practice, he faxed the grievance to both Oaks, as required by
CBA Article 3.8.2, and District Assistant Superintendent for Personnel Services Gail Isserman
(Isserman).
On December 21, 2006, Isserrnan denied the grievance. Isserman contended
that no
scheduled meeting occurred and that Scott was not questioned. She also noted that
Oaks
showed Scott "the written note in question." The letter ended: "The meetings to address this
particular complaint and other recent complaints have been and will be scheduled so
that
the
unit member may have representation present should the member so choose."
York testified that he thought he had forwarded a copy
of
the District's response to
Scott but then learned in November 2007 that he had not. York attributed this oversight to the
transfer
of
Scott's files to attorney Dale Brodsky (Brodsky), whom the Association had
retained to represent Scott in a disciplinary matter. York further testified that after receiving
the Step 1 response from Isserman he believed the grievance was moot because the District had
provided Scott with the written complaint, i.e. the note.
On March 1, 2007, Scott, York and Brodsky attended a scheduled meeting at which the
District presented Scott with a Notice
of
Incompetency and Unprofessional Conduct,
commonly known as a "45-day notice."4 The notice was based in part on both the razor blade
and profanity note incidents. The District also gave Scott a copy
of
the written complaint in
3 EERA is codified at Government Code section 3540 et seq. Unless otherwise
indicated, all statutory references are to the Government Code.
4 Education Code section 4493 8 provides that written notice of performance
deficiencies be given at least 45 days before disciplinary action is taken to allow the teacher
"an opportunity to correct his or her faults and overcome the grounds for the charge."
4

the razor blade incident for the first time. York and Scott testified they were surprised by this
as the District had led them to believe no written complaint existed.
On March 8, 2007, York filed a grievance on Scott's behalf. The grievance reiterated
the general allegations from the December 13, 2006 grievance and further alleged that the
District failed to provide copies
of
complaints between that date and March
1,
2007, despite
numerous requests for them. The grievance did not specifically mention Scott, the razor blade
incident, or the profanity note incident. As a remedy, the grievance sought rescission
of
the
45-day notice and withdrawal
of
all negative materials from Scott's personnel file "which are
not supported by substantiated evidence
of
wrongdoing." That same day, York wrote to Oaks
requesting a meeting with the complainant in the razor blade incident.
On March 21, 2007, Oaks responded on the District's grievance form that she had not
received a copy
of
the March 8 grievance, only the letter requesting a meeting. She further
stated: "Mr. Scott was informed
of
a complaint on December
1,
2006, notifying him that a
complaint had been filed and the nature
of
the complaint." Oaks also said she would arrange a
meeting with the complainant parent per York's request.
On March 27, 2007, Oaks informed Scott by letter that the parent had declined to meet
but that a meeting nonetheless would take place on April
5.
	Because York had a conflict on
this date, the meeting was rescheduled to April 19. Oaks notified Scott
of
the rescheduled date
by letter
of
April 6, 2007. According to York, he learned from Brodsky sometime before
April 19 that Scott did not believe York needed to attend the meeting because Oaks was
favorable to Scott's position in the matter. Based on his conversation with Brodsky, York did
not attend the April 19 meeting.
On May 2, 2007, York wrote to Isserman about the status of the March 8 grievance.
Receiving no response, York again wrote to Isserman on May 15 asking about the status of the
5

grievance and requesting that, due to the District's lack ofresponse, "this matter be addressed
through Expedited Arbitration." Isserman responded on May 22, asserting that Oaks
responded to the Step 1 grievance on March
21
and therefore York's "request to address this
matter further
is
untimely." York did not pursue the grievance further.
Scott did not receive a copy
of
Isserman' s denial until November 2007. Scott testified
that he inquired about the grievance during the spring
of
2007 but was told by the Association
that "it was still in progress."
York testified that soon after filing the March 8 grievance he consulted with Brodsky
and the California Teachers Association's (CTA) legal department about it. Based on these
consultations, York concluded that the remedy sought could not be granted because the 45-day
notice was not grievable under the CBA and that even
if
the Association prevailed on the
grievance it would have no binding effect in disciplinary proceedings under the Education
Code. 	York also testified that he told Scott they could challenge the incidents in any future
disciplinary hearing on the ground that the District had not provided Scott with the complaints.
Scott admitted that this conversation took place.
Also in May 2007, Oaks prepared Scott's performance evaluation for the 2006-2007
school year. Oaks gave Scott a "needs improvement" rating. 	On May 15, York grieved the
evaluation on the basis that, because
of
his involuntary leave, Scott did not have sufficient time
during the year to address the concerns raised. On May 24, Oaks wrote to York, with copies to
Scott and Isserman, stating that she would purge the 2006-2007 evaluation from Scott's
personnel file and evaluate Scott the following year.
During the summer of 2007, Scott submitted a written response to the 45-day notice.
According to Scott, the District told him that the response would be "revised." Scott contacted
6

