Standard School District (PERB 2273E)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
DIANA GARCHOW, et al.,
Charging Parties,
V.
STANDARD SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Respondent.
Case No. LA-CE-5586-E
PERB Decision No. 2273
June 22, 2012
Appearances: California Teachers Association by Robert E. Lindquist, Attorney, for
Diana Garchow, et al.; Fagen, Friedman & Fulfrost by James B. Fernow and Jordan I. Bilbeisi,
Attorneys, for Standard School District.
Before Martinez, Chair; Dowdin Calvillo and Huguenin, Members.
DECISION
DOWDIN CALVILLO, Member: This case is before the Public Employment Relations
Board (PERB or Board) on appeal by Diana Garchow, et al. (Garchow)1 of the Office of the
General Counsel's dismissal of her unfair practice charge. The charge, as amended, alleged
that the Standard School District (District) violated Educational Employment Relations Act
(EERA)2 section 3547 by failing to comply with public notice requirements concerning its
negotiations with the Standard Teachers Association (STA). The Board agent found that the
charge was untimely and failed to state a prima facie violation of~~.,~ A
1 The charge was filed by Garchow and signed by 20 other community members.
convenience, we will refer to Garchow as the charging party.
2 EERA is codified at Government Code section 3540 et seq. Unless otherwise noted,
all statutory references are to the Government Code.

The Board has reviewed the dismissal and the record in light of Garchow' s appeal, the
District's response, and the relevant law. Based on this review, the Board affirms the dismissal
of the charge for the reasons set forth below.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
On September 9, 2010, the District published an agenda listing items to be discussed at
the September 14, 2010 meeting of its Board of Trustees (Trustees). Under item 3.1, listing
matters that may be reported by the Superintendent, item 3.1.8 states: "District to Sunshine
Proposal to STA (supplement)." In addition, item 10.1 states that the Trustees may be required
to adjourn to closed session to "discuss matters related to STA and SEIU negotiations."
At the September 14, 2010, Trustees meeting, the District presented a document
entitled "Standard School District's Initial Proposals for 2009-2010, 2010-2011 and 2011-2012
to Standard Teachers' Association (Sunshining)." The body of the document states:
The current collective bargaining agreement between the
Standard School District ('District') and the Standard Teachers'
Association expired on June 30, 2009. For 2009-2010, 2010-
2011 and 2011-2012 school years, the parties will negotiate
regarding salary, health and welfare benefits and all other aspects
of the contract. The following are the District's initial proposals:
Article VII - Hours
The District will propose language to reduce the length of the
work year, to modify the time allowed for preparation with
regards to middle school teachers and to modify instruction on a
pull-out basis as it relates to 	and/or physical education
instruction.
Article VIII - Leaves
The District will propose modifications to its leave policies with
the goal to ensure employees receive appropriate leave while
maintaining appropriate coverage of classroom and other services
provided by regular employees.
2

Article XII - Class Size
The District will propose language to modify the student contact
ratio and the number of teaching periods and the preparation
period for grades 6-8.
Article XV - Salary
The District will propose a fair and affordable salary for the
2009-2010, 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 school years based on the
current economic climate, with the goal of maintaining a sound
fiscal policy.
At its meeting on November 9, 2010, the Trustees held a public hearing for the purpose
of allowing members of the public to comment about the District's proposals that were
presented at the September 14, 2010 meeting. The public hearing was noticed on the agenda
for the November 9, 2010 meeting as follows:
6.1 	Public Hearing - District Initial Proposal to STA: The
District's initial proposal to STA was sunshined at the 9-14-10
regular board meeting and has been available to the public since
that date. In accordance with code and policy, a public hearing
shall be held allowing members of the public to comment about
the proposal. There will be no action on this information at this
time.
No public comment was offered at the meeting.
STA and the District met and negotiated on March 24 and May 19, 2011. As a result of
those negotiations, the District and STA reached a tentative agreement on certain subjects.
STA refused, however, to negotiate over any of the District's initial proposals presented at the
September and November Trustees meetings. By letter dated May 17, 2011, STA asserted to
the District that the District's initial proposals presented at the September 14, 2010 Trustees
meeting failed to comply with the 	of 	section 3547. On June 2, 2011,
District met with STA and presented proposals on all of the subjects identified at the
September 14 Trustees meeting, but STA again refused to negotiate over those proposals. 	On
July 22, 2011, PERB declared the parties to be at impasse and approved the appointment of a
3

