Butte-Glenn Community College District (PERB 2834E)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONAL AND
TECHNICAL EMPLOYEES,
COMMUNICATION WORKERS OF
AMERICA LOCAL 9119,
Charging Party,
v.
BUTTE-GLENN COMMUNITY COLLEGE
DISTRICT,
Respondent.
Case No. SA-CE-2996-E
PERB Decision No. 2834
October 7, 2022
Appearances: Jason Rosenbury, Steward, for University Professional and Technical
Employees, Communication Workers of America Local 9119; Lozano Smith by
Thomas Gauthier and Allison Hernandez, Attorneys, for Butte-Glenn Community
College District.
Before Banks, Chair; Shiners and Krantz, Members.
DECISION
KRANTZ, Member: This case is before the Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB or Board) on exceptions by Butte-Glenn Community College District to a
proposed decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ). The proposed decision
considered three claims arising under the Educational Employment Relations Act
(EERA).1 First, the ALJ found that the District did not retaliate against protected
activity when it canceled three courses assigned to Stacey Burks, a part-time District
1 EERA is codified at Government Code section 3540 et seq. All statutory
references are to the Government Code.

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faculty member holding several positions in the Part-Time Faculty Association (PFA),
which is affiliated with Charging Party University Professional and Technical
Employees, Communication Workers of America Local 9119 (UPTE). Second, the ALJ
rejected UPTE’s claim that the District unilaterally changed polices related to course
assignments and grievances without affording UPTE adequate notice and an
opportunity to meet and negotiate.
Finally, the ALJ sustained UPTE’s third claim, finding that the District failed to
respond adequately to a request for information (RFI). Specifically, the ALJ found that
the District assessed and answered the RFI as if it arose under the California Public
Records Act (CPRA),2 and consequently failed to explore means of obtaining
requested information that was not in its class enrollment database, as required under
EERA. The ALJ ordered the District to provide, upon UPTE’s request, all outstanding
information responsive to the RFI.
The District excepted to some of the ALJ’s conclusions on information request
issues. UPTE filed no exceptions. Having reviewed the proposed decision, the parties’
arguments, and the record, we affirm the proposed decision.3
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We summarize the background pertaining to the District’s response to UPTE’s
RFI. The relevant background includes certain facts related to the District’s decision to
2 The CPRA is codified at section 6250 et seq.
3 Neither party filed exceptions regarding the retaliation and unilateral change
claims, and we express no opinion on them. The ALJ’s conclusions about these claims
are therefore non-precedential and are final and binding only on the parties to this
case. (County of Santa Clara (2021) PERB Decision No. 2799-M, p. 3, fn. 4.)

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cancel Burks’ classes, as UPTE sought information largely to assess whether the
District’s decision was lawful.
The District is a public school employer within the meaning of EERA section
3540.1, subdivision (k). UPTE is an employee organization within the meaning of
EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (d). Through the PFA, it exclusively represents the
District’s associate faculty.4
The following District employees played the most important roles in the parties’
dispute:
Burks was an associate faculty member in the Philosophy Department. She
served as PFA’s President, Chief Steward, and Bargaining Chief.
Virginia Guleff served as the District’s Vice President of Instruction. One of her
duties was to oversee course offerings and schedules. In this role, Guleff collaborated
with multiple administrators whom she supervised, including three scheduling and
curriculum analysts, five Deans of Instruction, and four Directors of Instruction. The
Deans of Instruction, in turn, worked with Department Chairs within their divisions to
schedule courses in advance of each academic year. The Deans were also
responsible for enrollment management, including exercising the authority to cancel
scheduled courses due to low enrollment, departure or unavailability of instructors,
curriculum changes, or overscheduling, among other reasons.
Carrie Monlux was one of five Deans of Instruction reporting to Guleff. She
oversaw the division that included Social and Behavioral Studies, including the
4 Like the parties, we use the phrase “associate faculty” to mean the same as
“part-time faculty.”

