City of Santa Maria (PERB 2736M)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
CITY OF SANTA MARIA FIREFIGHTERS
ASSOCIATION,
Charging Party,
v.
CITY OF SANTA MARIA,
Respondent.
Case No. LA-CE-1210-M
PERB Decision No. 2736-M
June 30, 2020
Appearances: Adams, Ferrone & Ferrone by Stuart D. Adams, Attorney, for City of
Santa Maria Firefighters Association; Liebert Cassidy Whitmore by Che Johnson and
Bryan Rome, Attorneys, for City of Santa Maria.
Before Banks and Krantz, Members.
DECISION1
BANKS, Member: This case is before the Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB or Board) on exceptions filed by respondent, City of Santa Maria (City), and
cross-exceptions by charging party, City of Santa Maria Firefighters Association
(Association), to an administrative law judge’s (ALJ) proposed decision (attached).2
1 Pursuant to Government Code section 3509, subdivision (a), and section
3541.3, subdivision (k), the Board has delegated this case for decision to a two-
member panel of the Board. Unless otherwise specified, all further statutory
references are to the Government Code.
2 The Association initially filed exceptions but PERB’s Appeals Assistant
administratively rejected them as untimely, which the Association’s appeals. Upon
review we have determined to treat the Association’s late-filed exceptions as timely

2
The underlying unfair practice charge and complaint alleged that the City violated the
Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA)3 when it failed to meet and confer before deciding
to open a recruitment for Fire Captains to outside candidates, rather than restricting
the recruitment to current employees of the City’s Fire Department (Department) in
accordance with established past practice. Additionally, the complaint alleged that the
City retaliated against certain employees when it initiated formal disciplinary
investigations of their protected activities, specifically their efforts to publicize the
Association’s dispute with the City over the recruitment and encourage others not to
apply for the positions.
In the proposed decision, the ALJ concluded that the City violated the MMBA by
retaliating against employees and by failing to bargain over the negotiable impacts of
the decision to open the recruitment to outside candidates. The City excepts to these
conclusions, contending it did not breach its legal duties under the MMBA.
Additionally, the proposed decision concluded that the City’s decision to run an open
promotional recruitment was outside the scope of representation and therefore not
subject to the meet and confer requirements of the MMBA. The Association excepts
to this conclusion, contending that the City had a duty to meet and confer before
deciding to alter promotional standards or procedures for Captains.
Having reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments, we conclude that the
proposed decision’s factual findings are substantially correct and adopt them as the
cross-exceptions, pursuant to PERB Regulation 32310. PERB Regulations are
codified at California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 31001 et seq.
3 The MMBA is codified at Government Code section 3500 et seq.

3
findings of the Board itself. We also agree with and adopt the proposed decision’s
conclusions that the City failed to engage in meaningful effects bargaining before
opening the Captain recruitment to outside candidates, and that its decision to initiate
disciplinary investigations constituted unlawful retaliation against employees because
of their protected activities. However, in light of County of Orange (2019) PERB
Decision No. 2663-M (Orange), which issued after the proposed decision and
overruled City of Alhambra (2010) PERB Decision No. 2139-M (Alhambra) to the
extent it held that changes to promotional criteria were outside the scope of
representation, we reverse the proposed decision’s conclusion that the City had no
duty to meet and confer over its decision to run an open recruitment. We conclude
instead that the City’s failure to negotiate over the decision constituted a discrete
violation of the MMBA.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
Since we adopt the proposed decision’s findings of fact, it is necessary to
provide only a brief factual summary to contextualize our discussion of the parties’
exceptions. By the following summary, we do not disturb those findings, but we do
add to them from the record evidence where necessary for purposes of addressing
certain of the parties’ arguments.
The Association represents a bargaining unit of Firefighters, Engineers, and
Captains, all of whom are sworn public-safety employees of the City.4 Its executive
board (E-board) consists of President Anthony Morales (Captain), 1st Vice President
4 The unit also contains non-sworn classifications, like fire marshal, but such
persons are not relevant to this matter.

4
Chad Wennerstrom (Captain), 2nd Vice President Jill Hoover (Engineer/acting
Captain), 3rd Vice President Clint McIntosh (Engineer), and Secretary/Treasurer
Anthony James Tevas (Firefighter), all of whom are employees of the Department.
Within the Department, the Firefighter classification is the entry-level position, while
the Engineer and Captain classifications are considered promotional. The Department
operates with three-person crews consisting of a Firefighter, an Engineer, and a
Captain who acts as the frontline supervisor during calls.
It takes considerable work and training to qualify to become a Captain. For
instance, those wishing to promote from Engineer to Captain must complete the
Captain’s task book, which details the skills, training, and education that a candidate
must demonstrate to the training chief in order to qualify for consideration. A
candidate cannot complete the entire task book in one effort. Rather the tasks are set
up sequentially, each building on the prior one, and the whole book requires significant
study and skill to complete. For this reason, Engineers wishing to promote to Captain
must devote considerable time to the undertaking, all while fulfilling their normal
duties.
A. The City Unilaterally Opens the Captain Positions to Outside Candidates
Before the events giving rise to this case, the City always promoted Captains
from within the bargaining unit and never permitted outside candidates to compete for
these positions. (Similarly, the City always selected unit Firefighters to become
Engineers.) Indeed, the City’s Fire Chief, Leonard Champion, who has worked for the
Department since 1990, admitted that he had never known the City to open such
promotional recruitments to persons outside the Department. This practice of

5
promoting Captains from within the rank-and-file ensured that only persons with
significant, actual experience with the specific and unique characteristics of the
Department would lead firefighters in their dangerous and critical public-safety work.
Likewise, the practice protected promotional opportunities for existing employees and
ensured that those who served the longest had the best opportunity to advance their
careers.
The City was faced with vacancies in the Captain classification beginning in or
around 2016. On March 28, 2016, Champion’s predecessor and interim Fire Chief,
Scott Kenley, raised with Morales the possibility of running an “open” recruitment for
the position of Captain and altering the Captain’s job description to permit candidates
to demonstrate competency by passing a probationary period instead of completing
the Captain’s task book. These changes would allow people who were not already
employees of the Department to apply for the position. Kenley cited low interest and
few applications among internal candidates as the reasons for the idea. After Morales
informally discussed the matter with Kenley, the Department ultimately chose to
continue its practice of selecting Captains from among the rank-and-file and retained
completion of the Captain’s task book as a prerequisite in the job description. These
informal discussions between Kenley and Morales did not commence, much less
complete, collective bargaining negotiations over any proposed decision or the effects
thereof. Rather, they were in the nature of an informal tête-à-tête. And since both
parties came away satisfied, the Association had no reason to proceed to full-fledged
negotiations over the matter.

6
Nevertheless, shortly after Champion assumed leadership of the Department,
the issue of vacancies resurfaced. On January 17, 2017, at a regularly scheduled
labor-management meeting, Champion disclosed that the Department had three
vacant positions for Captain and that there did not appear to be adequate interest
among employees eligible for promotion. Champion noted that many engineers were
turning down “move-ups,” where an engineer works out-of-class as an acting Captain
after completing a task book to become qualified. The fact that engineers had
declined opportunities to practice the duties of a promotional position before applying
indicated to him that engineers lacked sufficient interest to become Captains. 	The
Association suggested there should be greater out-of-class pay to attract candidates
willing to work as acting Captains and stated that if the City wished to open the
recruitment to external candidates, that would require a meet-and-confer process.
However, as discussed immediately below, the City proceeded to unilaterally
announce its decision to run an open recruitment.
On January 25, 2017,5 Champion e-mailed members of the E-board regarding
the Captain recruitment, announcing his decision to “look outside” the Department
because of the lack of promotional interest from rank-and-file engineers. Unlike his
predecessor, however, Champion claimed the Captain’s job description required no
changes to permit outside applicants, because the existing description allowed all who
possessed “the ‘education, training and/or experience to demonstrate knowledge,
skills, and abilities’ to meet the minimum requirements” for Captain to apply for the job.
5 The proposed decision misstates the date as occurring in 2018.

7
Champion also announced that the City would open or “fly” the Captain’s job on
February 22, 2017, but he invited the Association “to meet and discuss the impacts of
this decision” before that date.
On February 1, 2017, members of the Association’s E-Board met with the City
to discuss Champion’s e-mail. In response to Champion’s invitation discuss the
impacts of an open recruitment, the E-Board prepared a letter outlining their concerns
that the parties discussed during the meeting. The letter first enumerated the reasons
the Association believed employees did not accept acting-Captain status:
“1. 	Seniority—lose it when you promote
“2. 	Less [overtime] opportunities
“3. 	Not able to work at ARFF [6] anymore
“4. 	Extra work load, responsibility [without] adequate
pay raise (not proportionate to Captain to [Battalion Chief])
“5. 	Another year of probation as well as a daunting task
book
“6. 	The complexity of the testing process, when you can
just act for similar pay.”
Next, the Association enumerated its concerns with outside candidates:
“1. 	How can [outside candidates] be an effective leader
when they don’t know how [the City’s Department]
6 “ARFF” typically refers to the Aircraft Rescue & Firefighting Division, which
provides firefighting and other emergency services to area airports. (See, e.g., County
of Sacramento (2014) PERB Decision No. 2393-M.)

8
operates or how we connect with our community
members—it simply isn’t something that can be read
in a week or learned during a recruitment process[.]
“2. 	At what step/pay grade would they come in?
“3. 	What retirement formula do they come in at?
“4. 	Seniority—a brand new Captain could come in and
have more seniority than a 20-year veteran?
“5. 	Do they have to go through an academy? If so, how
much time and money are we going to spend on bringing
them up to speed? Aren’t we better off using those
resources to empower our own people to promote?
“6. 	Can they work down? As a firefighter or an
engineer? Do they have to do those taskbooks? Could
they drive our engines?
“7. 	Would they have applicable experience for respected
stations? If they don’t have wildland experience, would
they be able to go station 3 or 5? No truck experience, can
they work at station 1?
“8. 	Would they come in with a CPAT? [7]
“9. 	Would we allow two people from the outside to work
together? Example: an outside Captain and Engineer are
7 “CPAT” is the Candidate Physical Ability Test. (Health & Safety Code
§ 13159.15.)

9
working on an engine leaving the Firefighter as they only
person that knows the department and the city.
“10. 	Why are they leaving their current job? What issues
are they running from?
“11. 	Will they go through a ‘Lateral Captain Taskbook’?”
The Association also made it clear that it opposed the recruitment of outside
candidates for safety reasons: “Trusting your leader is of the upmost importance on
any crew, because we trust our lives with each other- and those relationships are built
over the years, not just because someone passed a promotional test.”
Champion believed that many of these issues were legitimate and amenable to
negotiations, however he remained convinced that the decision to fly the position to
the public was a managerial prerogative not subject to the meet and confer
requirements of the MMBA. At the conclusion of the meeting, Champion offered to
speak directly to the Engineers who were eligible for promotion to gauge their interest,
without opposition from the E-Board.
After speaking with those Engineers, many of whom were serving as acting-
Captains, Champion determined that only one was strongly interested in applying for
one of the three permanent Captain’s positions. He therefore requested and received
approval from the City’s human resources department to run an open recruitment for
the positions. On February 6, 2017, Champion informed Morales that the City was
going to fly the positions. Morales responded by demanding to bargain the matter and
Champion requested a legal opinion from the Association’s counsel to justify its
position.

10
On February 10, 2017, and before the Association had a chance to furnish the
requested legal opinion, Champion announced to the bargaining unit that the City was
opening the recruitment to the public. This announcement surprised the Association
not only because its counsel was working on a legal opinion,8 but also because
Champion had previously stated he was going to fly the position on February 22.
B. The Association Requests Publication of a “Do Not Apply” Communication
In response to this action,9 Morales spoke with an official of the Association’s
statewide federation, the California Professional Firefighters (CPF), who offered to
prepare a “Do Not Apply” communication for distribution to CPF leaders across
California. The purpose of this communication was to alert firefighters throughout the
state to the fact that the City’s publicly posted Captain positions were the subject of a
bargaining dispute between the Association and the City. As the name implies, a Do
Not Apply communication also seeks to encourage members of CPF-affiliated unions
to show solidarity with their fellow firefighters by refraining from applying for disputed
positions.
On or about February 21, 2017, CPF e-mailed a “Do Not Apply” communication
to firefighters on its membership list, which stated, in part:
“URGENT – PLEASE POST: DO NOT APPLY TO SANTA
MARIA FIRE DEPARTMENT
8 The Association provided the promised legal opinion on February 13, 2017.
9 As discussed below, when the Association sought to introduce evidence that
the action was unilateral, i.e., that the City did not provide the Association notice and
an adequate opportunity to meet and confer before deciding to open the recruitment to
non-employees, the City cut short the Association’s questioning via a stipulation that
effectively narrowed the City’s defenses to just two: arguing that the decision was
outside the scope of representation and/or consistent with past practice.

11
“Outside Search for Captain Ignores Past Practice and
Qualified Internal Candidates”
(Emphasis in original.)
Morales did not author or review the communication; he saw it only after CPF sent it to
him and every other member on CPF’s e-mail list. Once he received it, Morales was
concerned that the communication could be misconstrued to mean that the City was
passing up qualified rank-and-file candidates. Morales contacted CPF to request
certain revisions to clarify the nature of the bargaining dispute. CPF promptly sent a
second communication:
“Outside Search for Captain At Odds With Past Practice
[¶]
“Brothers and Sisters:
“The Santa Maria Fire Department has chosen to recruit for
fire captain by opening the position to outside candidates.
The effort to search outside is not in accordance with long-
standing past practice to promote from within.
“Currently there are highly qualified internal candidates for
the captain’s post.
“Recruiting outside candidates for this position would be a
direct affront to a long-standing principle and a blow to
morale.
“Local 2020 respectfully ask[s] for your help and support by
not applying for the captain’s post in Santa Maria and
further asks that you help get the word out to our affiliated
brothers and sisters and post on union bulletin boards.
“Please DO NOT APPLY in Santa Maria Fire
Department.”
(Emphasis in original.)

