Trustees of the California State University * * * PARTIALLY VACATED AND PARTIALLY SUPERSEDED BY Trustees of the California State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90 and Trustees of the California State University (2026) PERB Decision No. 2915a-H * * * (PERB 2915H)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
CALIFORNIA FACULTY ASSOCIATION,
Charging Party,
v.
TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE
UNIVERSITY,
Respondent.
Case No. SA-CE-422-H
PERB Decision No. 2915-H
August 19, 2024
Appearances: Rothner, Segall & Greenstone by Julia Harumi Mass, Attorney, for
California Faculty Association; Diva M. Sanchez Trevino, Labor Relations
Representative, for Trustees of the California State University.
Before Banks, Chair; Krantz and Paulson, Members.
DECISION
KRANTZ, Member: This case is before the Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB or Board) on exceptions by Respondent Trustees of the California State
University (CSU) to a proposed decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ). The
dispute arose in February 2023, when CSU adopted a new systemwide policy that
reduced the number of immunizations students must obtain. Charging Party California
Faculty Association (CFA) filed an unfair practice charge primarily alleging that CSU
violated the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act (HEERA) by failing to
* * * PARTIALLY VACATED AND PARTIALLY SUPERSEDED BY Trustees of the California
State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90 and
Trustees of the California State University (2026) PERB Decision No. 2915a-H * * *

2
afford CFA notice and opportunity to meet and confer over CSU’s decision to adopt
the new policy and its reasonably foreseeable effects on faculty health and safety.1
PERB’s Office of the General Counsel, after reviewing the charge and CSU’s
response, issued a complaint alleging that CSU violated HEERA by failing to bargain
over its decision and/or the effects thereof, as well as by failing to provide CFA with
information it requested. Thereafter, CFA withdrew its information request claim.
After holding a formal hearing and receiving the parties’ post-hearing briefs, the
ALJ issued the proposed decision in January 2024. The ALJ concluded that CSU
violated HEERA when it began to implement its decision before affording CFA notice
and opportunity to bargain over the policy’s reasonably foreseeable effects on faculty
health and safety, but CSU had no duty to bargain over its decision to adopt the
policy, as that decision involved a non-mandatory bargaining topic.2
CSU filed exceptions claiming that its policy had no reasonably foreseeable
effects on faculty, and in the alternative that it complied with any bargaining duty it
held and/or CFA waived its right to bargain. CFA responded to CSU’s exceptions,
1 HEERA is codified at Government Code section 3560, et seq. All further
statutory references are to the Government Code. To “meet and confer” means to
bargain. (Oxnard Union High School District (2022) PERB Decision No. 2803, p. 30,
fn. 14) In this decision, we will use the term “bargain” except when quoting sources
that use the term “meet and confer.”
2 “Non-mandatory” describes topics about which parties need not bargain,
although they may choose to do so. (Oakland Unified School District (2023) PERB
Decision No. 2875, p. 3, fn. 4 (Oakland).) One can convey the same meaning by
labeling topics “permissive,” or as falling outside the “scope of bargaining” or “scope of
representation.” (Ibid.) Although such topics are sometimes called “non-negotiable,”
that is imprecise because it could also mean illegal bargaining subjects. (Ibid.)

3
urging us to affirm the proposed decision. However, CFA filed no material exceptions
of its own, thereby acceding to the ALJ’s finding that CSU had no duty to bargain over
its decision.
Having reviewed the proposed decision, the parties’ arguments, and the record,
we affirm the ALJ’s conclusion that CSU unlawfully began to implement a new policy
without affording CFA adequate advance notice and opportunity to bargain over the
policy’s effects on faculty health and safety. However, for reasons we explain herein,
the unique circumstances of this case lead us to adjust the ALJ’s proposed remedy in
two primary respects. First, whereas the ALJ’s proposed order directed CSU to
rescind its new student vaccine policy, we decline to order rescission. Second, we
correct the ALJ’s make-whole relief order, as it did not direct CSU to reimburse CFA
for wasted or diverted resources (if any) and/or other harm resulting from CSU’s
violations.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
CSU is an employer under HEERA section 3562, subdivision (g). CFA, an
employee organization within the meaning of HEERA section 3562, subdivision (f)(1),
exclusively represents CSU’s Bargaining Unit 3. Although the unit includes lecturers,
assistant professors, associate professors, full professors, coaches, counselors, and
librarians, we use the term “faculty” to refer to all titles in Unit 3.
I. 	CSU’s Student Health Requirements Prior to February 2023
In December 1985, CSU’s chancellor issued Executive Order 469 (EO 469),
which required students to provide proof of immunization for measles and rubella
unless they qualified for a medical or religious exemption. The requirement applied to

4
students born after January 1, 1957, if they were enrolling for the first time or applying
for readmission. The requirement also applied to continuing students—irrespective of
their age—who lived in CSU dormitories, had attended school outside the United
States, or were studying in programs involving interaction with patients or children. EO
469 barred non-complying students from registering for classes but specified that
CSU’s health centers would provide students with the required immunizations at no
cost. The order also required campuses to develop appropriate immunization forms
and to educate students about the dangers of measles and rubella.
In February 2000, the chancellor issued Executive Order 730 (EO 730), which
superseded EO 469. Among other changes, EO 730 loosened deadlines for students
to comply with the measles and rubella requirements, added a hepatitis B
immunization requirement for first-time enrollees younger than eighteen (consistent
with a new state law), and allowed exemptions for “personal beliefs” in addition to
religious beliefs and medical reasons.
In February 2002, the chancellor issued Executive Order 803 (EO 803), which
superseded EO 730. This initial version of EO 803, which we refer to as the 2002
Policy, stated that students could satisfy the policy’s requirements by showing that
they had enrolled in a California public school for seventh grade or higher at any time
after June 30, 1999. The 2002 Policy also made other changes, such as requiring
each campus to inform incoming students residing on-campus about meningococcal
disease and the availability of a vaccine for it, and thereafter to obtain from such
students a signed response indicating whether they had chosen to obtain the
meningococcal vaccine.