4
Philosophy Department. Between July 2019 and the Spring 2020 semester, Monlux also
oversaw the division that included the Physical Sciences, including the Physics
Department.
Linda Johnson served as Chair of Social and Behavioral Sciences until
June 30, 2019. Thereafter, she continued to perform the Chair’s duties until Heather
Valle became the new Chair as of Fall 2019.
I. 	Fall 2019 Course Scheduling and Cancellations
In February 2019, the District assigned Burks to teach three Fall 2019 sections
of Philosophy 6 (Introduction to Logic).5 Leading up to this assignment, Monlux and
Johnson had worked together to develop the Fall course schedule and faculty
assignments. They first made sure that full-time faculty satisfied their contractual load
obligations. After assigning courses to full-time faculty, Monlux and Johnson assigned
remaining courses to associate faculty. The Philosophy Department had one full-time
faculty member (Dan Barnett) and four associate faculty, including Burks. Monlux and
Johnson initially scheduled ten sections of Philosophy 6, but thereafter they reduced
the number to nine, three of which they assigned to Burks.
At all relevant times, Monlux tracked enrollment numbers using a software
system known as Colleague. Monlux would download daily enrollment reports showing
course section fill rates and wait lists. Monlux would also track information by referring
to live dashboards on the District’s planning, budget, and research website. Monlux
sometimes asked her secretary to e-mail Department Chairs with enrollment data,
5 All further dates are in 2019 unless otherwise indicated.

5
including reports downloaded from Colleague. Monlux would periodically discuss such
data with Department Chairs, either by telephone or in person.
In the continuing aftermath of an unusually destructive fire in Butte County, the
District experienced declining enrollment and funding. In advance of the Fall 2019
semester, the District began cancelling more courses than it had before.
On or around July 17, Monlux notified Johnson, Valle, and Barnett by e-mail
that, due to low enrollment, the District would need to cancel certain Fall 2019
Philosophy sections. The e-mail named Burks’ three Philosophy 6 courses (with eight,
nine, and nine students enrolled, respectively), a Philosophy 16 course with five
students enrolled, and a Psychology 41 course with seven students enrolled. The
e-mail also identified an unstaffed Philosophy 6 course, noting that while only 12
students were enrolled, the section could potentially be preserved if Barnett needed it
to meet his required course load. The next day, Johnson e-mailed the District
Scheduling Center to cancel Burks’ three Philosophy 6 sections and the Philosophy 16
course. Monlux responded, confirming her approval. These e-mail messages included
the number of students enrolled in the courses at the time.
Between June 20 and August 19, Monlux canceled at least 14 course sections
due to low enrollment and other issues, including Burks’ three Philosophy 6 courses,
the Philosophy 16 and Psychology 41 courses noted above, and other Social and
Behavioral Sciences courses. Of these 14 canceled course sections, Monlux canceled
eight sections between June 20 and July 18, three more by July 29, and the last three
by August 16.
Other District staff also e-mailed the District Scheduling Center to cancel

6
Fall 2019 courses. For instance, in August, Physical Sciences Chair Jason Trento
e-mailed the District Scheduling Center to cancel all four Fall 2019 sections of
Physics 11. This e-mail contained student enrollment numbers for each section.
Although Burks was aware the District had canceled classes in the past, she
had never had her entire course load canceled before the start of a semester. She
believed more students might have enrolled in her sections had the District waited
longer before deciding whether to cancel them. Burks also believed that the District
could have taken a lesser step by combining her sections instead of cancelling them
all. On August 13, UPTE filed a grievance alleging that the District violated the parties’
collective bargaining agreement when it canceled Burks’ sections.
On August 24, the District canceled a Philosophy 6 section with 34 enrolled
students, due to a staffing issue. The District did not offer Burks the opportunity to
teach this unstaffed, fully enrolled course, adding to Burks’ concern that the District
was treating her dissimilarly from other associate faculty members.
II. 	UPTE’s Information Request
On October 1, UPTE e-mailed Chris Little, the District’s Executive Director of
Human Resources, seeking information related to the cancellation of Burks’ sections.
The e-mail stated that it was an official request for information, explained that UPTE
was seeking information as an exclusive representative, and specifically sought the
following items: (1) five years of information regarding the number of associate faculty
whose entire course loads were canceled due to low enrollment; (2) information
related to the number of associate faculty whose entire course loads were canceled
due to low enrollment for the Fall 2019 semester; (3) a list of all classes canceled for