12
Champion was shocked by the “Do Not Apply” communication and believed it
was disingenuous. On February 22, 2017, he sent a communication to the
Association laying out the legal position for the City’s decision to take unilateral action
to fly the Captain positions. Among other contentions, Champion claimed that the
City’s long, uninterrupted history of promoting Captains from within the ranks did not
create a binding past practice and that its actions were justified by the management
rights clause in the parties’ memorandum of understanding (MOU).
Champion also sent a similar communication to all bargaining unit members,
expressing his belief that the Association had brought discredit to the Department by
its decision to seek the assistance of CPF. Champion also claimed the City’s
Municipal Code authorized him to open the recruitment process to the public without
having to bargain with the Association. Specifically, Champion cited Section 2-20.09.1
of the Municipal Code, which states that the City “shall schedule open or promotional
recruitments based on vacancies or anticipated vacancies to meet the need in the City
service,” and that “[o]pen recruitments may be scheduled when it is not practical to fill
vacancies by promotion or when specifically requested by the appointing authority.”
Finally, although at hearing he acknowledged the legitimacy of many of the
Association’s concerns about outside candidates, Champion dismissed those
concerns in his letter to employees as “purely emotional.”
By the close of the application period, the City received between 14 and 16
applications from outside applicants for the open Captain positions. Champion said
four of them were deemed qualified and invited to take a written examination to be
held on or around March 16, 2017. One of the four external applicants who had been

13
invited to the examination notified the Department beforehand that he would not be
able to appear for the test. The other three external applicants did not appear for the
examination on March 16 without prior notice or explanation. Neither Champion nor
anyone else from the City contacted them to inquire about their failure to appear for
the exam.
Ultimately, three internal candidates took the examination, passed it, and were
promoted to the position of Captain.
C. The City’s Investigation of the Association’s E-Board
Despite this successful conclusion to the recruitment, Champion decided to
investigate the E-Board’s involvement in creating and distributing the “Do Not Apply”
communication, which he believed might have been created or distributed in violation
of City rules. Specifically, Champion testified he needed to determine the
Association’s intent in sending the communication, whether it had been prepared on
City-time or with City-equipment, and that everything was “done above board.”
Thus, on or around March 17, 2017, i.e., the day after the Captain examination,
the City’s Director of Human Resources and Records, Jayne Anderson, issued all five
members of the Association’s E-board an individually addressed memorandum
notifying them of a fact-finding investigation by an independent, third-party investigator
“regarding the publication of a post discouraging external applicants from applying for
employment with the City[.]” Significantly, the memorandum warned that “[t]he
subject matter during this interview may lead to discipline against you. Failure
to attend the meeting will be considered an act of insubordination and can be an

14
independent basis for disciplinary action, up to and including dismissal.” (Emphasis in
original.)
The City separately questioned each E-Board member. Before beginning the
investigative interrogation, the City’s investigator required the E-Board members to
sign an Administrative Investigation Advisement Form, acknowledging that they were
the subject of an investigation that could lead to discipline. According to the
transcripts of the interviews,10 the City’s investigator inquired about the identity of the
persons within the Association and CPF responsible for the “Do Not Apply”
communication, the conversations surrounding the publication of the communication,
and the Association’s intent and motivation for communicating with firefighters around
the state in this fashion.
About six weeks after these interrogations, Champion issued a confidential
memorandum notifying the E-Board members of the completion of the fact-finding
investigation into the communication. Champion noted the purpose of the
investigation had been (1) to find out if Department employees were “directly or
indirectly” involved in the publication of the communication, and (2) if the
communication “had any impact on the City’s ability to recruit candidates for a Fire
Captain position, and if so, what impacts.” After reviewing the investigator’s findings,
the City concluded that the E-Board members were directly involved in sending the
“Do Not Apply” communication, but also that there was insufficient basis to believe
10 These transcripts were attached as Exhibit 13 to the investigator’s final report
and made part of the record in these proceedings pursuant to the parties’ stipulation.

15
“the recruitment was detrimentally affected” as a result. Consequently, none of the E-
Board members received formal discipline.
DISCUSSION
Although the Board reviews exceptions to a proposed decision de novo, to the
extent that a proposed decision adequately addresses issues raised by certain
exceptions, the Board need not further analyze those exceptions. (County of Santa
Clara (2019) PERB Decision No. 2629-M, p. 6.) The Board also need not address
alleged errors that would not impact the outcome. (Ibid.) With these principles in
mind, we address whether: (1) the City had a duty to give the Association notice and
an opportunity to bargain before deciding to permit non-employees to apply for the
Captain positions, and (2) the City’s decision to investigate the Association’s E-Board
constituted unlawful retaliation against protected conduct.
A. 	The City’s Decision to Open the Recruitment to Non-Employees
Constituted an Unlawful Unilateral Change.
California’s labor relations statutes contemplate bilateral decision-making as to
subjects within the scope of representation, though an employer has the right to
impose new terms after bargaining in good faith, without committing unfair practices,
from “inception through exhaustion of statutory or other applicable impasse resolution
procedures.” (City of Glendale (2020) PERB Decision No. 2694-M, p. 60; City of San
Ramon (2018) PERB Decision No. 2571-M, p. 6; Fresno County In-Home Supportive
Services Public Authority (2015) PERB Decision No. 2418-M, pp. 54-55; City of San
Jose (2013) PERB Decision No. 2341-M, p. 40.) The gravamen of any unilateral
action is exclusion of employees through their chosen representative from
participation in the decision-making process. Whether a unilateral action is the

16
creation, implementation or enforcement of policy, or a change to existing policy as
contained in a written agreement, in written employer rules or regulations, or in an
unwritten established past practice, our statutes require an employer contemplating a
change in policy concerning a matter within the scope of representation to provide the
exclusive representative notice and an opportunity to bargain. (Pasadena Area
Community College District (2014) PERB Decision No. 2444, p. 12.)
Thus, a unilateral change violates the statutory duty to bargain in good faith if
(1) the employer took action to change existing policy; (2) the policy change
concerned a matter within the scope of representation; (3) the action was taken
without giving the exclusive representative notice or opportunity to bargain over the
change; and (4) the change has a generalized effect or continuing impact on terms
and conditions of employment. (City of Davis (2016) PERB Decision No. 2494-M,
p. 18, citing Fairfield-Suisun Unified School District (2012) PERB Decision No. 2262,
p. 9.)
Here, we focus only on the first two elements. The City inexplicably has
submitted numerous arguments as to the third element, even though it waived those
arguments in front of the ALJ.11 In order to deter gamesmanship, as well as for other
11 When the Association sought to introduce evidence that the action was
unilateral, i.e., that the City did not provide the Association notice and an adequate
opportunity to meet and confer before deciding to open the recruitment to non-
employees, the City’s counsel stated that if the Association’s purpose “is to get to the
point that the City did not meet and confer over . . . the decision to allow external
applicants [to] apply for the fire chief position, . . . We will stipulate that we did not
meet and confer over that issue.” Later, when the Association once more sought to
introduce such evidence, the City’s counsel again relied on the stipulation to keep
such testimony out. And still later, when the Association sought to introduce evidence
that it did not receive adequate advance notice of the City’s decision, the ALJ and

17
equally strong reasons of judicial economy, we do not consider arguments the City
waived. (Los Angeles County Superior Court (2018) PERB Decision No. 2566-C,
p. 12 [Board is justified in declining to review an exception raising an issue that was
not presented to the ALJ, and such considerations are even stronger when the
excepting party affirmatively waived the issue].) As to the fourth element, the City did
not except to the proposed decision’s conclusion that its action had a continuing
impact on the bargaining unit’s terms and conditions of employment, and we concur
with that conclusion.
1. 	Past Practice
A charging party can establish a change in policy with evidence of (1) changes
to the parties’ written agreements; (2) changes in established past practices; or (3)
newly created policies, or application or enforcement of an existing policy in a new
way. (County of Monterey (2018) PERB Decision No. 2579-M, p. 10.) Here, the
Association’s evidence focused both on the parties’ existing past practice and the
City’s application of its Municipal Code to allow the first-ever open recruitment for
Captain positions. On exceptions, the City contends that no past practice required it
counsel for both parties again acknowledged there was no need for such testimony,
since that was covered by the parties’ stipulation. Consistent with these stipulations,
the City’s brief to the ALJ argued only the first two elements of the unilateral change
test. In other words, since the City stipulated that it did not give adequate notice or
meet and confer, it is unnecessary to consider its argument that the Association “failed
to request bargaining.” But even absent the stipulation, the City’s argument would fail
because the Association clearly sought to bargain over the proposed decision to open
the recruitment and the impacts of such a change. Indeed, the Association’ February
1 letter outlining its concerns came in response to Champion’s request that the
Association “meet and discuss the impacts” of the proposal to fly the Captain
positions.

18
to maintain an internal Captain recruitment and that the Municipal Code gave it explicit
authority to open the recruitment to non-employees. We reject both contentions.
Simply stated, a binding past practice is one which is “unequivocal, clearly
enunciated and acted upon, and readily ascertainable over a reasonable period of
time as a fixed and established practice accepted by both parties,” or which is “regular
and consistent” or “historic and accepted.” (County of Orange (2018) PERB Decision
No. 2611-M, pp. 10-11, fn. 7, citing County of Riverside (2013) PERB Decision
No. 2307-M, p. 20.) Here, it is undisputed that the City always promoted Captains
from within the rank-and-file and never permitted non-employees to compete for such
positions. Indeed, Champion himself, who has worked for the Department since 1990,
admitted this has always been true.12 Such a longstanding status quo has all the
attributes of a binding, unwritten past practice.
The City attempts to counter this undisputed evidence of past practice by
asserting that its Municipal Code authorized it to conduct external recruitments.
Certainly, section 20.09.1 of the City’s Municipal Code purports to authorize the City to
conduct an open (external) or promotional (internal) recruitment “when specifically
requested by the appointing authority,” as was the case here. But a local ordinance
does not relieve the City of its statutory bargaining obligation, because “[l]abor
relations in the public sector are matters of statewide concern subject to state
legislation in contravention of local regulation.” (Huntington Beach Police Officers'
12 Additionally, in response to a request from its investigator for historical
information about past Captain recruitments, the City furnished records showing that it
recruited only internal candidates since 2012.

19
Assn. v. City of Huntington Beach (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 492, 503.) In other words,
the City may not enforce its Municipal Code in a manner that frustrates the declared
polices and purposes of the MMBA, which favor bilateral negotiation of subjects within
the scope of representation.
We also reject the City’s contention that it was privileged under Marysville Joint
Unified School District (1983) PERB Decision No. 314 (Marysville) to apply its
Municipal Code in a manner that contradicted established past practice. As the ALJ
noted in the attached proposed decision, at p. 18, Marysville deals only with clear and
unambiguous contractual waivers found in negotiated memoranda of understanding
and does not apply to a unilaterally adopted employer ordinance, which cannot
constitute a waiver. (City of Culver City (2020) PERB Decision No. 2731-M,
pp. 14-20.) The City thus misapprehends the law when it argues that the Municipal
Code left it with discretion to hold its first open Captain recruitment without any
bargaining obligation. Notably, if a union has not waived its right to bargain, then the
MMBA imposes a bargaining obligation on the employer prior to exercising discretion
on a negotiable topic. (County of Kern (2018) PERB Decision No. 2615-M, pp. 6-7.)13
13 The City argues that in the past it held open recruitments for other positions
but had no need to do so for Captains, because there were always internal applicants
willing and able to apply. However, this points precisely to the reasons the MMBA
requires bargaining in advance of a decision to change an established practice: the
mediating impacts of meeting and conferring could lead the Association to convince its
members to apply, or convince the City to sweeten the incentive to do so by fixing
employees’ loss of seniority or other issues. (Cf. Lucia Mar Unified School District
(2001) PERB Decision No. 1440, adopting proposed decision at pp. 42-43 & 45
[personnel problems are particularly amenable to negotiation, and neither the
employer nor PERB may assume such negotiations may fail; the law “does not

20
In its briefing to the Board, the City acknowledges Marysville held that “where
contractual language is clear and unambiguous, it is unnecessary to go beyond the
plain meaning of the contract itself to ascertain its meaning,” and similarly cites Rio
Hondo Community College District (1982) PERB Decision No. 279 for the proposition
that “even if an employer has not chosen to enforce its contractual rights in the past,”
this “does not mean that, ipso facto, it is forever precluded from doing so.” (emphasis
supplied.) The City therefore shifts its argument from contractual waiver to waiver by
conduct. But the City cannot allege facts showing such a waiver, such as that it
provided an opportunity to bargain and the Association declined. (City of Culver City,
supra, PERB Decision No. 2731-M, p. 18.) The City instead claims the Association
waived its right to bargain over changes to future recruitment practices merely
because it “was aware of the provisions of the Municipal Code, yet nevertheless
elected not to act on that knowledge.” Given that Captain recruitment has always
been internal-only, if there is any party whose conduct arguably shows conscious
acquiescence to the status quo, it would be the City, not the Association. There was
no reason for the Association to take any action given the established practice of
considering only internal applicants for Captain positions and the City’s duty to bargain
before implementing its policy in a new way that changed the practice.
2. 	Promotional Opportunities Are within the Scope of Bargaining
As noted, the proposed decision relied on Alhambra, supra, PERB Decision
No. 2139-M, for its conclusion that promotional opportunities like the ones at issue
mandate success, but only requires a good faith effort by the parties to reach
agreement”].)

21
here were not within the MMBA’s scope of representation. However, in Orange,
supra, PERB Decision No. 2663-M, the Board overruled Alhambra on this point and
held that changes to promotional procedures or criteria are within the scope of
representation because they are among the decisions that directly affect the
employment relationship. (Id. at pp. 7 & 12-15 [explaining that Alhambra was
inconsistent with other PERB and appellate precedent, and misapplied the test set
forth in International Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local 188, AFL-CIO v. PERB (2011)
51 Cal.4th 259, 272-273 (Richmond Firefighters).) This case falls squarely within that
holding and illustrates the significance of promotional procedures and opportunities to
the employment relationship.
Under the MMBA, the scope of representation includes all matters relating to
employment conditions and employer-employee relations, including wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment. (MMBA, § 3504.) Fundamental
managerial decisions regarding the merits, necessity, or organization of public
services, however, are outside the scope of representation and therefore not subject
to the MMBA’s meet-and-confer requirement. (Ibid.)
From this statutory language, the Supreme Court has distilled three categories
of managerial decisions: (1) “decisions that ‘have only an indirect and attenuated
impact on the employment relationship’ and thus are not mandatory subjects of
bargaining,” such as advertising, product design, and financing; (2) “decisions directly
defining the employment relationship, such as wages, workplace rules, and the order
of succession of layoffs and recalls,” which are “always mandatory subjects of
bargaining” and (3) “decisions that directly affect employment, such as eliminating

22
jobs, but nonetheless may not be mandatory subjects of bargaining because they
involve ‘a change in the scope and direction of the enterprise’ or, in other words, the
employer’s ‘retained freedom to manage its affairs unrelated to employment.’”
(Richmond Firefighters, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 272-273.)
If the decision at issue is in the first or second category, that is the end of the
inquiry, and a decision in the second category is bargainable irrespective of whether it
has a significant and adverse consequence on employees. (Orange, supra, PERB
Decision No. 2663-M, p. 7, citing County of Orange (2018) PERB Decision No. 2594-
M, p. 19 [noting, for instance, that even a wage increase, which benefits employees, is
bargainable].)14 If the matter is in the third category, we apply a balancing test, under
which bargaining is required only if “the benefit, for labor-management relations and
the collective bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the
business.” (Id., quoting Richmond Firefighters, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 273.)
In Orange, we explained that changes to promotional procedures and criteria
usually fall in the second Richmond Firefighters category, because they directly define
the employment relationship. (Orange, supra, PERB Decision No. 2663-M, pp. 7-8.)15
14 See Zerger, ed. (2nd ed. 2019) California Public Sector Labor Relations §
8.02[2] [“By explaining that decisions directly defining the employment relationship are
always mandatory subjects of bargaining, Richmond Firefighters . . . instructs that
PERB and the courts need not ask whether such a decision has a ‘significant and
adverse effect’ on wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment, nor
balance that effect against the employer’s need for unencumbered decisionmaking.”]
15 In the alternative, Orange held that even to the extent promotional criteria fall
into the third category of decisions—and the balancing test therefore applies—the
benefits to collective bargaining and labor relations outweigh the burden placed on
management. (Orange, supra, PERB Decision No. 2663-M, pp. 13-15.)