mediator. At a special meeting on July 26, 2011, the Trustees adopted the District's initial
proposals as originally presented on September 14, 2010.
On July 11, 2011, Garchow filed a charge alleging that: 	(1) prior to distributing the
agenda at the September 14, 2010 Trustees meeting, the District did not provide the public
with notice that it would be presenting the District's proposals and bargaining positions at that
meeting; (2) the District did not make copies
of
its initial bargaining proposal readily available
to the public at the September 14, 2010 meeting; (3) even after obtaining a copy
of
the
District's initial bargaining proposals, the proposals lacked sufficient specificity and were so
ambiguous and vague that charging parties were unable to determine the District's intent
or
the
nature
of
those proposals; and (4) the Trustees "did not adopt and has not subsequently
maintained" proposals consistent with the initial proposals presented at the September 14, 2010
meeting.
By letter dated August 24, 2011, the Board agent warned charging parties that the
charge was untimely with respect to the District's alleged conduct on September 14, 2010 and
that the remainder
of
the charge failed to state a prima facie violation
of
EERA section 3 54
7.
Garchow filed an amended charge on September 15, 2011, including allegations concerning
events throughout the same chronology as in the original charge and reasserting the contention
that the District violated its obligations under EERA section 3547.
DISCUSSION
EERA section 3547, entitled "Proposals relating to representation; informing public;
adoption
of
proposal; new subjects; regulations" provides:
(a) All initial proposals
of
exclusive representatives and
of
public school employers, which relate to matters within the scope
of representation, shall be presented at a public meeting
of
the
public school employer and thereafter shall be public records.
4

(b) Meeting and negotiating shall not take place on any proposal
until a reasonable time has elapsed after the submission
of
the
proposal to enable the public to become informed and the public
has the opportunity to express itself regarding the proposal at a
meeting
of
the public school employer.
(
c) After the public has had the opportunity to express itself, the
public school employer shail, at a meeting which is open to the
public, adopt its initial proposal.
(
d)
New subjects
of
meeting and negotiating arising after the
presentation
of
initial proposals shall be made public within 24
hours.
	If
a vote is taken on such subject by the public school
employer, the vote thereon by each member voting shall also be
made public within 24 hours.
(
e) The board may adopt regulations for the purpose
of
implementing this section, which are consistent with the intent
of
the section; namely that the public be informed
of
the issues that
are being negotiated upon and have full opportunity to express
their views on the issues to the public school employer, and to
know
of
the positions
of
their elected representatives.
We provide some historical context to this provision. As originally enacted in 1975,
EERA section 3547, subdivision (e), explicitly empowered the Board to promulgate
regulations to implement the statute. The purpose
of
the statute is to ensure that the public is
informed
of
the issues being negotiated by the public school employer and the positions
of
their elected representatives, and have an opportunity to express their views. 	(EERA § 3547,
subd. (e); Los Angeles Unified School District (1992) PERB Decision No. 964.) This is
accomplished under the statute by "sunshining" the initial proposals
of
both the exclusive
representative and the public school employer at a public meeting. 	(EERA § 3547, subd. (a).)
Once sunshined, these proposals are deemed to be public records. 	sunshining of the
proposals is 	that is required to be 	to 	public.
Statute of Limitations
Pursuant to the authority provided in EERA section 3547, subdivision (e), PERB
promulgated its first set of regulations to implement the public notice requirements ( original
5

regulations). Pertinent to the issue in this case, the original regulations established a 30-day
filing deadline by which a member
of
the public could file a public notice complaint.
Former regulation 37010, adopted in 1977, provided that "[a] complaint alleging that an
employer or an exclusive representative has failed to comply with [the public notice provisions
of
the Government Code]
...
shall be filed no later than thirty calendar days subsequent to the
date when conduct alleged to be a violation was known or reasonably could have been
discovered
....
"3 (Los Angeles Community College (Kimmett) (1978) PERB Order No. Ad-41
(Kimmett), emphasis added.)
In 2006, PERB adopted new regulations that changed the procedures applicable to
public notice and other types
of
cases. Under the new regulations, alleged public notice
violations would thereafter be treated as unfair practice charges and subject to the rules and
procedures applicable to such cases. 4 With this regulatory realignment, the 30-day statute
of
limitations for filing a public notice complaint was replaced by the six-month limitations
3 The substance
of
this regulation was moved to PERB Regulation 32910, which
provided:
A complaint alleging that an employer or an exclusive
representative has failed to comply with Government Code
sections 3547 or 3595 may be filed in the regional office. An
EERA complaint may be filed by an individual who is a resident
of
the school district involved in the complaint or who is the
parent or guardian
of
a student in the school district or is an adult
student in the district. The complaint shall be filed no
30 days subsequent to the date when conduct alleged to be a
violation was known or reasonable could have been discovered.
Any period
of
time used by the complainant 	first exhausting a
complaint procedure adopted by an EERA or	
L~•~L~,
~
employer
shall not be included in 	30-day limitation.
4 Under Subchapter 5 entitled "Unfair Practice Proceedings," PERB Regulation 32602,
subdivision (c ), codified the public notice complaint practice. It provides: "A charge alleging
that an employer or an exclusive representative has failed to comply with Government Code
section 3523, 3547, 3547.5, or 3595, or Public Utilities Code section 99569, may be filed by
any affected member of the public."
6