5
In March 2019, the chancellor issued a revised version of EO 803, which
superseded the 2002 Policy. This revised version, which we refer to as the 2019
Policy, stated that it would apply to all students entering CSU “in or after fall 2020,”
and that the policy was “adopted from the California Department of Public Health
(CDPH) IMMUNIZATION & SCREENING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COLLEGE
STUDENTS” (capitalization in original). The 2019 Policy further stated as follows: “Any
revisions of the CDPH recommendations for colleges and universities as of February
1, each year, will be reflected in CSU requirements for the subsequent fall academic
term.”
The 2019 Policy no longer permitted students to satisfy the policy’s
requirements by showing that they had enrolled in a California public school, for
seventh grade or higher, on or after July 1, 1999. And the 2019 Policy eliminated
religious and personal belief exemptions, while continuing to allow medical
exemptions. Absent a medical exemption, the policy required all students to prove that
they had a current tuberculosis screening/risk assessment and were current in their
immunizations for the following diseases:
“A. Measles, Mumps and Rubella (MMR)
“B. Hepatitis B (Hep B) [for students who are 18 or younger]
“C. Varicella (Chickenpox)
“D. Tetanus-Diphtheria-Pertussis (Tdap)
“E. Meningococcal Disease (Serogroups A, C, Y, W-135)”
In contrast, the 2019 Policy encouraged, without requiring, the following
immunizations:
“a. Hepatitis A (Hep A)
“b. Hepatitis B (Hep B) [for students who are 19 or older]
“c. Human papillomavirus (HPV)

6
“d. Influenza (Flu)
“e. Meningococcal B (Meningitis B)
“f. Pneumococcal
“g. Poliovirus (Polio)”
The 2019 Policy allowed campuses to require additional vaccines for groups
with increased risk (including intercollegiate athletes, dormitory residents, and
students traveling abroad), with exemptions for medical reasons. The policy required
campuses to advise students how to obtain required vaccines and screenings through
private providers. And it allowed campuses to continue providing such immunizations
and screenings. However, it removed any requirement that campuses offer no-cost
immunizations or, indeed, any immunizations.
Although the 2019 Policy stated that its requirements would take effect for
students entering CSU in fall 2020, the COIVD-19 pandemic disrupted that plan. As
explained below, CSU repeatedly delayed implementing the 2019 Policy and then
discarded and replaced it before it ever became mandatory.
In January 2021, CSU issued a memorandum entitled “Updated Implementation
Timeline for Immunization Requirements (formerly Executive Order 803).” This
memorandum provided a new implementation timeline for the 2019 Policy.
Specifically, it encouraged campuses to implement the 2019 Policy by a “soft”
deadline of fall 2021 while setting fall 2022 as a “hard” implementation date.
In July 2021, CSU issued a further memo, which delayed both the “soft” and
“hard” dates by one year, as follows:
“ • Fall 2022 will be a ‘soft’ implementation date. Campuses
that are prepared to implement an in-house or third-party
solution for immunizations for the entering student cohort
matriculating in Fall 2022 are encouraged to move forward

7
as planned. For planning purposes, this means
implementation must be initiated by Fall 2021 and
completed by early Spring 2022.
“ • Fall 2023 will be a ‘hard’ implementation date.
Campuses that are unable to comply with the immunization
policy by Fall 2022 are required to be prepared to be in full
compliance starting with the new student cohort
matriculating in fall 2023. For planning purposes, this
means implementation must be initiated by Fall 2022 and
completed by early Spring 2023.”
However, as discussed below, before the fall 2023 mandatory implementation
date, CSU replaced the 2019 Policy with a new student health policy.
II. 	CSU’s 2023 Policy on Student Health
On February 14, 2023, CSU revised EO 803.3 This revision, which we refer to
as the 2023 Policy, replaced the 2019 Policy. In the 2023 Policy, CSU eliminated the
tuberculosis screening requirement and most vaccine requirements in the 2019 Policy,
namely, the mandatory vaccines for measles, mumps, rubella, varicella, tetanus, and
meningococcal disease (serogroups A, C, Y, W-135). The 2023 Policy converted each
of these requirements into mere recommendations. This left only a single vaccine
requirement, required by state law: the hepatitis B vaccine for students under age 18.
The 2023 Policy stated, in relevant part:
“Immunization and Screening, Recommendations and
requirements adopted from the American College Health
Association (ACHA) Immunization Recommendations for
College Students [hyperlink omitted], and the California
Department of Public Health (CDPH) Immunization &
3 All further dates refer to 2023.

8
Screening Recommendations for College Students
[hyperlink omitted]
“NOTE: Any revisions of the CDPH recommendations for
colleges and universities as of February 1, each year, will
be reflected in CSU requirements for the subsequent fall
academic term.
“Required Immunization
“A. Hepatitis B (Hep B) – Ages 18 and younger as per
California law [legal citation omitted], enrollees who are 18
years of age or younger are required to provide proof of full
immunization against the hepatitis B virus prior to
enrollment.
“Immunization and Screening Recommendations
“The CSU recommends that students [endnote omitted] are
current for the immunizations listed below. Immunizations
and screening recommendations, and immunization
schedules are linked above. Campuses should link to
this policy to provide students with detailed immunization
and screening recommendations.
“Recommended Vaccines to Reduce Outbreaks
“A. Influenza Vaccine
“B. Measles, Mumps and Rubella (MMR) Vaccine
“C. Meningococcal Conjugate (Serogroups A, C, Y, W-135)
Vaccine
“D. Serogroup B Meningococcal Vaccine
“E. Tetanus-Diphtheria-Pertussis (Tdap) Vaccine
“F. Varicella (Chickenpox) Vaccine
“Other Vaccines Recommended for Adults
“A. Hepatitis A (Hep A) Vaccine
“B. Hepatitis B (Hep B) Vaccine – Ages 19 and older
“C. Human Papillomavirus (HPV) Vaccine
“D. Pneumococcal Vaccine
“E. Polio Vaccine

9
“Recommend Screening
“A Tuberculosis Screen/Risk Assessment (TB)”
At the hearing in this matter, CSU’s Systemwide Director for Student Wellness
and Basic Needs, Carolyn O’Keefe, testified about CSU’s decision to adopt the 2023
Policy. We credit her testimony as a fair summary of CSU’s rationale, but we
emphasize that the outcome of this case does not turn on the extent to which CSU’s
policymaking was prudent or imprudent from a health or education perspective.
Rather, we review the parties’ evidence and argument about CSU’s policymaking only
to the extent it is relevant to assessing whether CSU had a duty to bargain over
reasonably foreseeable health and safety effects (if any) on faculty.
One of CSU’s rationales is directly relevant to ascertaining if its policy change
had reasonably foreseeable effects on faculty. Specifically, CSU relied on the fact that
between 94 and 95 percent of CSU students attended school in California before
college. For this reason, and particularly in the wake of legislative enactments
intended to tighten immunization requirements in California K-12 schools, O’Keefe
explained CSU’s belief that a “significantly high number” of incoming CSU’s students
“are already vaccinated for California law.” O’Keefe also explained two additional
rationales supporting CSU’s policy change, though they are irrelevant to our liability
inquiry: (1) the 2019 Policy, if implemented, would have unduly burdened students (by
requiring them to produce records) and campus health centers (by requiring them to
collect such records and place holds on students who did not produce the needed
documentation); and (2) O’Keefe testified that CSU leaders had “anecdotally” shared