York, who told him he should review his personnel file to determine
if
the District had altered
his response. 	Scott attempted to review his file several times but was denied access.
On November 2, 2007, York filed a grievance alleging that the District had denied Scott
access to his personnel file on four occasions. The District denied the grievance, claiming that
Scott had not made an appointment in advance to review the file as required by District
procedure. Despite the denial, the District agreed to schedule an appointment for Scott to view
his file.
Scott asked York to move the grievance to Step 2. York told him there was no point in
doing so because the District had arranged for him to view the file. 	Scott testified that York
said to let him know
if
Scott still wanted to pursue the grievance.
Upon inspecting his personnel file, Scott discovered that his 2006-2007 evaluation was
still in the file and that his response to the 45-day notice was incomplete. York testified that he
did not file a grievance over the evaluation because he felt Oaks' letter saying she would purge
it would be sufficient to prevent its use in future disciplinary proceedings. As to the 45-day
notice response, York testified that by this point he felt it was unproductive to pursue further
grievances over the notice. In a November 14, 2007 letter to Scott, York recounted a recent
meeting with Isserman that indicated the District would initiate disciplinary action
if
it
received further complaints about Scott. York then stated:
At this point, the best course
of
action may be to leave things as
they are and try to get several months
of
teaching behind you
without further incidents. Alternatively, I can formally pursue
the issue relating to the inclusion
of
the 'razor blade' incident in
your 45 day notice.
When I spoke with Dale Brodsky, she though [sic] it would be
best for you to focus on your teaching and not so much on the
content of your 45 day notice. The allegations in the notice
would have to be argued at a hearing anyway. As we've
discussed, there seems to be clear evidence that the reference to
7

the 'razor blade' incident would be removed if the District moves
to a hearing. I just don't want it to come to that.
York wrote to Isserman on December 11, 2007. Despite his reluctance to pursue the
issue further, York objected to the District's failure to remove the 2006-2007 evaluation from
Scott's personnel file. 	He also objected to inclusion of the razor blade incident in the 45-day
notice. The letter then stated: "While I believe that some of the materials in Mr. Scott's
personnel file have been placed there due to legitimate District concerns, his 2006-07
evaluation and any reference to the alleged razor blade incident clearly should not have been
included."
After receiving a copy of this letter, Scott emailed York to thank him for it. He also
asked York what he felt were the "legitimate District concerns" reflected in his personnel file.
York did not respond despite two further inquiries by Scott.
ALJ' s Proposed Decision
The ALJ analyzed the allegations in the PERB complaint as both independent
violations and under a "totality of the conduct" analysis. Regarding the former, the ALJ found
the allegation regarding the failure to file a grievance in December 2006 untimely but
concluded the allegations of failure to properly file and appeal the March 2007 grievance were
timely because Scott did not discover the underlying facts until less than six months before the
charge was filed. 	Examining the timely allegations, the ALJ found no evidence that York's
action or inaction was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. 	The ALJ thus dismissed the
complaint.
Scott's Exceptions
A close examination of Scott's voluminous exceptions reveals two main arguments.
First, Scott argues that the Association breached its duty of fair representation by failing to
precisely follow the contractual grievance procedures. Second, Scott contends that the
8