7
the Fall 2019 semester, including the discipline, division, class title, faculty member’s
name, cancellation date, Dean responsible for the cancellation, and number of
enrollees at the time of cancellation; (4) District communications regarding the
cancellation of Burks’ Fall 2019 course sections; (5) District communications regarding
the cancellation of the unstaffed Philosophy 6 course section; and (6) District
communications regarding Burks’ Spring 2020 course sections.
On October 15, Shannon McCollum, the District’s Custodian of Records and
Executive Assistant to the President of the District Board of Trustees, responded to
UPTE’s October 1 RFI. McCollum referenced the CPRA three times in her short e-mail
and asserted that the District would respond only to the extent the CPRA required it to
do so. McCollum further explained that, because the CPRA only requires public
agencies to produce records existing at the time of a request and imposes no duty to
create new records, the District would not create summary data beyond any
preexisting records. McCollum sent UPTE a partial response to its third request,
supplying a spreadsheet listing all courses canceled for Fall 2019, but including no
information on faculty members assigned to the courses or the number of students
enrolled at the time of cancellation. With respect to UPTE’s third request, McCollum
stated: “This is the data that is obtainable.”
On November 6, McCollum wrote to UPTE again. She explained that when the
District cancels a class, the instructor’s name and information about the number of
students enrolled is deleted from the Colleague database, and thereafter the District
cannot recover such information. McCollum asserted that this software limitation
prevented the District from running “historical reports,” which limited the extent to

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which it could respond to UPTE’s requests. McCollum specifically claimed that,
because of the deletions required by Colleague when cancelling a class, information
responsive to UPTE’s first and second requests “does not exist.”
As part of its November 6 response, the District supplied records responsive to
UPTE’s fourth, fifth, and sixth requests. Specifically, after the District’s Information
Technology Department collected thousands of e-mails potentially responsive to those
requests, McCollum sent UPTE those she found to be responsive.
UPTE did not follow up further with McCollum after her November 6 response.
III. 	UPTE’s Unfair Practice Charge
UPTE filed this charge in January 2020. The District responded in March 2020,
asserting that it had “provided all relevant information in its possession” and that
“some of the requested information does not exist.” (Original underscore.) PERB’s
Office of the General Counsel issued a complaint. As relevant here, the complaint
alleged that the District failed and refused to provide UPTE with requested information
that is necessary and relevant to its representational duties. In answering the
complaint, the District denied that its RFI response was incomplete or inaccurate, and
affirmatively stated that it “provided all information requested” and that “some
information requested does not and did not exist.” The ALJ held a formal evidentiary
hearing in June 2021 and issued the proposed decision in April 2022.
DISCUSSION
When resolving exceptions to a proposed decision, the Board applies a de novo
standard of review. (County of Santa Clara (2019) PERB Decision No. 2629-M, p. 6.)
We review the entire record and are free to make different factual findings and reach

