County of San Joaquin (PERB 2761M)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
CALIFORNIA NURSES ASSOCIATION,
Charging Party,
v.
COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN,
Respondent.
Case No. SA-CE-1141-M
PERB Decision No. 2761-M
April 12, 2021
Appearances: Nicole J. Daro, Anthony J. Tucci, and Eric J. Wiesner, Attorneys, for
California Nurses Association; Sloan Sakai Yeung & Wong by Jeff Sloan, Justin Otto
Sceva, and Madeline Miller, Attorneys, for County of San Joaquin.
Before Banks, Chair; Shiners, Krantz, and Paulson, Members.
DECISION
KRANTZ, Member: This case is before the Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB or Board) for a decision based on the evidentiary record from a hearing before
an administrative law judge (ALJ). California Nurses Association (CNA) filed the
underlying unfair practice charge against the County of San Joaquin, alleging that the
County violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) and PERB Regulations.1
The core facts of the case are not in dispute. Several months before CNA held
a nurses’ strike, the County signed a strike replacement contract guaranteeing
1 The MMBA is codified at Government Code section 3500 et seq. Unless
otherwise specified, all further statutory references are to the Government Code.
PERB regulations are codified at California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 31001
et seq.

2
replacement nurses a minimum of five shifts.2 After nurses struck for two days, the
County barred most striking nurses from work for three additional days, prohibited
them from using accrued leave during these three days, and filled out nurses’
timecards with a payroll code that could potentially lead to adverse consequences.
The operative complaint alleges that the County’s conduct amounted to discrimination
against and interference with protected conduct, as well as a unilateral change in
employment terms without notice and an opportunity to meet and confer.
For the reasons set forth in detail post, we hold that a public health care
employer that prohibits bargaining unit employees from work after a strike, due to a
minimum shift guarantee for strike replacements, can typically establish an affirmative
defense to an interference claim and avoid a finding of discrimination only if it can
prove that: (1) it made a good faith effort in the marketplace to negotiate a strike
replacement contract that would eliminate any minimum shift guarantee or shorten it to
the greatest degree possible, but it ultimately needed to agree to the minimum shift
guarantee in order to maintain critical health care services; (2) it barred employees
from work only because such a contractual commitment temporarily reduced available
work opportunities, and it filled all remaining opportunities without discriminating
against employees based on whether they worked during the strike or engaged in any
other actual or perceived protected activity; and (3) it provided the employees’ union
with timely notice regarding any decision to guarantee replacement workers a
2 In this decision, we mainly refer to this type of contractual provision as a
“minimum shift guarantee.” We intend that term to have the same meaning as
“minimum number of paid hours” or “minimum work period.”

3
minimum work period or to modify the terms of such a guarantee, and, if requested,
bargained in good faith over the potential effects on bargaining unit employees.
Applying this holding to the instant record, we find the County violated the
MMBA and PERB Regulations by discriminating against and interfering with protected
conduct. Finally, while we clarify an employer’s notice and effects bargaining
obligations when it guarantees strike replacements a minimum work period that has
foreseeable impacts upon post-strike work opportunities for bargaining unit
employees, we dismiss the unilateral change claim presented in the operative
complaint.3
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The County and CNA have been parties to successive Memoranda of
Understanding (MOUs), the most recent of which was in effect from October 1, 2016,
through December 31, 2018. The parties began negotiating for a new MOU in
November 2018, reached an impasse in January 2020, and thereafter worked with a
mediator. After mediation failed to break the impasse, CNA held a two-day strike on
March 5-6, 2020.4
CNA filed the instant charge on March 10 and amended its charge on April 9.
After the Board expedited the case at all levels and the County responded to the
3 Both parties requested oral argument. The Board typically denies such
requests when we have an adequate record, the parties had ample opportunity to
present briefs and have availed themselves of that opportunity, and the issues before
the Board are sufficiently clear as to make oral argument unnecessary. (County of
Santa Clara (2018) PERB Decision No. 2613-M, p. 6, fn. 3.) Because the instant case
meets these criteria, we deny the parties’ oral argument requests.
4 Except where otherwise noted, all further dates refer to 2020.

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amended charge, PERB’s Office of the General Counsel issued a complaint against
the County. The complaint alleges, first, that the County interfered with and
discriminated against protected activity, thereby violating MMBA sections 3503, 3506,
and 3506.5, subdivisions (a) and (b), as well as PERB Regulation 32603, subdivisions
(a) and (b), by taking three actions: (1) notifying employees the day before the strike
began that it had hired replacement employees for a five-shift minimum and, as a
result, would not permit striking employees to return to work during the three days
following the strike, unless management called them in earlier; (2) preventing most
nurses who participated in the strike from returning to work until March 10 and
forbidding them from using vacation time, compensatory time off, or holiday hours to
cover the mandatory time off; and (3) noting “Leave Unauthorized” on nurses’
timecards for strike days and for mandatory days off following the strike.5
The complaint further alleges that the County violated MMBA sections 3505 and
3506.5, subdivision (c), as well as PERB Regulation 32603, subdivision (c), by failing
to provide notice and an opportunity to meet and confer before deviating from the
status quo set forth in three contractual provisions: (1) MOU section 14.2.1(d)-(e),
which required the County to refrain from involuntarily furloughing full-time nurses
without first seeking volunteers and calling off any travelers, contract nurses, registry
nurses, volunteers, nurses on overtime, per diem nurses, and part-time nurses;
5 The complaint inadvertently alleges that the County required nurses to use
accrued leave rather than forbade them from doing so. Pursuant to PERB Regulation
32645, we focus on the allegations the parties actually litigated and we disregard this
wording error that did not materially impact either party’s rights.

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(2) MOU section 14.2.1(g), which stated as follows: “If an employee is notified that he
or she is being furloughed and is then asked to report to work for the same shift, the
employee will be guaranteed a full shift whether or not the employee works a full shift.
Such an employee may not be ordered to return to work, and not required to be
available if called”; and (3) MOU section 14.2.1(o), which allowed furloughed nurses to
use up to 24 hours of vacation, compensatory time off, or holiday hours.
In its answer to the complaint, the County denied most of the material
allegations and asserted several affirmative defenses. After unsuccessful efforts to
settle the case, the parties stipulated to multiple essential facts and completed the
evidentiary record during a five-day formal hearing. All parties, witnesses, counsel,
and the ALJ participated in this hearing by video due to the COVID-19 pandemic. On
the third day of the hearing, prior to resting its case-in-chief, CNA moved to amend the
complaint. The County opposed this motion and the ALJ denied it, as discussed post.
After completing the hearing, the parties filed simultaneous opening briefs
followed by simultaneous reply briefs. On October 14, the Board transferred the matter
to the Board itself for decision pursuant to PERB Regulation 32215.
FACTUAL FINDINGS
The record reflects the following relevant facts, as well as certain additional
factual findings that we incorporate into our analysis, post at pages 51-74.
The County is a public agency within the meaning of MMBA section 3501,
subdivision (c) and PERB Regulation 32016, subdivision (a). The County operates
San Joaquin General Hospital (SJGH), a general acute care hospital located in French
Camp, California. The hospital includes an emergency department, a neonatal

6
intensive care unit, and the County’s only trauma center. The County also operates
outpatient clinics in French Camp and Stockton. SJGH serves more indigent patients
than any other hospital in the County and provides inpatient care to incarcerated
patients in a secure ward. In the first half of fiscal year 2019-2020, SJGH
underperformed its projected net balance of income and expenses, losing
substantially more money than expected.
CNA is an employee organization within the meaning of MMBA section 3501,
subdivision (a) and the exclusive representative, as defined in PERB Regulation
32016, subdivision (b), of a bargaining unit comprising more than 700 registered
nurses working at SJGH and other County locations.
I. 	Anticipating Possible Strikes, the County Contracted for Strike Replacements.
Beginning in June 2019—seven months before CNA and the County reached
impasse and more than eight months before CNA gave notice of a strike—the County
began to consider contracting for replacement services in the event of a strike. The
County sought proposals from three strike replacement companies—including
HealthSource Global Staffing (HSG)—between June and August 2019.
In October 2019, more than four months before CNA’s eventual strike, the
County executed a Contingency Staffing Agreement with HSG. The agreement called
for HSG to provide replacement employees in the event of a strike by CNA and/or by
the union representing technical workers and other employees at SJGH, Service
Employees International Union Local 1021.
The County’s contract with HSG included the following minimum shift
guarantee:

7
“Minimum Hours. Client will pay HealthSource a minimum of
what amounts to five (5) twelve-hour shifts (60 hours) for
each Replacement Staff that commences travel to the
Destination City. . . . Client shall pay the applicable hourly
rate for this minimum number of billable hours regardless of
whether Replacement Staff is assigned to work the full
number of hours. The calculation of the Guaranteed Hours
includes regular and overtime hours but does not include
any ‘on-call’ time. Orientation provided to the Replacement
Staff will be billed at applicable Compensation Fee rates and
will not count toward this minimum number of billable hours.”
Before executing the HSG contract, the County did not seek to eliminate or
reduce the minimum shift guarantee, although the County did successfully negotiate
with HSG over several other contract terms. In prior dealings with other clients, HSG
had negotiated over minimum shift guarantees and agreed to guarantees of fewer
than five shifts. The two companies the County did not select also offered a minimum
shift guarantee of fewer than five shifts.
II. 	After CNA Provided Strike Notice, the County Took More Preparatory Steps.
In January 2020, the parties reached an impasse in bargaining for a new MOU.
When post-impasse mediation did not resolve the impasse, CNA provided ten days’
written notice of a two-day economic strike. Specifically, CNA gave notice on
February 24 that bargaining unit nurses would strike from 7:00 a.m. on March 5
through 6:59 a.m. on March 7. CNA further noted that all striking nurses would return
to work unconditionally starting with shifts beginning at 7:00 a.m. on March 7.
On February 24, the County filed an unfair practice charge and request for
injunctive relief, asking PERB to seek a court order enjoining more than 50 nurses from
striking on the ground that their absence from work for the two days of the strike would
allegedly pose an imminent and substantial threat to public health or safety. On

8
February 28, the parties settled that charge. Pursuant to this settlement, CNA exempted
from the strike 38 nurses plus two alternates and one on-call nurse, and the County
withdrew its charge and request for injunctive relief.6
In advance of the strike, the County canceled some elective surgeries and
outpatient clinic visits, reduced its intake of trauma patients, and otherwise reduced its
patient census. The County’s decrease in patient census began before the strike, and
as a result the County instituted voluntary and involuntary furloughs in the days before
the strike.7 Moreover, the County continued to maintain a lower patient census during
the three days following the strike, March 7-9. During the five-day period comprising the
strike and the three days thereafter, the County succeeded in reducing its inpatient
census from approximately 150 patients to approximately 120 patients.8
6 PERB frequently takes administrative notice of its own records and files. (See,
e.g., Alliance Judy Ivie Burton Technology Academy High, et al. (2020) PERB
Decision No. 2719, p. 2, fn. 3; Regents of the University of California (2019) PERB
Decision No. 2646-H, p. 3, fn. 4; Children of Promise Preparatory Academy (2018)
PERB Decision No. 2558, p. 2, fn. 3.) In the instant case, we take administrative
notice of multiple filings in other PERB cases, including at the request of both parties.
For purposes of this paragraph, we take notice of records in PERB Case No.
SA-CO-153-M, which the County brought against CNA for the purpose of asking
PERB to seek injunctive relief barring allegedly essential employees from striking.
7 When there are more nurses than needed based upon the census,
management typically determines whether nurses can be floated to other departments
needing help, secondarily asks nurses to volunteer for a furlough, and as a last resort,
requires a mandatory furlough.
8 Patient census fluctuates from day to day and within the course of any single
day. Patient census during the five-day period fluctuated between approximately 112
and 135 patients.

9
The County also decided to make use of its contract with HSG. SJGH worked
with the County’s Health Care Services Agency, which uses nurses for public health,
behavioral health, and correctional health, to determine how many replacement
nurses the County would order from HSG. In determining how many replacement
nurses it needed to maintain critical hospital functions, the County considered patient
census, patient acuity, mandated nurse-to-patient ratios, and PERB precedent
requiring a hospital to obtain replacements for essential positions, if possible, rather
than seeking to enjoin employees from striking.
On March 3, SJGH Chief Executive Officer David Culberson asked the County
Board of Supervisors to approve the contract with HSG retroactively and to approve up
to $4 million for replacement workers during the period of March 2-10. The Board of
Supervisors approved Culberson’s requests.
On March 4, the day before the strike commenced, the County took several
actions. First, it gathered HSG replacement nurses for a paid orientation day, which did
not count toward the five-shift minimum hiring guarantee in the County’s contract with
HSG. Second, the County issued a memorandum to CNA entitled “Notice Regarding
Return to Work Date for Striking CNA Unit Members.” The memorandum stated in
relevant part:
“To ensure the continuity of necessary health services, the
County has had no choice but to contract with an outside
company for strike replacement workers. Such a contract
was, however, only available for a minimum period of five (5)
days. Given that fact, please be aware that we intend to
immediately transmit the memorandum attached hereto as
ATTACHMENT A to all potential strike participants, notifying
them that employees who choose to participate in the strike
will not be able to return to work immediately, after the strike

10
period noticed by CNA, and will instead not be accepted to
return to work until their first shift on or after Tuesday,
March 10 at 7 a.m., unless called into work at an earlier time
by SJGH management. The County also reserves its right to
implement temporary furloughs pursuant to Section 14.2.1 of
the County/CNA MOU, if it deems such furloughs
appropriate in light of any decrease to patient census.”
The memorandum’s attachment was a memorandum from Culberson to all CNA
bargaining unit nurses. This second memorandum, which the County posted in units
and break rooms throughout the hospital on March 4, stated in relevant part:
“To ensure our ability to provide necessary health services
without interruption, including emergency services, the
County has contracted with an outside company for
replacement workers during the strike period. The company
with which the County has contracted, however, will only
agree to provide such replacement workers for a full five day
period, and the County has therefore been forced to agree to
pay a minimum of five full days for all such workers[.]
“Given this unavoidable commitment, please know that CNA
unit members who participate in the strike will not be able to
return to work at the end of the strike period as noticed by
CNA. Instead, such participating employees will not be
accepted back at work until their first shift on or after
Tuesday, March 10 at 7 a.m., unless called into work at
an earlier time by SJGH management.
“Please bear in mind that you may be notified not to return to
work yet due to low census. Section 14.2.1 of the
County/CNA MOU provides that the Hospital Director or
designee may temporarily furlough any regular or contract
employee for up to thirty-six (36) hours per fiscal year due to
fluctuations in patient census. If the Hospital Director or
designee determines that census has decreased such that
furloughs are appropriate, given patient care needs, the skill
level of personnel, and the kinds of staffing levels required
for safe patient care, we will be abiding by the negotiated

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MOU terms governing such furloughs.” (Emphasis in
original.)
III. 	The County Continued Operations During the Strike.
The County operated during the strike using HSG replacement nurses, other
traveling or registry nurses who were already contracted to work for the County before
CNA called a strike, supervisors and managers with clinical competencies, and two
categories of CNA-represented bargaining unit nurses: (1) those that CNA exempted
from the strike pursuant to its agreement with the County, and (2) those that chose to
cross the picket line and work during the strike.
Shortly before CNA’s strike commenced, the County learned that many SEIU-
represented employees would strike in sympathy with CNA. The County did not have
sufficient notice to hire replacements for the sympathy strikers. However, HSG
replacement nurses, together with supervisory personnel and the CNA-represented
nurses and SEIU-represented workers who did not strike, were able to cover the
sympathy strikers’ work.
IV. 	The County Barred Most Nurses Who Participated in the Strike from Returning
to Work for Three Days, Did Not Allow Nurses to Use Paid Leave for Such
Days, and Marked “Leave Unauthorized” on Nurses’ Timecards.
In the three days following the strike, March 7-9, the County continued to
employ HSG replacement nurses, while barring from work most nurses who had
participated in the strike. The County did not bar any SEIU-represented employees from
returning to work.
CNA, and multiple nurses who were barred from work after the strike, believed
the County was furloughing nurses under MOU section 14.2.1, which provides for
furloughs in case of a low patient census. Some nurses accordingly attempted to use

12
accrued vacation, compensatory time off, or holiday hours for the time they were barred
from work. One or more managers initially marked an “F” on employee timecards, as is
typically done for a furlough under the MOU, before later changing those designations
to “LU,” meaning “Leave Unauthorized.” And Culberson told a group of nurses on
March 7 that the County would allow them to use paid leave as if it was a furlough under
the MOU.9 The County ultimately took the position that MOU section 14.2.1 did not
apply, and on that basis, it did not allow any nurse who participated in the strike to use
accrued paid leave to cover lost shifts from March 7-9.10
The County marked nurses as “LU” both for days on which employees struck and
for days employees were barred from work following the strike. An LU designation
refers to an unexcused absence. Employees perceive the designation as a negative
mark to be avoided, because an employee can face discipline for multiple unexcused
absences. As discussed post, during the evidentiary hearing in this matter, the County
announced that it would create a new payroll code and retroactively remove the LU
designation from most (but not all) nurse timecards for March 5-9.
During the three days in which the County barred from work most nurses who
had struck, the County attempted to call back to work certain nurses whom it had
initially barred. Many of these nurses refused to report to work out of solidarity and
9 Culberson testified that he misspoke during this March 7 discussion.
10 Although we ultimately conclude, post, that the County did not institute a low
census furlough within the meaning of MOU section 14.2.1, the term “furlough” in its
normal usage does provide one reasonable means of describing what occurred.
Hereinafter, we use the term in its generic sense, except where context dictates that
we mean to refer to a furlough within the meaning of the MOU.

13
relied on MOU section 14.2.1(g), which provided that furloughed nurses cannot be
required to return to work during the furlough timeframe. One nurse who is also a union
leader received questions from other nurses about how to respond to call back
requests, and she suggested that they invoke section 14.2.1(g). Similarly, when the
County asked for CNA’s assistance in convincing nurses to return in one understaffed
department, a CNA labor representative invoked section 14.2.1(g) in explaining why
nurses were within their rights to decide whether they wished to return if management
barred them from work and then called them back.
The County spent approximately $2.5 million on replacement nurses and asserts
that the strike cost it approximately $250,000 in administrative expenses.
V. 	Relevant MOU Provisions
Article 14 of the operative MOU included the following relevant sections:
“14.2 Short-Term Staff Reductions - SJGH
“The need for short-term reductions in temporary or regular
staff within San Joaquin General Hospital will be determined
by the Director of Nursing and/or the Deputy Directors of
Nursing and will be based on patient census/staffing
considerations within each division. Within the Nursing
Division, such determination will be made in conjunction with
discussions with Nursing Administration, including, as
appropriate, the Director of Nursing, Deputy Directors of
Nursing, or Nursing Department Managers responsible for
shift management.
“For those Nursing Division units listed below, unit staff
reductions will not reduce staffing levels below the
minimums indicated unless such unit is closed. For all other
Nursing Division units, staff reductions will occur as dictated
by patient census/staffing needs.