Association's conduct deprived him
of
an opportunity to adequately respond to the District's
allegations
of
misconduct. 5
DISCUSSION
The General Counsel's complaint alleged that the Association denied Scott the right to
fair representation guaranteed by EERA section 3544.9 and thereby violated section 3543.6,
subdivision (b
).
	The exclusive representative's duty
of
fair representation extends to grievance
handling. (Fremont Teachers Association (King) (1980) PERB Decision No. 125.) In United
Teachers
of
Los Angeles (Collins) (1982) PERB Decision No. 258, the Board stated:
Absent bad faith, discrimination, or arbitrary conduct, mere
negligence or poor judgment in handling a grievance does not
constitute a breach
of
the union's duty. 	[Citations omitted.]
A union may exercise its discretion to determine how far to
pursue a grievance in the employee's behalf as long as it does not
arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process a grievance
in a perfunctory fashion. 	A union is also not required to process
an employee's grievance
if
the chances for success are minimal.
To establish that the exclusive representative's conduct was arbitrary, the charging
party must show "how or in what manner the exclusive representative's action or inaction was
without a rational basis or devoid
of
honest judgment." (Reed District Teachers Association,
CTAINEA (Reyes) (1983) PERB Decision No. 332, quoting Rocklin Teachers Professional
Association (Romero) (1980) PERB Decision No. 124; emphasis in original.)
5 Scott also asserts that the ALJ erred in excluding one
of
his proferred exhibits, a
September 14, 2006 letter from Brodsky to Isserman in ,vhich Brodsky informed the District
that Scott had been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactive disorder. Scott argues this
document should have been admitted to show his "situation" prior to York's actions. He also
contends that the disclosure
of
his condition caused the District to issue him the 45-day notice.
The letter does not pertain to any of the incidents that were the subject of the
allegations in the PERB complaint. Moreover, PERB has no jurisdiction over disability
discrimination claims. (Alum Rock Union Elementary School District (2005) PERB Decision
No. 1748.) Therefore, even though the ALJ did not state on the record why he rejected this
exhibit, we find it was properly excluded on relevancy grounds.
9

With regard to when "mere negligence" might constitute arbitrary conduct, the Board
observed in Coalition of University Employees (Buxton) (2003) PERB Decision No. 1517-H,
that under federal precedent, a union's negligence breaches the duty of fair representation "in
cases in which the individual interest at stake is strong and the union's failure to perform a
ministeiial act completely extinguishes the employee's right to pursue his claim." (Quoting
Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (9th Cir. 1983) 749 F.2d 1270, 1274.)
When a charge alleges that the.exclusive representative's failure to act on behalf of an
employee constituted a breach of its duty of fair representation, PERB looks to whether "the
cumulative actions of the exclusive representative, considered in their totality, [are] sufficient
to constitute a prima facie showing of an arbitrary failure to fairly represent the employee."
(American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, International, Council 57
(Dehler) (1996) PERB Decision No. 1152-H.) A violation may be established based on an
overall pattern of conduct even if any one of the exclusive representative's actions by itself
would not breach the duty of fair representation. (Ibid.; San Francisco Classroom Teachers
Association, CTA/NEA (Bramel!) (1984) PERB Decision No. 430.) However, the exclusive
representative's failure to take certain actions does not establish a violation if the overall pattern
of conduct was one in which the union assisted the employee. (California School Employees
Association (Hansen) (2000) PERB Decision No. 1379.)
The complaint alleged eight separate failures to act by the Association that
cumulatively constituted a breach of the duty of fair representation. \Vhile we address each of
the failures to act in tum, our ultimate inquiry is whether the Association's overall pattern of
conduct was one in which the Association assisted Scott.
Before turning to the individual failures to act, however, we briefly address the timing
of the charge. Generally, alleged violations occurring more than six months before the filing
10