9
different legal conclusions than those in the proposed decision. (County of
Sacramento (2020) PERB Decision No. 2745-M, p. 10.)
The sole exceptions before us relate to the District’s responses to UPTE’s RFI.
An employer must normally provide an exclusive representative with all information
that is necessary and relevant to its right to represent bargaining unit employees
regarding mandatory subjects of bargaining. (State of California (State Water
Resources Control Board) (2022) PERB Decision No. 2830-S, pp. 9-10; City and
County of San Francisco (2020) PERB Decision No. 2698-M, p. 6.) This is a liberal,
discovery-type standard akin to the standard California courts use to determine
relevance, and, notably, “necessary” and “relevant” are interchangeable terms that do
not have separate meanings. (Sacramento City Unified School District (2018) PERB
Decision No. 2597, p. 8 (Sacramento).) Here, UPTE requested information relevant to
investigating whether the District treated Burks dissimilarly from other associate
faculty and/or unilaterally changed the status quo without bargaining. The District does
not contest that the information is necessary and relevant.6
Once a party receives a request for relevant information, it must either promptly
6 As stated in his concurrence in Contra Costa Community College District
(2019) PERB Decision No. 2652, Member Shiners disagrees that an exclusive
representative has a statutory right to request and receive information from the
employer when exercising its right to represent an employee in a proceeding where the
representative is not bound by the duty of fair representation. (Id. at pp. 34-35 (conc.
opn. of Shiners, M.).) Here, however, he agrees with his colleagues that the District had
an obligation to provide the information UPTE requested on October 1 because it was
relevant to UPTE’s August 13 grievance over Burks’ class cancellations. (Id. at
pp. 39-40; Hacienda La Puente Unified School District (1997) PERB Decision No. 1184,
p. 4.)

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and fully supply the information, or timely and adequately explain its reasons for not
doing so. (Sacramento, supra, PERB Decision No. 2597, p. 8.) The responding party
bears the burden of proof as to any defense, limitation, or condition that it asserts.
(Ibid.) If the responding party believes that a request is unduly burdensome, seeks
confidential information, or is otherwise overbroad, the responding party must
affirmatively assert its concerns and offer to bargain over those concerns with the
requesting party. (Id. at pp. 12-13; State of California (Department of State Hospitals)
(2018) PERB Decision No. 2568-S, pp. 15-16 (Department of State Hospitals)
[assertion that an information request is unduly burdensome must be timely raised so
the parties can negotiate over eliminating or reducing the responding party’s burden];
Petaluma City Elementary School District/Joint Union High School District (2016)
PERB Decision No. 2485, p. 19 (Petaluma) [“Even where a request is arguably
ambiguous or overly broad, the employer . . . must seek clarification [or] comply to the
extent the request seeks relevant information”].)
A responding party must exercise the same diligence and thoroughness as it
would in other business affairs of importance, and a charging party need not show that
a responding party’s lack of care caused harm. (Sacramento, supra, PERB Decision
No. 2597, pp. 8-9; Petaluma, supra, PERB Decision No. 2485, p. 19.) Thus, a
responding party violates its bargaining duty if it unreasonably delays its response,
even if the delay did not prejudice the requesting party. (Sacramento, supra, PERB
Decision No. 2597, p. 9; Petaluma, supra, PERB Decision No. 2485, p. 20.)
The ALJ concluded that the District violated EERA when it responded to
UPTE’s request under the CPRA, and consequently failed to explore means of

11
obtaining requested information that was not in its Colleague class enrollment
database. The District does not except to the finding that it responded under the
CPRA. Rather, the District claims no violation can be found because UPTE did not
follow up with McCollum, and further claims that it produced all responsive information
that existed. We address each argument in turn.
I. 	UPTE’s Failure to Reassert its Requests
The District, citing Oakland Unified School District (1983) PERB Decision
No. 367 (Oakland) and Trustees of the California State University (2004) PERB
Decision No. 1732-H (Trustees), argues that because UPTE did not reassert or clarify
its information request after receiving McCollum’s responses, it cannot establish that
the District acted unlawfully. We reject this exception.
Initially, we note that at no time in this case prior to its exceptions did the
District argue that the information request allegation should be dismissed because
UPTE did not reassert or clarify its RFI after McCollum’s November 6 response. The
Board generally “decline[s] to review an exception raising an issue that was not
presented to the ALJ.” (Los Angeles County Superior Court (2018) PERB Decision
No. 2566-C, p. 12; Colusa Unified School District (1983) PERB Decision No. 296,
p. 4.) Nevertheless, the District’s exception raises an important issue concerning when
an exclusive representative must reassert its information request upon receiving a
less-than-complete response from the employer. We accordingly exercise our
discretion to consider the District’s exception. (Los Angeles County Superior Court,
supra, PERB Decision No. 2566-C, p. 13.)
In Oakland, supra, PERB Decision No. 367, the Board adjudicated a complaint