10
experiences that students with certain backgrounds and socio-economic status had
more difficulty in overcoming vaccination-based enrollment holds.
Although the 2019 Policy never became mandatory, certain campuses
nonetheless instituted one or more of its requirements. And we infer that certain
campuses continue to require immunizations that the 2023 Policy does not mandate.
III. 	CFA’s Request to Bargain and CSU’s Response
CSU did not provide CFA with notice before or after adopting the 2023 Policy.
CFA discovered the policy change only because one of its members learned of the
change and notified a CFA leader.
On February 23, CFA e-mailed CSU a letter stating as follows:
“We have recently learned of a change to mandatory
immunization policy for CSU students.
“It appears that planning and implementation are
proceeding without regard to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement or our rights under HEERA. We were never
notified of this policy or invited to meet and confer on it.
Please cease implementation until we have had time to
meet and confer over this policy change, which requires
rescinding the policy until the union has had the opportunity
to meet and confer on impact. We are already hearing from
members that this change poses health and safety risks for
immunocompromised faculty and/or their families.
“The policy is likely to impact faculty rights in the areas of
health and safety and perhaps other rights as well. In that
context, CFA hereby request to engage in the required
bargaining.”
On February 28, CSU Senior Director of Collective Bargaining Stefanie Gusha
spoke with CFA Director of Representation and Bargaining Kathy Sheffield. Gusha
told Sheffield that: (1) CSU had no duty to bargain with CFA over student health

11
requirements; (2) CSU had never done so in the past; and (3) CSU saw no
foreseeable impacts that would be subject to bargaining with CFA.
On March 8, CFA filed its charge in this matter. On the same date, Gusha
e-mailed Sheffield a letter stating in relevant part:
“As we discussed on February 28, 2023, the CSU's decision
to modify the student Immunization Requirements is not
within scope of representation. These requirements are
fundamentally a student policy, and only applies to
undergraduate and graduate students, students matriculated
in self-support degree programs and K-12 students
participating in concurrent enrollment courses entering the
California State University (CSU) in or after fall 2023. As
such, the CSU does not see any foreseeable impacts that
are bargainable with CFA. In addition, the CSU has no
record of the parties ever negotiating with CFA over this
student requirement, including the 2019 changes to the
requirements.
“. . . And while we do not believe we are required to meet
and confer, we are willing to meet and discuss the
Immunization Requirements with you, in order to allow you
to explain why you believe there are impacts within your
scope of representation. We are available on March 16th
from 2 to 4 p.m. If that date and time does not work for you,
please provide me with alternative dates and times.”
On March 14, Gusha e-mailed Sheffield asking for a second time if CFA was
available to meet on March 16 from 2:00 to 4:00 p.m. Later that day, Sheffield
responded in relevant part:

12
“Have you changed your position? On February 28, 2023,
you told me on the phone that meeting and conferring ‘was
not required’ over the elimination of mandatory vaccinations
for students. You further told me that the change ‘was not
seen to have an impact of [sic] faculty.’ . . .
“I ask because we filed a PERB charge last week, and I
need to know your response to my question posed above
before agreeing to meet to discuss the matter. Discussing a
policy change, after the fact, that deeply impacts the health
and safety of our members does not satisfy your obligations
and the union’s rights under HEERA. If you need further
clarification on the union’s position, please review the
PERB charge we filed last week.”
On March 15, Gusha responded in relevant part: “As we stated in our March 8,
2023 letter, while we do not believe we are required to meet and confer, we are willing
to meet and discuss the Immunization Requirements with you, in order to allow you to
explain why you believe there are impacts within your scope of representation.
Accordingly, I offered March 16th from 2 to 4 p.m. If you are not interested in meeting,
please let me know.”
Later that day, Sheffield responded:
“The union is not interested in meeting under the terms you
laid out. We disagree with your position that the union has
no right to meet and confer formally, and we filed a charge
with PERB for this very reason.
“Elimination of vaccinations in the CSU puts faculty at risk,
and the decision does not conform with any health
guidance we know of. We shared news of this policy
change with members last week, and we supplied the
following links to information that I expect you are aware of
as well:
“Immunization Recommendations and Screening
Requirements for California Colleges [hyperlink omitted]

13
“Immunization Recommendations for College Students
(acha.org) [hyperlink omitted]
“Both the California Department of Public Health and the
American College Health Association recommend requiring
vaccines in a way that is consistent with the CSU’s past
practice.”
IV. 	Prior Negotiations Over Health and Safety Related Matters
The record does not reflect that CFA demanded to bargain, or that the parties
did bargain, over the 2019 Policy or any pre-2019 changes to CSU’s student health
policies. Since 2020, the parties have bargained over COVID-19 vaccination
mandates, mask mandates, air filtration, sanitation protocols, accommodations for
faculty with health concerns, and policies related to returning to campus during the
COVID-19 pandemic. These negotiations typically involved requirements for students
and faculty, among others.
DISCUSSION
When resolving exceptions to a proposed decision, we apply a de novo
standard of review. (City of San Ramon (2018) PERB Decision No. 2571-M, p. 5.)
However, we need not address arguments the ALJ sufficiently addressed or alleged
errors that would not affect the outcome. (Ibid.)
Here, because CFA no longer pursues its decision bargaining claim, it is
undisputed that CSU had no duty to bargain over its decision to adopt the 2023 Policy.
(County of Orange (2018) PERB Decision No. 2611-M, p. 2, fn. 2 [in the absence of
exceptions on an issue, an ALJ’s conclusions on that issue are final and binding on
parties to the case, but otherwise nonprecedential].) Accordingly, our focus is whether
CSU violated HEERA by beginning to implement the 2023 Policy before affording CFA