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Minimum Staffing Levels
Unit 	Per Scheduled Shift
ICU/CCU 	2 (2 RN)
OR/Recovery 	2 (2 RN)
Anesthesiology 	1 (CRNA)
Emergency Room 	3 (3 RN)
Intensive Care Nursery 	2 (2 RN)
Nursery/Post Partum 	3 (3 RN)
Labor and Delivery 	2 (2 RN)
Dialysis 	2 (2 RN)
Med/Surg 	2 (2 RN)
All others 	10 RN
As necessary, consolidation of Nursing
Division units may occur.
“For the purposes of short-term staff reductions, individual
seniority will be determined on the basis of continuous
County service in accordance with Civil Service Rule 17.
However, short-term staff reductions shall be determined on a
division by division basis except that in the Nursing Service
Division, they will be determined on a work-unit by work-unit
basis. Reduction in staff in one division or unit shall not affect
employees working in another division or unit. If consolidation
of units has occurred, seniority lists for those units shall also
be consolidated. Any reductions in staff will occur by class
and will affect part-time employees first, then regular
employees in accordance with seniority criteria spelled out in
Civil Service Rule 17, except that employees in a higher
class may not displace employees in a lower class. Minimum
staff maintained in any one Nursing Division unit (or
consolidated unit) will retain their seniority within that unit
(even if floated out) and will not cause or be affected by
short-term reductions in any other unit.
“When the need for a reduction in staff is determined in
advance of a shift, affected employees will be so notified as
early as possible, but at least within one and one-half (1-1/2)
hours prior to their shift start time.
“When the need for a reduction in staff occurs between one
and one-half 1-1/2 hours prior to an employee's shift or after
the employee has started work, the affected employee(s) will

15
be so notified within three (3) hours after starting the shift and
will be allowed to work one-half of the shift.
“Any employee affected by a short-term layoff may request
additional time off in conjunction with the layoff. Such
requests will be considered and may be granted subject to
staffing considerations.
“Employees affected by short-term reductions in staff will be
charged with administrative leave (if applicable) and then, at
the employee's option, with accrued compensatory time,
holiday time, or vacation time except that any employee
affected by short-term reduction in staff may retain up to
eighty (80) hours of accrued leave time or enough time to
cover a previously approved vacation, whichever is greater.
“Employees affected by short-term reductions in staff will be
considered laid off until patient census/staffing needs warrant
their return to duty. Such employees will be responsible for
calling the department on each day they are scheduled to
work subsequent to layoff to find out if they are to come back
to work. Such call-ins must be made no later than 1-1/2 hours
before the scheduled start time for day and p.m. shift
employees and no later than 6 hours before the scheduled
start time for night shift employees. Night shift employees who
call in on any given date and are advised not to return to work
may call again, within 1-1/2 hours of their shift start time to
determine if staffing needs have been changed and if they
may return to work. In the absence of such requests, the
hospital will call people back in reverse order of the reduction
to assure appropriate staffing.
“14.2.1 Low Census Program
“Fluctuations in patient census may lead to an occasional
need for reduced staff at San Joaquin General Hospital. To
avoid imposing actual short-term reductions in staff and yet to
accommodate the lower staffing needs, the Hospital Director
or designee may furlough any regular or contract employee
(full time or part time Nurse with benefits) for up to thirty six
(36) hours during any fiscal year. The following conditions
will govern the furlough program:
“(a) Furloughs will depend on patient care needs, skill levels

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of personnel, and kinds of staffing levels required for safe
patient care as determined by the Hospital Director or
designee.
“(b) Furloughs may be determined on a shift, hourly, or unit
basis and may result in the temporary reassignment of
remaining staff for the remainder of that shift.
“(c) Seniority and employment status will not be factors in the
scheduling of furloughs, except that, subject to the provisions
of 1.
“(d) The Department will make every attempt to seek
volunteers before imposing mandatory furloughs.
“(e) Call off order – Should conditions exist for furloughing,
after considering the staffing needs of the cluster, scheduled
nurses will be called off in the following order in the affected
unit on the affected shift.
1. 	Travelers, contract nurses, and registry nurses
2. 	Volunteers
3. 	Nurses on overtime
4. 	Per diem nurses on a rotational basis
5. 	Part time nurses on a rotational basis
6. 	Full time nurses on a rotational basis
“(f) Advance notice, to the extent allowed by patient care
needs, will be provided to employees being furloughed.
Reasonable effort will be made to notify employees at least
two (2) hours prior to the start of each shift.
“(g) If an employee is notified that he or she is being
furloughed and is then asked to report to work for the same
shift, the employee will be guaranteed a full shift whether or
not the employee works a full shift. Such an employee may
not be ordered to return to work, and not required to be
available if called.
“(h) Individual employees will not be furloughed more than
once in any given pay period unless the employee so
requests.
“(i) Every attempt will be made to assure that furloughed
employees receive their regularly scheduled days off. If low
census conditions change during the pay period in which the

17
furlough occurred, the employee may volunteer to make up
the furloughed day on a scheduled day off at straight time. If,
however, an employee is required to work on a regular day off
in that pay period, the employee will be guaranteed overtime
pay.
“(j) Regular employees affected by furloughs will maintain full
seniority for retirement and lay-off purposes.
“(k) Regular employees and part-time employees with benefits
so affected will accrue sick leave and vacation benefits as
though the furlough had not occurred.
“(l) No furloughed employee, regardless of the number of
hours furloughed, will lose medical, dental, or vision benefits
as a result of being voluntarily or involuntarily furloughed.
“(m) Employees at the Hospital who volunteer to accept any
furloughs shall be treated under provisions of 14.2.1 rather
than the leave of absence provisions.
“(n) Employees who are at work and are sent home on
furlough will get paid a minimum of half of their scheduled
work shift.
“(o) Nurses who are furloughed may use up to 24 hours of
vacation, compensatory time off or holiday hours to equal a
full shift’s pay.
[¶ . . . ¶]
“14.2.3 Seniority
“In making management decisions regarding reassignments,
work schedules and vacation schedules, several factors are
considered. Those factors include, but are not limited to,
patient care issues, staffing issues and minimizing overtime
costs. In addition to these factors the County agrees that
seniority shall also be a consideration in making such
decisions.
“14.3. Use of Registry, Traveler or Registry Contract Nurses
“Registry, traveler or registry contract nurses will be cancelled
before bargaining unit nurses at straight time or overtime.
However, a bargaining unit nurse can volunteer to be

18
canceled. The term ‘canceled’ is synonymous with ‘low
census’ or ‘furlough’.”
DISCUSSION
The complaint alleges three central types of violations: discrimination,
interference, and unilateral change. Before analyzing the merits of these claims, we
first assess the County’s assertions that the complaint does not include an
independent interference allegation, the parties litigated no such independent
interference claim, and the only interference allegation before us is therefore purely
derivative of discrimination. While these arguments would not impact our ultimate
remedial order in this matter, we nonetheless address them to provide clarity for future
cases.
I. 	The Nature of the Interference Allegations to be Resolved
Where a complaint alleges interference based upon the same conduct giving
rise to another claim, the interference claim is independent rather than derivative if the
interference claim can be established without the other claim being established.
(County of Santa Clara (2021) PERB Order No. Ad-485-M, p. 9.) In a case involving a
post-strike furlough resulting from a replacement contract containing a minimum shift
guarantee, it is unlikely, but not impossible, that interference and discrimination claims
would diverge in their outcome. For instance, as discussed post, an employer’s
affirmative defenses to interference and discrimination claims can involve different
considerations. Therefore, an independent interference claim is cognizable.
The County argues, first, that CNA’s charge did not allege interference as an
independent claim. But PERB does not penalize a charging party for failing to label a
theory that may fit the factual allegations in its charge; rather, PERB’s Office of the

19
General Counsel (OGC) must issue a complaint based on all legal theories for which
the alleged facts state a prima facie case. (San Jose/Evergreen Federation of
Teachers, AFT Local 6157, and American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO (Crawford
et al.) (2020) PERB Decision No. 2744, p. 23; Hartnell Community College District
(2015) PERB Decision No. 2452, pp. 53-54.) Here, the factual allegations in CNA’s
charge could support claims that the County independently interfered with, and
discriminated against, CNA’s rights and the rights of employees.
The County next claims that the complaint did not give it sufficient notice of an
independent interference claim. (See City of Roseville (2016) PERB Decision
No. 2505-M, pp. 15-16 (Roseville) [“Identifying the essential factual allegations and the
theories of liability in a complaint is necessary to provide adequate notice and ensure
a full and fair adjudication of the issues, including an opportunity for the respondent to
raise any affirmative defenses specific to each theory of liability”].) Applying Roseville
to the complaint in this matter, the complaint adequately alleged an independent claim
for violation of CNA’s rights, but did not adequately allege an independent claim for
violation of employee rights. We explain.
Paragraph five of the complaint alleges the following County conduct:
threatening to bar striking nurses from work for three days; carrying through on that
threat; prohibiting furloughed nurses from using accrued leave; and entering “LU” on
nurses’ timecards. Paragraph six of the complaint alleges that the County took these
adverse actions “because of” employees’ exercise of protected rights and thereby
violated MMBA sections 3506 and 3506.5, subdivision (a). Paragraph six in its entirety
hinges on the “because of” phrasing, thereby stating a discrimination claim and a

20
purely derivative claim for interference with employee rights. Paragraph six does not,
however, allege an independent claim for interference with employee rights.
In contrast, paragraph seven of the complaint, which alleges interference with
CNA’s rights, does not mention the County’s motive. Rather, it states: “This conduct
also interfered with Charging Party’s right to represent employees in violation of
Government Code sections 3503 and 3506.5(b).” The County, relying on the majority
opinion in County of Santa Clara (2017) PERB Decision No. 2539-M, argues that “this
conduct” can only refer to the retaliation allegation in the immediately preceding
paragraph. If that were so, that could arguably mean that “this conduct”—as used in
paragraph seven—incorporates the limiting “because of” language in paragraph six.
More logically, however, “this conduct” refers to the County’s conduct pled
earlier in the complaint, viz., its pre-strike threat and post-strike actions as set forth in
paragraph five. In these circumstances, where conduct set forth in earlier complaint
paragraphs could constitute a violation irrespective of motive, the phrase “this conduct
also interfered” does not limit a charging party to litigating only a derivative
interference theory. We partially overrule County of Santa Clara, supra, PERB
Decision No. 2539-M, to the extent it can be read to suggest that “this conduct” always
refers only to the immediately preceding paragraph of the complaint rather than to the
underlying conduct set forth in earlier complaint paragraphs.11
11 Reading the majority opinion in County of Santa Clara carefully, it appears
possible that the complaint there, unlike here, may not have set forth the conduct that
the charging party sought to litigate as interference. (County of Santa Clara, supra,
PERB Decision No. 2539-M, p. 16.) If that is so, nothing in our decision today disturbs
that aspect of the majority’s opinion. In other words, we leave the majority opinion
intact to the extent one basis for its holding may have been that the complaint

21
We reach this conclusion in part based on the plain meaning of the phrase “this
conduct,” as well as the distinction between derivative and independent claims noted
above. Moreover, the County’s interpretation of County of Santa Clara, supra, PERB
Decision No. 2539-M reveals that the concurring opinion therein expressed valid
concerns that: (1) the majority opinion could be read as requiring charging parties to
move to amend most complaints to allege interference twice—once as a derivative
claim and again as an independent allegation; (2) such an approach was
unnecessarily stringent, particularly where a complaint already alleges interference
and does not indicate that the claim must be proven via evidence of a discriminatory
motive; and (3) such an interpretation would “create additional obstacles,” undermine
sound public policy, and arbitrarily obstruct parties’ access to PERB procedures.
(County of Santa Clara, supra, PERB Decision No. 2539-M, pp. 37-38 (conc. opn. of
Banks, M.).) These concerns were well taken. Indeed, notice pleading principles do
not impose severe requirements in providing a respondent general notice of the claims
alleged, especially given that PERB “is not a court, but an administrative agency” and
favors “hearing cases on their merits.” (City and County of San Francisco (2020)
PERB Decision No. 2712-M, p. 22, fn. 7 (San Francisco).)
Today’s decision thus clarifies that PERB precedent, as properly construed,
does not impose the artificial, deleterious obstacles that the concurrence discerned in
County of Santa Clara, supra, PERB Decision No. 2539-M. As noted, we partially
overrule County of Santa Clara to the extent it suggests that the phrase “this conduct”
completely failed to mention the conduct which the charging party sought to litigate as
an independent interference claim.

22
must always refer to the preceding paragraph of the complaint rather than to the
underlying conduct set forth earlier in the complaint.
While the complaint in the instant case adequately alleged an independent
claim of interference with CNA’s rights, even setting that conclusion aside, the
unalleged violation doctrine provides a basis for us to consider interference with both
employee and organizational rights. (See, e.g., County of Santa Clara, supra, PERB
Decision No. 2539-M, pp. 16-17 [applying unalleged violation doctrine to independent
interference claim, after having found complaint did not adequately allege it].) Here,
the County had adequate notice and opportunity to defend against interference as an
independent claim, including based on CNA’s opening statement specifically arguing
that the County’s pre-strike memoranda would interfere with protected conduct.
Moreover, the interference and discrimination claims arise from the same events, the
parties litigated all issues relevant to interference and the County’s business necessity
defense thereto, and the County had the opportunity to examine and cross-examine
witnesses on such issues. The County has not identified any additional interference-
related facts it could have presented in its defense. Significantly, the parties’ briefs
cited both our discrimination standards and our separate interference standard.
Indeed, the County acknowledged its conduct could have a chilling impact on
protected conduct, but argued that any such impact was unavoidable, thereby
requiring us to decide, as we do post, whether it established a necessity defense to
interference.
For the foregoing reasons, in our below discussion we analyze the record under
both discrimination and interference standards.

23
II. 	Interference and Discrimination Analysis
A. 	PERB’s Longstanding Interference Standard
The Board first established its current interference test in Carlsbad Unified
School District (1979) PERB Decision No. 89, p. 5 (Carlsbad). To establish a prima
facie interference case under the Carlsbad standard, a charging party must show that
an employer’s conduct tends to or does result in some harm to union and/or employee
rights protected under the statutes we enforce. (City of San Diego (2020) PERB
Decision No. 2747-M, p. 36 (San Diego).) A charging party need not establish that the
employer held an unlawful motive. (Ibid.) Once a charging party has established a
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer. (Ibid.) The degree of harm
dictates the employer’s burden. (Ibid.) If the harm is “inherently destructive” of
protected rights, the employer must show that the interference results from
circumstances beyond its control and that no alternative course of action was
available. (Ibid.) For conduct that is not inherently destructive (which we sometimes
label “comparatively slight”), the respondent may attempt to justify its actions based on
operational necessity. (Ibid.) In such cases, we balance the asserted business need
against the tendency to harm protected rights; if the tendency to harm outweighs the
necessity, we find a violation. (Ibid.) Within the category of actions or rules that are not
inherently destructive, the stronger the tendency to harm, the greater is the
respondent’s burden to show its business need was important and that it narrowly
tailored its actions or rules to attain that purpose while limiting harm to protected rights
as much as possible. (Id. at p. 36, fn. 19.)

24
In Carlsbad, the Board borrowed the phrases “inherently destructive” and
“comparatively slight” from NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc. (1967) 388 U.S. 26
(Great Dane), which interpreted federal labor law governing private sector employers.
However, as we explained in Regents of the University of California (Berkeley) (2018)
PERB Decision No. 2610-H (Regents), the Carlsbad test diverges significantly from
federal precedent by incorporating these phrases into the Board’s interference
standard rather than using them solely to assess an employer’s alleged discriminatory
motive, as under federal law. (Id. at pp. 57, 92.) Thus, the “‘inherently destructive’ /
‘comparatively slight harm’ framework used for evaluating employer defenses under
Carlsbad has no analog in private-sector jurisprudence.” (Id. at p. 57.) Under private
sector labor law, proving that an employer engaged in inherently destructive conduct
is one way to prove the employer’s motive. PERB precedent, on the other hand,
dispenses with this artificiality and considers interfering conduct and employer
justifications on a continuum, holding that if conduct rises to the level of “inherently
destructive,” then the employer must justify it by demonstrating circumstances beyond
its control, leaving it with no alternative course of action. (Carlsbad, supra, PERB
Decision No. 89, pp. 10-11.)12
12 Although California public sector labor relations precedent frequently protects
employee and union rights to a greater degree than does federal precedent, where
California statutory provisions are akin to those found in federal law, we consider
federal precedent for its potential persuasive value. (City of Santa Monica (2020)
PERB Decision No. 2635a-M, p. 47, fn. 16 [judicial appeal pending]; see also Social
Workers’ Union, Local 535 v. Alameda County Welfare Dept. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 382,
391 [when interpreting California public sector labor relations laws, federal precedent
is a “useful starting point,” but it does “not necessarily establish the limits of California
public employees’ representational rights”].)

25
PERB has applied the Carlsbad interference standard in hundreds of cases
spanning 42 years—virtually the agency’s entire existence. Our concurring colleague
urges that the Board should instead follow federal law and consider inherently
destructive conduct only as a means of proving discrimination, thereby expanding on a
viewpoint he first articulated in dissent in Contra Costa County Fire Protection District
(2019) PERB Decision No. 2632-M (Contra Costa).13 The Contra Costa dissent would
have partially overruled innumerable precedential Board decisions, but a Board
majority respectfully disagreed and reaffirmed the Board’s Carlsbad test. (See Contra
Costa, supra, PERB Decision No. 2632-M, p. 36, fn. 18). Today’s concurring opinion
not only urges that the Board should begin considering inherently destructive conduct
solely as a means of proving discrimination, it also proposes a second change in
Board precedent: no longer requiring an employer to justify inherently destructive
conduct by showing circumstances beyond its control. However, we respectfully
disagree and once again adhere to Carlsbad.
First, we continue to believe that the concept of inherently destructive conduct
fits most naturally within an interference framework, even though in some
circumstances such conduct can also be relevant to assessing an employer’s motive.
13 In Contra Costa, supra, PERB Decision No. 2632-M, the interference and
discrimination claims were even more related than they are here, as the majority found
that the employer repeatedly and explicitly admitted its goal was a hierarchy in which
unrepresented managers were better compensated than represented managers
because of their representational status. (Id. at p. 11 [union asked whether employer
believed unrepresented managers should receive better benefits because they are
unrepresented; employer responded affirmatively; employer repeated this position at a
later bargaining session, noting that it was “looking for a differential between
represented and unrepresented managers”].)

26
Second, the fundamental logic underlying Carlsbad remains sound: the most
destructive category of interfering conduct should trigger the most stringent test for
judging an employer’s justification. (See, e.g., Superior Court v. Public Employment
Relations Bd. (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 158, 196 [Carlsbad test involves balancing
employer justification against tendency to interfere, unless the tendency is so strong
as to “demolish” a protected right].)14
As part of its argument, the concurrence relies on two appellate decisions—
Campbell Municipal Employees Assn. v. City of Campbell (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 416
(Campbell) and Rivcom Corp. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1983) 34 Cal.3d
743—each of which cited to federal precedent in assessing a discrimination claim. The
approach followed in these cases does not materially differ from one of PERB’s
governing discrimination tests. (See post at pp. 27-28.)
No California judicial precedent requires PERB to abandon its longstanding
interference test. In fact, as noted above, in Superior Court v. Public Employment
Relations Bd., supra, the court cited Carlsbad and explained that it does not provide
for simple balancing when employer conduct tends to egregiously interfere with
protected rights. (30 Cal.App.5th at p. 196.)
14 Moreover, having reviewed extensive Board precedent consistently applying
the Carlsbad standard, we do not view it as ill-defined or subject to manipulation. Nor
do we view private sector labor law standards as better defined. The concurrence, by
proposing to discontinue the longstanding standard that an employer must justify
inherently destructive conduct by showing circumstances beyond its control, would
provide less clarity than the current standard. While we mainly reaffirm Carlsbad
based on our agreement with its underlying logic, preserving clarity is a secondary
benefit.