12
alleging, among other things, that an employer failed or refused to provide requested
information. While the Board ordered the employer to supply one category of
requested information (id. at p. 43), the Board dismissed a separate information
request claim (id. at pp. 27-28). In support of the dismissal, the Board explained only
that the employer answered the union’s request in a manner that “might not have been
fully responsive,” but the union “never reasserted or clarified its request.” (Ibid.)
Although the Board’s decision describes neither what specific information the union
sought nor how the employer responded, the Board’s brief analysis turns on the fact
that the employer might not have fully responded. Thus, it was unclear whether the
employer supplied all requested items, meaning the union had the burden to say
something if it in fact had intended to ask for more than it received.
In Los Angeles Unified School District (2015) PERB Decision No. 2438
(LAUSD), the employer partially complied with the union’s information request but
withheld employee names pending completion of a process allowing employees to opt
out of having their names disclosed to the union. At the time of its request, the union
explained that it was concerned about reported violations of the employer’s
reassignment policies, as well as alleged age discrimination. (Id., adopting proposed
decision at pp. 11-12.) The union also had clearly expressed its strong opposition to
the opt-out procedure before receiving the partial response. (Id., adopting proposed
decision at p. 12.) On these facts, the Board held the union was not obligated to
reassert its request because it was “already sufficiently clear” that the response did
not fully satisfy the union’s request. (Id. at p. 16 & adopting proposed decision at
p. 11.)

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In finding the union had no obligation to reassert or clarify its information
request, LAUSD distinguished its facts from both Oakland, supra, PERB Decision
No. 367 and Trustees, supra, PERB Decision No. 1732-H, asserting those cases were
factually similar to one another. (LAUSD, supra, PERB Decision No. 2438, p. 18,
fn. 10.) However, Trustees recounts facts that are significantly more detailed, and
more variegated, than the skeletal facts in Oakland. The union in Trustees requested
seven items. (Trustees, supra, PERB Decision No. 1732-H, pp. 3-4.) For five of these
items, the Board found no evidence the employer withheld any responsive information,
nor any evidence that the union thereafter followed up, which combined to mean that
Oakland foreclosed any claim as to those five items. (Trustees, supra, PERB Decision
No. 1732-H, p. 6 & adopting proposed decision at p. 9.) With respect to the two other
requested items, the Trustees ALJ found the employer violated HEERA when it neither
supplied the information nor substantiated a valid defense. (Id., adopting proposed
decision at p. 10.) But the Trustees Board disagreed with the ALJ, concluding that the
union could not prevail given it did not reassert the outstanding requests. (Id. at p. 6.)
We find Trustees inconsistent with both Oakland, supra, PERB Decision
No. 367 and LAUSD, supra, PERB Decision No. 2438. In Oakland, it was unclear
whether the employer fully responded to the information request, and the Board was
unwilling to impose liability on the employer in the absence of any notice from the
union that the response was incomplete. (Oakland, supra, PERB Decision No. 367,
pp. 27-28.) In LAUSD, on the other hand, the Board found the scope of the union’s
request, and the fact that the employer did not fully satisfy it, were sufficiently clear
that the union did not need to follow up before filing a charge. (LAUSD, supra, PERB