14
notice and an opportunity to engage in effects bargaining. After answering that
question affirmatively, we consider the appropriate remedy.
I. 	CFA’s Effects Bargaining Claim
Even where a decision involves a non-mandatory bargaining topic, if the
decision has reasonably foreseeable effects on exclusively represented employees’
terms and conditions of employment, then the employer has a bargaining obligation
regarding the decision’s effects and implementation. (International Assn. of Fire
Fighters, Local 188, AFL-CIO v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2011) 51 Cal.4th
259, 265 & 276 (Richmond Firefighters); Regents of the University of California (2021)
PERB Decision No. 2783-H, pp. 28-29.) Accordingly, if an employer reaches a firm
decision on a matter outside the scope of representation and the decision has
reasonably foreseeable effects on represented employees, then the employer typically
must afford the exclusive representative notice and a meaningful opportunity to
engage in effects negotiations, before implementation begins. (Oakland, supra, PERB
Decision No. 2875, p. 18; City of Sacramento (2013) PERB Decision No. 2351-M,
pp. 2, 17-19 & 28-42 (Sacramento); County of Santa Clara (2013) PERB Decision
No. 2321-M, p. 30 (Santa Clara I).)
There is an exception in which an employer may begin implementation before
completing bargaining. In Compton Community College District (1989) PERB Decision
No. 720, the Board held that an employer may implement a decision on a
non-mandatory subject prior to exhausting its effects bargaining obligation if: (1) the
implementation date is based on an immutable deadline or an important managerial
interest, such that a delay in implementation beyond the date chosen would effectively

15
undermine the employer’s right to make the decision; (2) the employer gives sufficient
advance notice of the decision and implementation date to allow for meaningful
negotiations prior to implementation; and (3) the employer negotiates in good faith
prior to implementation and continues to negotiate afterwards as to the subjects that
were not resolved by virtue of implementation. (Id. at pp. 14-15.) Here, CSU does not
argue that this exception applies, nor does the record support such a conclusion.4
For the sake of brevity, we use the word “effects” as shorthand for the broad
category that comprises both the effects and implementation of a decision on a
non-mandatory bargaining subject. (Oakland, supra, PERB Decision No. 2875, p. 10.)
Negotiations over implementation may include negotiations over potential alternatives
or revisions that may mitigate or offset the impact of the decision on employees, even
though the decision itself is not bargainable. (Id. at p. 11.) For instance, even though
an employer has no duty to bargain over a decision to lay off employees, the
California Supreme Court has noted that the scope of required effects bargaining
includes “the timing of layoffs and the number and identity of the employees affected.”
(Richmond Firefighters, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 265, 276.) This means that even after
an employer has decided to lay off a set number of bargaining unit employees in
specific titles, a union has a right to propose alternatives during effects negotiations.
For instance, the union may propose to lessen the number of bargaining unit layoffs
and instead achieve desired labor cost savings by laying off non-bargaining unit
employees, saving money on wages or benefits, or other similar proposals.
4 Moreover, in its exceptions, CSU abandons the business necessity defense it
pursued unsuccessfully before the ALJ. We express no opinion on that issue.

16
CSU urges that to establish the complaint’s effects bargaining claim, CFA must
prove the same elements as it must for a decision bargaining claim. That is not
consistent with precedent, however. (Compare, e.g., Regents of the University of
California, supra, PERB Decision No. 2783-H, pp. 18-28 [decision bargaining analysis]
with id. at pp. 28-31 [effects bargaining analysis].) Most obviously, given that we have
already determined that CSU’s decision to adopt the 2023 Policy falls outside the
scope of bargaining, we do not revisit that question in our effects bargaining analysis,
other than to determine whether the effects fall within the scope of bargaining. On that
issue, we do not read CSU’s exceptions to argue that employee health and safety falls
outside the scope of representation, but rather to claim that the 2023 Policy had no
reasonably foreseeable impact on faculty health and safety, which we address below.
However, to the extent CSU challenges whether reasonably foreseeable health or
safety effects are bargainable, that argument is frivolous. (Richmond Firefighters,
supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 276-277 [where city faced a budget crisis and decided to lay
off firefighters, it had no duty to bargain over that decision but had to bargain over
effects such as the safety of remaining firefighters].)
Accordingly, in applying precedent to the record before us, we focus on these
primary outcome-determinative questions that CSU has raised: (1) whether the 2023
Policy had a reasonably foreseeable impact on faculty health or safety; (2) whether
CSU complied with any bargaining obligation it owed CFA; and (3) whether CFA
waived its right to bargain.

17
A. 	Applying The “Reasonably Foreseeable” Standard
Decisions with reasonably foreseeable impacts on employee health or safety
are a quintessential example of decisions that trigger an obligation to engage in
effects bargaining. (Richmond Firefighters, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 276-277; Salinas
Valley Memorial Healthcare System (2012) PERB Decision No. 2298-M, p. 19.) The
California Court of Appeal has noted that “where human health and safety are
involved,” we should err on the side of finding a change is material enough to trigger
bargaining even if it “will affect only a few employees.” (Solano County Employees’
Assn. v. County of Solano (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 256, 262 (Solano).) Indeed, Solano
held this is true even when management seeks to make the workplace safer, over the
union’s objection. (Ibid.) The principle holds even more sway here, where it is the
union that espouses the more cautious position.
CSU argues that changing its student health policy had no reasonably
foreseeable impacts on faculty health or safety. CSU relies, in part, on a version of the
rationale that O’Keefe explained in her testimony: between 94 and 95 percent of CSU
students attended school in California before college, meaning that a high percentage
of CSU students have already met the state’s student health requirements for K-12
schools. However, for the reasons we proceed to explain, CFA presented sufficient
evidence to show that, nonetheless, the 2023 Policy had a reasonably foreseeable
impact on faculty health and safety.5
5 In ascertaining if there are reasonably foreseeable effects, we consider the
2023 Policy as a change to two different aspects of the status quo that existed as of
February 2023: (1) it changed the 2019 Policy, which had been formally adopted, was
set to become mandatory as of the fall 2023 hard deadline, and therefore constituted
an established expectation; and (2) it also changed the interim status quo that existed

