P. v. Jafari

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Filed 12/22/14 P. v. Jafari CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
SARAH SAYAD JAFARI,
Defendant and Appellant.
A139896
(Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 5-100902-6)
Defendant Sarah Sayad Jafari entered a no contest plea to possession of a
controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351) and transporting a controlled
substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)). She was sentenced pursuant to her
plea agreement to one year in county jail to be served on electronic home detention,
followed by three years of mandatory supervision. She contends that the court erred in
denying her motion to suppress evidence of heroin found in her possession when a car in
which she was riding was stopped by the police. We conclude the heroin was discovered
during a traffic stop that was not unduly lengthy and affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
San Pablo police officer Bowler testified at the hearing on the suppression motion
that on the morning of August 23, 2009, she pulled over a vehicle she had seen make a
left turn without signaling, into a lane of oncoming traffic. Inside the car were the driver
and Jafari. Bowler had prior contacts with Jafari and knew about Jafari’s drug use.
Bowler obtained the driver’s license, returned to her car, and checked the status of the
license and whether the driver or Jafari had any outstanding warrants. The checks were

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completed, a cover officer arrived, and Bowler returned to the car with the other officer.
Bowler said she had not decided at that point whether to cite the driver for traffic
infractions.
Bowler asked the driver whether he had anything on him she should be concerned
about, and he said, “No.” She asked for and received the driver’s consent to search him,
performed the search, and found nothing. She then asked Jafari one or two times whether
she had anything on her. Bowler testified that Jafari “looked up at me and then turned
away, completely avoiding my question.” Bowler or the other officer asked Jafari to step
outside the vehicle. When Jafari was out of the vehicle, Bowler asked her again if she
had anything on her. Jafari nodded her head up and down, and pulled a bag of heroin out
of her jacket pocket. Bowler’s questioning of Jafari began about ten minutes after she
left her patrol car to get the driver’s license.
Jafari argued among other things that evidence of the heroin had to be suppressed
because the traffic stop was unduly prolonged. The court found Bowler’s testimony to be
credible, disagreed that the stop was overly prolonged, and denied the suppression
motion.
DISCUSSION
We independently review a Fourth Amendment suppression ruling “ ‘measur[ing]
the facts, as found by the trier, against the constitutional standard of reasonableness.’ ”
(People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 597.)
When a vehicle has been lawfully stopped for a traffic violation, the detention
“must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop.” (Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 500.) “A lawful roadside stop begins
when a vehicle is pulled over for investigation of a traffic violation. The temporary
seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the
duration of the stop. Normally, the stop ends when the police have no further need to
control the scene, and inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave. [Citation.]
An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop . . . do
not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those

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inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop. [Citation.]” (Arizona v.
Johnson (2009) 555 U.S. 323, 333 (Johnson).) “There is no set time limit for a
permissible investigative stop; the question is whether the police diligently pursued a
means of investigation reasonably designed to confirm or dispel their suspicions
quickly.” (People v. Russell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 96, 102.)
Jafari argues that the stop in this case was unlawfully prolonged after the license
and warrant checks were completed. She relies primarily on People v. McGaughran
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 577 (McGaughran), and Williams v. Superior Court (1985) 168
Cal.App.3d 349 (Williams). McGaughran held that an officer could not prolong a traffic
stop to conduct a warrant check after he obtained all information necessary to perform his
duties attendant to the stop. (McGaughran, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 587.) Similarly, the
officer in Williams was held to have unlawfully prolonged a traffic stop, after
“obtain[ing] all the information he needed to perform his citation duties,” in order to
determine whether the defendants were involved in an armed robbery. (Williams,
supra,168 Cal.App.3d at p. 359.) These cases have been interpreted to permit
“investigative activities beyond the original purpose of a traffic stop, including warrant
checks . . . as long as they do not prolong the stop beyond the time it would otherwise
take.” (People v. Brown (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 493, 498, italics added.)
Despite the language limiting the duration of a traffic stop to the purpose of the
stop, cases after McGaughran and Williams have not applied a strict rule that
investigative activities unrelated to a traffic stop are impermissible where they only
slightly prolong the stop. The courts have instead considered whether those activities
“unreasonably” (People v. Gallardo (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 234, 238) “unduly” (People
v. Brown, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 500 ), or “measurably” (Johnson, supra, 555 U.S.
at p. 333) extended the duration of the stop. The investigation here unrelated to the
stop—asking the driver if he had contraband, searching the driver, asking Jafari about
contraband, ordering her out of the car, asking her again about contraband—could have
taken no more than a brief time that did not unreasonably, unduly, or measurably prolong
the ten minute stop.

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Moreover, the investigation of Jafari began with only one or two questions, which,
according to the officer, she willfully evaded answering. “Circumstances which develop
during a detention may provide reasonable suspicion to prolong the detention.” (People
v. Russell, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 102.) Since Jafari’s actions provided good cause
for the officer to continue her investigation, Jafari has no grounds to object to anything
other than the first question the officer initially asked. If that limited questioning was
unlawful, then, contrary to Johnson’s holding, no investigation during a traffic stop is
allowed.
Jafari notes that there is no “general outside time limit for minor traffic offense
detentions. . . . [T]he circumstances of each traffic detention are unique and . . . the
reasonableness of each detention period must be judged on its particular circumstances.”
(Williams, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d at p. 358.) Jafari argues: “[Bowler] confirmed that the
driver’s license was valid and that there were no outstanding warrants either for him or
for [her]. By that time, a backup officer had arrived at the scene. [¶] At that point, the
only remaining step necessary for the arresting officer to fulfill her duties relative to the
purpose of the stop was to either cite or warn the driver for the traffic violation. The
detention became unlawful when the [officer] decided instead to embark upon a wholly
unrelated general criminal investigation.” Under Jafari’s reasoning the only problem
with the questions is that they were asked after, rather than before, the license and
warrants were checked, thus creating a distinction of no constitutional significance.
The officer in this case “diligently pursued a means of investigation reasonably
designed to confirm or dispel [her] suspicions quickly.” (People v. Russell, supra, 81
Cal.App.4th at p. 102.) The officer did not violate Jafari’s rights by asking whether she
was carrying contraband. The motion to suppress was properly denied.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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_________________________
Siggins, J.
We concur:
_________________________
McGuiness, P.J.
_________________________
Pollak, J.

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