14
Decision No. 2438, pp. 16-17 & adopting proposed decision at p. 11.) Trustees did not
address whether it was sufficiently clear that the employer did not fully respond to the
union’s information request. As a result, Trustees suggests that an exclusive
representative’s failure to reassert or clarify its information request upon receiving a
partial response from the employer always bars finding a violation of the duty to
bargain in good faith, regardless of whether it was sufficiently clear that the response
was incomplete. (Trustees, supra, PERB Decision No. 1732-H, p. 6.) Because
Trustees conflicts with LAUSD and Oakland on this point, we partially overrule
Trustees and reaffirm that an exclusive representative need not reassert or clarify its
information request upon receiving a partial response from the employer where it is
sufficiently clear that the response did not fully satisfy the request.
Here, the record satisfies the “sufficiently clear” standard. UPTE’s October 1
RFI requested six specific categories of information. McCollum’s November 6
response said that the District had provided all the requested information it could
obtain and that the remaining information “does not exist.” The District explicitly rooted
this position in its incorrect belief that it could analyze UPTE’s request solely under
CPRA standards and thereby conclude that it had no duty to compile information
contained in multiple sources, including employees’ memories. The District’s mistake
of law does not change the fact that it was sufficiently clear the District failed to seek
information beyond preexisting records. This prevented UPTE from “investigating the
full breadth of [alleged] policy violations.” (LAUSD, supra, PERB Decision No. 2438,
p. 16, internal quotations omitted.) In the face of the District’s unequivocal statement
that no more information would be forthcoming, UPTE was not obligated to reassert its

15
request.7 Consequently, the District cannot rely on UPTE’s failure to reassert or clarify
its RFI to escape liability; it may only do so by establishing a valid defense to
production of the remaining information, which we turn to next.
II. 	The District’s Claim that No Further Information Existed
In Sacramento, supra, PERB Decision No. 2597, we explained that while the
CPRA provides unions with the same right to public records as any person or
organization, the statutes we administer confer upon an exclusive representative, as
part of its representational rights and duties, a separate, broader right to information.8
(Id. at pp. 10-12.) For example, Sacramento notes that the CPRA may not require an
employer to “create a new set of public records,” but a union’s information request
“may cover both public records and information that may not be found in any existing
record,” meaning that “an employer responding to an RFI may be required to compile
information from multiple records, management agents, and other sources, unless it
can prove that doing so would be unduly burdensome.” (Id. at p. 11.)9
7 While the District points to the fact that it closed its two responses by inviting
UPTE to raise any questions or concerns, these standard invitations do not change
the substance of the District’s responses, which fall under the “sufficiently clear”
standard. As we cautioned in LAUSD, supra, PERB Decision No. 2438, it is important
not to elevate form over substance in deciding whether a union must reassert an
information request or else lose the right to litigate over the employer’s allegedly
inadequate responses. (Id. at pp. 17-18.)
8 Because UPTE served as an exclusive representative, we have no cause in
this case to consider the rights of a non-exclusive representative.
9 Furthermore, a responding party cannot rely on CPRA exemptions when
responding to an information request arising under a labor relations statute.
(Sacramento, supra, PERB Decision No. 2597, p. 10; see also County of Tulare
(2019) PERB Decision No. 2697-M, pp. 14-15, fn. 9 [party responding to information
request under labor relations statute may interpose defense to protect internal

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In Regents of the University of California (Davis) (2010) PERB Decision
No. 2101-H (Regents), we held that an employer cannot deny an RFI merely because
compiling the requested information would require consulting employee memories in
combination with records. Regents involved two RFIs intended to help a union assess
whether a university was reclassifying bargaining unit clerical positions into non-
clerical positions outside the unit. First, the union asked one campus for the
“classification history” of each open administrative analyst position posted over two
years, including the posted job description and the prior job description of any
predecessor position. (Id. at p. 12.) Management “concluded the only way to gather
the information was through a search of the institutional memory of the various
departments.” (Id. at pp. 12–13.) Second, the union asked each campus to search for
instances in which it largely replaced a clerical position with a non-clerical position,
and provide “the title of the position when it was in the clerical bargaining unit, the title
once the position was removed . . . or replaced in large part . . . and job descriptions
for both positions.” (Id. at p. 14.) The university asserted it did not have “a system of
recording and tracking filled and vacant positions.” (Ibid.) The university recognized
that responsive information existed but argued that collecting it would be unduly
burdensome because it would require tapping individuals’ memories. (Id. at p. 33.) We
concluded the university did not prove that supplying the information would have been
unduly burdensome. (Id. at pp. 33–34.) The university’s “lack of a database with
position control” did not establish an undue burden because “the record suggested
collective bargaining strategy but may not assert the broader deliberative process
privilege applicable under the CPRA].)