18
prior to the hard deadline—a status quo mainly set by the 2002 Policy. With respect to
either comparator, the 2023 Policy lessened student immunization requirements,
which is the key change we consider in ascertaining reasonably foreseeable effects.
To begin, while both the 2019 Policy and the 2023 Policy include phrases
suggesting that they are adapted from ACHA and CDPH guidance, the fact is that the
2019 Policy closely matched such expert guidance, while the 2023 Policy did not,
since it made critical immunizations optional. For instance, ACHA’s guidance indicates
that colleges should require the MMR, meningococcal, varicella, and Tdap vaccines
(among others) without allowing any exemptions for religious or personal beliefs. This
is a far stricter requirement than the 2023 Policy, which allows students full discretion
as to all vaccines (other than the hepatitis B vaccine for students under age 18),
without the need to show any basis for an exemption. CDPH similarly urges colleges
to make vaccines mandatory.
Most importantly, ACHA and CDPH both explain their guidance as protecting all
members of the college community from outbreaks. ACHA states that its guidance is
to protect “campus communities,” and “is particularly important in preventing disease
clusters and outbreaks on campus.” CDPH, similarly, states that its guidance will
reduce “the likelihood of requiring additional staff time during a disease-related
outbreak.” These expert sources make clear why a student vaccine policy can have a
reasonably foreseeable impact on faculty health.
A question remains whether this general proposition applies at CSU given the
high percentage of students who attended school in California before college. While

19
K-12 school immunization requirements reduce the risk of outbreaks at CSU, certain
factors limit the extent of that reduction. First, K-12 school immunization requirements
do not address meningococcal disease and tuberculosis, but the 2019 Policy
addressed these diseases. Relatedly, we credit the testimony of Richard Pan, a
physician and public health expert, who noted there have been recent deadly
outbreaks of meningococcus in high schools and colleges, and that faculty at a college
are therefore at risk.6
CSU’s student body makeup—heavily weighted toward students who attended
school in California before college—means that our inquiry is a closer call for those
diseases which K-12 requirements do address. But even for those diseases, Pan
explained that merely accepting 94 to 95 percent of students from within California
does not lead to sufficient community immunity to suppress outbreaks. With respect to
measles, for instance, Pan explained that effective community immunity requires a
vaccination rate of at least 95 percent, but the 94 to 95 percent of CSU students who
attended school in California includes those who did not receive vaccinations because
they were home schooled, plus those who had exemptions. Indeed, Pan noted that
exemptions pose a multifaceted problem, as medical exemptions increased when
California outlawed personal belief and religious exemptions. Furthermore, Pan noted
that there are certain counties where K-12 vaccination rates are especially low. This
6 Pan served in the California Legislature for 12 years. Among other roles that
Pan held during this time, he first chaired the Assembly Committee on Health and later
the Senate Committee on Health.

20
means that one cannot extrapolate from statewide averages to assume no reasonably
foreseeable effects at any campus.7
For all the foregoing reasons, CSU’s policy change had the reasonably
foreseeable result of reducing community immunity. As Pan explained, this places
certain faculty particularly at risk because they are immunocompromised and therefore
do not receive adequate protection from their own vaccines. Such faculty rely heavily
on community immunity.
CSU acknowledges the “reasonably foreseeable” standard but misapplies it.
Citing Fremont Union High School District (1987) PERB Decision No. 651, p. 25
(Fremont), CSU urges that an employer need only bargain regarding effects that are
“reasonably certain to occur.” We disagree. While Fremont employed the phrase
“reasonably certain to occur” in distinguishing between “actual” and “purely
speculative” effects (id. at pp. 25-27), we later overruled that entire framework,
clarifying that a charging party need only demonstrate that there are “reasonably
foreseeable” effects rather than “actual” ones. (See Rio Hondo Community College
District (2013) PERB Decision No. 2313, p. 18 [overruling San Francisco Unified
School District (2009) PERB Decision No. 2048, which had used the “reasonably
certain to occur” phrasing to ascertain whether there were “actual” impacts]; Trustees
of the California State University (2012) PERB Decision No. 2287-H, pp. 14-17
[overruling precedent requiring “actual” impacts, including Beverly Hills Unified School
District (2008) PERB Decision No. 1969, which had used the “reasonably certain to
7 Pan also indicated that K-12 vaccination rates have likely decreased further
since COVID, though CDPH had not yet released data at the time of hearing.

21
occur” phrasing to ascertain whether there were “actual” impacts].) CSU thus cited
Fremont for a proposition that has been a dead letter for over a decade. To avoid any
further such confusion we expressly overrule Fremont to the extent it suggests that
effects are only bargainable if they are “reasonably certain to occur.”
CSU asserts that there cannot be any effects on faculty that are causally
related to the 2023 Policy, because faculty safety has more to do with each faculty
member’s own vaccination status than that of students. This is true for most faculty but
ignores immunocompromised faculty who do not obtain adequate protection from
vaccines or for whom a vaccine may be contraindicated. CSU also argues that under
any policy, faculty do not know whether their students received a vaccine exemption
or are otherwise unvaccinated, and there is no evidence faculty would refuse to teach
unvaccinated students. These arguments are meritorious up to a point but miss the
fact that, as discussed ante, the 2023 Policy increases the risk of a future disease
outbreak at a CSU campus. While it may not be possible to quantify that risk with any
precision, Pan’s testimony supported the ALJ’s determination that the resulting
increased risk is a reasonably foreseeable impact on faculty health and safety.8
It is impossible to know if the parties might reach agreement on any issues or
policies, such as affording preference for virtual or hybrid teaching assignments to
8 CSU notes that it does not require its faculty to obtain the vaccines required in
its 2019 Policy. On this basis, CSU accuses CFA of hypocrisy for asking that students
have greater vaccine mandates than faculty. We express no opinion on the prudence
of CFA’s position, just as we express no such opinion whether CSU’s decision was
wise. Even assuming for the sake of argument that CFA’s position is hypocritical, that
would not change the fact that the 2023 Policy had a reasonably foreseeable health
and safety impact.

22
immunocompromised faculty, either at all times or in the event of a disease outbreak
in a nearby community.9 CSU argues that faculty already have individual rights to seek
a reasonable accommodation, but this argument favors CFA, not CSU, as reasonable
accommodation processes are part of a union’s scope of representation. (Sonoma
County Superior Court (2017) PERB Decision No. 2532-C, p. 46, fn. 7; Sonoma
County Superior Court (2015) PERB Decision No. 2409-C, p. 22.) Moreover, even
when parties are unable to reach agreement, there are benefits to bargaining over
fraught issues. (County of San Joaquin (2021) PERB Decision No. 2761-M, p. 69.)
For these reasons, CFA has established that the 2023 Policy had a reasonably
foreseeable impact on faculty health and/or safety.
B. 	The Parties’ Interactions After CFA Learned of the 2023 Policy
Where an employer’s decision has a reasonably foreseeable impact on
represented employees’ terms or conditions of employment, the employer generally
violates its duty to bargain if it begins to implement its decision before affording the
exclusive representative adequate advance notice and a meaningful opportunity to
engage in effects bargaining. (Oakland, supra, PERB Decision No. 2875, p. 10;
Regents of the University of California, supra, PERB Decision No. 2783-H, pp. 28-29;
Sacramento, supra, PERB Decision No. 2351-M, pp. 2, 17-19 & 28-42; Santa Clara I,
supra, PERB Decision No. 2321-M, pp. 30-32.) Here, though CSU admits that it never
provided CFA with notice of the 2023 Policy, CSU nonetheless claims it complied with
9 Even assuming for the sake of argument that existing policy calls for a
measles outbreak on campus to trigger 100 percent remote teaching, there may be
less certain situations depending on the distance between a campus and an outbreak.