27
In any event, the majority and concurrence agree the County’s conduct here
was inherently destructive. Thus, while interference jurisprudence is another example
in which PERB standards protect union and employee rights more strongly than
federal precedent governing private sector labor relations (see, e.g., Contra Costa
Community College District (2019) PERB Decision No. 2652, p. 16 & p. 27, fn. 17), the
instant case illustrates that the Carlsbad test does not necessarily lead to a different
result as would a private sector labor law approach.
B. 	PERB’s Discrimination Standards
PERB uses one of two tests in assessing discrimination cases. If an employer’s
conduct facially discriminates based on protected activity, that is “discrimination in its
simplest form,” and PERB may infer unlawful discrimination without further evidence of
motive. (Los Angeles County Superior Court (2018) PERB Decision No. 2566-C, p. 14
(LA Superior Court).) Common examples of facial discrimination include: (1) providing
different pay, benefits, or other working conditions based explicitly on union
membership or other protected activity; or (2) changing policies in response to
protected activity where the operative comparison is not between two different groups
of employees, but between an employer’s policies before and after the exercise of
protected rights. (Contra Costa, supra, PERB Decision No. 2632-M, p. 40; City of
Yuba City (2018) PERB Decision No. 2603-M, pp. 10-11.) Thus, the conduct at issue
may, but need not, involve disparate conduct toward different employee groups.
(Regents, supra, PERB Decision No. 2610-H, p. 81; LA Superior Court, supra, PERB
Decision No. 2566-C, p. 15.) Although inherently destructive conduct and facial
discrimination do not always equate to one another, the same conduct can meet both

28
standards, and in such circumstances the employer’s affirmative defense is the same
under the two standards. (See, e.g., Contra Costa, supra, PERB Decision No. 2632-M,
pp. 36 & 40.)
When the conduct at issue is not facially discriminatory, we apply the
framework set forth in Novato Unified School District (1982) PERB Decision No. 210
(Novato) and its progeny. (Regents, supra, PERB Decision No. 2610-H, p. 76; LA
Superior Court, supra, PERB Decision No. 2566-C, pp. 14-15.) To establish a prima
facie case under the Novato framework, a charging party must prove four elements:
(1) one or more employees engaged in activity protected by a labor relations statute
that PERB enforces; (2) the respondent had knowledge of such protected activity;
(3) the respondent took adverse action against one or more of the employees; and
(4) the respondent took the adverse action “because of” the protected activity, which
PERB interprets to mean that the protected activity was a substantial or motivating
cause of the adverse action. (San Diego, supra, PERB Decision No. 2747-M, p. 26.) If
the charging party has established a prima facie case but the evidence also reveals a
non-discriminatory reason for the employer’s decision, the respondent has the burden
to prove that it would have taken the exact same action even absent protected activity.
(Ibid.) In such “mixed motive” or “dual motive” cases, the question becomes whether
the adverse action would not have occurred “but for” the protected activity. (Ibid.)
C. 	Applying PERB’s Interference and Discrimination Standards
In applying these well-established interference and discrimination standards to
the instant facts, we do not disturb the settled understanding that a California public
sector employer may not impose a lockout. (Fremont Unified School District (1990)

29
PERB Order No. IR-54, pp. 10-11 (Fremont).) Rather, we consider whether there is a
narrow circumstance in which an employer may prohibit employees from working for
multiple days after a strike due to a necessary minimum shift guarantee for strike
replacements.
We begin by distinguishing between several issues that require only brief
analysis and several others that require substantial analysis. There is no doubt that
CNA and the nurses it represents engaged in protected activity when they called for
and carried out their March 2020 strike. (See generally Fresno County In-Home
Supportive Services Public Authority (2015) PERB Decision No. 2418-M, pp. 24-37.)
Nor can there be serious dispute that the County’s conduct tended to harm these
protected rights at least to some degree. Denying work opportunities following a strike
significantly coerces protected rights by discouraging employees from authorizing
future strikes, and therefore gives rise to a robust duty to narrowly tailor. The same is
true for preventing employees from using accrued paid leave for these days, as well
as designating both strike days and mandatory days off with an LU payroll code that
can be used for discipline. CNA has thus established a prima facie interference case,
and the outcome of its claim will turn on whether the County meets the business
necessity standard described above.
CNA’s discrimination claim similarly raises several easy issues and a couple
more difficult ones. There is no dispute, for instance, that CNA and represented
nurses engaged in protected activity and the County knew of this protected activity.
Moreover, only brief analysis is needed to conclude that four County actions were
adverse to CNA and CNA-represented nurses: threatening to disallow strikers from

30
work for multiple days after the strike, implementing that action, refusing to allow
nurses to use paid time off for the period following the strike in which they were barred
from work, and designating employees’ strike time and time following the strike as
“LU.” (See San Diego, supra, PERB Decision No. 2747-M, p. 27 [employer action is
adverse if a reasonable employee would view it as having an adverse impact on his or
her employment]; see also id. at p. 29 [a threat of action and carrying out the action
are separate adverse acts].) The first three actions were clearly adverse since they
blocked employees from remunerative work.
The LU designation requires closer analysis, but testimony from CNA’s
witnesses demonstrates that a reasonable employee would, objectively, perceive the
LU designation as a negative mark to be avoided, as an employee can face discipline
for multiple unexcused absences. Even the County’s own witness, Culberson,
confirmed this, though he said the County would not discipline nurses for any
absences from March 5-9. On the third day of hearing, Culberson testified that an LU
code “is used to identify that an employee was not present” when “requested or
scheduled,” that an LU code “can be used for disciplinary actions,” and that it was
reasonable for nurses who received LU designations to fear discipline, especially
given that the County had never reassured nurses that the March 2020 LU
designations would not be used for discipline. Continuing his testimony the next day,
Culberson stated that overnight between the third and fourth hearing days, the County
had decided to develop a new, non-disciplinary leave code “to be used for situations
such as occurred for this matter.” Culberson explained that the County would convert
the LU designations to this new code, both for nurses who struck and for those who

31
were barred from work. The County later introduced into evidence an internal County
memorandum regarding these decisions.15 However, as of the last day of hearing, the
County had not yet notified bargaining unit members that the County would amend
their time records and would not discipline them.
Even assuming the County eventually notified nurses of these decisions, it
would not qualify as a retraction under settled precedent. In both discrimination and
interference contexts, an “honestly given retraction” can erase the effects of prior
conduct if the retraction “completely nullified” all coercive effects. (County of San
Bernardino (2018) PERB Decision No. 2556-M, p. 21; Jurupa Unified School District
(2015) PERB Decision No. 2458, pp. 12-13.) To be effective, a retraction must be:
“(1) timely; (2) unambiguous; (3) specific in nature to the coercive conduct; (4) free
from other illegal conduct; (5) adequately publicized to the affected employees; (6) not
followed by other illegal conduct; and (7) accompanied by assurances that the
employer will not interfere with their protected rights in the future.” (County of San
Bernardino, supra, PERB Decision No. 2556-M, p. 21.) We need not consider the
second through seventh requirements because the County’s retraction was not timely,
15 The County’s delayed change did not, however, permit nurses to use paid
leave for days in which they were barred from work. Moreover, the memorandum
partially contradicted Culberson’s testimony by stating that employees would still have
the negative LU designations if they were called back to work between March 7 and 9
but did not report to work. The County maintained this position even though Culberson
acknowledged he initially misspoke, leading nurses astray as to whether the furlough
fell under MOU section 14.2.1, whether they could use accrued leave to cover
furlough days, and whether they needed to remain within range to be called back.

32
coming five months after the County first made the LU designations and after the
parties had substantially litigated the issue.
CNA has therefore established the first three elements of a Novato
discrimination claim. As with the interference claim, remaining issues require deeper
analysis, including whether the County can: (1) negate the fourth prima facie case
element, nexus, or establish an alternative, non-discriminatory reason for its action
under the Novato framework; and (2) establish that it did not engage in facial
discrimination.
Turning to the remaining, unresolved interference and discrimination issues, we
structure our analysis around four central questions:
(1) How have the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and federal appellate
courts approached analogous issues under private sector labor law?
(2) Under California’s public sector labor laws, when a hospital prohibits
employees from work for multiple days following a strike, under what circumstances, if
any, can the employer overcome a union’s interference and discrimination claims?
(3) If it is possible to bar employees from work for multiple days following a
strike in a manner that does not unlawfully interfere with or discriminate against
protected rights, did the County do so?
(4) Did the County interfere with and/or discriminate against protected rights
when it refused to allow nurses to use accrued paid leave for the period following the
strike in which they were barred from work, or when it designated nurses’ strike time
and mandatory time off following the strike as “LU”?
We consider each question in turn.

33
1. 	How have the NLRB and federal appellate courts approached
analogous issues under private sector labor law?
Federal decisions have repeatedly considered strike replacement contracts with
minimum guarantee provisions and, in a parallel line of cases, partial lockouts
featuring alleged discrimination against protected activity. These decisions lay out
neither a consistent analytic framework nor an approach we find fully persuasive in
interpreting the MMBA. However, NLRB and federal court pronouncements on these
issues are nonetheless useful in illustrating some of the main issues in play and
concerns in need of balancing.
a. 	Replacement contracts with minimum guarantee provisions
In Pacific Mutual Door Co. (1986) 278 NLRB 854 (Pacific Door), four truck
drivers went on strike. Their employer negotiated a contract for temporary
replacement workers, and this contract required the employer to provide 30 days’
notice prior to cancellation. (Ibid.) At issue was whether the 30-day notice requirement
justified the employer in not reinstating strikers until 30 days after the strike ended.
The NLRB, summarizing applicable private sector labor law principles, explained that
an employer may only delay reinstating strikers if it has a “legitimate and substantial”
business justification. (Id. at p. 856, fn. 12, citing NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co.
(1967) 389 U.S. 375 (Fleetwood); Great Dane, supra, 388 U.S. 26; and The Laidlaw
Corp. (1968) 171 NLRB 1366 (Laidlaw).) The NLRB concluded that the 30-day notice
provision satisfied this standard. (Pacific Door, supra, 278 NLRB at p. 856.)
Four years later, the NLRB addressed whether an employer, when making
staffing decisions following a strike, may favor employees who chose not to strike
(also known as “non-participants,” or sometimes as “crossovers,” particularly for

34
employees who initially struck but later decided to cross the picket line and work
during the strike). In Waterbury Hospital (1990) 300 NLRB 992, the NLRB found that
longstanding principles generally prohibit such discrimination: “[T]he employer was
obligated under the law of [NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. (1938) 304 U.S.
333 (Mackay)], Fleetwood Trailer, and Laidlaw Corp. to reinstate the striking
employees and the crossovers equally, either by seniority or on some other fair and
nondiscriminatory basis, or by mutual agreement.” (Id. at p. 1007.) Disfavoring strikers
at the expense of non-participants or crossovers is either inherently destructive or, at
least, unlawful in the absence of any legitimate and substantial justification. (See, e.g.,
id., at p. 1006, fn. 80 & p. 1008; Zapex Corp. (1978) 235 NLRB 1237, 1238; Laidlaw,
supra, 171 NLRB at p. 1368; but see Roosevelt Memorial Medical Center (2006) 348
NLRB 1016 [employer did not engage in inherently destructive or otherwise unlawful
conduct by removing employees from schedule during strike because they intended to
strike, particularly given that four of six potentially impacted employees ended up
receiving their full work opportunities and other two employees ended up removing
themselves from work opportunities].)
Waterbury Hospital noted that disfavoring strikers is permitted in the private
sector if, during an economic strike, an employer permanently replaces strikers with
new hires, non-participants, or crossovers. (Waterbury Hospital, supra, 300 NLRB at
pp. 1005-1006.) However, the statutes we enforce do not allow permanent
replacements. (Fremont, supra, PERB Order No. IR-54, pp. 10-11.)16 Decisions
16 There are many other critical differences between the private and public
sectors. For instance, bargaining unit employees who work during a private sector
strike may fairly be deemed “non-participants” or “crossovers,” but those who worked

35
permitting preference for permanent replacements over strikers, such as Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants (1989) 489 U.S. 426
(TWA), are therefore inapposite.17
The NLRB returned to the issue of replacement contracts with a minimum hiring
period in Harvey Mfg., Inc. (1992) 309 NLRB 465 (Harvey). There, after the employer
warned strikers that they would be permanently replaced if they did not return to work,
it hired more than 200 permanent replacements through a direct recruitment process,
recalled 100 previously laid off employees, and then contracted with a staffing agency
(First Temp) to refer applicants for additional replacement positions. (Ibid.) The
contract in question required the employer to hire each worker for at least 30 days and
provide at least 10 days’ notice prior to cancelling the contract. (Id. at p. 469.) While
the employer was interviewing and hiring applicants First Temp referred, the union
during a public sector strike are often essential employees who have no choice but to
work pursuant to an injunction or agreement. (See, e.g., County of San Mateo (2019)
PERB Order No. IR-61-M, pp. 3-5 (San Mateo).) That was the case here, though the
record does not reflect what percentage of employees working during the strike fully
supported it but worked pursuant to the agreement the parties reached to avoid
threatened injunctive relief litigation.
17 In any event, to the extent TWA has any relevance, the dissenting opinions
come far closer than the majority in providing analysis useful to interpreting
California’s broadly protective labor relations laws. (See, e.g., TWA, supra, 489 U.S.at
pp. 444 & 447 (dis. opn. of Brennan, J.) [explaining why employer favoring employees
who cross a picket line over those who did not is inherently destructive to protected
rights, citing Mackay, supra, 304 U.S. at p. 346 for the proposition that “in making
poststrike reinstatements an employer may not discriminate among its employees on
account of their union activity,” and citing NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp. (1963) 373 U.S.
221, 230-231 for the proposition that it is unlawful to offer individual benefits to strikers
to induce them to abandon a strike].)

36
called off its strike and unconditionally offered to return to work. (Ibid.) The employer
ultimately hired 265 replacements from First Temp, including those it hired before and
after the strike ended. (Ibid.) The employer claimed the 265 recruits from First Temp
were permanent replacements. (Ibid.) The union argued that they were temporary
replacements and that the employer therefore violated the law both when it continued
employing them in lieu of reinstating many strikers and again when it favored these
265 replacements over returned strikers during later layoffs and recalls from layoff. (Id.
at p. 466.)
The NLRB agreed with the union that the First Temp replacements were
temporary. (Harvey, supra, 309 NLRB at p. 466.) Therefore, the employer’s decision
to favor them over strikers was inherently destructive of protected rights. (Ibid.) The
NLRB also rejected the ALJ’s reliance on the 10-day notice and 30-day minimum
timeframes in the First Temp contract. (Id. at p. 469.) The NLRB found the employer
failed to raise such arguments and the record established neither that these
contractual provisions were “necessary in order to induce First Temp to provide
replacements,” nor that they absolutely required 30 days’ paid employment or 10 days’
notice before ceasing to hire applicants from First Temp. (Ibid.) The NLRB concluded
as follows:
“The First Temp employees were temporary replacements
and, given that status, the economic strikers’ reinstatement
rights are identical to those of unfair labor practice strikers
under Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278
(1956). Specifically, they have a right to immediate
reinstatement ‘because even economic strikers are entitled
to reclaim their jobs—not just be placed on a rehire list—if
the jobs are vacant or are occupied only by temporary
replacements when they make their unconditional offer to

37
return.’ Teledyne Still-Man, 298 NLRB 982, 985 (1990),
enfd. mem. 938 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1991). Routinely, the
economic strikers’ entitlement to immediate reinstatement
comprehends the discharge of temporary replacements
occupying the strikers’ prestrike or substantially similar
jobs. See Covington Furniture Mfg. Corp., 212 NLRB 214,
220 (1974), enfd. 514 F.2d 995 (6th Cir. 1975). See also
Hansen Bros., supra [279 NLRB] at 741 (‘where the striker
replacements are only temporary, an offer to return to work
which demands no more than the discharge of those
replacements is perfectly appropriate’).
[¶ . . . ¶]
“[A]ny delay in the reinstatement of the economic strikers in
this case assertedly required by the terms of the private
contract between the Respondent and First Temp, and any
consequent limitation on the backpay owed to the
discriminatees, would be an unsupportable restraint on the
[ ] rights of the strikers. . . . Private contractual
arrangements between an employer and temporary strike
replacement employees, or, more specifically here, a
contract with an employment agency for the supply of
temporary strike replacements, are valid only for the
purpose of filling vacancies left by striking employees while
they are on strike. Once an appropriate offer to return is
made, such contractual arrangements cease to have any
legitimate purpose within the parameters of the Act,
because there is no longer a need to hire replacements in
view of the strikers’ availability for work, and, more
significantly, because the strikers have a fundamental right
to immediate reinstatement.”
(Ibid.)
Although Pacific Door and Harvey are somewhat in tension with one another, it
is possible to discern a general set of principles applying to private sector employers:
a contractual provision may constitute a legitimate reason for delayed reinstatement if
the employer proves that the contractual provision absolutely requires a minimum shift

38
guarantee; the provision was needed to induce the staffing agency to provide
replacements; and while using temporary replacements for the minimum period the
employer fills other contemporaneous and later staffing needs without discriminating
between strikers and non-participants or crossovers.
The NLRB did little to clarify its analytic framework in Encino-Tarzana Regional
Medical Center (2000) 332 NLRB 914 (Encino-Tarzana), which involved a one-day
hospital strike. The hospital contracted with a staffing agency for temporary
replacement workers, and the agency insisted on a guarantee that each temporary
worker would be paid for a minimum of four shifts. (Ibid.) The NLRB could have
distinguished Pacific Door because Encino-Tarzana apparently involved discrimination
between strikers and non-participants or crossovers. The NLRB could equally have
distinguished Harvey if the record revealed that the four-shift minimum was necessary
to induce the staffing agency to provide replacements. Instead, the NLRB largely
sidestepped all such issues by “emphasiz[ing] that the [ ] complaint did not allege that
the [employer] was obliged to reinstate the economic strikers immediately on their
unconditional offer to return to work, notwithstanding its contractual obligation” to
guarantee the temporary replacements a minimum of 4 days’ pay. (Ibid.) Thus, just as
the employer in Harvey waived much of its potential defense, the complaint in Encino-
Tarzana waived significant parts of the union’s potential claims.18
18 In analyzing what remained of the union’s claims, which included a unilateral
change argument based on the parties’ contract and a peculiar interference and
discrimination argument shorn of any claimed right to immediate reinstatement under
Fleetwood, Laidlaw, and Harvey (see Encino-Tarzana, supra, 332 NLRB at p. 914),
the NLRB relied primarily on TWA, supra, 489 U.S. 426. Although TWA involved
permanent replacements and Encino-Tarzana involved only temporary replacements,

39
Sutter Health Roseville Medical Center (2006) 348 NLRB 637 (Sutter) also
involved a one-day hospital strike. The record revealed that the hospital was unable to
obtain replacements without committing to employ replacements for a minimum work
period. (Id. at p. 637, fn. 5.) Based on this contractual provision, the hospital notified
employees that it would bar certain unit employees from work for several days
following the strike. (Id. at p. 637.) The complaint challenged neither that decision nor
discrimination between strikers and crossovers and instead challenged two different
employer actions: (1) continuing to have supervisors, managers, and other non-unit
employees fill in for unit employees even after the strike ended, thereby reducing work
opportunities for unit employees; and (2) closing the hospital cafeteria and thereby
delaying reinstatement of cafeteria workers following the strike, even though they were
not replaced. (Ibid.) The NLRB found both actions were unlawful. (Ibid.)
While both CNA and the County have briefed their views on the extent to which
we should find portions of the above cases persuasive, only CNA asks us to consider
the NLRB’s latest decision in this area, Alaris Health at Castle Hill (2018) 367 NLRB
No. 52 (Alaris). A union called a three-day unfair practice strike at a nursing home and
rehabilitation center providing inpatient care, but when the strike ended, the employer
refused to immediately reinstate 15 strikers. (Id. at pp. 1-2.) The record revealed that,
after the employer received notice of the strike, it had amended its staffing contracts to
add a minimum hiring period of four to six weeks. (Id. at p. 2.) The NLRB found that
the TWA framework arguably made sense given the complaint did not claim that the
strikers had the right to immediate replacement under Fleetwood, Laidlaw, and
Harvey. These peculiarities add to the reasons the case is unpersuasive.