period applicable to unfair practice charges. (EERA sec. 3541.S(a).) With this change,
affected members of the public who wanted to bring a public notice complaint were afforded
five months more than the time period that had been in place for nearly 30 years. Although the
30-day statute of limitations no longer applies, early Board opinions interpreting the timeliness
issue provide insight as to the importance of handling public notice complaints in an
expeditious manner.
In Kimmett, the charging party filed a public notice complaint 55 days after the last in
the series of challenged public meetings, alleging that the meetings scheduled for presentation
of proposals and public response were held at 1:30 p.m. when full public participation was
impossible. The Board concluded that "the conduct alleged to violate the public notice
requirements occurred in its entirety more than 30 days prior to the date the complaint was
filed." In explaining its decision, the Board stated:
In implementing the public notice provisions of the EERA, the
Board has adopted rules and regulations that provide for
expedited proceedings so that the right of the public to receive
notice, learn the positions of its elected representatives, and to
express its own views can be fully protected. 	[Fn. omitted.] The
public notice provisions, however, were never intended to be read
in a vacuum but must be considered in light of the entire EERA.
The Legislature has determined that it is within the public interest
to achieve improved employer-employee relations within public
school systems. The ~~.•~. was enacted to promote this goal and
reflects the Legislative judgment that the desired improvement in
employer-employee relations can best be obtained though [sic] a
process of collective negotiations culminating in final agreement
and resulting in a mature and stable negotiating relationship. In
one section of the EERA, the public notice section, the
Legislature secured to the public the right to be informed and to
express its view on the negotiating process. The public
awareness and input was intended to further, not impede, the
broad goals of EERA.
Serious injury to educational employment relations would result
if concerned or merely disgruntled citizens could utilize the
public notice provisions of the EERA to bring delayed challenges
to negotiations that had otherwise been satisfactorily completed.
7

Moreover, there are compelling reasons to bar untimely public
notice complaints even though the parties may not yet have
reached agreement. While the Board has specifically provided in
its rules and regulations that the pendency of a public notice
complaint will not cause negotiations to cease, [fn. omitted] the
filing of a complaint nonetheless has an unsettling effect on the
negotiations in progress. This is so because should such a
complaint be found to have merit, the status of any final
agreement between the parties is uncertain and they must
necessarily divert their attention from reaching agreement to
defending against the charge. That the parties may ultimately be
vindicated in their conduct does not save the negotiating process
from harm, for the damage occurs when the unreasonably delayed
complaint is filed. A citizen who seeks to file a complaint
alleging a violation of the public notice provisions after the
prescribed time has elapsed could thus thwart the very harmony
between the employer and its employees sought to be promoted
by the EERA. Accordingly, we conclude that such untimely
complaints must be barred.
As seen above, in its original incarnation, the public notice complaint process was
intended to be an "expedited" process. Even when the limitations period was only 30 days, the
Board already had concerns about untimely complaints.
We consider this history in light of established PERB precedent governing the statute of
limitations for filing an unfair practice charge. 	EERA section 3541.5(a)(l) prohibits PERB
from issuing a complaint with respect to "any charge based upon an alleged unfair practice
occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge." The limitations period
begins to run once the charging party knows, or should have known, of the conduct underlying
the charge. (Gavilan Joint Community College District (1996) 	Decision No. 1177
(Gavilan).)
A charging party bears 	burden 	demonstrating a charge is 	filed.
(Los Angeles Unified School District (2007) PERB Decision No. 1929.) The statute of
limitations is an element of the charging party's prima facie case. (Long Beach Community
College District (2009) PERB Decision No. 2002 (Long Beach CCD).) The statute of
8