23
For example, in a landmark case, the Supreme Court held that a union’s proposals
about vacancies and promotions were mandatory subjects of bargaining because they
concerned job security and opportunities for advancement and therefore related
directly to the terms and conditions of the represented employees’ employment. (Fire
Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608, 618 (Vallejo).) Following
Vallejo, the Court of Appeal stressed the importance of promotional opportunities to
current employees in finding that promotional procedures are an important “condition
of employment.” (International Association of Fire Fighters Union v. City of
Pleasanton (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 959, 971 (Pleasanton).) The Board, for its part, has
cited to Vallejo and Pleasanton in noting that promotional criteria and procedures fall
within the scope of representation. (City of Riverside (2009) PERB Decision No. 2027-
M, p. 14.)
The facts of this case well illustrate why promotional opportunities are
bargainable, as the City’s decision to open the recruitment to outside candidates
related directly to the bargaining unit’s terms and conditions of employment. In
addition to the subjects identified in our prior cases, including seniority, opportunity for
advancement, etc., the decision to recruit an outside candidate to lead bargaining unit
firefighters implicated matters of safety. As the Association made clear in its letter of
February 1, 2017, a firefighting crew must have confidence in its frontline leaders, who
regularly make life-or-death decisions in emergencies. Introducing an outsider who is
unfamiliar with, inter alia, the crews, the City’s hazards, and the peculiarities of the
Department could well lead to significant safety risks. The Supreme Court has long
recognized that workplace safety is firmly within the scope of representation.

24
(Richmond Firefighters, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 275, citing Vallejo, supra, 12 Cal.3d at
p. 619 [questions of employee safety are within the scope of representation].) These
considerations support the precedential rule set forth in Orange and our conclusion
here that the Association was entitled to bargain about the City’s decision to alter and
curtail promotional opportunities by holding its first ever open recruitment for Captain.
Of course, we are mindful of the City’s concerns about persistent vacancies in
the Captain rank. However, the duty to bargain is not a fetter or snare for the unwary.
Rather, as noted ante, bargaining provides a valuable opportunity to air different
perspectives and thereby improve labor relations, and one can never predict the
outcome of such efforts in advance. If such bargaining had failed, the City would have
had the power to implement its last proposal on the matter. Even when it is necessary
for an employer to impose after impasse, the parties’ efforts in exhausting their
bargaining obligations are far from wasted, since it leaves employees knowing that
they had the full opportunity for input.16
B. 	The City’s Investigation of the Association’s E-Board Constituted
Retaliation.
The proposed decision concluded that the City retaliated against the
Association’s five E-Board members when it investigated protected activities, namely
the publication of the “Do Not Apply” communication. The City excepts to this
conclusion, contending that the first version of the communication was not protected
16 The City has not attempted to argue that it was excused from bargaining by a
compelling operational necessity that left insufficient time for negotiations. (See
Calexico Unified School District (1983) PERB Decision No. 357, adopting proposed
decision at p. 20.)

25
because it falsely stated that the City had ignored qualified internal candidates, that it
was published with actual malice, and that both versions of the communication
disrupted the Department’s operations by dissuading qualified outside candidates from
applying. Alternatively, the City argues that there was insufficient evidence of nexus
between the communication and the decision to investigate the E-Board members,
and that the investigations did not amount to an adverse action.17 Finally, the City
argues that it had legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons to conduct the investigation.18
Like the ALJ, we reject these contentions. Although the proposed decision adequately
addresses them, we supplement the proposed decision with limited further analysis
regarding the protected status of the communication and the adverse nature of the
investigation.
17 When we refer to the City’s investigations, we include by extension the City’s
threat of discipline. Although a threat and an investigation can constitute separate
adverse actions (Chula Vista Elementary School District (2018) PERB Decision
No. 2586, p. 25 (Chula Vista)), in this case we do not disturb the ALJ’s decision to
follow the parties’ lead and consider them in an integrated fashion.
18 We reject this exception because the City has already admitted it initiated the
investigations in response to the “Do Not Apply” communication. As in Chula Vista,
supra, PERB Decision No. 2586, the employer investigated employees for a written
communication which itself provided all the information the employer needed to
determine that the E-Board members maintained the MMBA’s protection. (Id. at p. 32
[“Under these circumstances, an appropriate action would have been to seek legal
advice regarding the protected status of the [communication], and not to demand that
[the employee] appear in person for questioning.”].) Thus, our analysis turns entirely
on (1) whether the communications at issue are protected or unprotected, and (2)
whether the City’s investigation was an adverse action. (Rancho Santiago Community
College District (1986) PERB Decision No. 602, pp. 11-12 & 14 [where employer
explicitly states that it disciplined employee as a result of employee statements, there
is no question as to motivation and PERB’s task is to determine whether the
statements were statutorily-protected].)

26
1. 	The “Do Not Apply” Communication Was Protected
The MMBA guarantees public employees “the right to form, join, and participate
in the activities of employee organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of
representation on all matters of employer-employee relations.” (MMBA, § 3502;
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. City of Gridley (1983) 34 Cal.3d
191, 197-198.) Among these rights is the right to communicate with fellow workers
and other persons for the purpose of publicizing a labor dispute. Indeed, “there is no
more fundamental right” afforded employees under PERB-enforced statutes than the
right to communicate with others about working conditions.” (Los Angeles Community
College District (Perez) (2014) PERB Decision No. 2404, p. 11, fn. 5.) On this basis,
we conclude that the “Do Not Apply” communication was presumptively protected
because its central purpose was to apprise others of a workplace dispute and to enlist
their support.
Moreover, the MMBA protects even those communications that criticize
management or working conditions, unless it is shown by clear and convincing
evidence that the employees published a false statement with actual malice. (Chula
Vista, supra, PERB Decision No. 2586, pp. 16-17 & fn. 8; see also County of Riverside
(2018) PERB Decision No. 2591-M, pp. 6-7.) Under Chula Vista, a party asserting
that presumptively protected speech is in fact maliciously false must prove that
“(1) the employee’s statement was false and (2) the
employee made the statement ‘with knowledge of its falsity,
or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false.’
[(Sutter Health v. UNITE HERE (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th
1193, 1209 (Sutter Health); Triple Play Sports Bar and
Grille (2014) 361 NLRB 308, 312.)] This standard focuses
on the employee’s subjective state of mind, not on whether

27
a reasonable person would have investigated before
making the statement. (Sutter Health, supra, 186
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1210-1211.) Even gross or extreme
negligence as to the statement’s truth is insufficient to
prove the actual malice necessary to strip employee speech
of statutory protection. (Id. at p. 12-11.)
Here, the City’s case rests on a single word in the first communication—
“Outside Search for Captain Ignores Past Practice and Qualified Internal Candidates.”
(Emphasis supplied.) But the word “ignores” does not come even close to meeting the
exacting “clear and convincing” standard for proving that E-Board members made a
false statement with actual malice. First, the word does not render the statement
false. Rather, the City did ignore past practice, and in doing so it arguably ignored the
protests and concerns of the qualified internal candidates who asked the City to
address those perceived unfair features of the City’s approach that disincentivized
existing City employee from applying. Second, even if the reference to internal
candidates was ambiguous, i.e., susceptible to a false interpretation, that would be
insufficient to constitute clear and convincing evidence that the E-Board members
made a false statement with actual malice. In fact, the Association took immediate
steps to clarify the matter by issuing a second version of the communication that
removed all ambiguity, thus demonstrating nothing like a reckless disregard for the
truth. Since the City can at most show only simple negligence on the part of the E-
Board, its arguments are insufficient to rob the communication of its protected status
even assuming for the sake of argument that it was false or misleading.
Finally, the City’s claim that the communication disrupted its operation by
preventing qualified outside candidates from applying is belied by the results of its own

28
investigation, which found no basis for any such conclusion. In any event, to one
degree or another, many protected concerted activities are undertaken for the purpose
of disrupting the employer’s unfair practices and operations. In the absence of
evidence that such activities “create a substantial and imminent threat to the health or
safety of the public” (County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees
Assn. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 564, 586) there is no basis to believe that a communication
like the one at issue here was rendered unprotected by its alleged success.
We conclude, therefore, that both versions of the “Do Not Apply”
communication were protected by the MMBA.
2. 	The Investigations Constituted Adverse Actions
The City argues that the investigations were mere fact-finding exercises and
were not adverse employment actions. We disagree. The initiation of an investigation
may be considered an adverse action against the investigated employee, regardless
of whether disciplinary action actually results. (City of Torrance (2008) PERB
Decision No. 1971-M, pp. 16-17 (Torrance); State of California (Department of Youth
Authority) (2000) PERB Decision No. 1403-S, p. 32; California Union of Safety
Employees (Coelho) (1994) PERB Decision No. 1032-S, p. 12 (CUSE).) The ultimate
question is whether a reasonable person experiencing the same circumstances as the
employee would consider the action to have an adverse employment impact. (Chula
Vista, supra, PERB Decision No. 2586, p. 25.) The question often turns on the degree
of adversity present in the investigation and thus depends on the facts of any given
case. (Service Employees International Union, Local 221 (Gutierrez) (2012) PERB
Decision No. 2277-M, p. 9.) Here, we believe the investigations were freighted with

29
sufficient adversity to constitute adverse actions for purposes of establishing
retaliation.
The investigations involved a high degree of formality, reflected by the fact that
the City expressly notified the E-Board members on multiple occasions that they faced
the possibility of discipline, as well as the fact that the investigation lasted several
months and resulted in a lengthy written report. (CUSE, supra, PERB Decision
No. 1032-S at p. 6; Torrance, supra, PERB Decision No. 1971-M, p. 16.) We reject
the City’s assertion that its disciplinary warnings were necessitated by the Firefighters
Procedural Bill of Rights or were an empty formality. (Gov. Code, § 3250 et seq.) The
warnings were serious in their appearance, and the fact that a statute may have
required the warnings is insufficient to reassure reasonable employees that an
investigation into their protected activity will leave untarnished their future promotion
prospects, ability to obtain desired assignments, and other employment conditions.
While these facts alone are sufficient to support the ALJ’s finding that the
investigation constituted adverse action, the content of the City’s questions further
supports this finding.19 In City of Commerce (2018) PERB Decision No. 2602-M, p. 6,
the Board held that even in those limited instances in which an employer may lawfully
interview employees about their protected activities,20 the employer must abide by the
19 No party has asked us to determine whether, pursuant to our unalleged
violation test, we may consider whether these questions constitute a separate
interference claim, and we decline to do so sua sponte. We therefore find only that
the City interfered with protected rights in a derivative fashion when it retaliated
against protected activities, as alleged in the complaint.
20 See, e.g., Chula Vista, supra, PERB Decision No. 2586, pp. 29-32 [employer
may ask about protected activities only if a facially valid complaint legitimately calls

30
following safeguards enumerated in Johnnie’s Poultry Company (1964) 146 NLRB
770, enf. den. (8th Cir. 1965) 344 F.2d 617:
“[T]he employer must communicate to the employee the
purpose of the questioning, assure him that no reprisal will
take place, and obtain his participation on a voluntary basis;
the questioning must occur in a context free from employer
hostility to union organization and must not be itself coercive
in nature; and the questions must not exceed the necessities
of the legitimate purpose by prying into other union matters,
eliciting information concerning an employee's subjective
state of mind, or otherwise interfering with the statutory rights
of employees.”
(Id. at pp. 774-775, footnotes omitted.)
Here, the investigations sought to determine not only if the E-Board members
had produced the “Do Not Apply” communication during work time or with City
resources, which might have been legitimate subjects for inquiry if the City had a
uniformly enforced policy prohibiting such conduct, but also the subjective motivations
and intent underlying the communication. Moreover, the City asked E-Board members
about their conversations with each other and CPF staff, all of which concerned
protected activities. Such questions were out-of-bounds because employees have the
right to keep confidential their union activities, including their participation in activities
for mutual aid and protection. (See, e.g., Guess?, Inc. (2003) 339 NLRB 432, 434.)
Questions like these that are designed to uncover protected activities have a chilling
into question whether employees lost legal protection via their own misconduct, the
alleged misconduct was not simply a written communication that can be assessed
without further investigation, and the employer promptly ceases the investigation and
notifies all affected employees regarding its outcome if it acquires information
indicating that the alleged conduct was protected].

31
effect on the exercise of employee rights. (County of Merced (2014) PERB Decision
No. 2361-M, p. 11.) Thus, the City’s failure to tailor its questions as described in City
of Commerce, supra, PERB Decision No. 2602-M, and its failure to offer the required
assurances described above, further supports our conclusion that its investigation was
objectively adverse and constituted unlawful retaliation.
ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record in
this case, it has been found that the City of Santa Maria (City) violated the Meyers-
Milias-Brown Act (MMBA or Act) (Gov. Code, § 3500 et seq.). The City violated
MMBA sections 3503, 3505, 3506, and 3506.5, subdivisions (a), (b), and (c), and
therefore committed unfair practices under MMBA section 3509, subdivision (b), and
Public Employment Relations Board (PERB or Board) Regulation 32603, subdivisions
(a), (b), (c), when it (1) failed to provide notice and an opportunity to bargain over the
decision and foreseeable effects of the decision to permit non-employees to compete
for vacant Captain positions; and (2) initiated an investigation into the conduct of each
of the members of the Santa Maria Firefighters’ Association (Association) E-Board in
response to his or her protected concerted activity and protected communications.
Pursuant to MMBA section 3509, subdivision (b), it is hereby ORDERED that
the City, its governing body, and its representatives shall:
A. CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Deciding to conduct, or implementing, an “open” recruitment for vacant
Captain positions without providing the Association with advance notice and an
opportunity to meet and confer over the decision and its foreseeable impacts.

32
2. 	Retaliating against members of the Association E-Board because of their
protected concerted activities and communications.
3. 	Denying bargaining unit employees the right to be represented by the
Association.
4. 	Denying the Association the right to represent its members.
B. TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE PURPOSES OF MMBA:
1. 	Provide the Association with advance notice and an opportunity to meet
and confer in good faith over the decision and foreseeable effects of any decision to
run an “open” recruitment for vacant Captain positions.
2. 	Destroy and rescind from employees’ personnel files any and all
documentation connected to the investigation against members of the Association’s E-
Board.
3. Within 10 workdays following the date this decision is no longer subject to
appeal, post at all work locations where notices to City employees in the bargaining
unit represented by the Association are customarily posted, copies of the Notice
attached hereto as an Appendix. The Notice must be signed by an authorized agent
of the City, indicating that it will comply with the terms of this Order. Such posting shall
be maintained for a period of 30 consecutive workdays. The Notice shall also be
posted by electronic message, intranet, internet site, and other electronic means
customarily used by the City to communicate with employees in the bargaining units

33
represented by the Association. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that the
Notice is not reduced in size, altered, defaced or covered with any other material.21
4. 	Written notification of the actions taken to comply with this Order shall be
made to the General Counsel of the Public Employment Relations Board, or the
General Counsel’s designee. The City shall provide reports, in writing, as directed by
the General Counsel or his designee. All reports regarding compliance with this Order
shall be concurrently served on the Association.
Member Krantz joined in this Decision.
21 In light of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, Respondent shall notify PERB’s
Office of the General Counsel (OGC) in writing if, due to an extraordinary
circumstance such as an emergency declaration or shelter-in-place order, a majority
of employees at one or more work locations are not physically reporting to their work
location as of the time the physical posting would otherwise commence. If
Respondent so notifies OGC, or if Charging Party requests in writing that OGC alter or
extend the posting period, require additional notice methods, or otherwise adjust the
manner in which employees receive notice, OGC shall investigate and solicit input
from all parties. OGC shall provide amended instructions to the extent appropriate to
ensure adequate publication of the Notice, such as directing Respondent to
commence posting within ten workdays after a majority of employees have resumed
physically reporting on a regular basis; directing Respondent to mail the Notice to all
employees who are not regularly reporting to any work location due to the
extraordinary circumstance, including those who are on a short term or indefinite
furlough, are on layoff subject to recall, or are working from home; or directing
Respondent to mail the Notice to those employees with whom it does not customarily
communicate through electronic means.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the State of California
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE. IT MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR AT LEAST 30
CONSECUTIVE WORKDAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
REDUCED IN SIZE, DEFACED, ALTERED OR COVERED WITH ANY OTHER
MATERIAL.
After a hearing in Unfair Practice Case No. LA-CE-1210-M, City of Santa Maria
Firefighters' Association v. City of Santa Maria, in which all parties had the right to
participate, it has been found that the City of Santa Maria violated the Meyers-Milias-
Brown Act (MMBA), Government Code section 3500 et seq.
As a result of this conduct, we have been ordered to post this Notice and we
will:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Deciding to conduct, or implementing, an “open” recruitment for
vacant Captain positions without providing the City of Santa Maria Firefighters'
Association (Association) with advance notice and an opportunity to meet and confer
over the decision and its foreseeable impacts.
2. 	Retaliating against members of the Association E-Board because
of their protected concerted activities and communications.
3. 	Denying bargaining unit employees the right to be represented by
the Association.
4. 	Denying the Association the right to represent its members.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE MMBA:
1. 	Provide the Association with advance notice and an opportunity to
meet and confer in good faith over the decision and foreseeable effects of any
decision to run an “open” recruitment for vacant Captain positions.
2. 	Destroy and rescind from employees’ personnel files any and all
documentation connected to the investigation against members of the Association’s
E-Board.
Dated: _____________________ 	City of Santa Maria
By: _________________________________
Authorized Agent