40
the Pacific Door line of cases does not apply to unfair practice strikes, as “where the
employer’s own unlawful conduct contributed to employees’ decision to strike, its
financial interest does not permit it to delay reinstating strikers.” (Id. at pp. 3-4.) Thus,
“the employer, not the unfair practice strikers, must bear the risk of having to pay for
two groups of workers at the same time.” (Id. at p. 4.) In any event, even if Pacific
Door principles had any application, the NLRB found that the employer had shown
neither that the minimum hiring periods were necessary to recruit replacements, nor
that it was liable for replacements not used after the strike ended. (Id. at p. 5.)19
b. 	Partial lockouts
A parallel line of federal decisions covers discrimination against protected
activities as part of implementing a lockout. In American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB
19 Furthermore, the NLRB in Alaris declined to apply Drug Package Co., Inc.
(1977) 228 NLRB 108 (Drug Package), wherein the Board found that the backpay
period for unfair practice strikers need not commence until five days after a strike has
ended, to provide “a reasonable period of time for employers to accomplish those
administrative tasks necessary to the orderly reinstatement of [strikers] and to accord
some consideration to the replacement employees who must be terminated.” (Id. at
p. 113.) The NLRB similarly did not apply Drug Package in Sutter, supra, 348 NLRB
637, noting that the employer had ample time for administrative tasks given that the
union had provided over 10 days’ notice of a one-day strike, and the employer need
only return to its normal scheduling. (Id. at p. 638.) We find this reasoning to be more
persuasive than that given in the Drug Package majority opinion. PERB has never
adopted Drug Package, no party asks us to adopt it in this case, and we specifically
reject it as an interpretation of the MMBA. As to the first rationale the Drug Package
majority provided—affording the employer time to complete administrative tasks—we
have substantial experience in modern public sector strikes in California and find that
to be a nonfactor. Indeed, while the Drug Package dissent had the better argument
even in the private sector in 1977, a fortiori, we find no cause to apply the
anachronistic rule now in an era of instant communication. As to the second rationale
given—consideration for replacement workers—there is no dispute that replacement
workers’ rights must give way to those of strikers.

41
(1965) 380 U.S. 300 (American Shipbuilding), the Supreme Court held that the
employer’s lockout was permissible, in part, because the employer implemented it
across-the-board rather than distinguishing between employees based on protected
activity. (Id. at p. 312.) Subsequent cases confirmed that a discriminatory lockout is
impermissible. (See, e.g., Schenk Packing Co. (1991) 301 NLRB 487, 490 [relying on
American Shipbuilding to find employer’s lockout unlawful given that it treated
employees disparately based on protected activity]; Allen Storage & Moving Co.
(2004) 342 NLRB 501 [employer evidenced unlawful motive when it implemented
lockout while exempting the only bargaining unit employee who had not struck].)
When the NLRB deviated from these principles in a pair of 2004 decisions, the
Seventh Circuit and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals reversed. First, in Local 15, Intern.
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB (7th Cir. 2005) 429 F.3d 651 (Midwest
Generation), a union representing approximately 1,150 employees called an indefinite
economic strike without any offer to return to work. Eight employees declined to strike,
and 53 employees who initially struck later crossed over. (Id. at p. 654.) The employer
continued to operate during the strike, using the non-participants and crossovers, as
well as supervisors and temporary replacements. (Ibid.) After striking for two months,
the union ended its strike and unconditionally offered to return to work. (Ibid.) Rather
than accepting this offer, the employer locked out all bargaining unit employees except
for the non-participants and crossovers. (Id. at pp. 654-655.) The union filed an unfair
labor practice charge, and the parties stipulated to a single issue in dispute which
noted that the conduct at issue could equally be framed as a lockout or a refusal to
reinstate certain employees:

42
“Whether the Company [unlawfully interfered with or
discriminated against protected activities] by locking out
and/or refusing to reinstate those employees who were on
strike at the time of the union’s unconditional offer to return
to work, while not locking out and/or reinstating those
individuals employed by the Company who, prior to the
union’s unconditional offer to return to work, had ceased
participating in the strike by making an offer to return to
work, and had either returned to work or scheduled a return
to work at the Company?”
(Id. at p. 655.) While the NLRB found no violation, the Seventh Circuit reversed. (Id. at
p. 662.) The court found that it did not matter whether the employer’s conduct was
inherently destructive or had a comparatively slight impact on protected rights,
because the employer had no legitimate and substantial business justification for
granting preferential status to non-participants and crossovers, meaning it could not
meet even the lower burden that applies when conduct is not inherently destructive.
(Id. at pp. 656-657, 662.)
In reaching this conclusion, the court held than an operational need must be
one that is critical to maintaining operations. (Midwest Generation, supra, 429 F.3d at
p. 658.) The court also rejected the employer’s argument that it lawfully favored non-
participants and crossovers to pressure strikers, finding that a “discriminatory lockout
on the basis of protected activity is unlawful even when it is supportive of an
employer’s bargaining position.” (Id. at p. 660.) Indeed, the court found that if
“employers were free to exercise economic penalties selectively against those
employees whom they believe economic coercion would be most effective, an
employer could take discriminatory actions that have traditionally been barred . . . This
type of discrimination cannot be a legitimate and substantial business justification for a

43
partial lockout.” (Id. at p. 660-661.) Lastly, the court noted that there is “an obvious
disparate treatment of employees when an employer locks out only those employees
who, by striking, had identified themselves as union adherents, while continuing to
operate with those employees who had not joined the strike.” (Id. at p. 661 [internal
quotation marks and citation omitted].) The court found interference given that the
employer undermined protected activity by demonstrating the advantages of refraining
from such activity, and the court also found discrimination in that the disparate
treatment demonstrated an unlawful motivation. (Id. at pp. 661-662.)20
Seven years after Midwest Generation, the NLRB returned to some of the same
issues in Dresser-Rand Company (2012) 358 NLRB 854 (Dresser-Rand I), which
remains a pivotal part of private sector labor law after the NLRB readopted its
reasoning and incorporated it by reference in Dresser-Rand Co. (2015) 362 NLRB
1100 (Dresser-Rand II).21 When the union in Dresser-Rand II ended a strike after
several months, the employer responded by locking out the entire bargaining unit,
including employees who had crossed the picket line and returned to work during the
20 In a 2006 unpublished decision, the D.C. Circuit, like the Seventh Circuit in its
published Midwest Generation decision a year earlier, disagreed with the NLRB’s
treatment of discriminatory lockouts and reversed the NLRB’s decision in Bunting
Bearings Corp. (2004) 343 NLRB 479.
21 The NLRB reconsidered the case after the United States Supreme Court
invalidated Dresser-Rand I, among other decisions, because a panel member’s recess
appointment was outside the bounds of the Constitution’s Recess Appointment
Clause. (NLRB v. Noel Canning (2014) 573 U.S. 513.) Dresser-Rand II explicitly
incorporated Dresser-Rand I by reference and adopted the ALJ’s proposed decision
as part of the NLRB’s decision, as supplemented and modified. (Dresser-Rand II,
supra, 362 NLRB at p. 1100)

44
strike. (Ibid.) The employer then preferentially called back the crossovers and refused
to bargain over such procedures. (Ibid.) The NLRB found both the preference and
refusal to bargain unlawful, and further found them to evidence unlawful animus that,
in combination with other conduct, showed the entire lockout to have been
discriminatory. (Id. at p. 1101.) On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed these
conclusions. (Dresser-Rand Co. v. NLRB (5th Cir. 2016) 838 F.3d 512.)
Thus, private sector labor law presents a somewhat chaotic tapestry.22
However, the NLRB’s reasoning in Dresser-Rand I and Dresser-Rand II, like the
Seventh Circuit reasoning in Midwest Generation, protects against discriminatory
partial lockouts. Such a rule is consistent with longstanding federal precedent such as
American Shipbuilding, Schenk Packing Co., and Allen Storage & Moving Co.23
22 For example, the employer averred that it had no choice but to lockout all
bargaining unit employees, as it would be unlawful to exempt crossovers. (Dresser-
Rand I, supra, 358 NLRB at p. 885.) The NLRB was somewhat more equivocal on this
point, describing the law as unsettled following Midwest Generation while
acknowledging that employers risk a violation if they treat employees differently based
upon whether they struck or abandoned a strike. (Dresser-Rand Co. v. NLRB, supra,
838 F.3d at p. 515, fn. 1). Thus, both Midwest Generation and the Dresser-Rand
cases show differences between various circuit courts and the NLRB. While the NLRB
reserves the right to refrain from applying both published and unpublished court of
appeal decisions in subsequent NLRB cases—irrespective of whether such a later
matter arises in the same circuit or in a different circuit—the NLRB is permitted to
follow appellate decisions that it finds persuasive, and refusal to acquiesce to the D.C.
Circuit can be particularly difficult since all NLRB litigants have the right to seek review
in that circuit. (Enloe Medical Center v. NLRB (D.C. Cir. 2005) 433 F.3d 834, 838.)
23 The Dresser-Rand decisions feature an employer arguing that it uniformly
locked out all bargaining unit employees on an initial basis and therefore was
permitted to preferentially call back employees who had abandoned the strike and
crossed-over. (Dresser-Rand I, supra, 358 NLRB at p. 887.) Such a loophole,
manifestly, would constitute a classic exception that swallows the rule, allowing an
employer to describe its actions as a non-discriminatory lockout of any length followed

45
California’s public sector labor relations statutes limit both the right to strike and
the right to lockout more so than does private sector labor law, while providing
stronger interference protections. In the below analysis of California law, we therefore
adapt federal principles, considering differences between federal private sector
precedent and California public sector precedent.
2. 	Under California’s public sector labor laws, when a hospital prohibits
employees from work for multiple days following a strike, under what
circumstances, if any, can the employer overcome a union’s
interference and discrimination claims?
Employers and unions under our jurisdiction each face stricter limits on their
use of economic weapons than the restrictions governing their private sector
counterparts. For instance, it is an unfair practice for a public sector union strike to
cause an imminent and substantial threat to the public’s health or safety, and a union
may lawfully strike pre-impasse only based upon employer unfair practices. (Regents
of the University of California (2019) PERB Order No. IR-62-H, pp. 8 & 10-11; San
Mateo, supra, PERB Order No. IR-61-M, pp. 5-6.) Employers, for their part, cannot
lock out employees or permanently replace strikers, among other restrictions.
(Fremont, supra, PERB Order No. IR-54, pp. 10-11.) These principles not only make
inapposite private sector caselaw allowing an employer to disfavor strikers if it has
made permanent new arrangements during an economic strike, but also aid us in
by allegedly lawful discrimination in ending the lockout. But the law should not be
nearly so brittle, arbitrary, or inconsistent. As the NLRB found, “full-term strikers and
the crossovers” were “equally entitled” to be recalled, and an employer normally
evidences an unlawful motive if it fails to use a nondiscriminatory recall procedure. (Id.
at pp. 887-888; Dresser-Rand II, supra, 362 NLRB at p. 1101 [rejecting employer’s
alleged non-discriminatory reasons for its disparate treatment].)

46
discerning the boundaries that apply to the County’s conduct, which bears
characteristics akin to a lockout.24
Furthermore, we take administrative notice of the fact that the County, in asking
PERB to seek to enjoin nurses from striking, argued that replacement employees may
not always serve the public at the same high level as regular employees. Other public
health care employers have done the same, and thereby availed themselves of an
essential employee injunction, an avenue not available to their private sector
counterparts. (San Mateo, supra, PERB Order No. IR-61-M, p. 23.) We thus keep in
mind that the public benefits when there are at most narrow circumstances in which an
employer is permitted to effectively prolong a strike. Moreover, as noted above,
because a public employer can ask PERB to seek an injunction against essential
employees threatening a strike, the nature of non-participants and crossovers in the
public sector is quite different than in the private sector. Employees who report to work
during a public sector strike may be non-supporters, or may do so pursuant to an
24 The County maintains that its conduct was not a lockout. At the hearing, the
County’s attorney asked Culberson why he did not believe the County had
implemented a lockout. Culberson testified that, in his view, a lockout involves the
entire bargaining unit. Culberson’s answer may implicitly reference private sector law
and its prohibition on discriminatory partial lockouts. The County also argues its action
was not designed to exert bargaining pressure and that it does not matter whether its
action was technically a lockout because a CNA strike manual acknowledged that a
full lockout may be legal. Ultimately, the parties’ labels or characterizations do not
determine the contours of labor law. Our task is to determine whether the MMBA
permits the County’s conduct, however labeled. In the below analysis, we for the first
time carve out a narrow set of circumstances that will typically permit a public hospital
to bar represented employees from working for a short period following a strike. This
analysis could be regarded as deeming such conduct not to constitute a lockout, or as
permitting a small subset of lockouts; the difference is semantic and therefore
immaterial.

47
injunction, a union exemption designed to benefit the public or to avoid litigation, or a
mutual agreement between the parties toward such an end. Thus, while there are
multiple reasons why an employer cannot discriminate against strike participants, this
circumstance helps to illustrate the idiosyncratic impacts of such discrimination.
A public hospital also risks significant inconsistency if it distinguishes itself from
private hospitals in seeking to enjoin strike activity only to later cite private sector labor
law to defend its strike responses. Here, the County makes some such inconsistent
arguments. Although the County concedes it should be afforded more limited
economic weapons than a private hospital, it relies on its preferred interpretation of
private sector precedent to argue that it can continue using replacements over
bargaining unit employees for the length of any minimum shift guarantee that may
remain after a strike concludes.
The foregoing considerations—including both the NLRB’s somewhat tortured
efforts to balance competing concerns, as well as recognizing the substantial
differences between state and federal labor relations frameworks—inform us in
applying our longstanding interference and discrimination standards to this new factual
context. We hold as follows. A public health care employer that prohibits bargaining
unit employees from work after a strike, due to a minimum shift guarantee for strike
replacements, can typically establish an affirmative defense to an interference claim
and avoid a finding of discrimination only if it can prove that: (1) it made a good faith
effort in the marketplace to negotiate a strike replacement contract that would
eliminate any minimum shift guarantee or shorten it to the greatest degree possible,
but it ultimately needed to agree to the minimum shift guarantee in order to maintain

48
critical inpatient services; (2) it barred employees from work only because such a
contractual commitment temporarily reduced available work opportunities, and it filled
all remaining opportunities without discriminating against employees based on
whether they worked during the strike or engaged in any other actual or perceived
protected activity; and (3) it provided the employees’ union with timely notice regarding
any decision to guarantee replacement workers a minimum work period or to modify
the terms of a prior guarantee, and, if requested, bargained in good faith over the
potential effects on bargaining unit employees.25 We proceed to explain why these
three elements will generally be necessary to show the employer acted in a non-
discriminatory manner and narrowly tailored its conduct to minimize the harm to
protected rights.26
First, while the NLRB has not fully explained why an employer must prove that
a contractual provision is “necessary” to induce a staffing agency to provide
replacements (Alaris, supra, 367 NLRB No. 52, p. 5; Harvey, supra, 309 NLRB at
p. 469), the reasons are evident: An employer that bars employees from work based
25 While the NLRB declines to apply Pacific Door and its progeny in unfair
practice strikes, the adapted version of these principles that we adopt should apply
equally in economic and unfair practice strikes. This conclusion makes sense in the
California public sector given that, as discussed above, one of the primary differences
between private sector economic and unfair practice strikes—the employer’s right to
hire permanent replacements in an economic strike but not in an unfair practice
strike—does not apply under California public sector labor relations laws.
26 Nothing in this decision rules out the possibility that a hospital marshalling
sufficient proof as to each of these three elements could still be held liable for
discrimination based on other evidence showing a discriminatory motive, including
statements indicating it barred employees from work to discourage them from further
strikes.

49
on a minimum shift guarantee it need not have signed imposes an adverse action
based more on protected conduct than on any legitimate non-discriminatory reason,
and it fails to narrowly tailor its conduct to minimize harm to protected rights. Indeed, if
an employer can truthfully explain to employees that it explored all options with
replacement companies and was left with no realistic choice, this will tend to lessen
the decision’s retaliatory and coercive nature. Thus, where strike replacement
companies with which the employer negotiates propose such a term, the employer
must make a good faith effort in the marketplace to negotiate a contract that would
eliminate the minimum shift guarantee or shorten it to the greatest degree possible.
Second, if a hospital denies work opportunities to a greater degree for those
who have engaged in protected activity, such conduct is facially discriminatory, and
the significantly coercive impact rises to the level of inherently destructive. (Contra
Costa, supra, PERB Decision No. 2632-M, pp. 34-35 & 39 [conditioning a benefit on
whether employees exercise protected rights is inherently destructive of those rights];
Santa Monica Community College District (1979) PERB Decision No. 103, pp. 19-20
[same] (Santa Monica CCD), affd. Santa Monica Community College Dist. v. Public
Employment Relations Bd. (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 684.)
Third, a hospital discriminates against and interferes with protected rights in
failing to provide notice and an opportunity to meet and confer regarding potential
post-strike furloughs and other bargainable effects of a minimum shift guarantee. In
reaching this conclusion, we note as an initial matter that an employer’s conduct
around notice and bargaining can evidence discrimination even in far less fraught
circumstances, when the decision and effects at issue do not involve core protected

50
conduct such as a strike. (See, e.g., San Francisco, supra, PERB Decision No. 2712-
M, p. 26 [allegation that employer refused to respond to bargaining request in a timely
and adequate manner suggested discriminatory motive behind related employer
conduct]; County of Orange (2018) PERB Decision No. 2611-M, p. 17 [unilateral
change evidenced discriminatory animus].)27 Context is critical in determining whether
particular bargaining conduct is persuasive proof of discrimination or an independent
interference allegation. In the present context, the bargaining conduct at issue is
persuasive because it undercuts a union’s ability to control the parameters of the
economic sacrifice involved in striking, preventing negotiations over use of leave or
other measures needed to keep that sacrifice from growing well beyond the usual,
anticipated loss of pay for each strike day.
Such bargaining conduct is also not narrowly tailored to spare protected rights
to the greatest degree possible. In addition to causing the aforementioned damage to
protected rights, it further tends to harm such rights by preventing the union and
represented employees from learning in advance if the employer plans to bar
employees from working after the strike, thereby denying them information salient to
their decision whether to strike (and for how long), as well as intensifying the coercive
impact and perception of punishment associated with the employer’s decision. The
instant case illustrates how the County escalated the tendency to harm protected
rights by keeping secret its minimum shift guarantee agreement and creating
27 Where, as here, bargaining conduct evidences discrimination, we consider it
irrespective of whether it was ever alleged or litigated in an unfair practice charge and
irrespective of whether it falls within the statute of limitations. (City of Oakland (2014)
PERB Decision No. 2387-M, pp. 35-36.)

51
widespread confusion among employees, the union, and even within management.
Indeed, Culberson admitted that he misspoke when he and bargaining unit nurses
discussed the post-strike mandatory days off, and he further admitted that the County
failed to tell them to remain within range to report to work if called in after having been
barred from work. Bargaining would have led to greater clarity on these issues, likely
would have prompted management to avoid using the LU designation rather than
waiting five months to replace such designations, and might well have led to an
agreement regarding use of paid leave. Moreover, advance knowledge and
consideration can reduce the perceived retaliatory nature of the employer’s actions,
especially when compared to a notification directly to employees on the eve of the
strike, as occurred here.28
3. 	Did the County interfere with and discriminate against protected rights
when it barred certain nurses from work following the strike?
Applying the above standards to the instant record, we conclude as follows.
a. 	The County did not establish that it made a good
faith effort in the marketplace to negotiate a contract
that would eliminate the minimum shift guarantee or
shorten it to the greatest degree possible.
In June 2019, recognizing that the County’s negotiations with CNA and SEIU
could result in one or both unions striking, the County began to consider contracting
28 As we discuss further post, executing a contract specifically for strike
replacements is not a mandatory subject of bargaining, but the effects of that decision
on bargaining unit employees are bargainable, because hours of employment, work
opportunities, and mandatory furlough periods are within the scope of representation.
The County’s conduct thus frustrated the MMBA’s central purpose of promoting full
communication between public employers and their employees. (MMBA, § 3500.)

