I.R. v. S.M.L. CA1/1 filed 7/22/26

Filed 7/22/26 I.R. v. S.M.L. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

I.R.
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
S.M.L.,
Defendant and Appellant.

A173164

(Solano County
Super. Ct. No. FFL158954)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff and respondent I.R. instituted this action against defendant and appellant S.M.L. for a determination of parentage as to her son. During the course of the proceeding,respondent sought a protective order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code, §6200 et seq.). After a multi-day hearing, at which both parties personally appeared,the trial court issued a protective order with a three-year duration and visitation orders.
Appellant appeals from the orders.The only brief before us is appellant’s opening brief, as respondent did not file a brief.
Appellant predicates his appeal on a single assertion—that he was denied the right to have several of the days of the hearing reported by a court reporter or recorded electronically. He states, for example, “The rationale for this appealrests singularly upon the negligent or intentional act of the trial court judge seated to take up the DVRO Petition. The court was not honest with [appellant] and misstated that the trial was being audio recorded,” a recording that would “be accessible at a later date so the [appellant’s] hired court reporter could transcribe it.” But “[i]n fact no such recording system was present nor enabled.”He complains, “the trial court allowed evidentiary rulings and witness testimony while knowing the trial was not being recorded or reported. Despite [appellant’s] clearly articulated statements to the Court of his need for a Reporter’s Transcript, the court thwarted the [appellant].” Although he was aware from the outset of the hearing that no court reporter was present, he asserts he did not discover the hearing was not being electronically recorded until the close of the second day. He then hired a court reporter, and thus obtained transcripts of the remaining days, including the day on which the court issued its ruling from the bench granting a domestic violence protection order (DVPO) and issuing a limited visitation order.
As best we can discern, appellant’s argument is that had the proceedings been taken down by a court reporter or electronically recorded, he would have been able to mount evidentiary and substantial evidence challenges to the orders. But since he purportedly cannot do so due to the electronic recording misinformation provided by the trial court, he has, instead, been subject to a “ ‘miscarriage of justice’ ” entitling him to reversal of the orders and a new hearing.
It is clear from the reporter’s transcript of the final day of the hearings, when the trial court ruled from the bench, that the court does not agree counsel for appellant was ever told the proceedings would be electronically recorded and thus appellant would be able to hire a court reporter to prepare a written transcript. Indeed, it appears that counsel seems to have assumed that when the trial court stated proceedings were “on the record,” the court meant the proceedings were being electronically recorded.
Moreover, the local superior court rules state no court reporter would be provided by the court, but a party could hire their own reporter (Super. Ct.Solano County, Local Rules, rule 18.1; see Cal.Rules of Court, rule 2.956), and no electronic recording would be made unless in lieu of reporter in a proceeding in which a court reporter was required by statute, which was not the case as to the proceedings here at issue, or on application to and approval by the court (Super. Ct.Solano County, Local Rules, rules 17.1 [general requests to record proceedings], 18.1 [electronic recordings in lieu of court reporter where reporter required to be present]).
In any case, we need not attempt to sort out exactly what colloquies occurred between the court and counsel on hearing dates where no court reporter was present. Appellant had alternatives to a reporter’s transcript—namely, an agreed-to statement pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.134, or a settled statement pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.137. (SeeLeslie v. Roe (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 104, 108 [although appellants did not have the right to transcripts at public expense, the rules of court provided “alternative means of preparing the record on appeal” by way “an agreed statement of the parties” or “a settled statement”]; People v. Scott (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 80, 86 [where “trial judge and both trial attorneys were available to help reconstruct” the trial proceedings, “counsel on appeal had available to him a preliminary hearing transcript,” the People’s case was “straightforward,” the “settled statement” contained“a detailed explication of the facts,” and no “issues of fact or law which were before the trial court” were “omitted from the settled statement,” the settled statement was “a fair substitute for a complete transcript” and the record was “adequate to afford defendant effective appellate review”]; Le Font v. Rankin (1959) 167Cal.App.2d 433, 436–437 [“When an appellant desires to present any point which requires consideration of the oral proceedings, he must obtain and file in the appellate court a reporter’s transcript, certified by the reporter; or, where a transcript is unavailable, a settled statement of the oral proceedings prepared by the parties and settled by the judge who heard the matter; or an agreed statement prepared by the parties, consisting of a condensed statement of the relevant proceedings.”].)
It appears, however, appellant never availed himself of either procedure. (See Cal.Rules of Court, rules 8.134 [setting forth procedure for agreed-to statement], 8.137 [setting forth procedure for obtaining a settled statement].) He provides no citation to the clerk’s transcript that he did so, and the table of contents of the clerk’s transcript identifies no submissions in such regard.At a minimum, however, to prevail on his argument that he has been effectively denied appellate review for lack of an adequate record, he was required to establish that he was wrongfully foiled in efforts to obtain either an agreed-to or settled statement. He has not done so.(SeeJameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609 [“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.”].)
Finally, it is apparent from the trial court’s ruling from the bench, which was reported, that ampleevidence supports the DVPO and the limited visitation order. The court read on the record a series of highly abusive text messages to respondent that appellant did not dispute that he authored. These text messages, alone, support issuance of the challenged orders. (See Burquet v. Brumbaugh (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1144 [unannounced and uninvited visit and repeated contacts by phone, e-mail, and text, despite requests of no contact, “ ‘disturb[ed] the peace’ ” and constituted “ ‘abuse’ ” within the meaning of Fam. Code, § 6320].)
In short, the trial court’s rulings are supported by uncontradicted evidence to which he did not objectand which constitute “abuse” under the DVPA. Accordingly, whatever spin he may want to put on these text messages,or whatever he may argue should have detracted from respondent’s credibility, are not arguments that can carry the day given our standard of review. “ ‘We review the grant of a DVPA restraining order for abuse of discretion, and, to the extent we are called upon to review the court’s factual findings, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review. [Citation.] In reviewing the evidence, we examine the entire record to determine whether there is any substantial evidence—contradicted or uncontradicted—to support the trial court’s findings. [Citation.] We must accept as true all evidence supporting the trial court’s findings, resolving every conflict in favor of the judgment. [Citation.] We do not determine credibility or reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] If substantial evidence supports the judgment, reversal is not warranted even if facts exist that would support a contrary finding.’ ” (Parris J. v. Christopher U. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 108, 116.)
DISPOSITION
The DVPO and visitation orders issued by the court on February 10, 2025, are AFFIRMED.

_________________________
Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________
Humes, P.J.

_________________________
Smiley, J.

A173164, I.R. v. S.M.L.