limitations for new allegations contained in an amended charge begins to run based upon the
filing date of the amended charge. (Sacramento City Teachers Association (Marsh) (2001)
PERB Decision No. 1458.)
Garchow argues that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until mid-June 2011,
when she "discovered" the District's allegedly unlawful conduct, relying on judicial authority
applicable to civil cases. (See, e.g., Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4 th 383.) We reject
this standard and conclude that, under the Gavilan "knew or should have known" standard, the
statute of limitations for a charge alleging a violation of the public notice provisions of EERA
begins to run either upon publication of a public notice of a meeting at which bargaining
proposals will be sunshined or at the public meeting itself. (See, e.g., Los Angeles Community
College District (1991) PERB Decision No. 908 (Los Angeles CCD) [placement of an initial
proposal on a board agenda placed the public on notice of the proposal].) Thus, if the charge
alleges that the notice itself was defective, the statute of limitations begins to run upon
publication of the notice. If the charge alleges that the notice itself was proper but the
proposals sunshined at the meeting failed to comply with the provisions of EERA
section 3547, the limitations period begins to run on the date of the meeting where the
proposals were presented to the public.
Applying the Gavilan standard, the undisputed evidence establishes that the District
provided public notice of its intent to sunshine its initial proposals when it published its agenda
for the September 14, 2010 Trustees meeting on September 9, 2010, and again when it
published its agenda for the November 9, 2010 meeting at which the opportunity for public
comment was provided. Accordingly, we conclude that the charging parties knew or should
have known of the District's conduct not later than November 9, 2010, when the District
9

placed its initial proposals on the agenda for public comment and held a public meeting at
which it provided the opportunity for public comment.
The original charge was filed on July 11, 2011. Therefore, all alleged violations
pertaining to conduct that occurred prior to January 11, 2011 are untimely. Accordingly, all
allegations concerning the District's presentation of its initial proposals on September 14, 2010
and the public hearing on those proposals at the November 9, 2010 Trustees meeting are barred
by the statute of limitations.
The amended charge was filed on September 15, 2011. Therefore, all new allegations
of conduct occurring prior to March 15, 2011 are time-barred.
The only conduct alleged to have occurred during the six months prior to filing the
amended charge is that, between March 24 and June 2, 2011, the District attempted to meet
and negotiate with STA over its proposals despite its prior alleged lack of compliance with the
public notice provisions of Section 354 7, and that, on July 26, 2011, the Trustees adopted the
District's initial proposals presented at the September 14, 2010 public meeting. Under the
"continuing violation" doctrine, a violation within the statute of limitations period may
"revive" an earlier violation of the same type that occurred outside of the limitations period.
(Sacramento City Teachers Association (Franz) (2008) PERB Decision No. 1959 (Franz);
Compton Community College District (1991) PERB Decision No. 915.) The violation within
the limitations period must constitute an 	unfair practice 	reference to
prior violation. (North Orange County Community College District (1999) PERB Decision
No. 1342.) If 	are satisfied, PERB may consider the prior violation even
though it occurred outside the statute of limitations period. For the continuing violation
doctrine to apply, the conduct alleged during the limitations period must be of the same ~ as

that alleged outside the limitations period and must stand on its own
as
an unfair practice.
(Franz.)
Although the amended charge alleges that the District attempted to negotiate over its
initial proposals between March 24 and June 2, 2011, it further alleges that ST A refused to
negotiate over those proposals. These allegations
do
not state an independent unfair practice.
Moreover, even
if
they did, the District's conduct in seeking to negotiate with STA
is
not
of
the same type as its alleged violation
of
the public notice requirements
of
EERA section 3547
so as to constitute a continuing violation.
Similarly, the District's adoption on July 26, 2011
of
its September 14, 2010 initial
proposals does not constitute an independent unfair practice. EERA section 3547(c) required
the District to adopt its initial proposal at a public meeting after the public has had the
opp01iunity to express itself. Even
if
this act were an independent violation, it would not
"revive" the earlier allegation that the notice provided in September 2010 failed to comply
with the requirements
of
Section 3547. Accordingly, the charge fails to allege any violation
of
Section 3547 occurring within the six-month limitations period.
Under the Gavilan "knew or should have known" standard, members
of
the public as a
whole are placed on notice
of
the negotiation process by the sunshining
of
proposals to the
public. 	While we have no authority to determine a public entity's compliance with the open
meeting requirements
of
state and local law5 when noticing its 	and agendizing the
matters that come before it, we conclude that the public as a whole should have known
of
the
conduct underlying a public notice 	as 	time 	agenda was published or the
bargaining proposals were sunshined, at a public meeting where the public was provided an
5 See Section 11120 et seq. (Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act); Section 54950 et seq.
(Ralph M. Brown Act).
11