52
with a strike replacement company.29 County Chief Nursing Officer Belva Snyder
asked a manager, Roberta Schramek, to obtain three strike replacement bids. Each
company that Schramek approached provided the County with an initial draft contract.
HSG’s draft contract contained a five-shift minimum hiring period, irrespective of the
length of the strike. A second company, Autumn Enterprises, provided an initial draft
containing a three-shift minimum for a one-day strike and a four-shift minimum for a
strike lasting two or more days. The third company, Maxim Healthcare Services,
similarly offered a four-shift minimum for a strike lasting two days.
The County e-mailed all three companies with requested contractual changes,
and the companies readily agreed to such changes. However, none of these
requested changes related to the minimum shift guarantee. In the case of HSG, the
County asked to edit the contract to lower the contractual interest rate, and the County
also sought clarification as to a contract term that appeared to prevent it from
continuing to employ traveling nurses from other agencies. HSG approved the change
in interest rate and reassured the County that the contract did not prevent it from
continuing to employ travelers.
The County early on stopped seriously considering Maxim’s bid because the
County considered Maxim to provide primarily longer-term traveling nurses rather than
strike replacements, and Maxim did not always fill the County’s orders for travelers.
That left HSG and Autumn as the only contenders. Snyder chose HSG over Autumn
29 During a prior round of bargaining with CNA in 2016, the County briefly
considered the need for strike replacement services. At that point, the County reached
out to one company, HSG, but their discussion ended when the County concluded it
would not need replacement services during that round of negotiations.

53
because HSG was experienced and well respected, HSG was confident that it could
fulfill the County’s needs, and HSG was considerably cheaper than Autumn. The
County’s slight familiarity with HSG from brief discussions three years earlier also
played a role in this decision.
The County has not provided an adequate explanation for only approaching two
companies that it believed focused on strike replacements. Nor, despite its burden to
establish an affirmative defense, has the County provided any information about the
number of potentially available companies or how its modest foray into the market
showed that it gained contemporaneous knowledge as to whether a five-shift minimum
was truly standard.30 Snyder, when asked during her testimony why the County
approached Maxim over other companies focused on providing strike replacements,
testified that even though Culberson had made her responsible for choosing a strike
replacement company, she provided no input into which companies the County should
approach. Moreover, the County employees responsible for this decision—Schramek
and one of her supervisors—did not testify. In any event, Snyder admitted that the
County proceeded with initial negotiations with Maxim even while knowing that Maxim
did not focus on strike replacements.
This testimony suggests that the County was, at least in part, going through the
motions of a bid process without exercising due diligence as to how many companies
30 We take administrative notice of a compendium of evidence submitted under
penalty of perjury in PERB Case Numbers SF-CO-222-H and SF-CO-223-H, Volume
D, pp. 9-10, listing approximately 20 companies in the hospital strike replacement
business. We make no finding as to whether that evidence is accurate. Rather, we cite
it to illustrate one category of evidence missing from the instant record.

54
it should approach, what terms it should prioritize and negotiate, or how to conduct the
negotiation by comparing offers from multiple companies and using the competition to
obtain better terms. Whether bureaucratic obstacles or another type of inefficiency
was primarily responsible for the County’s narrow focus on HSG and Autumn, the
above process would not establish a good faith effort in the marketplace, even if we
were to assume for the sake of argument that, while still negotiating the contract, the
County had attempted to eliminate or reduce the minimum shift guarantee.31
Even more importantly, Snyder testified that the only time the County raised the
minimum shift guarantee issue was well after the County had already executed its
contract with HSG. Snyder testified to this fact twice. First, she testified that she
discussed the minimum guarantee with HSG Regional Sales Manager Brian McInnes
only after the County had already selected HSG. Snyder then testified that although
she cannot recall the timing of when she asked HSG to reduce the minimum shift
guarantee, it likely would have been shortly before CNA provided strike notice in
February. McInnes did not testify.32
31 The County’s narrow focus on just a few companies is particularly curious
given that Culberson testified he was aware of PERB precedent requiring an employer
seeking an essential employee injunction to contact all companies or other entities
potentially able to provide replacement employees or services. (See San Mateo,
supra, PERB Order No. IR-61-M, p. 8.)
32 If Snyder had sought to change the minimum shift guarantee in a timely
manner while still negotiating the contract, McInnes likely would have consulted with
his superior, Tabi Ebahou, who served as HSG Vice President and General Manager
from November 2018 until shortly after CNA’s March 2020 strike. Ebahou executed
the contract for HSG and testified that he and McInnes together spoke with the County
about its needs several times. Ebahou recalled that the County asked to edit the
contract to lower the contractual interest rate, and that he discussed the contract

55
The County likely knew, or should have known, that CNA and SEIU commonly
hold strikes lasting fewer than five days at many California hospitals. This raises
further questions regarding why the County failed to negotiate over the minimum shift
guarantee before executing a replacement contract. In any event, the County never
offered any reasonable explanation for not having raised the issue in a timely manner.
This timing evidence, even alone, represents a further independent reason why the
County cannot meet its burden.33
In assessing this evidence, we also consider that the County began seeking a
strike replacement agency in June 2019 and concluded its effort in October 2019.
Between June and October, the County had plenty of time to approach a reasonable
number of companies in the marketplace, obtain comparator contracts they had
signed in the past, and attempt to negotiate the best possible terms. The County failed
to do so and instead signed with HSG without discussing the minimum shift guarantee,
only to purportedly raise the issue shortly before the strike, long after the County had
completed its selection process and executed the HSG contract. This did not reflect a
good faith effort to eliminate or reduce the shift guarantee through negotiation.
terms with McInnes, but he could not recall the County raising any issue over the
minimum shift requirement.
33 Furthermore, while our standard does not require that an employer
necessarily document its negotiations on this topic in writing, we note the County
made no written request to amend the contract. This was the case even though the
County made written requests as to other matters and even though Snyder admitted
that the minimum shift guarantee had a substantial, negative effect on the overall cost
of the contract. When the County’s attorney asked Snyder on redirect examination
why she made no written request to change the minimum shift guarantee, she
admitted she had no answer to that question.

56
Had the County negotiated in a timely manner to change the minimum shift
guarantee as it sought to change other contract terms, it is more likely than not that
HSG would have reduced the minimum period in order to secure the County’s
business. We base this inference on multiple evidentiary strands. First, while Ebahou
initially testified that the five-shift hiring minimum is an “industry standard” needed to
recruit enough replacements, and he initially stated that he could only recall lower
minimums being used for one-day strikes, counsel for CNA then showed him other
HSG contracts containing lower minimums for strikes of two or more days, at which
point Ebahou stated he was not aware of those. But even Ebahou was able to recall
that HSG had in the past negotiated with other employers seeking to reduce the
minimum shift requirement.
Moreover, the available evidence does not show that a five-shift minimum is an
industry standard, even for strikes lasting more than one day. In 2017, for instance,
the University of California and HSG entered into a strike staffing agreement featuring
different minimum shift guarantees depending on the duration of a strike. In the event
of a one-day strike at a University medical center, the contract required a three-shift
minimum hiring period, which would include employees’ travel days on either end of
such a single-day strike. In the event of a strike lasting two or more days, the contract
required a four-shift minimum, which, again, could include employees’ travel days on
either end of the strike. As a result of these arrangements, when nurses struck for two
days in 2018, the University did not bar any nurses from work following the strike.34
34 The County suggests that the University of California had greater bargaining
leverage with HSG because of the large number of nurses the University needed to
hire. The record does not contain adequate support for this theory. Indeed, to the

57
In PERB proceedings involving the University’s 2017 contract with HSG, the
University submitted a declaration from Robin Epstein Ludewig, a Senior Director of
Human Resources Planning and Talent Acquisition for the University of California Los
Angeles Health System, claiming that the alternate three-shift or four-shift minimum,
depending on the length of the strike, was “a common provision” for “strike
replacement agreements.” As noted above, PERB commonly takes administrative
notice of its own records and files. In this instance, we take administrative notice of
Ludewig’s declaration (which is part of the record in PERB Case Numbers SF-CO-
222-H, SF-CO-223-H, and SF-CO-224-H) and the contract referenced therein, both of
which CNA and the County referenced at the hearing and in their briefs in this matter.
We also take administrative notice of two more contracts between medical
centers and strike staffing agencies appearing in records of other PERB cases, both of
which CNA and the County referenced at the hearing and in their briefs in the instant
matter.35 The first is a 2013 contract between HSG and the University, introduced into
extent the record contains relevant facts, it suggests that the more nurses needed for
the same period of days, the harder it is to recruit and the more need there may be for
a minimum shift guarantee.
35 Before the ALJ granted CNA’s motion for administrative notice, the County
raised two objections which the ALJ overruled and which we briefly address. First, the
County claimed parts of the documents in question are not relevant. We disagree. The
above-referenced documents, together with the offers the County received from other
companies, rebut the County’s claim that a five-shift minimum hiring provision is an
industry standard. Second, the County asserted that the documents are hearsay and
cannot be relied upon for the truth of the matter asserted. We do not find that the
contracts with strike replacement companies introduced in prior PERB proceedings
have more hearsay characteristics than those introduced as evidence in the instant
matter, and indeed it is not clear that any are introduced for “the truth of the matter
asserted” within the meaning of the County’s argument. Moreover, the County itself

58
evidence in PERB Case Numbers SF-CE-1029-H, SF-CE-1030-H, SF-CO-186-H, and
SF-CO-187-H. This contract provided for either a four-shift minimum hiring period or,
in the event of a one-day strike, a one-shift minimum hiring period at a higher rate.
The second is a 2010 contract between Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare System,
Huffmaster Crisis Response, LLC, and Alternative Workforce, Inc., introduced into
evidence in PERB Case Numbers SF-CO-222-H, SF-CO-223-H, and SF-CO-224-H.
This contract provided for a three-shift minimum hiring guarantee for a strike of any
length.
Snyder testified that when she finally raised the minimum guarantee with
McInnes, he responded: “this is our standard contract, basically, this is what we do.”
But her testimony on that point was hearsay, and the weight of the evidence does not
indicate that a five-shift guarantee was the industry standard. Furthermore, Snyder
had not done sufficient research to learn that HSG had agreed to lower minimum shift
guarantees in other contracts, and she did not raise with McInnes the fact that other
companies had offered lower minimums. Snyder testified that she had the information
needed to bargain with HSG based on the other offers the County received, but she
could not recall ever having done so. This testimony shows how the timing of Snyder’s
alleged conversation with McInnes—months after she had already selected HSG and
just before the strike—interplays with her lack of good faith effort to negotiate a lower
sought administrative notice of documents from filings in other PERB cases involving
different parties, and, at least as much as CNA, has relied on those documents for the
truth of various matters asserted. In any event, PERB Regulation 32176 allows us to
consider hearsay evidence where, as here, there is also other evidence showing that
a five-shift minimum is not the industry standard.

59
minimum shift guarantee. By raising the issue only when a strike was imminent and
the County needed to order replacements, Snyder gave up any leverage to convince
HSG it should reduce or eliminate the minimum shift guarantee.
Lastly, while the County did not come close to establishing a good faith effort to
reduce or eliminate the minimum shift guarantee even if we were to credit all of
Snyder’s testimony, we also find Snyder was not a reliable witness when she testified,
as noted above, that McInnes rebuffed her when she raised the minimum shift
guarantee after CNA gave notice of a two-day strike.36 On direct examination, Snyder
gave vague testimony about her discussion with McInnes. On cross-examination,
CNA’s counsel tried to dig deeper, revealing Snyder had limited recall about her
conversation with McInnes. For instance, Snyder could not recall who participated in
the call. On redirect examination, after a break, Snyder provided the more definitive,
hearsay testimony noted above, claiming that in her discussion with McInnes shortly
before the strike, he indicated that the five-shift guarantee was standard. While this
testimony is plausible, particularly given that the tardy inquiry gave Snyder no
leverage, we are also aware that Snyder had an obvious incentive to cover herself by
reframing a last-minute lament about the minimum shift guarantee as if she had
actively sought to change the term. Indeed, Snyder’s initially vague testimony,
36 While Culberson similarly testified that Snyder had raised the topic with HSG,
this testimony was hearsay and not based upon personal knowledge, as Culberson
was not involved in selecting a strike replacement company.

60
followed by better recollection on redirect examination after a break in the
proceedings, further undercuts her credibility.37
b. 	The County engaged in facial discrimination when it
granted preference to non-strikers over strikers.
If the County had made a good faith effort to secure replacements while
eliminating or shortening the minimum replacement period, then the first two
sentences of Culberson’s March 4 memorandum to CNA would have been accurate:
“To ensure the continuity of necessary health services, the County has had no choice
37 CNA also successfully impeached Snyder’s credibility by showing how she
had previously mischaracterized facts, despite declaring them under penalty of
perjury, to obtain maximum legal leverage. In support of the County’s request to enjoin
certain nurses from striking on the ground that they were essential, Snyder signed a
declaration dated February 25, 2020. She declared under penalty of perjury that the
County needed an injunction for full minimum staffing in the operating room because—
unlike other categories of nurses—there would be no replacement workers to cover
operating room nurse shifts, due to insufficient supply and, in any event, because “it
takes generally 3 months to train and onboard agency workers for this position. There is
not enough time to train registry workers for this position.” At the formal hearing in this
matter, however, Snyder was eventually forced to admit, after significant attempts at
evasion, that in fact it was not right to say that there would be no replacements
available and the County did in fact receive such replacements. Snyder testified that
what she meant was it was her “preference” to use the County’s own nurses, and she
would use HSG replacements only if she failed in having County operating room
nurses deemed essential workers. Snyder’s declaration manifests a significant
deviation from the truth on a critical matter before PERB. On redirect, the County’s
counsel solicited Snyder to testify that when she signed the declaration on
February 25, she did not yet know what percentage of the requested nurses HSG
would fill, meaning she did not yet know whether HSG would provide operating room
nurses. This admission makes matters no better, however, since Snyder’s declaration
stated that, unlike other categories of nurses, no operating room replacements would
be available and further stated that, in any event, there was no time to provide enough
training. Snyder also admitted, contrary to her declaration, that replacements could be
used in the operating room with only a single day orientation, provided there was a
regular nurse present as well.

61
but to contract with an outside company for strike replacement workers. Such a contract
was, however, only available for a minimum period of five (5) days.”
Even had that been the case, however, the memorandum’s next sentence
included the following facially discriminatory statement:
“[P]lease be aware that we intend to immediately transmit
the memorandum attached hereto as ATTACHMENT A to all
potential strike participants, notifying them that employees
who choose to participate in the strike will not be able to
return to work immediately, after the strike period noticed by
CNA, and will instead not be accepted to return to work until
their first shift on or after Tuesday, March 10 at 7 a.m.,
unless called into work at an earlier time by SJGH
management.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Culberson attached to his March 4 memorandum to CNA a copy of his pre-strike
memorandum to nurses, which reveals the same facial discrimination between strikers
and nurses not striking: “CNA unit members who participate in the strike will not be able
to return to work at the end of the strike period as noticed by CNA. Instead, such
participating employees will not be accepted back at work until their first shift on
or after Tuesday, March 10 at 7 a.m., unless called into work at an earlier time by
SJGH management.” (Emphasis in original.)
In his testimony, Culberson confirmed that his memoranda accurately stated his
intent, viz., to warn nurses that those who chose to participate in the strike would not be
able to return for three days unless called to work. Moreover, while the County later
called some strikers back to work between March 7-9, the record and post-hearing
briefing from the County leave no doubt that it singled out strikers for different treatment
from non-strikers. The parties stipulated that the County treated “strike participants who
would have otherwise been regularly scheduled to work” differently than others,

62
generally looking first to non-participants when filling available slots. While this
stipulation, the March 4 memoranda, and the briefing fully resolves the fact that the
County did, in fact, discriminate against strikers, extensive record evidence also
supports this finding. Indeed, the County argues that when it barred nurses from
striking who had not actually been scheduled to work during the strike, that, too, was
based on protected activity such as organizing the strike, urging others to strike,
providing picket signs to others, leading a rally, or simply picketing during the strike,
any of which was sufficient to make a nurse an “active striker” in the County’s view.
Singling out employees who honored picket lines during the strike and reducing
their post-strike work opportunities—while granting greater opportunities to employees
who did not strike—constitutes facial discrimination under our discrimination standard
and inherently destructive conduct under our interference standard. (Campbell, supra,
131 Cal.App.3d 416, 423 [noting that, under Great Dane, supra, 388 U.S. 26, favoring
non-strikers over strikers constitutes “discrimination in its simplest form”]; Contra
Costa, supra, PERB Decision No. 2632-M, pp. 34-35, 39 & 40-43; Santa Monica CCD,
supra, PERB Decision No. 103, pp. 19-20.) As noted above, the County must
therefore prove that it acted solely due to circumstances beyond its control and no
alternative course of action was available. (Contra Costa, supra, PERB Decision No.
2632-M, pp. 36 & 40.)
Therefore, even if the County had shown it had no choice but to agree to a
minimum shift guarantee for replacement employees, and as a result there were
reduced work opportunities for bargaining unit employees, the County would have the
further burden of showing an outside circumstance requiring it to rely on protected

63
activities to determine which bargaining unit employees would receive the limited
remaining work opportunities. The County attempts to meet this burden by referencing
HSG’s alleged prohibition on replacement employees working alongside bargaining
unit workers, a concern allegedly based on HSG’s experience outside of California
involving such groups working together. There are a series of problems with the
County’s defense.
First and foremost, the contractual provision at issue does not call for
discrimination between strikers and non-strikers. Rather, it treats all members of the
bargaining unit equally, providing that the County “shall not schedule [HSG]
Replacement Staff to work alongside Client’s Staff who are members of a collective
bargaining unit with which Client had a labor dispute within the previous 30 days
without prior written approval from [HSG’s] Vice President.”38 Similarly, when Snyder
and Culberson described HSG’s concerns, they were clear that HSG’s concerns
applied to the entire bargaining unit, rather than particularly to strikers. For instance,
during the shift change at the start of the strike, HSG asked that bargaining unit
38 We draw no conclusion as to what circumstances, if any, would permit a
public employer to execute a discriminatory contract. We need not resolve that
question because the contract here did not require discrimination. We therefore leave
open the question of whether, faced with a demand for a discriminatory contract, a
hospital may narrowly tailor its conduct by showing it attempted to negotiate over the
discriminatory provision in advance of executing the contract and ultimately had no
choice but to accept such a contract. Here, the record does not reflect that the County
negotiated over the side-by-side work provision.