23
its bargaining duties and/or that CFA waived its right to bargain. The crux of CSU’s
argument centers on the parties’ interactions in February and March. Specifically, on
February 23, shortly after CFA learned of the 2023 Policy, the union demanded to
bargain over health and safety effects (including, specifically, impacts on
immunocompromised faculty). In its demand to bargain, CFA stated, with concern, that
it appeared “planning and implementation are proceeding.” On February 28, CSU flatly
denied that there were any bargainable effects. Then, on March 8, CSU offered to
meet so that CFA could “explain why you believe there are impacts within your scope of
representation.” After CSU repeated this offer on March 14, CFA refused it, declining
to bargain “after the fact.” CSU never denied that implementation was underway or
indicated that it would hold off on implementation until after bargaining.
As we proceed to explain, for CSU to raise tenable arguments regarding these
interactions, CSU would have to show, at a minimum, that it had not yet begun
implementing the 2023 Policy in February and March. However, CSU failed to make
any such showing. Indeed, the record strongly suggests the opposite, and CSU has
failed to challenge the ALJ’s finding that implementation began in February.
To begin, we affirm the ALJ’s reliance on Santa Clara I, supra, PERB Decision
No. 2321-M for the proposition that where a decision on a non-mandatory topic has
bargainable effects and the employer begins implementing its decision without providing
clear notice regarding the nature and scope of the change, the employer has at that
point violated its bargaining duty and the union generally has no duty to request
bargaining. (Id. at p. 30; see also Oakland, supra, PERB Decision No. 2875, p. 19
[union had no duty to bargain effects because employer had already begun

24
implementing its decision].) As the ALJ noted, an employer frustrates good faith
negotiations if it begins implementation before bargaining. (Santa Clara I, supra, p. 24
[bargaining “from a hole” is futile]; accord Sacramento, supra, PERB Decision
No. 2351-M, p. 41.)
Santa Clara I overruled multiple decisions that mistakenly required a union to
demand effects bargaining whenever it gained “actual knowledge” (also known as
“actual notice”) of an employer decision, even if implementation was already underway.
(Santa Clara I, supra, PERB Decision No. 2321-M, pp. 26-32; see also Sacramento,
supra, PERB Decision No. 2351-M, pp. 17 & 38 [explaining Santa Clara I’s import].)
After Santa Clara I and Sacramento, there remains only a narrow path for an employer,
after failing to afford a union notice, to rely on the fact that a union official nonetheless
gained actual knowledge of the decision. Specifically, as part of an affirmative defense
asserting that a union clearly and unmistakably waived its right to bargain, the employer
must show that a union official with authority to act obtained full, timely, actual
knowledge of the decision not only before the employer began implementation, but also
with sufficient time to allow good faith bargaining before implementation. (Santa Clara I,
supra, at pp. 28-29 [citing Victor Valley Union High School District (1986) PERB
Decision No. 565, pp. 4-6 (Victor Valley)]; accord Sacramento, supra, pp. 38-42.)
Victor Valley, supra, PERB Decision No. 565, which arose in a decision
bargaining context, interwove analysis of what constitutes adequate notice from an
employer and what constitutes adequate actual knowledge in lieu of notice from the
employer. (Id. at pp. 4-6.) Santa Clara I explained how these concepts apply if an

25
employer has a duty to bargain over effects and implementation rather than over the
decision itself. (Santa Clara I, supra, PERB Decision No. 2321-M, pp. 30-32.)
In either a decision bargaining or effects bargaining context, two points are
critical. The first relates to burdens of proof. While a charging party union has the
burden to prove that the employer failed to provide adequate advance notice and/or
opportunity to bargain, if the employer seeks to rely on the union’s “actual knowledge” in
lieu of formal notice, the employer must do so as part of a waiver defense for which it
bears the burden of proof. (Sacramento, supra, PERB Decision No. 2351-M, pp. 38 &
40.) Second, the Board has logically and properly interpreted Victor Valley, supra,
PERB Decision No. 565 as making the requirements attendant to an actual knowledge
showing no less stringent than the requirements when an employer provides formal
notice to a union. Thus, to prove a union’s actual knowledge, the employer must show
that such actual knowledge satisfied each element of effective notice set forth in Victor
Valley, meaning that the union official with actual knowledge must: (1) have authority
to act; (2) know of those aspects of the decision that have bargainable effects; and (3)
possess the knowledge sufficiently in advance of a firm decision to allow good faith
decisional bargaining or sufficiently in advance of implementation to allow for good
faith effects bargaining. (Sacramento, supra, pp. 28-42; Victor Valley, supra, at pp. 5-6;
accord El Dorado County Deputy Sheriff’s Assn. v. County of El Dorado (2016) 244
Cal.App.4th 950, 956-957; San Diego Adult Educators v. Public Employment Relations
Bd. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1124, 1136.)10
10 “What constitutes a ‘reasonable amount of time’ necessarily depends upon
the individual circumstances of each case.” (Victor Valley, supra, PERB Decision
No. 565, p. 5.) However, it must include sufficient time for the organization to consult