17
manageable steps the university could have taken” to provide that information. (Id. at
p. 34.) For example, the university could have created an electronic list of postings
and then “sought the requested information regarding those jobs from the individual
departments.” (Ibid.)
In sum, while it is tautological that an employer need not provide information
that does not exist, “when the requested information does exist in some form, the fact
that the employer may have to compile it from various sources does not excuse the
employer from producing it unless the employer can prove doing so would be unduly
burdensome.” (Department of State Hospitals, supra, PERB Decision No. 2568-S,
p. 15.) Moreover, an employer must raise any such burden contemporaneously with
the requesting union “so the parties can negotiate over eliminating or reducing the
employer’s burden.” (Id. at p. 16.) Otherwise, the employer forfeits the defense and
PERB will order the employer to supply the information despite any burden it may
impose. (Ibid.)
Here, the District did not notify UPTE that its request was unduly burdensome,
thereby waiving any such argument. (Sacramento, supra, PERB Decision No. 2597,
p. 12; Department of State Hospitals, supra, PERB Decision No. 2568-S, pp. 15-16;
Petaluma, supra, PERB Decision No. 2485, p. 19.) The District instead asserted that
significant parts of the requested information did not exist. As the record
demonstrates, that statement was inaccurate because the District could have tapped
individuals’ memories, as well as their e-mails, to inquire about information responsive
to UPTE’s first three requests. For instance, McCollum could have contacted the
Scheduling Center, the Deans and Directors of Instruction, the Chairs, and other

18
similarly situated personnel to ask that they and their support staff search their
memories, computers, servers, and e-mails, while consulting the partial spreadsheet
that featured certain blank columns.10 Monlux and her secretary often downloaded
student enrollment reports and shared such reports with Department Chairs and other
District employees via e-mail, and thus the requested information may still exist in
some form—including even some forms that could be public records within the
meaning of the CPRA. Indeed, the record contains three e-mails that include the
number of students enrolled at the time a Fall 2019 course was cancelled. The District
almost certainly would have found further such information upon inquiry.
Instead of doing what it could to gather all existing responsive information or
raising the burden of doing so and offering to bargain with UPTE, the District stopped
after finding that much of the information did not exist within its central database. As
noted above, an employer normally must supply responsive information even when
the employer cannot retrieve it from a centralized database.11
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the ALJ’s conclusion that the District
violated EERA when it illegally applied CPRA standards to UPTE’s RFI and thus did
not attempt to gather all responsive information within its possession or control.
10 If certain responsive information existed mainly in individuals’ memories,
such information was not a public record within the meaning of the CPRA. A union’s
right to obtain that type of information illustrates one of the most salient respects in
which EERA confers broader rights than the CPRA. (Sacramento, supra, PERB
Decision No. 2597, pp. 10-11.)
11 Notably, it is not a charging party’s burden to prove exactly what further
information a respondent would have found by conducting a proper, diligent search.

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III. 	Remedy
The appropriate remedy in cases involving a failure to provide information
typically includes a cease-and-desist order and an order to provide the requested
information upon the charging party’s request. (Department of State Hospitals, supra,
PERB Decision No. 2568-S, pp. 16-18; Regents, supra, PERB Decision No. 2101-H,
p. 37; see also Children of Promise Preparatory Academy (2019) PERB Order
No. Ad-473, pp. 4-5 [responding party must provide requested information based upon
its duties when its obligation first arose, irrespective of whether intervening events
may have created new potential defenses to providing the requested information].)
In challenging the ALJ’s proposed remedy, the District first reprises its
argument that the requested information does not exist. We reject this argument for
reasons already explained. Alternatively, the District asks us to order the parties to
negotiate over the cost of compiling the information. However, as noted above, the
District waived this argument when it neither raised the alleged undue burden
contemporaneously nor offered to bargain with UPTE about it. (Department of State
Hospitals, supra, PERB Decision No. 2568-S, p. 16.) We therefore will order the
District to provide further information responsive to the October 1 RFI upon UPTE’s
request.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing and the entire record in this case, the Public
Employment Relations Board (PERB) finds that Butte-Glenn Community College
District violated the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA), Government
Code section 3543.5, subdivision (c), and derivatively violated subdivisions (a)