64
workers and replacements not interact with one another, reinforcing that HSG did not
ask for discrimination between strikers and non-strikers.39
The contract provision on which the County relies, in addition to not requiring
discrimination, also allowed the County to ask HSG to waive the provision. And, in
fact, HSG permitted such side-by-side work when asked. According to Snyder’s
testimony in her direct examination, HSG made an “exception for essential workers,”
meaning the nurses that CNA and the County agreed would work during the strike.
Then, on cross-examination, Snyder admitted that the County went significantly further
than that in allowing HSG replacements to work alongside bargaining unit workers—
including both strikers and non-strikers—and that HSG in fact had no problem with
any of the interactions the County wished to occur between HSG replacements and
bargaining unit nurses. Nor did HSG have any problem with the fact that five
bargaining unit nurses trained the HSG replacements on the day before the strike.
While the above factors are each, independently, sufficient to defeat the
County’s defense to CNA’s discrimination claim, we also briefly consider the County’s
effort to introduce evidence of actual tension between strikers and replacements. We
do not tarry long on this evidence as there is no clear basis for finding it relevant given
that the County set out its discriminatory decision in pre-strike memos. Alleged tension
during the strike simply cannot explain the County’s pre-strike decision to discriminate
based on protected activity. Similarly, in Sutter, supra, 348 NLRB 637, the NLRB
rejected the hospital’s argument that strikers and replacements working side-by-side
39 While both Snyder and Culberson gave hearsay testimony about HSG’s
concerns, Culberson offered double hearsay that came from HSG to Snyder and then
from Snyder to Culberson.

65
would engender hostility, as the record did not show a history of such conflict at the
hospital in question, and the hospital’s decision “could not have turned on any events
occurring during the instant strike,” because the decision was announced before the
strike.
Furthermore, while Snyder pointed to a single incident on the picket line, her
testimony was hearsay and lacking in personal knowledge. In any event, tempers
commonly flare on a picket line and that would not necessarily lead us to extrapolate
and assume that one or more nurses might act unprofessionally in the workplace,
particularly given the record reveals that from March 7 through 9, HSG replacements
successfully worked alongside bargaining unit employees, including some strikers.
Similarly, a nurse testified using the word “scab” to describe replacements, and she
acknowledged there could be tension between bargaining unit nurses and
replacements, but she also testified that as it played out there were no such tense
incidents while regular nurses and replacements worked together in the hospital.
Snyder, too, positively reviewed the actual side-by-side work, testifying that
between March 7 and 9 the County brought back strikers to work alongside HSG
replacements and there were no incidents of conflict. Culberson further supported the
same conclusion, as he testified that he had no reason to think that bargaining unit
nurses would act inappropriately or unprofessionally simply because they were
working alongside HSG replacements.
For the foregoing reasons, the County engaged in facial discrimination when it
explicitly threatened to withhold available work opportunities based upon whether
employees had engaged in protected activities and then carried through on this threat.

66
(Cf. Contra Costa, supra, PERB Decision No. 2632-M, pp. 34-35, 39, & 40-43
[employer explicitly distinguished between represented and unrepresented
employees].) In the alternative, as discussed below the same discriminatory conduct
would, in any event, supply a sufficient showing of nexus to satisfy a prima facie case
under the Novato framework.
Where, as here, there is direct evidence of discrimination, i.e., “the employer’s
words or conduct reveal that its adverse action was based on the employee’s union
activities or other protected acts,” no further evidence of nexus is required. (County of
Riverside (2018) PERB Decision No. 2591-M, adopting proposed decision at p. 63.)
The direct evidence of discrimination in this case makes it unnecessary to review
circumstantial evidence, but that evidence, too, supports our alternative finding. For
instance, many avenues existed for the County to avoid such discrimination; there
were numerous non-discriminatory bases for assigning work, including basing
assignments on skills, seniority, or, most easily, pre-existing schedules if they were
created without a discriminatory basis.40 The County deviated sharply from such
unbiased decision-making. It also deviated from norms when it declined to call in full-
time nurses ahead of part-time, per diem, contract, registry or traveling nurses. And
the County evidenced further animus by preventing nurses from being paid for days
40 There is no evidence that the County relied on discriminatory criteria in
deciding how many bargaining unit nurses to schedule on March 7-9 to supplement
HSG replacements. For instance, the record reveals no reason to doubt that the
County looked at remaining service needs after accounting for the number of
replacements it had obligated itself to hire on those days. As discussed above,
however, the County readily admits that it took protected activity into account when
deciding which bargaining unit employees would fill the available slots.

67
following the strike on which management barred them from work, even though
allowing use of accrued paid time off was standard for other types of furlough days.41
Finally, the County has not established that it would have taken the same action
for a non-discriminatory reason. Indeed, while the County asserts HSG’s requirement
as its alternative, non-discriminatory basis for preferencing non-strikers over strikers,
that argument fails for all the reasons discussed above, including that HSG’s
requirement related to any bargaining unit employee working alongside a
replacement, and that HSG waived the requirement for strikers and non-strikers alike
in those instances in which the County sought a waiver. The record therefore suggests
it is more likely than not that HSG would have agreed to a non-discriminatory
approach for assigning post-strike work availabilities to work alongside replacements.
c. 	The County failed to provide CNA with adequate notice of
the HSG contract’s minimum shift guarantee, thereby
precluding negotiations over the foreseeable effects on
bargaining unit employees’ work opportunities.
Advance notice and bargaining are the primary means by which the MMBA
promotes its central purpose—communication—and would lead to greater
understanding and harmony going forward. Work opportunities, hours, and mandatory
furlough periods are within the scope of representation. (See, e.g., Modoc County
Office of Education (2019) PERB Decision No. 2684, p. 10; City of Long Beach (2012)
PERB Decision No. 2296-M, p. 23; County of Fresno (2010) PERB Decision No.
41 In Part III, we find that MOU section 14.2.1 did not cover the post-strike
furlough and that, instead, the County had no prior policies or MOU provisions
covering this type of furlough. Nonetheless, the County evidenced discriminatory
intent by adopting a more punitive policy for a furlough following protected activity, as
compared to furloughs arising from low census under section 14.2.1.

68
2125-M, adopting warning letter at p. 3; cf. Dresser-Rand II, supra, 362 NLRB at p.
1101 [noting employer’s duty to bargain over how to recall employees after a strike
and lockout].) In the present circumstances, the decision to contract with HSG had
foreseeable effects on these mandatory subjects of bargaining. The County therefore
was required to provide notice and a meaningful opportunity to bargain over the
reasonably foreseeable effects of its decision before implementation. (County of Santa
Clara (2019) PERB Decision No. 2680-M, p. 12.) While we find no independent effects
bargaining violation, because the operative complaint included no such allegation and
CNA has not pursued such an independent claim as an unalleged violation, the same
conduct constitutes a third, independent reason why the County cannot establish that
it narrowly tailored its actions to an important business need while limiting harm to
protected rights to the extent possible.42
Snyder and Culberson admitted that when the County executed its contract with
HSG in October 2019, the County had no idea what length strike, if any, CNA or SEIU
might call. Since the County had just committed to a five-shift minimum hiring period,
the County knew or should have known that it might try to avoid double-paying for
nurses by furloughing bargaining unit employees or otherwise reducing their work
opportunities for a few days following a strike. There was sufficient time for substantial
negotiations before the strike, had the County provided notice of the minimum shift
guarantee in October 2019.
42 While the parties did not litigate the County’s failure to provide notice as part
of an independent failure to bargain claim, CNA did submit that the County’s lack of
notice and deprivation of the opportunity to bargain was part of the County’s
discrimination against and interference with protected rights.

69
If the County had provided notice as required, several benefits to sound labor
relations would have likely ensued. First, through the bargaining process, the parties
might well have worked out a lawful, nondiscriminatory method for assigning limited
work opportunities following any strike. Indeed, the focus and reflection associated
with bargaining likely would have led the County to seek legal counsel and recognize
its duty not to discriminate. The parties likely could have worked out a way for the
County to avoid violating the MMBA by use of the LU code, and the County might also
have acceded to requests to allow nurses to use paid leave to cover any days they
were barred from work. Finally, the parties could have bargained over whether nurses
furloughed after the strike were required to remain within range and appear for work if
asked.43
Even had it proven difficult to reach agreement on some or all effects of the
County’s decision to bar nurses from work, discussion would have clarified matters on
all sides. Indeed, when the County instead waited until the day before the strike to
provide notice, a chaotic implementation ensued, in which the County’s own managers
were unclear on some of the above issues, and bargaining unit nurses even more so.
This is not surprising given the short time frame, lack of discussion, and the County’s
43 Advance notice might have mooted all such issues if it led CNA to call a five-
day strike to match the minimum shift guarantee. The County’s unlawful decision not
to provide CNA with advance notice of the HSG contract terms caused CNA to have
no basis to make such a decision. Furthermore, the County’s conduct led to an
anomaly that does not promote sound labor relations: nurses, who provided 10 days’
notice of their two-day strike, were barred from work thereafter. SEIU-represented
employees, on the other hand, faced no such bar because they provided virtually no
notice of their sympathy strike and thereby left the County insufficient time to hire HSG
replacements.

70
eventual decision to treat the post-strike furlough differently from any prior furlough.
Thus, for instance, while managers in some cases began marking “F” for furlough on
timecards (implying that section 14.2.1 and all its conditions might apply), the County
later changed these timecards to “LU,” before later abandoning the LU designation
and changing all subject timecards yet again. As a result of the confusion even on
management’s side, Culberson misspoke when he and bargaining unit nurses
discussed the post-strike mandatory days off, thereby exacerbating confusion among
nurses.44 Culberson also admitted that the County failed to tell them to remain within
range to report to work if called in after having been barred from work.
For the foregoing reasons, the County’s tardy notice on March 4, when there
was no longer an adequate opportunity to bargain over negotiable effects, increased
the tendency to harm protected rights rather than minimizing such tendency to the
extent feasible, as PERB precedent required the County to do. Therefore, even had
the County established that it had no choice but to accede to a five-shift hiring
minimum and that it implemented its decision in a non-discriminatory manner, the
County could still not meet its burden of defending its decision to bar certain nurses
from work from March 7-9.
44 Beyond sowing confusion, failure to provide advance notice and an
opportunity to bargain also breeds mistrust. As Culberson noted, loss of pay for three
days after the strike was significant for nurses. Nurses learning about this extra pay
loss on the eve of the strike with no input from or opportunity to consult in advance
through their union, combined with the County’s discriminatory focus on strike
participants, heightened the extent to which nurses were likely to view the County’s
action as retaliatory and undermined CNA’s status as their bargaining representative.

71
4. 	Did the County interfere with and/or discriminate against protected
rights when it refused to allow nurses to use paid leave for the period
following the strike in which they were barred from work, or when it
designated nurses’ strike time and mandatory time off following the
strike as “LU”?
Our above analysis resolves the complaint’s interference and retaliation
allegations as to the threats contained in the County’s March 4 memoranda as well as
the County’s post-strike implementation in which it barred most striking nurses from
work for three days. We turn now to the County’s two final adverse actions: refusing to
allow nurses to use paid time off for the period following the strike in which they were
barred from work; and designating nurses’ strike time and mandatory time off following
the strike as “LU.”
The County allows nurses to use paid leave for furloughs that have no
relationship to protected activity. Singling out the post-strike furloughs for differential
treatment from all other furloughs is both facially discriminatory and inherently
destructive of protected rights. As we proceed to explain, the County has not justified
such conduct with a valid business necessity, much less one reflecting circumstances
beyond its control leaving it with no other alternative. And even were we to instead
apply the Novato framework, the County’s disparate treatment of post-strike days
meets the nexus element, while illustrating that the County would likely have permitted
nurses to use paid leave, absent protected activity.
At the hearing in this matter, the County’s attorney asked Culberson why the
County did not permit nurses to use paid leave to cover days following the strike
during which the County barred them from work. Culberson responded that the County
does not allow paid leave “to substitute for strike hours.” The County’s attorney noted

72
that his question did not relate to the two strike days, and he therefore re-asked the
question. Culberson said he did not know why. Similarly, Culberson did not explain
why employees who attempted to use paid leave on their timecards were prohibited
from doing so.
Snyder testified next, and she had an answer prepared, albeit an inadequate
one. Snyder provided the following one-sentence explanation: “We'd be paying the
nurses and paying the replacement workers and that was financially not what we could
afford.” However, in the normal course of business the County hires per diem or
registry nurses to replace nurses who are using their accrued leave, thereby paying
out leave time while simultaneously paying a replacement. This is necessary because
the County must eventually pay accrued leave, and employees generally have the
right to take leave at their discretion. Indeed, on cross-examination Snyder
acknowledged that because nurses are eventually paid for all accrued leave, the
County would not lose money by having nurses use such leave during the post-strike
period.45 Most importantly, the County has not established that it treats employees
comparably during similar furloughs unrelated to protected activity. Thus, Snyder’s
testimony does not adequately support the County’s defenses to CNA’s interference
and discrimination claims.
45 Typical low census furloughs, in which nurses are free to use paid leave,
illustrate the point. Absent such a furlough, nurses would work on the days in question
and use their paid leave on other days, when they would likely need to be replaced by
per diem or registry nurses. Thus, a furlough saves the County money because it
forces employees to choose between using up accrued leave or not being paid.
Snyder’s flawed reasoning, on the other hand, would imply that low census furloughs
do not save the County money if the employees choose to use accrued leave.

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We similarly find that the County’s decision to use the LU code for employee
absences—for strike days and for the mandatory days off thereafter—constitutes
facial discrimination and also discrimination under the Novato framework, especially
given that the County could have simply entered “F” for furlough on nurses’ timecards.
The County also has not established a legitimate business purpose that outweighs the
tendency of the County’s conduct to harm protected rights. We explain.
There is no dispute that the LU code can be a basis for discipline, nor any
dispute that it is used to identify that an employee was not present when scheduled or
requested. Here, the County used it for employees who were striking and therefore not
subject to discipline, and then for employees whom the County itself had barred from
working.46 The County’s primary defense for misusing the LU code was that it had no
other code to use and, implicitly at least, did not realize the need for such an alternate
code until the night between the third and fourth days of the hearing, five months after
CNA’s March 2020 strike. We do not find that this explanation outweighs the tendency
to harm protected rights or shows an alternative, non-discriminatory basis for the
decision; a fortiori, it does not meet the higher standard needed to excuse conduct
that is facially discriminatory and/or inherently destructive. As already explained, the
46 As above, there is no need to examine circumstantial evidence where the
employer conduct at issue directly responds to protected activity. To the extent it is
relevant, however, the timing evidence is particularly strong, since the County’s
adverse actions immediately followed protected activity, while the County’s eventual
fix came much later and only when called to account for its actions. We also infer
improper motive from the County’s inability to explain why it did not allow employees
to use the non-punitive “F” (for furlough) on their timecards for the post-strike
furloughs, at least until it created a new code for such situations.

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County’s tardy decision to create a new payroll code (and to convert all the LU
designations) does not constitute an adequate defense; it does, however, lead us to
narrow the scope of our remedy, as the County’s creation of a new code largely
eliminates the need to bar it from using the LU code in future strikes.
The County asserts an additional defense vis-à-vis one category of nurses:
those who were scheduled to work on March 7, 8, or 9, were initially barred from
working but then were called back, and at that point refused to report. For these
nurses, the County claims that its use of the LU code is still warranted and there
should be no back pay ordered. We disagree on both counts. While we find below that
MOU section 14.2.1 did not cover the post-strike furlough, we also find that nurses
were reasonably confused for the reasons already described. Indeed, Culberson’s
admission that he misspoke, and that the County did not tell nurses to remain within
range to report to work if called in, confirms testimony from CNA’s witnesses
suggesting that they reasonably interpreted Culberson’s statements to mean that the
County was furloughing nurses under MOU section 14.2.1. Nor are we swayed to a
contrary conclusion by the fact that these nurses were asserting their averred section
14.2.1 rights out of solidarity to one another. Because they reasonably believed not
only that they had the right to do so but that they could use paid leave to cover the
days, it would undercut the MMBA’s purposes to deny them any remedy for the
County’s interference and discrimination.47
47 A “properly designed remedial order seeks a restoration of the situation as
nearly as possible to that which would have obtained but for the unfair labor practice.”
(Modesto City Schools (1983) PERB Decision No. 291, pp. 67-68.) An appropriate
remedy therefore should make whole all injured persons or organizations for the full
amount of their losses and should withhold from the wrongdoer the fruits of its

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III. 	Unilateral Change Analysis
A unilateral change to a matter within the scope of representation constitutes a
per se violation of the duty to meet and negotiate. (Stockton Unified School District
(1980) PERB Decision No. 143, p. 22.) To establish a prima facie case of an unlawful
unilateral change, a charging party must prove that: (1) the employer took action to
change policy; (2) the change concerns a matter within the scope of representation;
(3) the change has a generalized effect or continuing impact on represented
employees’ terms or conditions of employment; and (4) the employer reached its
decision without first providing advance notice of the proposed change to the
employees’ union and bargaining in good faith over the decision, at the union’s
request, until the parties reached an agreement or a lawful impasse. (County of
Merced (2020) PERB Decision No. 2740-M, pp. 8-9.) Three primary types of policy
changes are sufficient to prove the first element: (1) deviation from the status quo set
forth in a written agreement or written policy; (2) a change in established past practice;
and (3) a newly created policy or application or enforcement of existing policy in a new
way. (Id. at p. 9.)
The complaint alleged only that the County deviated from the status quo as set
forth in MOU section 14.2.1, entitled “Low Census Furlough.” In Part III(A) below, we
violation. (City of Pasadena (2014) PERB Order No. Ad-406-M, p. 13.) In addition to
serving restorative and compensatory functions, a Board-ordered remedy should also
deter future misconduct, so long as the order is not a patent attempt to achieve ends
other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the labor
relations laws the Board enforces. (Sacramento City Unified School District (2020)
PERB Decision No. 2749, pp. 10-11; City of Palo Alto (2019) PERB Decision
No. 2664-M, p. 3.)

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find that the County did not unilaterally deviate from section 14.2.1, as that contractual
provision does not apply to the County’s post-strike furlough.48
On the third day of hearing, prior to resting its case-in-chief, CNA moved to
amend the complaint to allege that the County deviated from the status quo as set
forth in MOU section 14.2. For the reasons discussed in Part III(B) below, we find that
the ALJ erroneously denied CNA’s motion. However, we also explain that, at this
stage, resolving the claim that CNA properly sought to add would require further
proceedings, and we decline to order such further proceedings given that the added
claim could not lead to a greater remedy.
Significantly, neither the complaint nor CNA’s motion to amend the complaint
alleged that the status quo was that the County had previously adopted no policies on
assigning post-strike work opportunities, post-strike furloughs and use of paid leave,
and appropriate payroll codes for use during strikes and post-strike furloughs. For all
the reasons set forth above, these are bargainable effects on mandatory subjects of
bargaining, and the County implemented new policies on all these topics without
notice and an opportunity to bargain. But we do not find a violation because the
complaint did not allege this unilateral change theory, and the parties did not litigate it
sufficiently to satisfy the unalleged violation doctrine.
A. 	Alleged deviation from MOU section 14.2.1
The parties exhaustively litigated whether the County implemented a furlough
within the meaning of MOU section 14.2.1. We find in favor of the County on this
48 All pertinent MOU provisions are set out in full, ante, at pages 13-18.