26
its members, decide on a course of action, request and receive information, and then
bargain in good faith to impasse or agreement. (Sacramento, supra, PERB Decision
No. 2351-M, pp. 29-30.)
Here, we assume that a CFA official with authority to act had actual knowledge of
the full scope of the 2023 Policy in February 23. However, CSU failed to prove that CFA
had such knowledge at a time before implementation began, much less sufficiently in
advance to allow a meaningful opportunity to bargain. Indeed, to the contrary, O’Keefe
admitted in her testimony that the 2023 Policy “was implemented in February of 2023.”
Contemporaneous events bolster this admission: when CFA wrote CSU on February
23, indicating that implementation was apparently underway and asking for
implementation to cease to allow bargaining over the 2023 Policy’s impact on faculty,
CSU never denied that implementation was underway and never agreed to cease
implementation to allow bargaining. Finally, the ALJ found that implementation began in
February 2023, and CSU did not challenge that finding in its exceptions, thereby
waiving any further challenge on that outcome-determinative point.
Thus, CSU has no defense to liability even though on March 8 it partially walked
back its February 28 flat denial that there were no bargainable effects, replacing its
denial with this equivocal offer: “[W]hile we do not believe we are required to meet and
confer, we are willing to meet and discuss the Immunization Requirements with you, in
order to allow you to explain why you believe there are impacts within your scope of
representation.” For CSU to establish that CFA waived its right to bargain by turning
down this this offer, CSU had the burden prove that it was holding off on

27
implementation. Because the evidence before us strongly suggests the opposite, and
CSU has in any event waived any argument to the contrary, CSU’s argument fails.
Accordingly, CSU had already violated HEERA when CFA filed this charge, and
we affirm the ALJ’s conclusion that CSU violated its effects bargaining duty. This
conduct also derivatively interfered with protected union and employee rights. (City and
County of San Francisco (2023) PERB Decision No. 2858-M, p. 14, fn. 8.)
II. 	Remedy
Although neither party filed exceptions on remedial issues, we nonetheless
exercise our discretion to adjust the remedy. (Oakland, supra, PERB Decision
No. 2875, pp. 9-10.)
The Legislature has vested PERB with broad authority to decide what
remedies are necessary to effectuate the purposes of HEERA and the other acts we
enforce. (HEERA, § 3563, subds. (h) & (m); § 3563.2, 1st par; § 3563.3; Mt. San
Antonio Community College Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1989) 210
Cal.App.3d 178, 189.) PERB remedies must serve the dual purposes of compensating
for the harm a violation causes and deterring further violations. (County of San
Joaquin v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 1053, 1068.)
Moreover, a “properly designed remedial order seeks a restoration of the situation as
nearly as possible to that which would have obtained but for the unfair labor practice.”
(Modesto City Schools (1983) PERB Decision No. 291, pp. 67-68.) We therefore
attempt to “recreate the conditions and relationships that would have been had there
been no unfair labor practice, even when doing so necessarily entails some degree of

28
uncertainty as to the precise relationships.” (City of Pasadena (2014) PERB Order
No. Ad-406-M, p. 13.)
When an employer does not fulfill its decision bargaining obligation, PERB’s
standard remedy includes a cease-and-desist order, restoring the status quo ante via
a rescission order, make-whole relief, and a prospective order to bargain. (The
Accelerated Schools (2023) PERB Decision No. 2855, p. 18 (Accelerated Schools);
Pittsburg Unified School District (2022) PERB Decision No. 2833, p. 14 (Pittsburg).)
However, the proper remedies sometimes differ when an employer has no decision
bargaining obligation and instead violates its duty to bargain effects. (Accelerated
Schools, supra, PERB Decision No. 2855, p. 19.) We explain.
A. 	Rescission
As part of remedying a failure to bargain effects, PERB does not necessarily
direct the employer to fully rescind its implementation of the underlying decision.
(Accelerated Schools, supra, PERB Decision No. 2855, p. 19.) Determining whether to
order rescission for a failure to bargain effects typically turns on whether rescission is
necessary to level the playing field and allow fair, good faith bargaining. For instance,
in some decisions involving a failure to bargain over effects, we have found it sufficient
to prospectively exempt bargaining unit employees from the effects of the decision
until the employer has fulfilled its bargaining duty (without exempting non-bargaining
unit employees) and provide make-whole relief from the date of the violation until
negotiations are complete. (See, e.g., County of Santa Clara (2021) PERB Decision
No. 2799-M, pp. 29-30 (Santa Clara II).)

29
Here, there are reasons favoring the ALJ’s proposed rescission order, as well
as reasons to refrain from ordering rescission. The primary rationale for ordering
rescission is that the circumstances of this case make it difficult to promote fair
collective bargaining and deter future violations, because: (1) unlike Santa Clara II,
supra, PERB Decision No. 2799-M, where we temporarily enjoined the employer from
applying its surveillance technology ordinance to bargaining unit employees while it
bargained, there is no comparable option here; rescission is the only action that might
lessen health and safety risks associated with the 2023 Policy; and (2) unlike
Accelerated Schools, supra, PERB Decision No. 2855, it is hard for us to know if our
make-whole order will lead to monetary relief for faculty.11 Thus, absent rescission,
there is significant risk of a toothless remedy that fails to level the playing field for fair
collective bargaining to ensue.
While these circumstances could support a rescission order, there are three
countervailing reasons that persuade us to refrain from such an order. First, the 2023
Policy changed CSU’s student-facing health framework. Our expertise is in enforcing
statutory labor relations rights and duties, not in crafting student immunization policies.
This is why we noted (ante at p. 9 & p. 21, fn. 8) that expert guidance on higher
education immunization requirements is relevant to this case only because it provides
evidence that the 2023 Policy had a reasonably foreseeable impact on faculty health
and safety, which is central to our inquiry. CSU offered educational reasons (as well
11 While CFA will have the opportunity in compliance proceedings to prove that
CSU’s violation caused faculty to incur damages—such as lost wages or paying for
masks or vaccine booster shots—we express no opinion as to the likelihood that CFA
will establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation caused such a loss.

30
as public health arguments based on the nature of its student body) for departing from
such expert guidance, and it is not our role to assess the validity of those reasons
from an educational or public health perspective. Accordingly, and given that the
standard range of PERB remedies in an effects bargaining case does not necessarily
include a rescission order, we hesitate to order rescission.
Second, outside of the COVID-19 context, there is no indication that CFA or
any other union has previously sought to bargain in past instances when CSU
strengthened or loosened its student health policies. While declining to request
bargaining in past instances does not waive the right to bargain in future instances
(County of Kern & Kern County Hospital Authority (2019) PERB Decision No. 2659-M,
p. 22, fn. 19), this history is a further reason to exercise our discretion not to order
rescission. Moreover, in holding that CSU must bargain over the health and safety
effects of its 2023 Policy, we have resolved an issue of first impression. These
unusual, combined circumstances make it clear why CSU did not consider HEERA
before it began to implement its new policy.
Third, while we have found CSU failed to prove that CFA had actual knowledge
of the 2023 Policy before implementation began, and therefore we find CFA had no
duty to bargain, we also recognize that CFA declined to take CSU up on its offer to
explain why there are bargainable effects. CFA was within its rights to do so without
waiving its right to prevail in this case. But given that rescission is not necessarily a
standard remedy for a failure to bargain effects, CFA’s choice further persuades us to
err on the side of leaving the 2023 Policy fully in place during bargaining, even
knowing that the resulting remedial order may insufficiently promote fair negotiations.