opportunity to comment. This rule provides clear guidance to the public of both its rights and
responsibilities and is not dependent upon facts personal to individual members of the public.
Misrepresentation
Garchow also contends that principles of equitable estoppel require tolling the statute of
limitations due to the District's misrepresentation and concealment of material facts relevant to
the provision of public notice of its initial proposals. While PERB has applied the doctrine of
equitable tolling under certain circumstances, none of these circumstances are applicable in
this case. (See, e.g., Long Beach CCD [statute of limitations is tolled during the period of time
the parties are utilizing a non-binding dispute resolution procedure if: (1) the procedure is
contained in a written agreement negotiated by the parties; (2) the procedure is being used to
resolve the same dispute that is the subject of the unfair practice charge; (3) the charging party
reasonably and in good faith pursues the procedure; and (4) tolling does not frustrate the
purpose of the statutory limitation period by causing surprise or prejudice to the respondent].)
Garchow asserts that the District misrepresented material facts by: (l) stating in agenda
item 10 for the September 14 meeting that the Trustees would hold a closed session to discuss
matters related to negotiations; (2) posting the agenda for the September 14 meeting in a
manner that made it largely inaccessible to the public; (3) placing agenda item 10 at the end of
the meeting and used inaccessible devices to discourage public attendance at the meeting and
deny the public a meaningful opportunity to become informed and express itself regarding the
proposal; and (4) suggesting that the District had already completed compliance with the
requirements of public notice Section 3547 by stating in the minutes of the September 14
meeting that the superintendent would deliver the District's proposals to the STA president.
We find no merit to these claims. In addition to stating that matters related to
negotiations with STA and another labor organization would be discussed in closed session,
12

the September 14 meeting agenda also stated in item 3 .1.8 that the District would sunshine its
proposal to STA and that there would be a "supplement," presumably containing that proposal.
We also find no misrepresentation in the manner in which the District posted its notice of the
meeting. As alleged in the charge, the notice was posted in a glass case located beside the
entrance to the District's administrative offices. 	Subsequently, the District also made the
notice available on its website. We reject Garchow's assertions that these methods of notice,
along with the placement of agenda item 10 and the statement in the September 14 minutes,
were misleading, insufficient or deprived the public of a meaningful opportunity to become
informed and participate. (Los Angeles CCD.) In short, Garchow has failed to allege any facts
showing that the District engaged in any misrepresentation with respect to its public notice
obligations so as to extend the statute of limitations.
Timeliness as an Element of Garchow's Prima Facie Case
In Long Beach CCD, the Board held unequivocally that the charging party bears the
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the charge was filed within the
six-month limitations period, expressly overruling prior PERB decisions finding the statute of
limitations to be an affirmative defense. (See, e.g., Walnut Valley Unified School District
(1983) PERB Decision No. 289; Long Beach Community College District (2003) PERB
Decision No. 1564.) Garchow urges us to reverse this rule. The Board thoroughly analyzed
this 	Long Beach CCD 	three years ago, and we find no basis to revisit it at this
time.
CONCLUSION
Garchow bears the burden of establishing, as part of the prima facie case, that
charge was filed within the statutory six-month period. Because Garchow has failed to meet
that burden, the Board lacks jurisdiction to consider this matter.
13

ORDER
The unfair practice charge in Case No. LA-CE-5586-E is hereby DISMISSED
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
Chair Martinez joined in this Decision.
Member Huguenin's concurrence begins on page 15.
14