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
CITY OF SANTA MARIA FIREFIGHTERS'
ASSOCIATION,
UNFAIR PRACTICE
CASE NO. LA-CE-1210-M
PROPOSED DECISION
(March 29, 2019)
Charging Party,
v.
CITY OF SANTA MARIA,
Respondent.
Appearances: Adams, Ferrone & Ferrone by Stuart Adams, Attorney, for City of Santa Maria
Firefighters’ Association; Liebert Cassidy Whitmore by Che Johnson, Attorney, for City of
Santa Maria.
Before Valerie Pike Racho, Administrative Law Judge.
INTRODUCTION
In this case, a union representing public employees alleges that a public agency violated
its duty to meet and confer in good faith under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA)1 by
changing a long-standing past practice of running internal promotional examinations, and by
retaliating against union officials because of their protected concerted activities and
communications with the leadership of other unions and employees represented by other
unions. The public agency denies all violations.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 28, 2017, the City of Santa Maria Firefighters’ Association (SMFA or Union)
filed an unfair practice charge with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB or Board)
against the City of Santa Maria (City) alleging a failure to meet and confer on a matter within
________________________
1 The MMBA is codified at Government Code section 3500 et seq. Unless otherwise
specified, all statutory references herein are to the Government Code.

2
the scope of representation and retaliation against Union board members for their protected
concerted activity in violation of the MMBA.
On September 18, 2017, the City filed a position statement responding to SMFA’s
allegations.
On December 26, 2017, PERB’s Office of the General Counsel issued a Complaint
alleging that the City’s conduct violated MMBA sections 3503, 3505, 3506.5, subdivisions (a),
(b), and (c) and PERB Regulations.2
On January 5, 2018, the City filed its Answer to the Complaint, admitting certain facts
but denying all material allegations of wrongdoing and alleging various affirmative defenses.
On January 16, 2018, PERB conducted an informal settlement conference. The dispute
was not resolved.
On April 9 and 10, 2018, a formal hearing was held. The parties agreed to a staggered
briefing schedule.
The case was fully submitted for proposed decision on August 3, 2018, upon receipt of
the final closing brief.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Parties and Jurisdiction
The City is a public agency within the meaning of MMBA section 3501, subdivision
(c), and is therefore within PERB’s jurisdiction. SMFA is an exclusive representative of an
appropriate bargaining unit of City firefighter employees within the meaning of PERB
Regulation 32016, subdivision (b). As relevant here, the positions of firefighter, engineer, and
captain are included within SMFA’s bargaining unit. The Union’s executive board (E-board)
________________________
2 PERB Regulations are codified at California Code of Regulations, title 8, section
31001 et seq.

3
consists of President Anthony Morales (captain), 1st Vice President Chad Wennerstrom
(captain), 2nd Vice President Jill Hoover (engineer/acting captain), 3rd Vice President Clint
McIntosh (engineer), and Secretary/Treasurer Anthony James Tevis3 (firefighter).
The Fire Department’s Recruitment for Captain in 2016
In March 2016, then-interim chief Scott Kenley first raised the possibility with SMFA
of running an “open” recruitment for the position of captain, which would allow people who
were not already employees of the fire department to apply for the position.4 Kenley cited low
interest and applications among internal candidates as the reasons for the idea. The fire
department had never allowed external applicants to compete for the promotional positions of
engineer and captain within the bargaining unit. In contrast, the entry level position of
firefighter had traditionally been subject to open recruitment, as well as upper management
positions that are outside of the bargaining unit, including battalion chief, deputy chief, and
chief.
Morales discussed the issue with Kenley informally, explaining that SMFA was
opposed to opening up the recruitment to outsiders. Kenley informed Morales that he did not
believe the decision required a formal meet-and-confer process, but he was open to discussion
and input from SMFA. Morales confirmed that no formal bargaining over the issue took place,
and the parties were able to resolve the issue without executing a side letter or memorandum of
understanding. Ultimately, the fire department ran a recruitment for the captain position that
________________________
3 According to the Reporter’s Transcript, Mr. Tevis spelled his last name with an “a,”
i.e., “Tevas,” but the charge documents and hearing exhibits, which include official fire
department correspondence, note the spelling of his last name as “Tevis.” I therefore conclude
that Tevis is the correct spelling.
4 Kenley did not testify.

4
year that was not open to outside applicants. A sufficient number of internal applicants
applied, passed their examinations, and were promoted to the position of captain.
The Fire Department’s Recruitment for Captain in 2017
1. 	Initial Discussions
Leonard Champion was appointed as chief sometime before January 17, 2017.5 On that
date, the parties held a Labor-Management meeting. The fire department had 10 open
positions to fill at the time, at least three of which were for captain. Champion raised concerns
during the meeting that there did not appear to be adequate interest among eligible employees
for the captain positions. Champion noted that many engineers were turning down “move-
ups,” where an engineer works out-of-class as an acting captain after completing a task book to
become qualified.6 The fact that engineers were passing up the opportunity to become familiar
with the duties of a promotional position before applying indicated to him that there was a lack
of interest in promoting by current staff. SMFA again opposed the plan to hold an open
recruitment for captain. Morales suggested that to incentivize move-ups, there should be
greater out-of-class pay. Hoover also attended the meeting. She was not too worried about the
issue because she did not think the fire department would ever follow through with an open
recruitment for captain.
On January 25, 2018, Champion e-mailed members of the E-board regarding the
captain recruitment. On this date, several E-board officers were attending a union conference.
Chris Mahon, a district representative of California Professional Firefighters (CPF), which is a
________________________
5 Champion was a career employee of the fire department before becoming chief. All
members of the E-board had worked with him for years and knew him well.
6 A task book refers to a series of duties that must be successfully performed before an
employee is deemed qualified to test for the next higher position.

5
statewide affiliate organization of the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF), was
also attending the conference. SMFA is affiliated with both CPF and IAFF. SMFA is one of
40 locals assigned to Mahon. He provides consultation and advice to local affiliates over labor
representation issues. Mahon was present when Morales received Champion’s e-mail.
Champion stated that because of his continuing concerns regarding an inadequate candidate
pool he was contemplating running an open captain recruitment with a target date of
February 22, 2017 for the posting. Champion wrote, “If the Executive Board would like to
meet and discuss the impacts of this decision, please let me know by February 1, 2017.”
(Emphasis added.)
Mahon told Morales to try to set up a meet and confer session right away with
Champion. If Champion was then still inclined to run an open recruitment, Mahon suggested
that CPF could issue a statewide “Do Not Apply” alert to its members. Mahon described CPF
leadership alerts as “internal member communications” that are used to inform all locals across
the state regarding issues that CPF deems to be of statewide concern. A “Do Not Apply” alert
is an example of this type of communication. It is used when there is an external recruitment
over which a local has not reached an agreement with management. Mahon testified that
external recruitment for the promotional position of captain is rare in a full-time department
like Santa Maria. It is of concern to CPF and locals because it reduces the opportunity for
promotion for existing employees. CPF considers the issue to be a mandatory subject of
negotiations. Part of the aim of such an alert is to make applicants aware of potential
violations of law in the hiring process. CPF considers the subject of open promotional
recruitments to be an issue of statewide concern because if more employers start doing it
unchecked then MMBA violations may become more commonplace. Champion confirmed

6
that it is unusual and “a big deal” for the fire department to make such a decision. He said it
had always been the preference and practice of the department, before this instance, to limit
recruitment for captain positions to existing employees.
2. 	February 1, 2017 Meeting
SMFA officers met with Champion on February 1, 2017. They prepared a letter
outlining their concerns over the proposed open recruitment that the parties discussed during
the meeting. The letter first addressed why SMFA believed that employees were passing on
the acting captain status, stating:
Why don’t we look at the reasons why current eligible engineers
have decided not to take the current test:
1. 	Seniority—lose it when you promote
2. 	Less [overtime] opportunities
3. 	Not able to work at ARFF [7] anymore
4. 	Extra work load, responsibility [without] adequate pay raise
(not proportionate to Captain to [Battalion Chief])
5. 	Another year of probation as well as a daunting task book
6. 	The complexity of the testing process, when you can just act
for similar pay
Next, SMFA highlighted a number of issues causing it concern should the fire department hire
an outside captain:
1. 	How can they be an effective leader when they don’t know
how SMFD operates or how we connect with our community
members—it simply isn’t something that can be read in a
week or learned during a recruitment process[.]
2. 	At what step/pay grade would they come in?
3. 	What retirement formula do they come in at?
4. 	Seniority—a brand new Captain could come in and have more
seniority than a 20-year veteran?
5. 	Do they have to go through an academy? If so, how much
time and money are we going to spend on bringing them up to
speed? Aren’t we better off using those resources to
empower our own people to promote?
________________________
7 This acronym was not defined in the record.

7
6. 	Can they work down? As a firefighter or an engineer? Do
they have to do those taskbooks? Could they drive our
engines?
7. 	Would they have applicable experience for respected stations?
If they don’t have wildland experience, would they be able to
go station 3 or 5? No truck experience, can they work at
station 1?
8. 	Would they come in with a CPAT [8] ?
9. 	Would we allow two people from the outside to work
together? Example: an outside Captain and Engineer are
working on an engine leaving the Firefighter as they only
person that knows the department and the city.
10. Why are they leaving their current job? What issues are they
running from?
11. Will they go through a “Lateral Captain Taskbook”?
Like Kenley, Champion stated that the decision to open the captain recruitment was not
subject to formal meet and confer. Champion contended that it was a management right to run
an open recruitment. He did not cite or mention the City’s Municipal Code as providing the
authority. None of the SMFA witnesses were familiar with the particulars of the Municipal
Code as it applied to the City’s hiring practices but all were aware that the code supplied
relevant procedures. Wennerstrom attended the meeting and said that Champion listened to
SMFA’s concerns as outlined in the letter, but Champion did not really address the issues.
Champion testified that he told SMFA representatives that “a lot of these items are negotiable
items that would have to be handled with the City,” and also noted that he lacked “direct
control” over those matters. Morales testified that they left the meeting with the understanding
that Champion would talk directly to the engineers who were eligible to apply for captain to
gauge the employees’ interest in the positions. There is nothing in the record to suggest that
SMFA objected to Champion communicating directly with employees.
________________________
8 This acronym was not defined in the record.

8
3. 	Champion’s Communications with Employees and SMFA after the February 1 Meeting
Champion testified about his conversations with engineers after meeting with SMFA on
February 1, 2017. He wanted eligible engineers to answer three basic questions—will they
test; if so, will they put their “best foot forward”; and if offered the position, will they accept?
He communicated with all of the employees within three days of the February 1 meeting,
trying to make clear that he was not pressuring anyone to take the examination. Three
engineers told him flatly they were not interested in the position and would not test. One said
he would take the test and put forth maximum effort but would not accept the position if it was
offered to him. Two candidates answered affirmatively to all of Champion’s questions, but
also stated that they would only do it to prevent an outside hire. One candidate was very
strongly interested in the position. Hoover told Champion she was only 70 percent likely to
apply and wished that there was more time to make the decision.9
After Champion communicated with each of the eligible engineers, he was still
concerned that there were too few internal candidates genuinely interested in promoting. He
then sought and received approval from the City’s human resources department to run an open
recruitment for captain. On the evening of February 6, 2017, Champion e-mailed Morales to
inform SMFA of his decision. Morales responded that the issue was within the scope of
representation and therefore required meeting and conferring. Champion requested that
Morales obtain a written legal opinion from SMFA regarding its position. This was the first
point that Champion understood SMFA to be making a formal request to bargain. He
________________________
9 Out of the employees who were questioned by Champion, only Hoover testified.
Champion’s testimony about the statements of the others is considered only for how the
conversations influenced Champion’s state of mind.

9
considered the preceding discussions over the issue to have been an informal process. Morales
said he would work on obtaining a legal opinion from SMFA’s attorney.
According to Champion, he was told around February 9, 2017, that SMFA’s legal
counsel was still drafting its response regarding the matter being within the scope of
representation. Someone from human resources also informed Champion around this date that
since the recruitment was going to be open, more time was required for the application period.
On February 10, 2017, having still not received SMFA’s legal opinion, Champion determined
to proceed with the posting of the position. Champion testified that he notified each member
of the E-board at their work and personal e-mail addresses that the position was to be flown
that day. However, the parties stipulated that Champion did not directly notify SMFA that the
position was going to advertised to outside applicants before the posting was publicized.
Hoover testified that she learned of the posting from friends who work at another local fire
department and she called Morales with the news. Morales and Wennerstrom also testified
that they learned about the posting from external sources. SMFA officers were surprised that
the posting had been flown on February 10, instead of February 22, as Champion had
previously stated.
4. 	Morales Asks CPF to Issue a “Do Not Apply” Alert
Around February 18 or 19, 2017, Morales contacted CPF representative Mahon with
the news that Champion had posted the open recruitment and therefore did not appear to be
willing to meet and confer with SMFA. Mahon suggested going forward with the “Do Not
Apply” alert (hereafter, “alert”) and Morales agreed. Morales was the only E-board member
that communicated with CPF about the alert. CPF staff were responsible for the format and
content of the alert. Morales saw it for the first time on February 21, 2017, which appears to

10
be the date it was issued publicly. He was immediately concerned by some of the wording.
The alert stated, in part:
URGENT – PLEASE POST: DO NOT APPLY TO SANTA
MARIA FIRE DEPARTMENT
Outside Search for Captain Ignores Past Practice and Qualified
Internal Candidates
(Emphasis in original.)
Morales thought that the latter statement above could imply that the fire department
was not permitting qualified internal candidates to test for the position, which was incorrect.
Morales immediately tried without success to reach Mahon. Morales then promptly made
contact with someone else at CPF and asked for the alert to be revised. Within hours, a
corrected version was issued by CPF stating in relevant part, “Outside Search for Captain At
Odds With Past Practice.”10 The alert continued:
Brothers and Sisters:
The Santa Maria Fire Department has chosen to recruit for fire
captain by opening the position to outside candidates. The effort
to search outside is not in accordance with long-standing past
practice to promote from within.
Currently there are highly qualified internal candidates for the
captain’s post.
Recruiting outside candidates for this position would be a direct
affront to a long-standing principle and a blow to morale.
Local 2020 respectfully ask[s] for your help and support by not
applying for the captain’s post in Santa Maria and further asks
that you help get the word out to our affiliated brothers and
sisters and post on union bulletin boards.
________________________
10 The text from the previous version in all capital letters remained unchanged in the
updated alert.