31
For these reasons, we reverse the ALJ’s proposed remedial order to the extent
it directed CSU to rescind its implementation of the 2023 Policy.
B. 	Make-Whole Relief
To remedy an effects bargaining obligation, PERB generally directs the
offending respondent to provide make-whole relief from the first date of harm until the
earliest of: (1) the date the parties reach an agreement, typically as part of complying
with PERB’s effects bargaining order; (2) the date the parties reach a good faith final
impasse, including exhaustion of any required or agreed upon post-impasse
procedures; or (3) the date the charging party fails to pursue effects negotiations in
good faith. (Accelerated Schools, supra, PERB Decision No. 2855, pp. 19-20.) Such
make-whole relief should normally cover harm that the respondent’s violation(s)
materially caused to both employees and to a charging party union. (County of Santa
Clara (2024) PERB Decision No. 2900-M, pp. 31-36 [judicial appeal pending on other
grounds] (Santa Clara III).) We therefore amend the proposed make-whole order to
reimburse CFA for wasted/diverted resources or other harm it can prove materially
resulted from CSU’s violations.12
12 As explained in Santa Clara III, supra, PERB Decision No, 2900-M, such
standard make-whole relief to a successful charging party union does not include
damages based on litigation expenses incurred in the same case. (Id. at pp. 28-36.)
Moreover, CFA will bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that a violation materially caused harm. (Bellflower Unified School District (2022)
PERB Decision No. 2544a, p. 26.) However, CFA need not prove damages precisely.
Rather, make-whole relief usually involves predictions and estimates, and thus an
approximation may be sufficient to meet the charging party’s burden. (Ibid.) We
resolve uncertainties against the wrongdoer and, provided that an estimate has a
rational basis and is not so excessive as to be punitive, it appropriately serves both a
compensatory and deterrent function. (Ibid.)

32
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing analysis and the record in the case, the Public
Employment Relations Board (PERB) finds that Respondent Trustees of the California
State University (CSU) violated the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations
Act (HEERA), Government Code section 3560 et seq., by failing to afford Charging
Party California Faculty Association (CFA) notice and opportunity to bargain over
reasonably foreseeable health and safety effects before implementing CSU’s 2023
decision to adopt a new student immunization and screening policy.
Pursuant to HEERA section 3563.3, it hereby is ORDERED that CSU, its
governing board and its representatives shall:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Refusing to afford CFA adequate notice and opportunity to
bargain before implementing policies with reasonably foreseeable effects on faculty.
2. 	Interfering with the HEERA rights of CFA and faculty it represents.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS TO EFFECTUATE
THE POLICIES OF HEERA:
1. 	Upon request, bargain with CFA in good faith regarding the
reasonably foreseeable effects on faculty health and safety caused by CSU’s 2023
decision to adopt a new student immunization and screening policy.
2. 	Make whole CFA and CFA-represented faculty for harm caused
by CSU’s failure to afford CFA adequate notice and opportunity to bargain over
reasonably foreseeable effects before implementing CSU’s 2023 decision to adopt a
new student immunization and screening policy.

33
3 	Augment any monetary relief owed with daily compound interest,
at an annual rate of seven percent, accrued from the date of harm until payment.
4. 	Within 10 workdays after this decision is no longer subject to
appeal, post copies of the Notice attached hereto as an Appendix at all work locations
where CSU posts notices to CFA-represented faculty. An authorized agent of CSU
must sign the Notice, indicating that CSU will comply with the terms of this Order. CSU
shall maintain the posting for a period of 30 consecutive workdays and take
reasonable steps to ensure that the Notice is not reduced in size, altered, defaced, or
covered with any other material. In addition to physically posting this Notice, CSU shall
communicate it by electronic message, intranet, internet site, and other electronic
means that CSU uses to communicate with CFA-represented faculty.13
5. 	Notify OGC of the actions CSU has taken to follow this Order by
providing written reports as OGC directs and serving such reports on CFA.
Chair Banks and Member Paulson joined in this Decision.
13 Either party may ask PERB’s Office of the General Counsel (OGC) to alter or
extend the posting period, require further notice methods, or otherwise supplement or
adjust this Order to ensure adequate notice. Upon receipt of such a request, OGC
shall solicit input from all parties and, if warranted, provide amended instructions to
ensure adequate notice.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the State of California
After a hearing in Unfair Practice Case No. SA-CE-422-H, California Faculty
Association v. Trustees of the California State University, in which all parties had the
right to participate, the Public Employment Relations Board concluded that Trustees of
the California State University (CSU) violated the Higher Education Employer-
Employee Relations Act (HEERA), Government Code section 3560 et seq., by failing
to afford California Faculty Association (CFA) notice and opportunity to bargain over
reasonably foreseeable health and safety effects before implementing CSU’s 2023
decision to adopt a new student immunization and screening policy.
As a result of this conduct, we have been ordered to post this Notice and we will:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Refusing to afford CFA adequate notice and opportunity to
bargain before implementing policies with reasonably foreseeable effects on faculty.
2. 	Interfering with the HEERA rights of CFA and faculty it represents.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS TO EFFECTUATE
THE POLICIES OF HEERA:
1. 	Upon request, bargain with CFA in good faith regarding the
reasonably foreseeable effects on faculty health and safety caused by our 2023
decision to adopt a new student immunization and screening policy.
2. 	Make whole CFA and CFA-represented faculty for harm caused
by our failure to afford CFA adequate notice and opportunity to bargain over
reasonably foreseeable effects before implementing our 2023 decision to adopt a new
student immunization and screening policy.
3. 	Augment any monetary relief owed with daily compound interest,
at an annual rate of seven percent, accrued from the date of harm until payment.
Dated: _____________________ 	Trustees of the California State University
By: _________________________________
Authorized Agent
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE. IT MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR AT LEAST 30
CONSECUTIVE WORKDAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
REDUCED IN SIZE, DEFACED, ALTERED OR COVERED WITH ANY OTHER
MATERIAL.