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issue, concluding that section 14.2.1 did not apply, and the County did not apply that
section in a new way.
Our analysis begins with the language of section 14.2.1, which clearly applies
only to furloughs resulting from low patient census. While the hospital’s census was
lower than normal during the March 7-9 furlough, the primary cause of the furlough
was not low census but rather the County’s use of replacement nurses to cover most
of the bargaining unit work. Although some nurses read Culberson’s March 4
memoranda to mean that strikers were barred from work following the strike under
section 14.2.1, the better reading of the memo is the one Culberson explained in his
testimony: the first paragraph to address the issue indicates that the County was
furloughing strikers because it hired replacements for a minimum period, while the
next paragraph warns that furloughs under section 14.2.1 could become necessary as
well, presumably if patient census remained low when the replacement nurses finished
their minimum shift guarantee.
As recounted above, Culberson led nurses astray, or at least compounded their
confusion, when he misspoke. More generally, confusion among the County’s own
managers, combined with the County’s lack of notice to CNA, contributed to nurses’
misunderstanding as to whether section 14.2.1 applied. As described above, these
facts form part of the circumstances leading us to remedy the County’s interference
and discrimination even as to nurses who, citing section 14.2.1, refused to work when
the County called them back after initially barring them from their regular shifts. Such
reasonable confusion does not, however, mean that section 14.2.1 in fact applied. We

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therefore find that CNA has not established a unilateral deviation from that contract
provision.
B. 	Alleged deviation from MOU section 14.2
PERB favors a liberal right to amend pleadings, so that parties are not deprived
of the opportunity to have their issues heard on the merits due to legal technicalities.
(Eastern Municipal Water District (2020) PERB Decision No. 2715-M, p. 8 (EMWD).) A
party may amend a complaint during a hearing unless the amendment “would result in
undue prejudice to other parties.” (Ibid.; Contra Costa Community College District
(2019) PERB Decision No. 2669, p. 8.) Notably, “prejudice typically means that a party
has been prevented from preparing or presenting evidence or argument. It does not
typically mean that an amendment improves one party’s pleadings and thereby
presents an additional obstacle to the opposing party; were that the case, nearly every
proposed amendment would be prejudicial.” (EMWD, supra, PERB Decision No. 2715-
M, pp. 11-12.) Even if an amended pleading would prejudice the other party, it is
appropriate to grant the requested amendment if the ALJ can order accommodations
that sufficiently alleviate the prejudice, typically a continuance that allows additional
time to prepare the case. (Id. at p. 8.)
This standard remains the same even if a charging party moves to amend its
complaint after resting its case-in-chief. (EMWD, supra, PERB Decision No. 2715-M,
p. 9, citing Contra Costa Community College District, supra, PERB Decision No. 2669,
p. 8.) Thus, at any stage, the same core question must be answered: “Is there undue
prejudice that cannot be sufficiently mitigated by scheduling additional hearing time
after an appropriate continuance?” (EMWD, supra, PERB Decision No. 2715-M, p. 9.)

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In some cases, moreover, a proposed amendment may cause so little prejudice that
there is no need for a continuance. (Ibid.)
In its initial charge, CNA premised its unilateral change claim solely on an
alleged change to the status quo as set forth in MOU section 14.2.1. CNA maintained
that claim in its first amended charge, while adding that the County also changed the
status quo as set forth in the immediately preceding provision, MOU section 14.2,
entitled “Short-Term Staff Reductions – SJGH.” In processing the charge, however,
OGC neither dismissed this allegation nor included it in the complaint.
During cross-examination on the first day of hearing, Marilyn Scheid, a
bargaining unit nurse, testified that MOU section 14.2 establishes a program allowing
the hospital to reduce staff in the short term based on patient census and staffing
considerations, but she has never seen it used. Scheid then testified that section
14.2.1, which the hospital uses regularly, allows furloughs when there is a low census
within a particular department. Scheid also testified that, in past instances in which
management has implemented a low census furlough, management has not
determined the need for such a furlough three days in advance, as management did
here with respect to the post-strike days.
On the third day of the formal hearing, prior to resting its case-in-chief, CNA
orally moved to amend the complaint to allege that the County changed the status quo
not only as set forth in MOU section 14.2.1, but also as set forth in section 14.2. CNA
specifically proposed to amend the complaint to allege that the County, when it denied
post-strike work opportunities based on nurses’ strike participation and denied them
the right to use accrued leave, deviated from provisions in section 14.2 requiring that:

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(1) a short-term staffing reduction must affect part-time employees first, followed by
regular employees in seniority order; (2) employees subject to such a short-term
staffing reduction may use paid leave to cover the absence; and (3) employees
subject to such a short-term staffing reduction are to be called back to work in reverse
order of the reduction.
The County orally opposed CNA’s motion. The County argued, in part, that
“there must have been a reason” that OGC did not include MOU section 14.2 in the
complaint. As a matter of law, however, if OGC does not address an allegation in a
charge, we make no assumption that OGC rejected the allegation. (See, e.g., Trustees
of the California State University (2017) PERB Decision No. 2522-H, pp. 6, 18-19
[remand to OGC for further investigation where Board determined that dismissal did
not address alternate theory of violation]; Trustees of the California State University
(2014) PERB Decision No. 2384-H, pp. 4-5 [remand to OGC for further investigation of
any factual or legal issues that were not fully or properly considered]; PERB Reg.
32620, subd. (d).) Indeed, the fact that CNA had included section 14.2 in its charge
strengthens rather than weakens its argument in favor of amending the complaint,
since the County was on notice about the claim and CNA was not to blame for OGC’s
omission.
The County also argued that CNA had already rested its case-in-chief, but the
ALJ correctly noted that was not true and that it would not, in any event, constitute a
ground for barring CNA’s motion. Furthermore, while the County claimed the first two

81
days of hearing had featured no testimony about practices under MOU section 14.2,
that would not constitute a basis for barring CNA’s motion.49
On the determinative question of prejudice, the County presented no
substantial or persuasive reason why it could not defend against CNA’s renewed claim
regarding section 14.2. In lieu of demonstrating that it had “been prevented from
preparing or presenting evidence or argument” (EMWD, supra, PERB Decision
No. 2715-M, pp. 11-12), the County made the above-noted arguments and summarily
asserted that “we’ve got a real prejudice problem.” The County gave few specifics
about such alleged prejudice; it appears that the alleged prejudice was having to
defend against another claim. As noted above, that would not constitute prejudice
unless the County could show that CNA, by delaying in bringing its motion, had
prevented the County from being able to defend the claim even with a reasonable
continuance.
Moreover, the record does not reflect any reason why a continuance would not
have been sufficient to mitigate any material prejudice. The Board expedited this
matter at CNA’s request. If a continuance were needed to mitigate material prejudice,
this would run counter to the need CNA saw to expedite the matter, but in such an
instance the ALJ should provide the charging party with a choice of foregoing its
amendment or seeing its case delayed.
49 The County’s claim was also inaccurate. While cross-examining Scheid on
the first day of hearing, the County’s attorney posed two questions that specifically
asked about that MOU provision. Although this examination strengthened CNA’s
motion, our analysis demonstrates that the motion would have been valid in any event.

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At the outset of the parties’ arguments on CNA’s motion, the ALJ repeatedly
noted that PERB liberally grants motions to amend. The ALJ also correctly identified
that the “real issue is what prejudice will come to the County.” However, he did not
base his ruling on any analysis of alleged prejudice. Rather, in his eventual oral ruling
on CNA’s motion, the ALJ did not mention prejudice at all. The ALJ instead stated that
he was denying CNA’s motion because section 14.2 is a less good fit for what
occurred when compared to section 14.2.1.
The ALJ’s ruling was erroneous. First, the ALJ did not base his ruling on
demonstrated prejudice to the County. Second, the ALJ ruled on the merits of the
section 14.2 issue prior to the close of the hearing, which is only appropriate if the
pleadings (together with any stipulations and any facts that may be administratively
noticed) establish that there are sufficient undisputed facts to make a hearing on one
or more issues unnecessary. (EMWD, supra, PERB Decision No. 2715-M, pp. 13 &
15.) Notably, the County had made no such contention.
While there can be occasions in which an ALJ may, on her or his own accord,
raise potential summary judgment on a claim, the ALJ here did so without notice to the
parties. The ALJ also did so without an adequate substantive basis. Whereas section
14.2.1 covers furloughs resulting solely from low patient census, section 14.2 covers
short term staff reductions “based on patient census/staffing considerations.” Section
14.2 therefore describes a broader set of circumstances than the low census program
found in section 14.2.1, and, indeed, “patient census/staffing considerations” arguably
captures both the primary grounds for the County’s decision—the minimum shift
guarantee for HSG replacements—as well as the more minor role that low patient

83
census played in reducing work opportunities from March 7-9. CNA therefore had a
colorable claim that the County deviated from section 14.2, as well as a separate
colorable claim that the County’s actions amounted to applying section 14.2 in a new
way. Because the ALJ sought to resolve a theory on the merits without hearing
evidence on it, he should have applied “the standard governing the pre-complaint
investigation of an unfair practice charge.” (Cal Fire Local 2881 (Tobin) (2018) PERB
Decision No. 2580-S, p. 2.) In those circumstances, a hearing is required if there were,
as here, “contested, colorable legal theories.” (County of Santa Clara (2013) PERB
Decision No. 2321-M, p. 13.)
Although the ALJ should have granted CNA’s motion to amend, we decline to
remand for the parties to litigate the additional unilateral change claim. This decision
best effectuates the MMBA’s purposes because remand would substantially delay the
outcome of this matter without providing an opportunity for different make-whole relief.
(City of Glendale (2020) PERB Decision No. 2694-M, pp. 58-59 [judicial appeal
pending].)
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entire
record in this case, the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) finds that the
County of San Joaquin (County) violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA),
codified at Government Code, section 3500 et seq. Specifically, the County violated
MMBA sections 3503, 3506 and 3506.5, subdivisions (a) and (b), and PERB
Regulation 32603, subdivisions (a) and (b), by interfering with and discriminating

84
against protected rights of the California Nurses Association (CNA) and nurses it
represents. All other allegations in the complaint are dismissed.
Pursuant to MMBA section 3509, subdivision (b), it hereby is ORDERED that
the County, its governing board, and its representatives shall:
A. CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Interfering with or discriminating against employee rights protected
by the MMBA.
2. 	Interfering with CNA’s right to represent employees under the
MMBA.
3. 	Barring nurses represented by CNA from work as a result of a
minimum shift guarantee in a strike replacement contract, without: (a) seeking in good
faith to shorten or eliminate the minimum shift guarantee before entering into the
contract; (b) providing timely notice regarding any decision to guarantee replacement
workers a minimum work period or to modify the terms of a prior guarantee, and, if
requested, bargaining in good faith over the potential effects on bargaining unit
employees; and (c) treating all nurses equally irrespective of whether they struck or
engaged in any other actual or perceived protected activity.
B. TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE MMBA:
1. 	Provide all lost compensation, including but not limited to wages,
differentials, accruals, and other benefits, to those nurses who were scheduled to work
on March 7, 8, or 9, 2020, but whom the County barred from work on such a
scheduled day. This Order shall include nurses who were subsequently called back to

85
work but did not return during that period, irrespective of the reason they did not do so.
This Order shall include interest at a rate of 7 percent per year.
2. 	Unless the parties agree otherwise, permit nurses to use paid
leave time for furloughs occasioned by a minimum shift guarantee in a strike
replacement contract to the same extent as is permitted for furloughs resulting from
reduced patient census or other business reasons.
3. 	Remove all “Leave Unauthorized” codes from the payroll and
timekeeping records of any nurses who struck on March 5-6, 2020, or who were
barred from work on March 7-9, 2020, irrespective of whether such nurses were
subsequently called back to work during that period.
4. 	Rescind any discipline issued to nurses based, in whole or in part,
on absences from March 5-9, 2020, occasioned by the strike or the County’s refusal to
allow employees to return to work, and make any impacted nurses whole for all lost
compensation and benefits plus interest at a rate of 7 percent per year.
5. 	Within 10 workdays after this decision is no longer subject to
appeal, post at all work locations in the County where notices to CNA-represented
employees customarily are posted, copies of the Notice attached hereto as an
Appendix. The Notice must be signed by an authorized agent of the County, indicating
that the County will comply with the terms of this Order. Such posting shall be
maintained for a period of 30 consecutive workdays. In addition to physical posting of
paper notices, the Notice shall be posted by electronic message, intranet, internet site,
and other electronic means customarily used by the County to communicate with its
employees in the bargaining unit represented by CNA. Reasonable steps shall be

86
taken to ensure that the Notice is not reduced in size, altered, defaced, or covered
with any other material.50
6. 	Written notification of the actions taken to comply with the terms of
this Order shall be made to the General Counsel of the Public Employment Relations
Board, or the General Counsel’s designee. The County shall provide reports, in
writing, as directed by the General Counsel, or his designee. All reports regarding
compliance with this Order shall be served concurrently on CNA.
Chair Banks and Member Paulson joined in this Decision.
Member Shiners’ concurrence begins on p. 87.
50 In light of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, Respondent shall notify PERB’s
Office of the General Counsel (OGC) in writing if, due to an extraordinary
circumstance such as an emergency declaration or shelter-in-place order, a majority
of employees at one or more work locations are not physically reporting to their work
location as of the time the physical posting would otherwise commence. If Respondent
so notifies OGC, or if Charging Party requests in writing that OGC alter or extend the
posting period, require additional notice methods, or otherwise adjust the manner in
which employees receive notice, OGC shall investigate and solicit input from all
parties. OGC shall provide amended instructions to the extent appropriate to ensure
adequate publication of the Notice, such as directing Respondent to commence
posting within 10 workdays after a majority of employees have resumed physically
reporting on a regular basis; directing Respondent to mail the Notice to all employees
who are not regularly reporting to any work location due to the extraordinary
circumstance, including those who are on a short term or indefinite furlough, are on
layoff subject to recall, or are working from home; or directing Respondent to mail the
Notice to those employees with whom it does not customarily communicate through
electronic means.

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SHINERS, Member, concurring: I agree with the dismissal of the unilateral
change allegation for the reasons stated in the majority opinion. I also agree that the
County of San Joaquin discriminated against registered nurses represented by the
California Nurses Association (CNA) as alleged in the complaint. I disagree, however,
with aspects of the legal framework the majority applies in its analysis. I therefore write
separately to explain my reasoning for finding discrimination.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND51
This case arises from a strike by CNA-represented County nurses on March 5
and 6, 2020. In preparation for a potential strike, the County entered into a strike
replacement staffing agreement with HealthSource Global Staffing (HSG) in October
2019. Under the agreement, the County had to pay each replacement nurse for five
12-hour shifts even if the nurse did not work a full 60 hours.
On February 24, 2020, CNA gave the County written notice that nurses would
strike from 7:00 a.m. on March 5 through 6:59 a.m. on March 7. The notice said all
striking nurses would return to work unconditionally starting with shifts beginning at
7:00 a.m. on March 7.
On March 4, 2020—the day before the strike began—San Joaquin General
Hospital (SJGH) Chief Executive Officer David Culberson sent a memorandum to
CNA-represented nurses. The memorandum informed them that the County had
contracted with a staffing agency to provide replacement nurses during the strike—the
first time CNA and the represented nurses learned of the HSG staffing agreement.
51 I join in the majority’s factual findings, and briefly summarize here the facts
pertinent to my reasoning on the discrimination issue.

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The memorandum said that, because of the contractual commitment to pay
replacement nurses for five shifts, nurses who participated in the strike would not be
allowed to return to work in the three days following the strike, i.e., not until March 10,
unless they were called to work earlier by SJGH management.
Upon their return to work, several nurses—believing the County had furloughed
them—attempted to use accrued vacation, compensatory time off, or holiday hours for
shifts missed on the three days they were not allowed to work. Likewise, some
managers marked “F” for furlough on employees’ timecards for the three days
following the strike. Ultimately, the County did not allow any nurses who participated in
the strike to use accrued leave to receive pay for the shifts they were not allowed to
work on March 7-9, 2020. The County also marked shifts nurses missed because of
the strike and the ensuing three-day delay in allowing strikers to return to work as
“Leave Unauthorized (LU),” a designation that could subject nurses to discipline for
unexcused absences.
DISCUSSION
The complaint alleges that the County took the following adverse actions
against CNA-represented nurses: (1) notifying nurses on March 4, 2020, that striking
nurses would not be allowed to return to work until March 10 because of the County’s
contractual commitment to pay replacement nurses for five shifts; (2) preventing most
nurses who participated in the strike from returning to work until March 10 and
forbidding them from using vacation time, compensatory time off, or holiday hours to
receive compensation for the mandatory time off; and (3) noting “Leave Unauthorized”

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on nurses’ timecards for strike days and for mandatory days off following the strike.52
The complaint alleges the County violated MMBA sections 3506 and 3506.5,
subdivision (a), and PERB Regulation 32603, subdivision (a), by taking these actions
because of the nurses’ participation in the strike.53 The complaint also alleges this
same conduct interfered with CNA’s right to represent the nurses but does not allege
that the adverse actions interfered with employee rights under the MMBA.54
I. 	Prima Facie Case
Under Campbell Municipal Employees Assn. v. City of Campbell (1982) 131
Cal.App.3d 416 (Campbell), a charging party may establish “discrimination in its
simplest form” via evidence of “employer conduct that is facially or inherently
discriminatory, such that the employer’s unlawful motive can be inferred without
specific evidence.” (Los Angeles County Superior Court (2018) PERB Decision No.
2566-C, p. 14 (LA Superior Court).) “This type of discrimination may manifest where
an employer provides pay or benefits or other working conditions based on union
52 Although the County’s answer denied these actions were adverse, it made no
argument on that point in its briefing. The argument therefore has been waived.
(Colusa Unified School District (1983) PERB Decision No. 296, p. 4.)
53 The MMBA grants public employees a qualified right to strike. (Fresno
County In-Home Supportive Services Public Authority (2015) PERB Decision
No. 2418-M, p. 33.)
54 While I agree with the majority that PERB’s unalleged violation doctrine has
been met with respect to an independent allegation of interference with employee
rights, I see no reason to address such an allegation because finding an interference
violation would be cumulative and would not affect the remedy. (Fresno County In-
Home Supportive Services Public Authority, supra, PERB Decision No. 2418-M,
p. 20.)

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membership or other protected activity.” (Ibid.; City of Yuba City (2018) PERB
Decision No. 2603-M, p. 10.) Of particular relevance here, denying a benefit to strikers
while giving the same benefit to non-strikers is facially discriminatory. (NLRB v. Great
Dane Trailers, Inc. (1967) 388 U.S. 26, 32 (Great Dane).)55
All of the adverse actions here—threatening a three-day delay in strikers’ return
to work, actually barring strikers from working during the three days after the strike,
denying the use of accrued leave to receive pay for missed shifts on those days, and
designating missed shifts during the strike and the three days afterward as “LU”—
were taken only against those nurses who participated in the strike. Nurses who did
not strike, either under the parties’ “line pass” agreement or of their own accord, were
not subject to the three-day bar on working and thus did not suffer loss of pay or
receive LU notations on their timecards for those days. This differential treatment
based solely on strike participation is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.
II. 	Appropriate Level of Scrutiny
“If the employer has engaged in [facially discriminatory] conduct, it bears the
burden of justifying its conduct by coming forward with a legitimate business
justification.” (City of Yuba City, supra, PERB Decision No. 2603-M, p. 10, citing
55 Federal judicial and administrative precedent is not binding on PERB, though
we may find such precedent persuasive in construing California’s public sector labor
relations statutes. (City of Sacramento (2020) PERB Decision No. 2702-M, p. 9,
fn. 13.) Federal precedent is particularly relevant here because “Great Dane provides
the most direct authority for PERB’s interpretation and application of Campbell and,
inasmuch as Campbell is controlling authority for PERB, its explicit reliance on Great
Dane makes that case . . . controlling precedent for PERB as well.” (Regents of the
University of California (2018) PERB Decision No. 2610-H, p. 79 (Regents).)