11
Please DO NOT APPLY in Santa Maria Fire
Department.
(All emphasis in original.) The alert was issued under Morales’s name as the president of
SMFA.
5. 	Champion’s Reaction to the Alert
Champion found out about the alert from the president of another local firefighters’
union on or around the date it was issued by CPF. He testified that he was shocked that SMFA
had decided to air their dispute statewide. He also believed that the alert did not paint an
accurate picture of all the facts with which he was dealing, especially the low interest among
the qualified internal candidates. Morales, Wennerstrom, and Hoover all testified that the
purpose of alert was not to discourage outside applicants from applying, but to get Champion
to the bargaining table. Hoover explained that having worked with Champion for many years
before he was chief, they knew Champion was familiar with the work of CPF. They believed
that Champion would understand the seriousness of the issue once he saw the alert and be more
willing to negotiate. Morales said that he had intended to send it to Champion directly, but
Champion had already seen it and contacted him about it before he had the chance to do so.
On February 27, 2017, Champion issued a lengthy memorandum to employees with
verbatim copies of both versions of the alert embedded within the document. Champion
explained his view of the events that led to the decision to run an open recruitment for captain
and summarized all communications and meetings with SMFA over the issue. Champion
stated that the alert brought “discredit” to the fire department and that he had a “professional
obligation to set the record straight.” Champion cited City “Municipal Code Section 2-
20.09.1” as authorizing open recruitments. In reference to the meeting with SMFA on
February 1, 2017, Champion stated that “[t]he arguments presented by Local 2020 leadership

12
were purely emotional and provided no substantive facts[.]” In his testimony, however,
Champion conceded that most of the concerns raised by SMFA in its February 1 letter were
legitimate.
6. 	The City’s Personnel Rules
The City’s hiring policies are embodied in its Municipal Code. Relevant here,
Municipal Code Section 2-20.09.1, subdivisions (b)(1) and (2), states in part:
(b) Recruitment Process: The City Manager shall schedule open
or promotional recruitments based on vacancies or anticipated
vacancies to meet the need in the City service[.]
(1) Open Recruitments: Open recruitments may be scheduled
when it is not practical to fill vacancies by promotion or when
specifically requested by the appointing authority, with the
approval of the City Manager. Open recruitments shall be open
to all applicants who meet the minimum requirements for the
position in accordance with these chapters.
(2) Promotional Recruitments: Promotional recruitments are open
to all City employees who [] meet the minimum requirements for
the position in accordance with these chapters.
7. 	The Captain Testing Process
The fire department received between 14 and 16 applications from outside applicants
for the open captain positions. Champion said four of them were deemed qualified and invited
to take a written examination to be held on or around March 16, 2017. One of the four external
applicants who had been invited to the examination notified the fire department beforehand
that he would not be able to appear for the test. The other three external applicants did not
appear for the examination on March 16 without prior notice or explanation. Champion did
not contact them to ask why that they did not take the test. He also did not believe that anyone
else from the fire department or City contacted the external applicants to inquire in that regard.

13
There were around six internal applicants. Up to four of them were deemed qualified to
take the written examination. According to Champion, three of the internal candidates took the
examination, passed it, and were promoted to the position of captain.
The Investigation of the E-board
On or around March 17, 2017, the next day after the captain examination was held, all
five members of the E-board were served with an individually addressed memorandum
notifying of a fact-finding investigation by an independent, third-party investigator “regarding
the publication of a post discouraging external applicants from applying for employment with
the City[.]”11 E-board members were advised of the date, time, and location of their interviews
and informed it would be recorded. They were instructed to fully cooperate with the
investigator and to turn over any relevant documentary or photographic evidence to him. The
memoranda also warned that, “The subject matter during this interview may lead to
discipline against you. Failure to attend the meeting will be considered an act of
insubordination and can be an independent basis for disciplinary action, up to and including
dismissal.” (Emphasis in original.) E-board members were informed of their right to have a
representative of their choice present during the interview as long as the representative was not
also “a person subject to the same investigation.” If legal counsel was to be the member’s
representative, extra notice to the City was requested so that it may arrange to have its own
legal counsel attend the interview.
The interviews were originally scheduled for April 4, 2017, but did not happen until
May 22, 2017. Tevis, McIntosh, Hoover, and Morales were separately interviewed by the
________________________
11 The memoranda all used the same language in substance.

14
investigator and represented by SMFA’s legal counsel.12 Each of them was notified that he or
she was “a subject of this investigation.” The substantive questions centered on who prepared
the alert, CPF’s role in the situation, whether the interviewee had any knowledge that the alert
had successfully discouraged external applicants from completing the application process, and
whether there had been any negative impacts on fire department operations.
On July 6, 2017, Champion issued a confidential memorandum addressed to Morales,
Wennerstrom, Hoover, McIntosh, and Tevis to notify them of the completion of the fact-
finding investigation into the alert. Champion noted the purpose of the investigation had been
(1) to find out if fire department employees were “directly or indirectly” involved in the
publication of the alert, and (2) if the alert “had any impact on the City’s ability to recruit
candidates for a Fire Captain position, and if so, what impacts.” During his testimony,
Champion stated that he and the City wanted to ascertain the intent of the E-board members in
sending the alert and to ensure everything was done “above board,” meaning whether it had
been prepared on City time or with City resources. Champion concluded in the memorandum:
After a careful review of the evidence, while you admittedly had
knowledge of the directive to issue the publication, the City is
unable to reach the ultimate conclusion that the recruitment was
detrimentally affected by your actions. Therefore, that allegation
is deemed unsubstantiated.
Morales, Wennerstrom, Hoover, McIntosh, and Tevis all testified that the investigation
process, lasting from March to July, significantly added stress to an already stressful job.
Hoover asked human resources director Jayne Anderson if the investigation could lead to
discipline up to and including termination and Anderson confirmed that it could. The City did
not refute Hoover’s testimony. Champion also confirmed that discipline could have resulted
________________________
12 Wennerstrom was travelling that day. He was told the interview would be
rescheduled, but it never was and therefore he did not sit for one.

15
for any person who was a subject of the investigation. Morales, Wennerstrom, and Hoover
testified about being subjected to multiple personnel investigations since being appointed to
the E-board. They believed that SMFA officials were being targeted by the City.
ISSUES
1. 	Did the City fail and refuse to bargain over the decision and/or the effects of the
decision to run an open recruitment for a promotional position within the bargaining unit?
2. 	Did the City retaliate against members of the E-board by (1) notifying them that
they would be investigated, which could lead to discipline being taken against them, and (2)
subjecting them to an investigatory interview because of their involvement or suspected
involvement in the drafting and public dissemination of the alert?
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. 	Failure and Refusal to Bargain
a. 	Unilateral Change
Public agencies and recognized employee organizations each have a duty to meet and
confer in good faith over matters within the scope of representation, as defined in MMBA
section 3504. (MMBA, § 3505.) Unilateral changes to negotiable subjects are “per se”
violations of the duty to bargain and violate MMBA Section 3506.5, subdivision (c). (City of
Livermore (2014) PERB Decision No. 2396-M, p. 20.) To establish a prima facie case for an
unlawful unilateral change, the charging party must show by a preponderance of the evidence
that: (1) the employer took action to change existing policy; (2) the policy change concerned a
matter within the scope of representation; (3) the action was taken without giving the exclusive
representative notice or opportunity to bargain over the change; and (4) the change has a
generalized effect or continuing impact on terms and conditions of employment. (Fairfield-

16
Suisun Unified School District (2012) PERB Decision No. 2262, p. 9,13 citing Grant Joint
Union High School District (1982) PERB Decision No. 196, p. 10; Walnut Valley Unified
School District (1981) PERB Decision No. 160, p. 5; see also Vernon Fire Fighters, Local
2312 v. City of Vernon (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 802, pp. 822-823.)
The parties stipulated to the lack of notice to SMFA regarding Champion’s decision to
move forward with the external recruitment. The City maintains that it had the right to make
the decision at issue; PERB has found that such a stance satisfies the fourth element above.
(City of Davis (2016) PERB Decision No. 2494-M, p. 24.) The City disputes, however, that
there was a change in policy. The parties were also instructed to brief whether the decision at
issue was a matter within the scope of representation under City of Alhambra (2010) PERB
Decision No. 2139-M. These disputed elements of the unilateral change analysis are discussed
below.
i. 	Change to Existing Policy
A change in policy generally falls into one of three categories: (1) changes to the
parties’ written agreements; (2) changes in established past practices; or (3) newly created
policies, or application or enforcement of an existing policy in a new way. (County of
Monterey (2018) PERB Decision No. 2579-M, p. 10; City of Davis (2016) PERB Decision No.
2494-M, pp. 30-31; Pasadena Area Community College District (2015) PERB Decision No.
2444, p. 12, fn. 6 (Pasadena CCD).) A policy may be established by written agreement,
written employer rules or regulations, or regular and consistent past practice. (Salinas Valley
________________________
13 When interpreting the MMBA, it is appropriate to take guidance from cases
interpreting the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and California labor relations statutes
with parallel provisions. (Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608, 616-
617 (City of Vallejo).)

17
Memorial HealthCare System (2017) PERB Decision No. 2524-M, p. 17 (Salinas Valley);
Pasadena CCD, supra, PERB Decision No. 2444, p. 12; emphasis added.)
Under Marysville Joint Unified School District (1983) PERB Decision No. 314
(Marysville), where an employer’s past practice is to provide benefits that are more generous
than the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, such benefits may be lawfully modified
unilaterally as long as the modification merely results in enforcement of the actual terms of the
written agreement. (Id. at pp. 9-10.) At issue in that case was a contractual 30-minute lunch
period, but a longstanding past practice of allowing employees to take a 55-minute lunch
period. When the employer began enforcing the 30-minute lunch period, the union objected
that it was a unilateral change to past practice. The Board disagreed, stating:
The mere fact that an employer has not chosen to enforce its
contractual rights in the past does not mean that, ipso facto, it is
forever precluded from doing so. Accordingly, we find that the
Association, by agreeing to a contractual provision which plainly
permitted the District to grant teachers a lunch period of 30
minutes or longer at its discretion, waived its right to negotiate
over the District’s reduction of the lunch period to 30 minutes.
(Id. at p. 10, citation omitted; emphasis added.) The written terms to be enforced must be clear
and unambiguous on their face in order for this principle to apply. (Id. at p. 9.)
Here, City Municipal Code Section 2-20.09.1, subdivisions (b)(1) and (2), states in part:
(b) Recruitment Process: The City Manager shall schedule open
or promotional recruitments based on vacancies or anticipated
vacancies to meet the need in the City service[.]
(1) Open Recruitments: Open recruitments may be scheduled
when it is not practical to fill vacancies by promotion or when
specifically requested by the appointing authority, with the
approval of the City Manager. Open recruitments shall be open
to all applicants who meet the minimum requirements for the
position in accordance with these chapters.

18
(2) Promotional Recruitments: Promotional recruitments are open
to all City employees who[]meet the minimum requirements for
the position in accordance with these chapters.
(Emphasis added.) The City argues that despite never having before run an open recruitment
for promotional captain positions, it nevertheless acted consistently with the written policy
above as Champion sought and received approval from the City to run an open recruitment for
the positions when he determined that the internal candidate pool and interest level was not
adequate to keep it strictly promotional. Accordingly, the City contends that its decision to act
unilaterally should be excused under Marysville because it does not amount to a change in
policy.
The City does not cite any PERB or court decision, and I am not aware of any, which
applies the Marysville rule to employer action that is consistent with its own written rule or
regulation. Vital to the Board’s conclusion in Marysville was that by agreeing to a contractual
provision setting a 30-minute lunch period, the union “waived its right to negotiate” over the
employer’s decision to cease a longer lunch break and revert to the contractual term.
(Marysville, supra, PERB Decision No. 314, p. 10.) The facts here do not align with those in
Marysville. There is no showing that SMFA negotiated over the terms of the City’s Municipal
Code regarding recruitments. Thus, SMFA could not waive a right to negotiate over the
reversion to a term that it had never agreed to in the first place. Therefore, I decline to apply
Marysville to these facts. (See also, County of Riverside (2013) PERB Decision No. 2307-M,
pp. 24-25.)
It is undisputed that the fire department had never before run an open recruitment for
the promotional position of captain, despite former chief Kenley having briefly entertained the
idea in the past but abandoning it. Rather, captain recruitments had always been limited to

19
existing fire department employees and treated as a promotion for unit engineers. Thus, the
facts here adequately demonstrate a change in past practice.
ii. 	Scope of Representation
MMBA section 3504 defines the scope of representation as:
The scope of representation shall include all matters relating to
employment conditions and employer-employee relations,
including, but not limited to, wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment, except, however, that the scope of
representation shall not include consideration of the merits,
necessity, or organization of any service or activity provided by
law or executive order.
The Board recently clarified standards for determining whether a subject is within the
scope of representation under the MMBA. In County of Orange (2018) PERB Decision
No. 2594-M, the Board noted its long adherence to the test for negotiability set forth in
Claremont Police Officers Association v. City of Claremont (2006) 39 Cal.4th 623 (Claremont)
and applied by the Board in Alhambra, supra, PERB Decision No. 2139-M.14 At issue in
County of Orange was an employer’s unilateral adoption of an “Openness in Negotiations”
ordinance and whether some disputed provisions of the ordinance were properly considered
ground rules for negotiations, which have traditionally been found to be within the scope of
representation by PERB. The Administrative Law Judge acknowledged the Board’s precedent
________________________
14 Claremont set forth the following three-part test to analyze the scope of
representation: “First, we ask whether the management action has ‘a significant and adverse
effect on the wages, hours, or working conditions of the bargaining-unit employees.’ [] If not,
there is no duty to meet and confer. [] Second, we ask whether the significant and adverse
effect arises from the implementation of a fundamental managerial or policy decision. If not,
then [] the meet-and-confer requirement applies. [] Third, if both factors are present [] we
apply a balancing test. The action ‘is within the scope of representation only if the employer’s
need for unencumbered decisionmaking in managing its operations is outweighed by the
benefit to employer-employee relations of bargaining about the action in question.’” (39
Cal.4th at p. 638.) The Court acknowledged that First National Maintenance Corporation v.
NLRB (1981) 452 U.S. 666 (First National) “applied a similar balancing test.” (Claremont,
supra, at p. 637.)

20
regarding ground rules negotiability, but determined that the issue had not before been
analyzed in an MMBA case; thus, he applied the Claremont test as adopted in Alhambra to
answer the question. The Board responded as follows:
In Alhambra, supra, PERB Decision No. 2139-M, the Board
described Claremont as establishing “the test to determine
whether a matter is within the scope of representation under the
MMBA.” (Id. at p. 13.) In that case, the issue was whether the
minimum qualifications for a bargaining unit position was within
the scope of representation. Applying Claremont, the Board
determined it was not.
A year after Alhambra issued, the California Supreme Court
again clarified the test for determining the scope of bargaining
under the MMBA. (International Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local
188, AFL-CIO v. PERB (2011) 51 Cal.4th 259, 272-273
(Richmond Firefighters).) The Court observed that there are
three distinct categories of managerial decisions, each with its
own implications for the scope of representation: (1) “decisions
that ‘have only an indirect and attenuated impact on the
employment relationship’ and thus are not mandatory subjects of
bargaining,” such as advertising, product design, and financing;
(2) “decisions directly defining the employment relationship,
such as wages, workplace rules, and the order and succession of
layoffs and recalls,” which are “always mandatory subjects of
bargaining” (emphasis added); and (3) “decisions that directly
affect employment, such as eliminating jobs, but nonetheless may
not be mandatory subjects of bargaining because they involve ‘a
change in the scope and direction of the enterprise’ or in other
words, the employer’s ‘retained freedom to manage its affairs
unrelated to employment.’” (Ibid.) The Court explained that the
First National Maintenance balancing test applies only to the
third category of managerial decisions[.]
[¶…¶]
By explaining that decisions directly defining the employment
relationship are always mandatory subjects of bargaining,
Richmond Firefighters provides an important clarification of the
limits of Claremont. It is not necessary to ask whether such a
decision has a “significant and adverse effect” on wages, hours,
or other terms and conditions of employment, nor is it necessary
to balance that effect against the employer’s need for
unencumbered decisionmaking.