HUGUENIN, Member, concurring: 	I support the majority's decision to construe
strictly the limitations period in cases involving public notice complaints. I write separately to
underscore the distinction in limitations policy applicable to public notice complaints and to
unfair practice charges.
Public Notice Limitations Policy
The Legislature included in the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA) a
provision for public notice and participation in formulation of the public school employer's to
bargaining proposals. (EERA § 3547.) EERA delegated to the Public Employment Relations
Board (PERB or Board) enforcement of this public notice provision, through regulation and
adjudication. PERB adopted separate regulations for the public notice, including a thirty (30)
day limitations period within which to assert a public notice violation, and thereafter enforced
strictly the limitation period. (Los Angeles Community College District (1978) PERB Order
No. Ad-41.) Later the Board eliminated its separate regulation for public notice complaints,
folding public notice complaint enforcement into PERB' s unfair practice charge enforcement
process. The limitations period for public notice complaints thus increased to six (6) months,
but the underlying policy of strictly enforcing the public notice limitations period has
remained. The Board here gives effect to that policy by applying its Gavilan 1 limitations
calculus in public notice cases as follows: 	the complaining party "should have known" of an
allegedly defective notice on the date of its publication, and of an allegedly defective proposal
on the date where it was first presented to the public. The public notice complaint must be
six 	months of such date.
Gavilan Joint Community College District (1996) PERB Decision No. 1177
(Gavilan).
15
1

Unfair Practice Limitations Policy
This decision leaves untouched the Board's unfair practice limitations policy, a
principal focus of which is, in my view, full and fair enforcement of employee and
organizational rights necessary to functioning of the EERA' s system of collective negotiations.
Thus, the Board will continue to apply its Gavilan calculus in unfair practice cases, requiring
that a charging party file a charge no later than six (6) months from the discovery of conduct
forming the basis for the charge. The Board initially articulated this policy in 1985:
In San Dieguito Union High School District (1982) PEPB
Decision No. 194, PERB held that, to state a prima facie
violation, charging party must allege and ultimately establish that
the alleged unfair practice either occurred or was discovered
within the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of
the charge with PERB. EERA section 3541.5; Danzansky
Goldberg Memorial Chapels, Inc. (1982) 264 NLRB 112
[ 112 LRRM 1108]; American Olean Tile Co. (1982) 265 NLRB
No. 206 [112 LRRM 1080]; A.F.C. Industries, Inc. (Amcar
Division) (1978) 234 NLRB 1063 [98 LRRM 1287], enf d as
modified (8 Cir. 1979) 596 F.2d 1344 [100 LRRM 3074]. The
National Labor Relations Board cases cited here hold that the six
month period commences on the date the conduct constituting the
unfair practice is discovered. It does not run from the discovery
of the legal significance of that conduct.
(Fairfiled-Suisun Unified School District (1985) PERB Decision No. 547, Warning Letter,
at p. 2.)
Our unfair practice limitations policy reasonably forbids charging parties to "sit on their
rights" by requiring that upon discovery of the conduct forming the basis for a charge that a
charging party thereafter bring a charge within six (6) months. A charging party is not excused
from timely filing on the ground that he/she learned later of the legal significance, i.e., the
allegedly unlawful nature, of the conduct. Thus, if a party learns of ("discovers") conduct
which might be the basis for a charge, that party has six (6) months to consult counsel or
otherwise to assess whether the conduct does violate our statutes, and to file a charge.
16

The Board's decision herein works no change to our unfair practice limitations policy.
Charging Parties' Limitations Authority
Charging Parties herein rely, inter alia, on Norgart
v.
Upjohn Company (1999)
21
Cal.4
th
383 (Norgart), and authorities therein cited.2 Norgart reflects the same policy as
Gavilan, requiring a party to proceed within a prescribed limitations period upon discovering
the conduct underlying a violation, even though the legal significance
of
that conduct is not
evident. 	Thus, pursuant to Norgart and our public notice limitations policy explicated above,
Charging Parties "had reason to discover" or "should have learned"
of
the facts essential to
their claims in September and/or November
of
2010. The Board's decision in this case is
consistent with Norgart as well as Gavilan.
2 Norgart states, in part, at pages 397-398:
An exception to the general rule for defining the accrual
of
a
cause
of
action-indeed,
the 'most important'
one-is
the
discovery rule. 	[Citation omitted.]
	It
may be expressed by the
Legislature or implied by the courts. 	[Citation omitted.] It
postpones accrual
of
a cause
of
action until the plaintiff
discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause
of
action.
Footnote 2 states:
See Gutierrez
v.
Mofid [1985] 39 Cal.3d [892,] at pages 897-898:
'[T]he uniform California rule is that a limitations period
dependent on discovery
of
the cause
of
action begins to run no
later than the time the plaintiff learns, or should have learned, the
facts 	to his 	[Citations.) It is irrelevant that
plaintiff is ignorant of
...
the legal theories underlying his cause
of action. Thus,
if
one has suffered appreciable harm and knows
or suspects that
...
blundering is its cause, the fact than an
attorney has not yet advised him does not postpone
commencement of the limitations period.'
17