91
Campbell, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at p. 424; Great Dane, supra, 388 U.S. at p. 34.) As
discussed post, the County has offered business justifications for its discriminatory
conduct. It therefore is necessary to determine what level of scrutiny applies to those
justifications. (Regents, supra, PERB Decision No. 2610-H, p. 86.)
The appropriate level of scrutiny is determined by how much the employer’s
discriminatory conduct harms protected rights. If the employer’s conduct is inherently
destructive of protected rights, it bears a heavy burden to prove it acted because of a
legitimate and substantial business reason that outweighed the harm to protected
rights. (International Paper Co. v. NLRB (D.C. Cir. 1997) 115 F.3d 1045, 1048.) On
the other hand, if the employer’s conduct results in comparatively slight harm to
protected rights, the employer need only prove that its “conduct was ‘reasonably
adapted’ to achieve the legitimate business purposes asserted.”56 (Regents, supra,
PERB Decision No. 2610-H, p. 90.) In such cases, “the charging party must produce
evidence of unlawful motive to sustain the charge.” (Ibid., citing Campbell, supra, 131
Cal.App.3d at pp. 423–424.)
Inherently destructive “conduct carries with it unavoidable consequences which
the employer not only foresaw but which he must have intended and thus bears its
own indicia of intent.” (Regents, supra, PERB Decision No. 2610-H, p. 80, quoting
Great Dane, supra, 388 U.S. at p. 33, internal quotations and citation omitted.)
Generally, inherently destructive conduct is “conduct that has far reaching effects
56 “Comparatively slight” does not mean the harm actually is slight, just that it is
less harmful than inherently destructive conduct. (City of San Diego (2020) PERB
Decision No. 2747-M, pp. 36-37, fn. 19 (San Diego).)

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which would hinder future bargaining and conduct that creates visible and continuing
obstacles to the future exercise of employee rights.” (International Paper Co. (1995)
319 NLRB 1253, 1269, internal quotations and citations omitted.) “The more severe
the consequences reasonably perceived by employees to flow from their exercise of
[protected] rights, the more likely [ ] that the future exercise of those rights will be
chilled.” (Roosevelt Memorial Medical Center (2006) 348 NLRB 1016, 1018-1019.)
“The act of paying accrued benefits to one group of employees while announcing the
extinction of the same benefits for another group of employees who are
distinguishable only by their participation in protected concerted activity surely may
have a discouraging effect on either present or future concerted activity.” (Campbell,
supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at p. 423, quoting Great Dane, supra, 388 U.S. at p. 32; Santa
Monica Community College District (1979) PERB Decision No. 103, pp. 19-20.)
That is the case here, where threatening to deny strikers pay for up to three
days after the strike ended, actually doing so, and then coding missed shifts during the
strike and the three days afterward in a way which could subject nurses to discipline
has the unavoidable consequence of strongly discouraging nurses from exercising
their right to strike.57 Because the County’s adverse actions were inherently
destructive of protected rights, its asserted business justifications are subject to
heightened scrutiny.
57 As I noted in my dissent in Contra Costa County Fire Protection District
(2019) PERB Decision No. 2632-M (Contra Costa), the inherently destructive conduct
standard has been criticized as ill-defined and subject to manipulation to achieve a
particular result. (Id. at pp. 84-87 & fn. 40 (dis. opn. of Shiners, M.).) Whatever the
potential shortcomings of the standard, the County’s conduct here falls squarely within
the bounds of inherently destructive conduct under existing precedent.

93
In applying heightened scrutiny in cases like this one, I would not require the
employer to prove that it acted solely due to circumstances beyond its control and that
no alternative course of action was available. (San Diego, supra, PERB Decision
No. 2747-M, p. 36.) In Carlsbad Unified School District (1979) PERB Decision No. 89
(Carlsbad), the Board, interpreting the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA,
Gov. Code § 3540 et seq.), adopted the “inherently destructive”/“comparatively slight”
framework from Great Dane but added the requirement that the employer prove “it
acted solely due to circumstances beyond its control” to establish its defense when
inherently destructive conduct is found. (State of California (Department of Personnel
Administration) (2011) PERB Decision No. 2106a-S, p. 11, overruled in part on other
grounds in LA Superior Court, supra, PERB Decision No. 2566-C.) This requirement
has no analog in federal precedent, and no other jurisdiction that applies the Great
Dane framework—federal or state—has modified it to include such a requirement.
(E.g., NLRB v. Oregon Steel Mills, Inc. (9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 1536, 1538; Town of
Winchester v. Connecticut State Bd. of Labor Relations (Conn. 1978) 402 A.2d 332,
342-343; Pasco County School Bd. v. Florida Public Employees Relations
Commission (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1977) 353 So.2d 108, 117, fn. 4.) The California
Supreme Court has applied Great Dane in discrimination cases under the Agricultural
Labor Relations Act without requiring a “circumstances beyond its control” defense.
(Rivcom Corp. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 743, 757-758.)
Most importantly, the Campbell court applied Great Dane without a “circumstances
beyond its control” defense to find that the city employer discriminated against

94
employee organizations in violation of the MMBA. (Campbell, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d
at pp. 423-424.)58
Although PERB need not interpret the statutes it administers consistently with
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), our departure from federal precedent should
be supported by dissimilar statutory language or a substantial policy reason to adopt a
different rule for California’s public sector. (McPherson v. Public Employment
Relations Bd. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 293, 306-308.) Carlsbad noted that, unlike the
NLRA, EERA’s prohibitions on discrimination and interference are in the same
provision. (Carlsbad, supra, PERB Decision No. 89, pp. 6-9.) But nowhere in the
decision did the Board explain why requiring an employer to prove its inherently
destructive conduct was justified by “circumstances beyond its control” is warranted in
California’s public sector, especially when such a defense has not been imposed in
any other jurisdiction.59 Nor does the text of EERA or its legislative history reveal the
58 The majority suggests that in Superior Court v. Public Employment Relations
Bd. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 158 (Superior Court), the court of appeal affirmed the entire
Carlsbad test. The court, however, addressed only the balancing of interests for
comparatively slight harm, not the employer’s burden to justify inherently destructive
conduct. (Id. at pp. 196-197.) Superior Court thus did not affirm the “circumstances
beyond its control” defense. (See County of Orange (2019) PERB Decision No. 2657-
M, p. 15 [“It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered”].)
59 The Carlsbad Board notably did not justify its adoption of the “circumstances
beyond its control” defense by claiming—as the majority does here—that the PERB-
administered statutes provide greater protection against discrimination and
interference than does the NLRA. Indeed, because EERA and the MMBA were
patterned on the NLRA, there is a presumption that the Legislature intended for both
statutes to incorporate the discrimination and interference standards from federal law.
(Belridge Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 551, 557; see
Campbell, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at pp. 422-423 [applying the Great Dane framework

95
Legislature intended to impose such a high burden on employers to disprove a
discrimination or interference claim.
Given the absence of any justification for departing from federal precedent,
I would follow Great Dane and Campbell and not require an employer to prove its
inherently destructive conduct was justified by “circumstances beyond its control.” As I
have previously noted, pairing the concept of inherently destructive conduct with a
“circumstances beyond its control” defense allows PERB “to limit employer defenses
in order to produce a preferred outcome” by simply deeming the employer’s conduct to
be inherently destructive. (Contra Costa, supra, PERB Decision No. 2632-M, p. 82
(dis. opn. of Shiners, M.); see Regents, supra, PERB Decision No. 2610-H, p. 58
[recognizing that “the level of scrutiny used to evaluate the employer’s affirmative
defense (under the ‘inherently destructive’/‘comparatively slight’ framework) may even
determine the outcome of the case”].) To lessen the likelihood that a finding of
inherently destructive conduct could be used to achieve a particular outcome, I would
not limit the employer’s defense to proving it acted because of “circumstances beyond
its control.” Instead, I would follow the underlying essence of Carlsbad—that the
“interests of the parties should be placed in balance and the matter resolved
accordingly” (Carlsbad, supra, PERB Decision No. 89, p. 9)—by allowing the employer
to assert as a defense any business justification, regardless of whether motivated by
to a discrimination claim because MMBA section 3506 is “patterned closely upon
analogous provisions of the” NLRA].)

96
internal or external circumstances, and balancing that justification against the harm to
protected rights.60
III. 	The County’s Asserted Business Justifications
The County defends its differential treatment of striking nurses by asserting that
the staffing agreement with HSG required the County to pay replacement nurses for
shifts on the three days following the strike, and that under National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) precedent such a contractual obligation constitutes a substantial and
legitimate business justification for delaying strikers’ return to work. Under NLRB
precedent, economic strikers must be reinstated and temporary replacements
released upon the strikers’ unconditional offer to return to work. (Harvey Mfg., Inc.
(1992) 309 NLRB 465, 466.) The NLRB also has recognized that a contractual
minimum hours guarantee may provide a legitimate and substantial business
justification for delaying reinstatement of strikers when agreeing to such a guarantee
was necessary to obtain temporary replacements so the employer could continue its
operations during the strike.61 (Pacific Mutual Door Co. (1986) 278 NLRB 854, 856.)
60 This approach is not as radical as the majority suggests. Federal courts,
applying a similar standard, have “described the employer’s burden in justifying
inherently destructive conduct as ‘heavy . . . if not impossible.’” (International Paper
Co. v. NLRB, supra, 115 F.3d at p. 1048.) Elimination of a “circumstances beyond its
control” defense thus will not subject an employer to a lower standard of proof but will
merely remove an arbitrary requirement that has no basis in statutory text or case law.
61 Unlike my colleagues, I see no need to fashion a multi-part test to determine
whether a public employer has a legitimate and substantial business justification for
delaying strikers’ return to work. While each of the three elements of the majority’s test
is relevant to whether the County discriminated against striking nurses in this case,
their relevance may vary case by case and other factors not present here may also be
relevant. I therefore would not cast these three elements in stone as the only way to
mount a successful defense to a discrimination claim in this context. Because I would

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Although the County relies heavily on Pacific Mutual Door and NLRB decisions
following it, this line of cases is unavailing because the County did not prove that it
had to enter into a staffing agreement with a five-shift guarantee in order to secure
replacement nurses to continue critical inpatient services during the strike. The County
contacted three staffing agencies about strike replacements. Two of them sent draft
contracts with four-shift minimums for a strike of two days or more. The third agency,
HSG, sent a draft contract with a five-shift minimum. In the evidentiary record are
contracts between HSG and other public employers for strike replacement nurses that
contain a four-shift minimum for a strike of two or more days. The record also includes
a declaration from a human resources director of one of these public employers
stating that a four-shift minimum for strikes of two days or more is “a common
provision” for “strike replacement agreements.”62 And while the HSG official who
executed the agreement with the County, Tabi Ebahou, testified that a five-shift
minimum is industry standard, he also recalled that HSG had negotiated with
employers seeking to reduce the minimum shift requirement. It cannot be concluded
from this evidence that a five-shift minimum guarantee is required to obtain
replacement nurses for a two-day strike.
not impose the three-part test, I do not join that portion of the order requiring the
County to satisfy the three-part test in order to delay the return of strikers in the future.
62 Although the declaration is hearsay, it can be considered because it is
corroborated by the non-hearsay contract between the declarant’s public employer
and HSG. (PERB Reg. 32176; see County of Santa Clara (2019) PERB Decision
No. 2670-M, p. 21, fn. 23 [considering hearsay documents that were corroborated by
non-hearsay evidence]; PERB regulations are codified at California Code of
Regulations, title 8, section 31001 et seq.)

98
Nor did the County prove that HSG insisted on the five-shift guarantee as a
condition for providing replacement nurses for the March 5-6, 2020 strike. As Ebahou
admitted, HSG previously had negotiated with employers over the minimum shift
guarantee. In this case, the County asked to lower the contractual interest rate and
HSG agreed. But the County executed the agreement without asking whether the
minimum shift guarantee could be changed. Not until after CNA gave its notice of a
two-day strike did County Chief Nursing Officer Belva Snyder call HSG about reducing
the minimum shift guarantee. According to Snyder, the HSG representative, McInnes,
responded, “this is our standard contract,” and the County did not pursue the issue
further.
This evidence fails to establish that HSG insisted on the five-shift minimum as a
condition for providing replacement nurses on March 5-6, 2020. First, McInnes did not
testify, and his statement to Snyder that a five-shift minimum was standard therefore is
hearsay. Because there is no non-hearsay evidence in the record establishing that a
five-shift minimum is industry standard for a two-day strike, we cannot consider
McInnes’s statement as evidence of that fact. (PERB Reg. 32176; see Palo Verde
Unified School District (2013) PERB Decision No. 2337, p. 24 [hearsay evidence may
be considered when it corroborates non-hearsay evidence].) Second, Ebahou testified
that if the County had sought to change the minimum shift guarantee, McInnes likely
would have consulted with him about the request. But McInnes did not do so,
indicating the County never asked to change the minimum shift guarantee. Finally,
Snyder’s testimony about the call with McInnes was vague and she appeared to have
limited recall of what transpired on the call. This, coupled with her incentive to

99
characterize the call as a request to reduce the minimum shift guarantee to help the
County’s litigation position, renders Snyder’s testimony suspect.63
Further undermining the County’s asserted justification is how the County
treated nurses who were not scheduled to work during the strike. Because none of
these nurses was on strike during a scheduled shift, the County did not need to hire
replacement workers to fill their positions. Its stated basis for barring striking nurses
from returning to work for three days—that under the HSG staffing agreement it had to
pay a replacement nurse to fill their position—therefore does not apply to this group of
nurses. But these nurses nevertheless suffered the same adverse actions as their
counterparts who struck during their shifts. The County’s failure or refusal to limit the
adverse actions to those nurses who actually were replaced belies its stated reason
for the three-day delay and supports an inference that the adverse actions were
intended to discourage or punish participation in strike activity.
The County’s justification also is weakened by the fact that the County waited
until the day before the strike to inform CNA and the nurses it represents about the
HSG agreement containing a five-shift minimum guarantee. The County has asserted
no business reason for withholding this information from CNA and the nurses until the
strike was imminent. Had CNA and the nurses known of the five-shift guarantee prior
to deciding whether to strike, they could have weighed the potential loss of up to five
days’ pay (instead of two) as part of their decision making process. As it was, nurses
63 A witness’s “capacity to . . . recollect” and “bias, interest or motive” are
relevant in determining the credibility of testimony. (State of California (Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation) (2012) PERB Decision No. 2285-S, p. 10, fn. 15, citing
Evid. Code, § 780.)

100
learned of the shift guarantee on the eve of the strike, requiring them to quickly decide
whether to risk losing more than double the amount of pay they anticipated foregoing
during the strike. Under these circumstances, the County’s 11th hour reveal of the
five-shift guarantee to CNA and the nurses suggests it did so to coerce nurses not to
strike.64
In sum, the County failed to prove that it had to agree to a five-shift minimum
guarantee to secure replacement nurses for the March 5-6, 2020 strike. The County
thus has not established a legitimate and substantial business justification for barring
strikers from returning to work until March 10.
Turning to the County’s refusal to allow striking nurses to use accrued leave
time on the three days it barred them from working after the strike ended, the County
argues it was justified in doing so because the County could not afford to pay its
nurses and replacement nurses for the same days. But, as Snyder admitted on cross-
64 I disagree with the majority’s injection of a notice and meet and confer
obligation into the discrimination analysis. It very well may be, as the majority finds,
that a public employer has an obligation to provide notice to the union and meet and
confer upon request over the effects of a decision to enter into a strike replacement
contract with a minimum shift guarantee. But CNA did not allege such a violation in its
charge, the complaint did not allege one, and the parties did not litigate one. We
therefore have no basis to determine whether such an obligation existed here, much
less whether the County breached it. (See Tahoe-Truckee Unified School District
(1988) PERB Decision No. 668, p. 10 [“The province of the Board is to resolve, not to
find, issues”].) The majority nonetheless finds such an obligation and bootstraps it into
its new discrimination test, further breaking down the distinction between
discrimination and bargaining violations. (See Contra Costa, supra, PERB Decision
No. 2632-M, pp. 68-69 (dis. opn. of Shiners, M.) [observing that majority’s finding that
district’s bargaining proposal constituted interference and discrimination allowed
charging party to obtain a remedy it could not have received for a bargaining
violation].)

101
examination, the County pays nurses for accrued leave whenever they take it. At
times, the County must temporarily replace a nurse who is on paid leave with a per
diem or registry nurse. Paying a nurse for accrued leave time at the same time it pays
a replacement worker for that nurse thus is a routine practice. The County has offered
no credible reason why it could not have followed that practice during the three days
after the March 5-6, 2020 strike, and thus has failed to prove a legitimate and
substantial business justification for denying striking nurses use of accrued leave time
on March 7-9, 2020.
Finally, the County claims it designated shifts that striking nurses missed during
the strike and the following three days as “LU” because it had no other code it could
use to designate the missed time. Yet some managers initially coded the missed time
as “F” for furlough. The County does not explain why it could not have allowed that
non-punitive designation to remain until a new code was created. Given that the “LU”
designation was, at best, a product of administrative convenience, the County has not
established it had a legitimate and substantial business reason for using it over other
possible, non-punitive designations. And, as the majority notes, the County’s creation
several months later of a new payroll code for the missed time does not absolve it of
liability, but merely impacts the appropriate remedy.
CONCLUSION
The County’s actions of threatening and then actually barring striking nurses
from returning to work for three days after the strike ended, denying them use of
accrued leave to receive compensation for that mandatory time off, and then
designating shifts missed because of the strike and mandatory three-day delay as

102
“Leave Unauthorized” were inherently destructive of protected rights because they
penalized nurses for exercising their right to strike in a way that strongly discouraged
nurses from exercising that right in the future. The County has not met its heavy
burden to establish a legitimate and substantial business justification for any of these
actions. I accordingly join my colleagues in finding that the County discriminated
against CNA-represented nurses in violation of MMBA sections 3506 and 3506.5,
subdivision (a), and PERB Regulation 32603, subdivision (a), as alleged in the
complaint.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the State of California
After a hearing in Unfair Practice Case No. SA-CE-1141-M, California Nurses
Association v. County of San Joaquin, in which all parties had the right to participate, it
has been found that the County of San Joaquin violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act
(MMBA), Government Code sections 3503, 3506 and 3506.5, subdivisions (a) and (b),
and Public Employment Relations Board Regulation 32603, subdivisions (a) and (b),
by interfering with and discriminating against protected rights of the California Nurses
Association (CNA) and nurses it represents.
As a result of this conduct, we have been ordered to post this Notice and we
will:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Interfering with or discriminating against employee rights protected by
the MMBA.
2. 	Interfering with CNA’s right to represent employees under the MMBA.
3. 	Barring nurses represented by CNA from work as a result of a minimum
shift guarantee in a strike replacement contract, without: (a) seeking in good faith to
shorten or eliminate the minimum shift guarantee before entering into the contract; (b)
providing timely notice regarding any decision to guarantee replacement workers a
minimum work period or to modify the terms of a prior guarantee, and, if requested,
bargaining in good faith over the potential effects on bargaining unit employees; and
(c) treating all nurses equally irrespective of whether they struck or engaged in any
other actual or perceived protected activity.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE MMBA:
1. 	Provide all lost compensation, including but not limited to wages,
differentials, accruals, and other benefits, to those nurses who were scheduled to work
on March 7, 8, or 9, 2020, but whom we barred from work on such a scheduled day.
This Order shall include nurses who were subsequently called back to work but did not
return, irrespective of the reason they did not do so. This Order shall include interest
at a rate of 7 percent per year.

2
2. 	Unless the parties agree otherwise, permit nurses to use paid leave time
for furloughs occasioned by a minimum shift guarantee in a strike replacement
contract to the same extent as is permitted for furloughs resulting from reduced patient
census or other business reasons.
3. 	Remove all “Leave Unauthorized” codes from the payroll and
timekeeping records of any nurses who struck on March 5-6, 2020, or who were
barred from work from March 7-9, 2020, irrespective of whether such nurses were
subsequently called back to work.
4. 	Rescind any discipline issued to nurses based, in whole or in part, on
absences from March 5-9, 2020, occasioned by the strike or our refusal to allow
employees to return to work, and make any impacted nurses whole for all lost
compensation and benefits plus interest at a rate of 7 percent per year.
Dated: _____________________ 	COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN
By: _________________________________
Authorized Agent
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE. IT MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR AT LEAST 30
CONSECUTIVE WORKDAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
REDUCED IN SIZE, DEFACED, ALTERED, OR COVERED WITH ANY OTHER
MATERIAL.