of
the charge are untimely. Clearly, the application
of
this rule is appropriate in cases
where
a
single independent act is alleged to breach the duty
of
fair representation. However,
"[w]hen
the 'conduct' in dispute consists
of
a lengthy period
of
silence and inaction, the Board
must
be
able to consider the entire course
of
processing a grievance to discern whether a pattern
exists-." (American Federation
of
State, County and ivfunicipal Employees, International,
Council 57 (Dehler), supra, concurring opinion
of
Member Garcia.) Accordingly, we
hold
that
in duty
of
fair representation cases based on the "pattern
of
conduct" theory set forth
in
San Francisco Classroom Teachers Association, CTAINEA (Bramel!), supra, a violation may
be established based on inaction that occurred more than six months before the charge was
filed, provided the inaction was part
of
the same course
of
conduct as inaction within
the
statutory limitations period. We therefore overrule the Board's contrary holding in American
Federation
of
State, County and Municipal Employees, International, Council 57 (Dehler),
supra.
The complaint alleged that the Association "failed to file a grievance on Charging
Party's behalf with respect to several personnel issues arising in December 2006." This
allegation is easily dismissed as the' record clearly shows the Association filed grievances over
the razor blade and profanity note incidents, both
of
which occurred in December 2006.
The complaint also alleged that the Association "failed to provide the Charging Party
with copies
of
any and all relevant documentation and/or information regarding the
grievances." It is undisputed that the Association did not provide Scott with copies
of
the
District's denials
of
the December 12, 2006 profanity note grievance and the March 8, 2007
razor blade grievance until November 2007. It appears from York's testimony that he either
believed he had sent copies to Scott or assumed Brodsky had provided copies to Scott. 	There
is no evidence that the Association intentionally withheld these documents from Scott. 	Thus,
11

the Association was at most negligent in failing to provide the documents to Scott upon
receiving them from the District.
We do not find that this negligence constituted a breach
of
the Association's duty
of
fair representation. In Dutrisac, supra, the court found the employee's individual interest to be
strong because the grievance concerned the employee's discharge. (749 F.2d at
p.
1274.)
Here, the interest asserted in the grievances was Scott's right under the CBA to receive a
written copy
of
any formal complaint against him. While this is certainly an important interest,
in light
of
Dutrisac, supra, we find it insufficient to be considered "strong," notwithstanding
that the underlying incidents were also used in Scott's 45-day notice. Moreover, while the
Association's failure to provide Scott copies
of
the grievance denials precluded him from
timely elevating the grievances to the next step, this conduct did not prevent Scott from
challenging the underlying allegations in a future disciplinary hearing.
The complaint made two allegations regarding the March 8, 2007 razor blade
grievance. The first is that the Association failed to file the grievance in accordance with the
procedures set forth in the CBA. In his exceptions, Scott makes much
of
the fact that York
filed the grievance not only with his immediate supervisor, Principal Oaks, as required by the
CBA, but also with Assistant Superintendent
of
Personnel Isserman. 6 According to Scott, this
resulted in the grievance being reviewed initially by Isserman, who usually resolved issues
unfavorably to Scott, instead
of
by Oaks, who often resolved them in Scott's favor.
Nothing in the record indicates that a different outcome would have resulted
if
York
had not faxed a copy of the grievance to Isserman on the same day he faxed it to Oaks. 	Oaks
Pursuant to Article 3. 8 of the CBA, the Step I grievance is to be filed with the
employee's "immediate supervisor." The grievant may appeal the Step 1 decision to Step 2,
which provides for review by the "Superintendent or his/her designee." Isserman was the
superintendent's designee for Step 2 grievances. Step 3 of the grievance procedure is final and
binding arbitration.
12

responded on March 21, 2007 that she believed the issue being grieved had been resolved by
the December 12, 2006 grievance. Isserman affirmed that conclusion in her May 22, 2007
response to York. Thus, the proper order
of
grievance steps was followed in this case.
The second allegation is that York failed to timely appeal Oaks' Step 1 denial, resulting
in Isserman's denial
of
the appeal as untimely. CBA Article 3.9.1 states that the grievant has
10
days to appeal the Step 1 decision to Step
2.
It
is undisputed that, following Oaks'
March
21
denial
of
the grievance, York did not write to Isserman until May 2, 2007. Clearly
York missed the
10
day appeal deadline.
York testified, however, that by the time he received Oaks' denial, he believed based on
conversations with CTA and outside counsel that the grievance was futile because it could not
result in removal
of
the razor blade incident from the 45-day notice. We therefore find that,
because York made an honest judgment that the grievance could not achieve the desired result,
he did not act arbitrarily by failing to immediately appeal the March
21
denial.	
It
is also worth
noting that, despite his conclusion, York pursued the matter further with Isserman and even
demanded that the grievance be moved to Step 3 arbitration.
Though not alleged in the complaint, Scott argues that the Association breached its duty
of
fair representation by misrepresenting the status
of
the razor blade grievance. Assuring an
employee that a grievance is being processed when in fact it has been abandoned constitutes a
breach of the duty
of
fair representation. (Service Employees Local 3 03 6 (Linden
1vfaintenance) (1986) 280 NLRB 995, 996-997.) Scott testified that when he asked about the
razor blade grievance in spring 2007, the Association told him "it was still in progress." Scott
contends this statement was false because York failed to appeal the Step 1 denial of the
grievance in March 2007. The record establishes that, as of May 15, 2007, the Association was
still pursuing the grievance, which also incorporated the allegations from the prior profanity
13