21
[¶…¶]
Thus, under Richmond Firefighters, a balancing test applies only
to employer decisions that directly affect employment, such as
eliminating jobs, but also involve ‘“a change in the scope and
direction of the enterprise’ or, in other words, the employer’s
‘retained freedom to manage its affairs unrelated to
employment.’” (Richmond Firefighters, supra, 51 Cal.4th 259,
273 [other citation and quote omitted].) To the extent
Alhambra, supra, PERB Decision No. 2139-M, conflicts with
Richmond Firefighters on this point—specifically, by
suggesting that the Claremont test always applies to determine
whether a matter is within the scope of representation under
the MMBA—we disavow it. [Footnote omitted.]
(County of Orange, supra, PERB Decision No. 2594-M, pp. 18-20; italics in original; bold
emphases added.)
The Board noted that although Claremont is still good law, the Supreme Court’s more
recent treatment of the subject in Richmond Firefighters requires that the type of balancing
analysis used in First National, which is the same test used in Claremont, only be applied to
“some managerial decisions, not those directly defining the employment relationship.”
(County of Orange, supra, PERB Decision No. 2594-M, p. 20, fn. 10.)
Notably, the only part of the Alhambra decision that the Board specifically repudiated
in County of Orange is the notion that Alhambra requires in every instance that the three-part
Claremont test be applied when the scope of representation is at issue under the MMBA. The
Board did not overturn the rest of the Alhambra decision or disturb its conclusions regarding
minimum qualifications being outside the scope of representation, despite the Board’s
adherence to the Claremont balancing test in that case in reaching its conclusion. Thus, the
remainder of the Alhambra decision is still good law.

22
In Alhambra, the employer, without negotiating with the union, eliminated certain
certification requirements in a classification specification for the promotional position of fire
captain in an effort to increase the number of eligible applicants. (Alhambra, supra, PERB
Decision No. 2139-M, p. 4.) The union argued that the unilateral modification of the
classification specification had a significant and adverse impact on unit employees’ working
conditions because it “potentially increases the number of candidates eligible to compete for
the position of fire captain, thereby making it more difficult for those candidates who possess
all of the required certifications to obtain positions because they have to compete against a
greater number of candidates.” The Board rejected the union’s argument, finding that the new
specification did not impose new eligibility requirements, grant preferences, nor affect the
opportunity of employees with certificates to compete for and obtain the promotional position,
and thus there was no “significant impact on the working conditions of bargaining unit
employees.” (Id. at pp. 14-15.)
The Board also rejected the idea that increasing candidate pools for promotional
positions is inherently damaging to current employees’ interests, stating:
[T]he mere fact that the modified qualifications will result in a
broader pool of eligible candidates is not adverse to the wages,
hours, or working conditions of bargaining unit employees. The
record contains no evidence that any current employee without
the certifications was promoted over a candidate meeting the
certification requirements, as the City has not yet implemented
the change. Thus, any asserted adverse impact is purely
speculative. Even if there were such a showing, however, we do
not find the expansion of the minimum qualifications to allow
additional candidates to compete to be an adverse impact. It is
generally recognized that competition for jobs in the public sector
is desirable to promote efficiency and prevent patronage in the
public service. (Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown (1981) 29
Cal.3d 168.) Further, this policy is recognized by and consistent
with the City Charter, which promotes competitive employment
opportunities. A policy that merely increases competition

23
without imposing any additional requirements or burdens on
bargaining unit employees is not adverse.
(Alhambra, supra, PERB Decision No. 2139-M. at p. 15; emphasis added; internal footnotes
omitted.) Thus, increasing competition for promotional positions does not negatively impact
existing employees’ working conditions.
The Board also distinguished cases finding that policies affecting procedures for
promotion are negotiable citing, City of Vallejo, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 618, International
Association of Fire Fighters Union v. City of Pleasanton (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 959, 971 (City
of Pleasanton), and Healdsburg Union High School District and Healdsburg Union School
District/San Mateo City School District (1984) PERB Decision No. 375 at pp. 45-47
(Healdsburg).
In City of Vallejo, the Court’s decision did not describe the “vacancies and promotions”
proposal over which a union sought to compel arbitration; nevertheless, the Court concluded
that it concerned firefighters’ job security and opportunities for advancement, similar to
negotiable union hiring hall arrangements in the private sector, and therefore found it related to
terms and conditions of employment. (City of Vallejo, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 618.) The Court
in City of Pleasanton concluded that a unilateral change in the location and time period of the
postings of promotional positions by the employer should have been subject to negotiations
because it amounted to “a substantial change in the procedure to be followed” and therefore
was “an equally important ‘condition of employment’ according to the broad meaning of the
term as used in the [MMBA] and the liberal judicial construction required of it.” (City of
Pleasanton, supra, 56 Cal.App.3d at p. 971.) In Healdsburg, the Board concluded that
provisions that changed procedures for employees to apply for promotions and granted
preference to employees for filling vacancies inside of the unit were within scope, but

24
proposals over classification and reclassification of positions, and over the employer granting
preference to unit employees for filling vacancies outside of the unit were not. (Healdsburg,
supra, PERB Decision No. 375, pp. 45-47.) The Board in Alhambra stated that unlike the facts
in those cases, the change in job qualifications at issue did not affect the promotional
opportunities of bargaining unit employees. (Alhambra, supra, PERB Decision No. 2139-M,
p. 17.) The Board also noted that none of those cases addressed whether the establishment of
job qualifications is within the scope of bargaining, and so they were not dispositive of that
issue. (Ibid.)
Returning to the instant matter, SMFA argues that Alhambra is distinguishable because
the promotional recruitment in that case was limited to internal candidates, and although the
employer’s decision to loosen minimum qualifications had the effect of broadening the
candidate pool, it actually increased promotional opportunities on whole for that bargaining
unit. SMFA finds this to be a salient difference from the present case, arguing that the Board
in Alhambra did not consider the effects of an external promotional recruitment on employees.
SMFA argues that the City’s decision to open the promotional recruitment to external
candidates created issues beyond increased competition, such as, the potential for hiring
candidates who lack the insider “corporate knowledge” of the City and the fire department
raising safety and other concerns.15 As discussed below, these arguments do not persuade
departure from the rationale in Alhambra.
________________________
15 As discussed more fully in the next section of the proposed decision, I view these
concerns as foreseeable effects of the employer’s decision to open the promotional recruitment,
because they would only come to fruition if the opened recruitment actually resulted in an
external recruit being hired as a captain. They have no bearing on employees’ participation in
the recruitment process itself, however.

25
Even though a change in minimum qualifications is not directly at issue here as was the
case in Alhambra, the core issue is the same—an increased number of candidates being able to
compete for a promotional position because of an employer’s change in recruitment practices.
Thus, the Board’s rationale in Alhambra is applicable to this situation. CPF representative
Mahon testified that external captain recruitments, which are rare in “full-time paid personnel”
departments, like the City’s, are a concern to CPF because they reduce promotional
opportunities for existing employees. Hoover similarly testified that allowing external
candidates to test for captain reduced promotional opportunities for existing employees,
especially those who had not yet completed their task books to qualify for the examination but
were close to doing so.
Contrary to SMFA’s argument, the Board’s analysis in Alhambra does not turn on the
fact that the increased competition for open promotional positions was restricted to internal
employees. Rather, the focus of the analysis was that the qualification changes did not result
in any change to procedural requirements for employees to apply and compete for the
promotional positions. As noted above, courts and PERB have concluded that new or
additional procedural requirements in the process for employees to compete for open positions
are within the scope of representation. (City of Pleasanton, supra, 56 Cal.App.3d at p. 971;
Healdsburg, supra, PERB Decision No. 375, pp. 45-47.) Whereas in Alhambra, the
recruitment for fire captain increased competition but did not impose any additional
requirements or burdens on unit employees who desired to apply for the position. For this
reason the Board concluded that the changes at issue were outside scope under the first prong
of Claremont. (Alhambra, supra, PERB Decision No. 2139-M, pp. 15-17.) Similarly here, the
record does not indicate that any new procedural requirements or burdens were imposed on

26
employees to apply and test for captain. Rather, once employees applied, the candidate pool
may have included a greater number of applicants than it would have if the recruitment had
remained purely internal. The mere fact that competition for a promotional position may be
increased, without additional procedural hurdles for employees to cross, does not, under
Alhambra, show that the decision to run an external recruitment affected a matter within the
scope of representation.
Since the decision to run an open promotional recruitment was outside the scope of
representation, the City did not violate the MMBA by failing to bargain over the decision to
proceed with that course of action. However, as discussed below, that is not the end of the
inquiry.
b. 	The City Failed to Bargain Over Foreseeable Effects of a Non-Negotiable
Decision
In County of Santa Clara (2013) PERB Decision No. 2321-M, the Board provided an
in-depth treatment of the parties rights and obligations vis-à-vis effects bargaining, where an
employer had imposed a non-negotiable change in staffing levels without notice to the union.
The Board first explained the policies behind requiring effects bargaining over non-negotiable
decisions:
An employer violates the duty to bargain in good faith when it
fails to afford a union reasonable advance notice and an
opportunity to bargain before it either: (1) reaches a firm decision
to establish or change policy within the scope of representation,
(Public Employment Relations Bd. v. Modesto City Schools Dist.
(1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 881, 900) or (2) implements a new or
changed policy not within the scope of representation but having
a foreseeable effect upon matters within the scope of
representation. (Claremont.) [] And implementing a new or
changed policy not itself within the scope of representation (e.g.,
staffing levels) but having a foreseeable effect(s) on employee
wages, hours or other terms and conditions of employment (e.g.,
safety or workload), likewise violates the employer’s duty to

27
bargain in good faith where implemented without notice and
opportunity to bargain over the foreseeable effect(s). [Citations
omitted.] In both instances the harm is the same: matters
relegated by statute to bilateral decisions are instead determined
unilaterally.
[¶…¶]
An employer’s unilateral change implemented without prior
notice or opportunity to negotiate over the decision or the
foreseeable effects within the scope of representation disrupts and
destabilizes employer-employee relations and is inconsistent with
the goals of our statutes to improve both employer-employee
relations and communications between public employers and
their employees.
[¶…¶]
The rule requiring effects bargaining arises from balancing the
need of employers to make unfettered decisions about the
direction of the enterprise with the rights of employees, through
their exclusive representatives, to a voice in workplace matters
related to wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment.
In other words, effects bargaining is not a stepchild of decision
bargaining. It is just as important as bargaining over a decision to
alter terms and conditions of employment.
(County of Santa Clara, supra, at pp. 21-24.)
Citing Compton Community College District (1989) PERB Decision No. 720 (Compton
CCD), the Board stated that an employer is permitted to implement before agreement or
impasse only where: (1) the implementation date was not arbitrary but based on an immutable
externally-established deadline, or on an important managerial interest such that delay would
effectively undermine the employer’s ability to make the decision in the first instance; (2)
notice to the union of both the decision and implementation date was given sufficiently in
advance to allow for meaningful meeting and conferring before implementation; and (3) the
employer met and negotiated in good faith on implementation and effects before the
implementation and thereafter as to those subjects not resolved by the implementation itself.

28
(County of Santa Clara, supra, PERB Decision No. 2321-M, p. 25, fn. 16; emphasis added.)
The Board noted:
In sum, our decisions establish the expectation that an employer
will give notice and an opportunity to bargain over reasonably
foreseeable effects within the scope of representation before
implementing a managerial decision.
This principle is undermined by a rule that excuses an employer
which fails to provide a union both notice and an opportunity to
request bargaining before implementing a change with negotiable
effects. Compton CCD in particular is eviscerated if the
employer faces no potential liability for failing to give advance
notice and an opportunity to request effects bargaining.
(County of Santa Clara, supra, at p. 26; emphasis in original.) The Board then overruled
several decisions, specifically, State of California (Department of Corrections &
Rehabilitation, Avenal State Prison) (2011) PERB Decision No. 2196-S and Sylvan Union
Elementary School District (1992) PERB Decision No. 919, which stood for the proposition
that an employer’s duty to bargain over effects only arose upon a union’s specific request for
effects bargaining, regardless of a failure by the employer to give proper notice. (County of
Santa Clara, supra, at p. 30.)
In conclusion, the Board announced the following rules applicable to the duty to
bargain over negotiable effects:
1. 	The employer has a duty to provide reasonable notice and an
opportunity bargain before it implements a decision within its
managerial prerogative that has foreseeable effects on
negotiable terms and conditions of employment. A
“reasonable” notice is one which is “clear and unequivocal”
[citations omitted] and which “clearly informs the employee
organization of the nature and scope of the proposed change.”
[Citation omitted.]
2. 	Once having received such advance notice, the union must
demand to bargain the effects or risk waiving its right to do
so. The union’s demand must identify clearly the matter(s)

29
within the scope of representation on which it proposes to
bargain, and clearly indicate the employee organization’s
desire to bargain over the effects of the decision as opposed to
the decision itself. [Citations omitted.]
3. 	Having received such advance notice and an opportunity to
bargain, a union’s failure to demand effects bargaining may
waive the right to bargain the reasonably foreseeable effects.
[] Waiver remains, however, an affirmative defense. Where a
union alleges that the employer did not provide reasonable
notice and an opportunity to bargain prior to the employer’s
implementation of a change in a non-negotiable policy having
a reasonably foreseeable impact on a matter within the scope
of representation, a prima facie case of a failure to bargain in
good faith is established. The union need not allege as well
that it made a demand to bargain such effects as a condition to
seeking PERB enforcement of its right to be free of an
employer’s failure to provide notice and an opportunity to
bargain effects. The employer may raise an affirmative
defense of waiver or otherwise challenge the union’s claim
that the employer did not provide sufficient notice of the
change.
4. 	Where an employer implements the change without giving the
union reasonable notice and opportunity to bargain over
foreseeable effects on matters within the scope of
representation, it acts at its own peril. If the employer is
ultimately found to have had a duty to bargain over effects
and thus to have provided the union reasonable pre-
implementation notice and an opportunity to bargain, its
implementation without giving such notice and an opportunity
to bargain constitutes a refusal to bargain. [Citations
omitted.]
We conclude that, facing a unilateral change or fait accompli,
a union has a choice. It may proceed to PERB via an unfair
practice charge without first making a demand to bargain
effects. Or, it may demand effects bargaining. If the union
does demand bargaining over effects of a decision already
implemented without the required notice, the employer must
respond pursuant to its duty established in Healdsburg Union
High School District and Healdsburg Union School
District/San Mateo City School District (1984) PERB
Decision No. 375, at pp. 9-10 (party objecting that proposal is
beyond scope of representation must make good faith effort at
clarification by voicing its specific reasons for believing