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and (b), by failing to adequately respond to an information request from University
Professional and Technical Employees, Communication Workers of America
Local 9119 (UPTE).
Pursuant to EERA section 3541.5, subdivision (c), it is ORDERED that the
District, its governing board, and its representatives shall:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST from failing or refusing to provide necessary and
relevant information to UPTE pursuant to the requirements of EERA.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF EERA:
1. 	Upon UPTE’s request, supply all information in the District’s
possession or control that is responsive to UPTE’s information request dated
October 1, 2019.
2. 	Within 10 workdays following the date this Decision is no longer
subject to appeal, post at all locations where it posts notices to District employees
represented by UPTE, copies of the Notice attached hereto as an Appendix. An
authorized agent of the District must sign the Notice, indicating that the District will
follow the terms of this Order. The District shall maintain the posting for a period of 30
consecutive workdays and shall also post it by electronic message, intranet, internet
site, and other electronic means the District uses to communicate with employees in
UPTE’s bargaining unit. The District shall take reasonable steps to ensure that the
Notice is not reduced in size, altered, defaced, or covered with any other material.12
12 In light of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, Respondent shall notify PERB’s
Office of the General Counsel (OGC) in writing if, due to an extraordinary
circumstance such as an emergency declaration or shelter-in-place order, a majority
of employees at one or more work locations are not physically reporting to their work

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3. 	Within 30 workdays after this decision is no longer subject to
appeal, provide PERB’s General Counsel, or the General Counsel’s designee, with
written notification of all actions taken to comply with this Order; thereafter continue to
report in writing to the General Counsel, or designee, periodically as directed; and
concurrently serve UPTE with all such notifications and reports.
Chair Banks and Member Shiners joined in this Decision.
location as of the time the physical posting would otherwise commence. If Respondent
so notifies OGC, or if Charging Party requests in writing that OGC alter or extend the
posting period, require more notice methods, or otherwise adjust the way employees
receive notice, OGC shall investigate and ask for input from all parties. OGC shall
provide amended instructions to the extent appropriate to ensure adequate publication
of the Notice, such as directing Respondent to commence posting within 10 workdays
after a majority of employees have resumed physically reporting on a regular basis;
directing Respondent to mail the Notice to all employees who are not regularly
reporting to any work location due to the extraordinary circumstance, including those
who are on a short term or indefinite furlough, are on layoff subject to recall, or are
working from home; or directing Respondent to mail the Notice to employees with
whom it does not communicate through electronic means.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the State of California
After a hearing in Unfair Practice Case No. SA-CE-2996-E, University
Professional and Technical Employees, Communication Workers of America Local
9119 v. Butte-Glenn Community College District, in which all parties had the right to
participate, the Public Employment Relations Board found that Butte-Glenn
Community College District violated the Educational Employment Relations Act
(EERA), Government Code section 3543.5, subdivision (c), and derivatively violated
subdivisions (a) and (b), by failing to adequately respond to an information request
from University Professional and Technical Employees, Communication Workers of
America Local 9119 (UPTE).
As a result of this conduct, we have been ordered to post this Notice and we
will:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST from failing or refusing to provide necessary and
relevant information to UPTE pursuant to the requirements of EERA.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TO EFFECTUATE
THE POLICIES OF EERA:
1. 	Upon UPTE’s request, supply all information in our possession or
control that is responsive to UPTE’s information request dated October 1, 2019.
Dated: _____________________ 	BUTTE-GLENN COMMUNITY COLLEGE
DISTRICT
By: _________________________________
Authorized Agent
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE. IT MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR AT LEAST 30
CONSECUTIVE WORKDAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
REDUCED IN SIZE, DEFACED, ALTERED OR COVERED WITH ANY OTHER
MATERIAL.