note grievance. Because the record does not show when Scott made his inquiry, we cannot
conclude that the Association told Scott his grievance was still being processed at a time when
it had abandoned the grievance. Furthermore, given the overlapping subject matter of the
grievance and the 45-day notice, it is clear that the Association continued to pursue the matter
well into the fall of 2007.
The complaint next alleged that the Association failed to timely appeal the denial of the
November 2, 2007 grievance regarding Scott's inability to access his personnel file. There is
no dispute that York did not appeal the denial. However, Scott admitted that York told him
there was no point in pursuing the grievance because the District had agreed to set up a time
for Scott to review the file. 	Thus, York's failure to appeal the denial did not prejudice Scott's
rights in any way.
The complaint further alleged that the Association "failed to file a grievance with
respect to the placement of Charging Party's 2006-07 performance evaluation in Charging
Party's personnel file." It is true that no grievance was filed over this issue. However, York
did raise the issue in a letter to Isserman on December 11, 2007. In the letter, he demanded
that Isserman "take steps to ensure that [Scott's] 2006-07 evaluation is marked 'purged."'
York took this step despite his statements to Scott that it was in Scott's "best interest" not to
grieve the issue and that they could challenge the District's failure to purge the evaluation in a
disciplinary hearing if necessary. Thus, notwithstanding his misgivings over pursuing this
course of action, he continued to advocate on behalf of Scott regarding the 2006-2007
evaluation. That he did not file a formal grievance over the issue does not establish a breach of
the duty of fair representation. (See Coalition of University Employees (Buxton), supra
["Failure to pursue the grievance in the way requested by the employee does not necessarily
constitute a breach."]; Duarte Unified Education Association (Fox) (1997) PERB Decision
14

No. 1220 [union representative's failure to adopt aggressive strategy urged by employee
insufficient to establish breach
of
duty
of
fair representation].)
As for the allegation that the Association "failed to file a grievance with respect to the
District's actions ofredacting portions
of
Charging Party's response to a disciplinary
document," there is no evidence that Scott ever requested York file a grievance over the
matter. The same is true for the allegation that the Association failed to file a grievance over
the absence from Scott's personnel file
of
his response to the 2006-2007 performance
evaluation. Scott's expression
of
concern over these matters to York was insufficient to
impose a duty on York to file grievances over them. Therefore, the Association's failure to file
grievances over these issues did not breach the duty
of
fair representation. (See California
School Employees Association (Hansen), supra [union's failure to file grievances over
employee's concerns did not breach duty
of
fair representation because employee did not
request that grievances be filed].)
Viewed as a whole, the record establishes that the Association's overall pattern
of
conduct toward Scott between December 2006 and December 2007 was one
of
assistance.
While the Association's handling
of
Scott's personnel issues was less than stellar at times,
nothing in the record demonstrates that the Association acted in "reckless disregard"
of
Scott's
rights. 	(See Dutrisac, supra, 749 F.2d at p. 1272 ["an unintentional mistake is arbitrary
if
it
reflects a 'reckless disregard' for the rights
of
the individual employee"].) York and Scott
clearly disagreed over
hov
✓
best to deal vvith Scott's issues but the record fails to
sho,x1
that
York acted in bad faith, or in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. Accordingly, we conclude
the Association did not breach its duty of fair representation.
15

ORDER
The complaint and underlying unfair practice charge in Case No. SF-C0-722-E are
hereby DISMISSED.
1-1embers }v1cKeag and Wesley joined in this Decision.
16