30
proposal is outside the scope of representation and entering
into negotiations on those aspects of proposal which, after
clarification, it views negotiable; failure to seek clarification
in itself violates the duty to negotiate in good faith and will
result in an order requiring the objecting party to return to
the negotiating table to seek clarification). [Citation
omitted.]
(County of Santa Clara, supra, PERB Decision No. 2321-M, pp. 30-32; underscore in original;
italics added.)
Turning back to these facts, Champion initially notified SMFA of his intent to run an
open recruitment on January 25, 2017. He told Morales that, like former chief Kenley, he did
not consider the decision to run the open recruitment to be subject matter that required formal
negotiations. He invited SMFA representatives to let him know by February 1, 2017, if the
Union desired to negotiate over effects. They did so, providing a detailed letter before the
meeting that outlined concerns regarding the open recruitment that can be broadly
characterized as covering topics of legitimate concern to employees such as safety, seniority,
and work load, among others. Champion admitted that many of the items that SMFA
presented to him in response to his invitation to the Union to bargain over effects were matters
that were outside of his unilateral control and would have required the input of City
representatives in formal negotiations. It is important to note that Champion told SMFA
before this meeting that the open recruitment would not be posted before February 22, 2017.
SMFA agreed at the meeting’s conclusion that Champion could speak directly to unit
engineers to gauge their interest in applying for the promotion. After he did, he informed
SMFA that he was still unconvinced of sufficient internal interest and would move forward
with the open recruitment. This was on or about the evening of February 6, 2017. He
maintained his stance on the decision being outside scope and asked for a written legal opinion

31
from the union outlining its contrary position. Up until this point, the parties’ dealings
conformed to the standards discussed above in County of Santa Clara, Compton CCD, and
Healdsburg.
Within days, however, things went awry. On or about February 9, 2017, Champion
learned both that the Union’s legal opinion was not yet finished, and an open recruitment
required a “longer application period.” Apparently, Champion believed he needed to move
forward with posting the recruitment immediately based on this latter information, but that is
not entirely clear from the record. The open recruitment was posted the next day. However,
two important things did not occur before posting the recruitment: (1) Champion did not
inform SMFA that the implementation date of the non-negotiable decision had been moved up
to February 10; and (2) effects bargaining was not completed, despite a previous express
invitation to engage in the process and notification from the Union of a litany of foreseeable
effects.
Regarding the first point, SMFA lacked adequate notice of implementation. Under
Compton CCD and County of Santa Clara, a union is entitled to advance notice of both the
decision and the implementation date so there is time for meaningful negotiations before the
decision is put into effect. Because neither Champion nor other City representatives informed
SMFA that the previously announced date for implementation had been considerably
advanced, SMFA did not have proper notice and an opportunity to bargain over effects. Under
the Board’s guidance in County of Santa Clara, the implementation before such notice and
opportunity constitutes a refusal to bargain. (County of Santa Clara, supra, PERB Decision
No. 2321-M, p. 31.)

32
Regarding the second point, the fire department’s implementation before completing
effects bargaining is also not excused under the parameters in Compton CCD, supra, PERB
Decision No. 720, pp. 14-15, first, because there is no evidence of an “immutable externally-
established deadline” or an “important managerial interest” such that delay would effectively
undermine the employer’s ability to make the non-negotiable decision. Champion’s vague
testimony that someone in human resources told him that a longer application period was
required for an external recruitment is uncorroborated hearsay and, without an applicable
exception to the hearsay rule, is insufficient to establish a factual finding. (PERB Reg. 32176;
Palo Verde Unified School District (2013) PERB Decision No. 2337, p. 19 (Palo Verde).)
Moreover, Champion’s testimony on this issue does not explain why the longer period could
not have commenced after bargaining obligations with SMFA were extinguished.
Additionally, as discussed above, notice of the implementation date was insufficient for
meaningful negotiations to have had time to occur. Furthermore, the February 1, 2017 meeting
did not extinguish the obligation or waive SMFA’s right to participate in impacts negotiations.
Champion acknowledged in his testimony that neither agreement nor impasse was reached
over SMFA’s letter outlining concerns that were provided in response to his invitation to
SMFA to bargain over negotiable effects of the decision to run an external promotional
recruitment. Champion also acknowledged that most of those items would have required City
negotiators’ involvement in formal bargaining. Yet, there is no evidence that Champion shared
SMFA’s concerns with the City or that formal effects bargaining took place.
Finally, although SMFA was, before implementation, maintaining its right to bargain
over the decision itself, due to inadequate notice of the implementation date, such a stance
cannot be considered a waiver of SMFA’s right to bargain over foreseeable effects. If the

33
parties had continued to clarify their positions over negotiability, as Champion rightly had
started doing by requesting SMFA’s legal position in writing, then they may have come to an
understanding regarding decision versus effects bargaining. Unfortunately, Champion abruptly
and without notice to SMFA decided to proceed with implementation before the parties had
finished clarifying their positions. The “failure to seek clarification in itself violates the duty
to negotiate in good faith and will result in an order requiring the objecting party to return to
the negotiating table to seek clarification.” (County of Santa Clara, supra, PERB Decision No.
2321-M, p. 32; Healdsburg, supra, PERB Decision No. 375, pp. 9-10.)
For all of these reasons, the City violated its duty to bargain in good faith under the
MMBA by failing to give adequate notice to SMFA of its decision to implement a non-
negotiable decision, thereby depriving SMFA of an opportunity to bargain over foreseeable
effects of the decision.
2. 	Retaliation
To demonstrate that an employer discriminated or retaliated against employees in
violation of MMBA sections 3506 and 3506.5, subdivision (a), and PERB Regulation 32603,
subdivision (a), the charging party must show that (1) employees exercised rights under the
MMBA; (2) the employer had knowledge of the exercise of those rights; (3) the employer took
adverse action against employees; and (4) the employer took the action because of the exercise
of those rights. (Novato Unified School District (1982) PERB Decision No. 210, pp. 6-8
(Novato); Campbell Municipal Employees Assn. v. City of Campbell (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d
416, 424.)
Once the charging party establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
employer to prove it would have taken the same adverse action even if employees had not

34
engaged in protected activity. (Novato, supra, PERB Decision No. 210, p. 14; Martori
Brothers Distributors v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 721, 729-730
(Martori Bros.); Wright Line (1980) 251 NLRB 1083, p. 10.) To prevail, the employer must
show that it had an alternative non-discriminatory reason for taking the adverse action and that
it acted because of this alternative non-discriminatory reason, not because of employees’
protected activity. (Palo Verde, supra, PERB Decision No. 2337, pp. 12-13.)
The facts in this case clearly establish that management knew of the employees’ alleged
protected conduct and also acted in direct response to it.16 Although Hoover, Wennerstrom,
McIntosh, and Tevis had very little to no input regarding the decision to ask CPF to run the
alert, even an employer’s mistaken belief that employees participated in protected activities is
sufficient to establish a violation. (Simi Valley Unified School District (2004) PERB Decision
No. 1714, p. 15.) Where an employer stated in its disciplinary memorandum that it was being
issued “in response to” an employee’s letter, which the Board had determined was protected
speech, the Board considered that direct evidence of unlawful motive. Examination of
circumstantial evidence of motivation is not necessary in such a case. (Alisal Union
Elementary School District (1998) PERB Decision No. 1248, p. 6.) Similarly, the fire
department’s decision here to launch an investigation into its employees’ conduct stemmed
directly from the public issuance of an alleged protected communication. The knowledge and
________________________
16 The City contends in its brief at the time the investigation was initiated, management
did not know “for sure” that the E-board was involved, which is why an investigation
commenced. Therefore, the City argues that the knowledge element is not met. The argument
is baseless. The alert was issued under Morales’s name as President of SMFA. Moreover,
Champion’s February 27, 2017 memorandum to employees, which issued several weeks before
the investigation notices, states: “It has come to my attention that the leadership of Local 2020
has posted the following disingenuous communication to the [] CPF and instructed all Local
Presidents to distribute to CPF members.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, it is clear that
management was aware of the alleged protected conduct by employees before it took alleged
adverse actions against them.

35
nexus elements of the prima facie case are thus sufficiently demonstrated and do not require
further discussion. The disputed elements of whether public dissemination of the alert was
protected by the MMBA and whether the investigation was an adverse action are discussed in
turn below.
a. 	Protected Communications
MMBA section 3502 states that “public employees shall have the right to form, join,
and participate in the activities of employee organizations of their own choosing for the
purpose of representation on all matters of employer-employee relations.” This right is
enforced by shielding the ability of employees to communicate freely with each other over
working conditions without fear of employer reprisal. In recognition of this premise, the
Board noted “there is no more fundamental right” afforded employees under PERB-enforced
statutes than the right to communicate with others about working conditions.” (Los Angeles
Community College District (Perez) (2014) PERB Decision No. 2404, p. 11, fn. 5.) Protected
activity in this regard is also not limited to association with employees of the same employer,
or with employees represented by the same organization. An appellate court found that
although California’s public sector labor relations statutes do not contain the NLRA’s “other
mutual aid and protection” language, there is no cause for the public sector to depart from
federal authorities’ conclusions that “association with, and assistance to, employees outside the
bargaining unit is an integral part of normal organizational activities and therefore is protected
from employer reprisal.” (McPherson v. PERB (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 293, 309-311
(McPherson).)
The general rule regarding employee speech and conduct is that they are protected
under PERB-enforced statutes when related to matters of “legitimate concern to employees as

36
employees so as to come within the right to participate in the activities of an employee
organization for the purpose of representation on matters of employer-employee relations.”
(Rancho Santiago Community College District (1986) PERB Decision No. 602, p. 12 (Rancho
Santiago).) Disputes over wages, hours, and other working conditions are among those most
likely to cause ill feelings and strong responses; thus, parties are afforded wide latitude to
engage in “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate” during those disputes. (City of Oakland
(2014) PERB Decision No. 2387-M, p. 23; other citations omitted.) Accordingly, employee
speech that is related to employer-employee relations will generally not lose its statutory
protection unless it is so “opprobrious, flagrant, insulting, defamatory, insubordinate, or
fraught with malice as to cause substantial disruption of or material interference” with the
employer’s operations. (Id. at p. 24; Rancho Santiago, p. 13.) The Board generally considers
speech protected “even if defamatory and even if erroneous, unless it can be shown that such
speech was made with malice and with knowledge it was false.” (Rocklin Teachers
Professional Association, CTA/NEA (Romero) (1995) PERB Decision No. 1112, warning ltr.,
p. 4, citing State of California (Department of Transportation) (1983) PERB Decision
No. 304-S.) A party claiming that employee speech lost statutory protection because it was
false and defamatory must demonstrate “actual malice” with clear and convincing evidence.
(Chula Vista Elementary School District (2018) PERB Decision No. 2586, pp. 16-17 and fn. 8
(Chula Vista).)
Employees’ appeals to the public that are detrimental to and disparaging of an
employer’s business or services and which do not directly tie into employees’ interests in terms
and conditions of employment or an ongoing labor dispute have been considered unprotected
under the NLRA. (NLRB v. Local Union 1229, Intl. Brotherhood of Elec. Workers (1953) 346

37
U.S. 464, 476-478.) However, PERB has consistently held that “peaceful picketing, including
distribution of leaflets or other materials to advertise grievances or solicit support from
employees and the public are among the statutorily-guaranteed rights of employees and
employee organizations.” (Petaluma City Elementary School District/Joint Union High School
District (2016) PERB Decision No. 2485, p. 43; other citations omitted.) To wit, the Board
found that the distribution of leaflets to attendees of a graduation ceremony that criticized the
employer’s fiscal management and hiring policies was not impermissibly disloyal to the
employer and the activity retained statutory protection because the leaflets also touched on
labor relations concerns. (Mt. San Antonio Community College District (1982) PERB Decision
No. 224, pp. 4-7. (Mt. San Antonio).) Similarly, a court relied on Mt. San Antonio to conclude
that organizing teachers at a charter school who issued a letter to parents that was highly
critical of the charter school’s management and educational policies were engaged in protected
activity despite that the letter did not expressly tie the teachers’ criticisms to their working
conditions. (California Teachers Assn. v. PERB (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1091-1092
(CTA).)
Employees who are also union officials are often placed in uncomfortable positions
during their representational advocacy because they are likely to have to take positions that are
contrary to those of their own employer. Recognizing this tension, the Board stated:
We recognize that while seeking to resolve divergent and often
conflicting interests, representatives of both unions and
employers may resort occasionally during representational
meetings to intemperate speech or less than civil conduct. It is
for this reason that party representatives are afforded significant
latitude in their representational speech and conduct, which
serves the ultimate goal of accommodating divergent interests
and resolving conflicts.

38
(State of California (Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation) (2012) PERB Decision
No. 2282-S, p. 7, emphasis added (CDCR).) The Board further noted that an employer who
would discipline an employee “for speech or action” while the employee acted as a
representative of the union “must take care not to punish protected activity. To justify such
discipline, an employer must demonstrate that the employee’s speech or actions were so
disruptive as to shed the protective status such activity otherwise enjoys.” (Ibid.)
Returning to these facts, the City argues that the alert was not protected by the MMBA
under the Rancho Santiago standard because it was defamatory and disruptive to the fire
department’s operations. The City claims it was defamatory because the first version of the
alert implied that the fire department was not considering internal applicants, which was not
true. The City claims the alert was disruptive because its language shows that SMFA intended
to discourage outside applications for the fire captain position despite that SMFA knew there
was inadequate interest among existing employees. Neither argument is persuasive.
First, regarding the notion that the first version of the alert stated something that was
untrue, I note that it was not an explicit misstatement of fact and it was promptly corrected.
Even it had been patently false, under the Chula Vista standard discussed above, a clear and
convincing showing of malicious intent with knowledge of falsity is required before reaching
the conclusion that a communication is defamatory and therefore unprotected. There are no
facts showing that Morales, the only E-board member who provided substantive information to
CPF regarding the preparation of the alert acted with actual malice. To the contrary, he was
conscientious in his attention to the accuracy of the alert and acted quickly to correct language
that could have been misconstrued. Therefore, the alert cannot be considered false and
defamatory.

39
Second, there is no clear evidence that the alert caused a material disruption to fire
department operations. Champion testified that he did not contact the no-show applicants to
ascertain the reason they did not appear for the examination. He also stated that he did not
believe any other manager had done so and no such evidence was presented. If the City had a
factual basis for its conclusion that the alert was responsible for the no-shows they did not
reveal it. Thus, it is purely speculative to suppose that the reason that the external candidates
did not appear was because they were influenced by the alert or that they even knew about it.
The record also shows that the fire department had a sufficient number of qualified individuals
who completed the application process and who were later selected to fill the vacant captain’s
positions. A material disruption simply is not demonstrated by this record.
SMFA asked members of other unions affiliated with CPF to respect SMFA’s
preference that recruitment for captains remain internal. Under the court’s rationale in
McPherson, employees seeking assistance in labor relations matters from employees in other
unions, as SMFA did here, “is an integral part of normal organizational activities and therefore
is protected from employer reprisal.” (McPherson, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d 293, 311.) The
alert in this case also referenced the parties’ dispute over the interpretation of past practice
regarding promotional recruitments, which tied it more closely to working conditions than the
public appeals in Mt. San Antonio and CTA, and those were statutorily protected. In short, this
is not a close call. The categories of unprotected speech outlined in Rancho Santiago simply
are not demonstrated. Morales’s request on behalf of the E-board that CPF prepare and
disseminate the alert to CPF-affiliated locals was protected activity.

40
b. 	Adverse Action
In determining whether an employer’s action is adverse, the Board uses an objective
test and will not rely upon subjective reactions of the employee. (Chula Vista, supra, PERB
Decision No. 2586, pp. 24-25.) “The test which must be satisfied is not whether the employee
found the employer’s action to be adverse, but whether a reasonable person under the same
circumstances would consider the action to have an adverse impact of the employee’s
employment.” (Id. at p. 25, quoting Newark Unified School District (1991) PERB Decision
No. 864, pp. 11-12.) The reasonable person test applies equally when the employer’s alleged
adverse action is a warning of a possible future action. (Chula Vista at p. 25.) A threatened
adverse action is a separate potential unfair practice from the completed action. (San Diego
Unified School District (2017) PERB Decision No. 2538, p. 11 (San Diego), citing Regents of
the University of California (2004) PERB Decision No. 1585-H; Monterey Peninsula Unified
School District (2014) PERB Decision No. 2381, p. 35.)
i. 	Employer Investigations as Adverse Actions
The initiation of an investigation into alleged employee misconduct by the employer
may be considered an adverse action against the investigated employee, regardless of whether
disciplinary action actually results. (City of Torrance (2008) PERB Decision No. 1971-M, pp.
16-17 (Torrance); State of California (Department of Youth Authority) (2000) PERB Decision
No. 1403-S, p. 32 (Dept. of Youth Authority); California Union of Safety Employees (Coelho)
(1994) PERB Decision No. 1032-S, p. 12 (CAUSE-Coelho).) This is true for investigations
initiated at the behest of management (Torrance, supra, PERB Decision No. 1971,
p. 16), and those that were undertaken as a result of complaints against the employee made by
another employee or third parties, including by representatives of the union. (Dept. of Youth

41
Authority, supra, PERB Decision No. 1403-S, proposed dec., p. 16; CAUSE-Coelho, supra,
PERB Decision No. 1032-S, p. 5.)
The determination of whether an employer’s investigation rises to the level of an
adverse action is made on a case-by-case basis on the facts presented. (Service Employees
International Union, Local 221 (Gutierrez) (2012) PERB Decision No. 2277-M, p. 9 (SEIU-
Gutierrez).) In SEIU-Gutierrez, the union’s request to management to investigate an
employee’s alleged on-duty, anti-union activities did not result in a finding of adverse action,
because the investigation consisted entirely of one phone call by management to the
investigated employee, after which the matter was completely dropped on the same day. (Id. at
p. 7.) The Board concluded that no employee would reasonably fear disciplinary action based
on the very limited response of the employer to the union’s allegations against him. (Id. at
pp. 7-9.)
In contrast, in Torrance, the investigation was found to be adverse because the
employee was threatened that sustained allegations could lead to discipline. (Torrance, supra,
PERB Decision No. 1971-M, p. 16.) Similarly, in Dept. of Youth Authority, the adverse
investigation consisted of formal witness interviews over a long period and the allegations
involved misconduct against students. (Dept. of Youth Authority, supra, PERB Decision No.
1403-S, p. 37.)
In CAUSE-Coelho, a union’s attorney filed a written complaint against a safety officer
employed by the state’s department of fish and game. The facts giving rise to the union’s
complaint were as follows. After the employee had sued the union in small claim’s court, a
heated verbal altercation ensued outside of the court house between the union’s attorney and
the employee. The union alleged that the employee potentially represented a threat to the

42
safety of the union’s staff members because of the way the employee had behaved toward the
union’s attorney. The employer’s investigation consisted of formal interviews and a lengthy
written report, but the charges were not sustained against the employee. The Board found that
such action by the union was adverse to the employee, because “a reasonable person [would]
be concerned about the potential adverse effect of the complaint and ensuing investigation on
his employment relationship. The fact that the complaint and investigation did not result in
action being taken against Coelho by his employer does not eliminate the adverse nature of
CAUSE’s conduct.” (CAUSE-Coelho, supra, PERB Decision No. 1032-S, p. 12.)
Thus, where the investigation into alleged misconduct by the employee is conducted in
a formal and serious manner by the employer, the more likely it is to be found to be adverse to
the investigated employee’s interests.
In this case, the investigation into the conduct of the E-board employees was formal
and serious because (1) it was assigned to an outside investigator; (2) employees were
compelled to attend a recorded interview and to fully cooperate under threat of
insubordination; and (3) they were advised in writing that their responses could lead to
discipline, including possible termination.17 The process also spanned several months before
E-board members were finally cleared of wrongdoing, during which time a cloud of suspicion
hung over their heads. Thus, the investigation process here was very different from the
insubstantial one in SEIU-Gutierrez, and very similar to those in the other cases cited above,
where formal investigations were adverse to employment interests despite them not
culminating in disciplinary action against the investigated employees. A reasonable employee
in these circumstances would find the investigation to be adverse to his or her employment.
________________________
17 At least one E-board member, Hoover, was also verbally notified that this most
serious level of discipline could result from the investigation.

43
Likewise, as the threat of future adverse action may constitute a separate unfair practice from
the completed action (San Diego, supra, PERB Decision No. 2538, p. 11, and the cases cited
therein), it was reasonable for employees to fear future discipline in this case upon receiving
notice of the compulsory investigation that expressly threatened such action. (Chula Vista,
supra, PERB Decision No. 2586, p. 25.)
For all of the reasons stated above, SMFA has demonstrated a prima facie case of
retaliation by the City because of the E-board’s protected conduct under the MMBA. The
burden of proof shifts now to the City to prove it had a non-retaliatory reason and acted for that
reason, and not because of the employees’ protected conduct. (Palo Verde, supra, PERB
Decision No. 2337, pp. 12-13.)
c. 	Burden Shift
Where there is evidence that the respondent’s adverse action was motivated by both
lawful and unlawful reasons, “the question becomes whether the [adverse action] would not
have occurred ‘but for’ the protected activity.” (Martori Bros., supra, 29 Cal.3d 721, 729-
730.) The “but for” test is “an affirmative defense which the respondent must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence.” (McPherson, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d 293, 304.)
In assessing the evidence, PERB’s task is to determine whether the respondent’s “true
motivation for taking the adverse action was the employee’s protected activity.” (Regents of
the University of California (2012) PERB Decision No. 2302-H, p. 3, citations omitted (UC
Regents); see also Los Angeles County Superior Court (2008) PERB Decision No. 1979-C,
p. 23.) Further, PERB “weighs the respondent’s justifications for the adverse action against
the evidence of the respondent’s retaliatory motive.” (Baker Valley Unified School District
(2008) PERB Decision No. 1993, p. 14.) If PERB determines that a respondent’s action was

44
not taken for an unlawful reason, it has no authority to also determine whether the action was
otherwise justified or proper. (City of Santa Monica (2011) PERB Decision No. 2211-M,
p. 17.)
Even where there is direct evidence of unlawful motivation, a respondent may prove
that the employee’s protected activity was not the true motivation for its action, which is
sufficient to defeat the prima facie case. (UC Regents, supra, PERB Decision No. 2302-H,
p. 4.) In that case, although the employer specifically referenced the employee’s protected
conduct as part of its written grounds for termination, there was sufficient evidence of
performance concerns that showed the employer would have taken the same course of action,
regardless of the protected conduct. (Id. at proposed dec., p. 33.)
A different result was reached in the CDCR case, however. In that instance, there was
no basis offered by the employer for disciplining the steward other than her conduct toward the
manager during the two disciplinary meetings at issue. The Board stated:
CDCR reasons that such conduct as forms the basis for the
discipline was not protected, and violated its conduct standards
for employees, thus providing a lawful basis for the discipline.
Were its initial premise correct, that would be so. However, we
have determined that the conduct forming the basis of the
discipline is protected. Thus, there is no unprotected conduct to
serve as a lawful basis for the discipline, and [the employee’s]
discipline is seen to arise from, and only from, [the employee’s]
protected conduct.
(CDCR, supra, PERB Decision No. 2287-S, p. 14.) Thus, the Board found that the employer
could not meet its burden to defeat the prima facie case in such a circumstance. (Ibid.)
In its brief, the City does not advance a non-discriminatory reason for its decision to
investigate the E-board. Rather, it contends its course of action was justified under the
circumstances, because of the alert’s “potential to sabotage the City’s Fire Captain recruitment

45
by rendering the candidate pool so small that the vacant positions could not be filled.” The
City also notes that if the positions had remained unfilled, it would have created a “middle-
management vacuum.” Setting aside the facts that the City did not show that the alert was
responsible for the no-show applicants, and that three internal candidates actually filled the
positions, so there was no hiring deficit, the City has not and cannot show that its action was
motivated by any other reason than the E-board members’ protected conduct.
This is not the situation contemplated by Martori Bros., where there are both lawful
and unlawful reasons motivating the action at issue. Thus, there no need to apply a “but for”
analysis or to weigh the employer’s justifications for its actions against the evidence of
unlawful motive to discover its true motivation. Rather, this is a situation like in CDCR, where
the employer there presumed that the punished conduct was unprotected but was incorrect in
that regard.
Since the City has not shown an alternative, non-discriminatory reason for its actions, it
cannot defeat the charging party’s prima facie case. As such, the City violated MMBA section
3506.5, subdivision (a) when it notified the E-board employees of a pending investigation and
followed through with that investigation. This conduct also concurrently violated subdivision
(b) and interfered with SMFA’s right to represent employees. Such interference with SMFA’s
rights is especially notable here, as the City’s actions against the entire E-board not only
reasonably discourages SMFA officers from continuing to represent the bargaining unit, but
also sends a bleak message to employees that their chosen bargaining representatives suffer
reprisals because of their exercise of MMBA-protected rights.

46
REMEDY
MMBA section 3509, subdivision (b), authorizes PERB to order “the appropriate
remedy necessary to effectuate the purposes of this chapter.” (Omnitrans (2010) PERB
Decision No. 2143-M, p. 8.) This includes the authority to order an offending party to cease
and desist from conduct that violates the MMBA, as well as to take affirmative actions
designed to effectuate the statute’s purposes. (Torrance, supra, PERB Decision No. 1971-M,
pp. 28-29).
It has been determined that the City failed to provide notice and an opportunity to
bargain over the foreseeable effects of a non-negotiable decision in violation of MMBA
sections 3505 and 3506.5, subdivision (c). This same conduct also interfered with the rights of
bargaining unit employees to be represented by SMFA and with SMFA’s right to represent its
unit employees in violation of MMBA section 3506.5, subdivisions (a) and (b). In effects
bargaining cases, the Board does not typically order the employer to rescind a decision that it
was not required to bargain over. (Sutter County In-Home Supportive Services Public
Authority, supra, PERB Decision No. 1900-M, pp. 17-18 [regarding the effects of non-
negotiable decision to require background checks for caregiver employees]; Oak Grove School
District (1986) PERB Decision No. 582, pp. 29-31 [regarding the effects of a non-negotiable
decision to increase students’ instructional time].) Rather, the more appropriate remedy is to
order the employer to cease and desist from violating the duty to meet and confer in good faith,
and to negotiate, upon demand, over the effects of the new policy. (Ibid.; see also, Bellflower
Unified School District (2014) PERB Decision No. 2385, pp. 12-14.) The same remedy is
warranted here.

47
It has also been determined that the City committed unfair practices in violation of
MMBA section 3506.5, subdivision (a), when it initiated an investigation into the conduct of
each of the members of the SMFA E-board in response to his or her protected concerted
activity and protected communications with the leadership of other unions and employees
represented by other unions. This conduct also necessarily interfered with SMFA’s right to
represent its members under MMBA section 3506.5, subdivision (b). The City is therefore
ordered to cease and desist from retaliating against employees for their protected activities. An
ordinary remedy for such a violation is to restore the status quo ante by rescinding
documentation connected to the violation. (Jurupa Unified School District (2015) PERB
Decision No. 2458, proposed dec., p. 52.) Thus, the City is ordered to destroy and rescind
from employees’ personnel files any and all documentation connected to the investigation
against members of the SMFA E-Board.
It is also appropriate to order the City to post a notice incorporating the terms of this
order at all locations where notices to unit employees are usually posted. Posting of such a
notice, signed by an authorized representative of the City, provides employees with notice that
the City acted in an unlawful manner, must cease and desist from its illegal action, and will
comply with the order. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notice shall be
posted by electronic message, intranet, internet site, and other electronic means customarily
used by the City to communicate with its employees in the bargaining unit represented by
SMFA. (City of Sacramento (2013) PERB Decision No. 2351-M, pp. 44-45.) It effectuates
the purposes of the MMBA to inform employees of the resolution of this controversy.
(Omnitrans, supra, PERB Decision No. 2143-M, p. 9.)

48
PROPOSED ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record in this
case, it has been found that the City of Santa Maria (City) violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown
Act (MMBA or Act) (Government Code, § 3500 et seq.). The City violated MMBA sections
3503, 3505, 3506, and 3506.5, subdivisions (a), (b), and (c), and therefore committed unfair
practices under MMBA section 3509, subdivision (b), and Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB or Board) Regulation 32603, subdivisions (a), (b), (c), when it (1) failed to provide
notice and an opportunity to bargain over the foreseeable effects of a non-negotiable decision;
and (2) initiated an investigation into the conduct of each of the members of the Santa Maria
Firefighters’ Association (SMFA) E-board in response to his or her protected concerted
activity and protected communications with the leadership of other unions and employees
represented by other unions.
Pursuant to MMBA section 3509, subdivision (b), it is hereby ORDERED that the City,
its governing body, and its representatives shall:
A. CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Failing to bargain in good faith with SMFA over the foreseeable impacts of
the decision to run an “open” recruitment for a promotional position.
2. 	Retaliating against members of the SMFA E-Board because of their
protected concerted activities and communications with the leadership of other unions and with
employees represented by other unions.
3. 	Denying bargaining unit employees the right to be represented by SMFA.
4. 	Denying SMFA the right to represent it members.

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B. TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE PURPOSES OF MMBA:
1. 	Upon request by SMFA, meet and negotiate in good faith over the
foreseeable effects of the decision to run an “open” recruitment for a promotional position.
2. 	Destroy and rescind from employees’ personnel files any and all
documentation connected to the investigation against members of the SMFA E-Board.
3. 	Within ten (10) workdays of the service of a final decision in this matter,
post at all work locations in the City where notices to bargaining unit employees customarily
are posted, copies of the Notice attached hereto as an Appendix. The Notice must be signed by
an authorized agent of the City, indicating that the City will comply with the terms of this
Order. Such posting shall be maintained for a period of thirty (30) consecutive workdays.
Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that this Notice is not reduced in size, altered,
defaced or covered with any other material. In addition to physical posting of paper notices,
the Notice shall be posted by electronic message, intranet, internet site, and other electronic
means customarily used by the City to communicate with its employees in the bargaining unit
represented by SMFA.
RIGHT TO APPEAL
Pursuant to California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 32305, this Proposed Decision
and Order shall become final unless a party files a statement of exceptions with the Public
Employment Relations Board (PERB or Board) itself within 20 days of service of this Decision.

50
The Board’s address is:
Public Employment Relations Board
Attention: Appeals Assistant
1031 18th Street
Sacramento, CA 95811-4124
(916) 322-8231
FAX: (916) 327-9425
E-FILE: PERBe-file.Appeals@perb.ca.gov
In accordance with PERB regulations, the statement of exceptions should identify by
page citation or exhibit number the portions of the record, if any, relied upon for such
exceptions. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 32300.)
A document is considered “filed” when actually received during a regular PERB business
day. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 32135, subd. (a) and 32130; see also Gov. Code, § 11020, subd.
(a).) A document is also considered “filed” when received by facsimile transmission before the
close of business together with a Facsimile Transmission Cover Sheet or received by electronic
mail before the close of business, which meets the requirements of PERB Regulation 32135,
subdivision (d), provided the filing party also places the original, together with the required
number of copies and proof of service, in the U.S. mail. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 32135, subds.
(b), (c) and (d); see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 32090, 32091 and 32130.)
Any statement of exceptions and supporting brief must be served concurrently with its
filing upon each party to this proceeding. Proof of service shall accompany each copy served on
a party or filed with the Board itself. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 32300, 32305, 32140, and
32135, subd. (c).)