Miri v. AlignerCo Corp. CA1/1 filed 6/30/26

Filed 6/30/26 Miri v. AlignerCo Corp. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

SARA MIRI,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
ALIGNERCO CORP.,
Defendant and Respondent.

A174362

(Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. 23CV030735)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case returns to us on appeal from an order granting in part a motion to tax costs. In our prior opinion (Miri v. AlignerCo Corp. (July 10, 2025, A172220) [nonpub. opn.]), we affirmed an order granting a motion for terminating sanctions and the subsequent judgment of dismissal. Defendant AlignerCothereafter filed a memorandum of costs for $2,710, primarily for filing and motion fees, and e-filing and e-service fees.
Plaintiff Sara Miri moved to tax all costs. She complained AlignerCo had not supplied “any kind of supporting documentation” in connection with its memorandum of costs, costs for copies were not allowable “under [Code of Civil Procedure]§1033.5(b)(3),” some of the claimed costs had been incurred in a different legal proceeding between the parties (a civil harassment proceeding Miri filed against defense counsel), and she lacked the ability to pay, in any event, and therefore “should be exempt” from costs.
After a contested hearing, the trial court granted Miri’s motion in part, taxing $1,224.10 of costs sought by AlignerCo, largely on the ground these costs pertained to the other legal proceeding. It also found several items were duplicative. Miri was therefore left to bear $1,485.90 in costs.
“We generally apply the abuse of discretion standard of review when evaluating a ruling on a motion to tax costs or one addressing a motion for attorney fees. (Valenti v. City of San Diego (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 218, 231....) Under the abuse of discretion standard, ‘ “[t]he trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” ’ (Gaines v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1081, 1100. . . .)” (G.F. Galaxy Corp. v. Johnson (2024) 100Cal.App.5th 542, 551.) We “apply the de novo standard only to the trial court’s interpretation of the statute. We review the court’s application of the relevant statutes to the facts of the case for abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.)
Miri’s opening brief is not a model of clarity. As best we can discern, she is advancing most of the same arguments she made in the trial court—AlignerCo did not adequately support its claimed costs, costs for copies are not recoverable under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (b)(3), and she should be exempt from costs, in any event, because she is proceeding in forma pauperis. She has not, however, addressed the applicable standard of review or cited any legal authority in support of her assertion that the trial court abused its discretion or committed legal error, and has therefore failed to carry her burden, as the appellant, on appeal. “The most fundamental rule of appellate review is that the judgment or order challenged on appeal is presumed to be correct, and it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error.” (Argueta v. Worldwide Flight Services, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 822, 833, citing Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) “To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error.” (In re S.C. (2006) 138Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) “ ‘All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support [the judgment] on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2Cal.3d 557, 564.) In any case, her contentions on appeal are meritless.
Support for claimed costs. AlignerCo submitted a signed memorandum of costs and supporting worksheet and attachments. As the trial court observed, the costs sought appeared to be recoverable. Thus, unless Miri demonstrated they were not allowable, the costs were not subject to being taxed. (See Lowry v. Port San Luis Harbor Dist. (2020) 56Cal.App.5th 211, 222.) In other words, contrary to Miri’s claim, AlignerCo was not required to submit “receipts or other documentation” of its claimed costs. (Bach v. County of Butte (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 294, 308 [“There [is] no requirement that copies of bills, invoices, statements or any other such documents be attached to the memorandum....”].) If counsel so verifies the memorandum of costs, that memorandum is considered prima facie evidence that the costs requested were necessarily incurred. (Ibid.)
Costs for copies and duplicative costs. Miri continues to insist costs were improperly allowed for copying expenses, citing Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (b)(3).Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (b)(3) provides: “The following items are not allowable as costs, except when expressly authorized by law: [¶] . . . [¶] (3) Postage, telephone, and photocopying charges, except for exhibits.” Pointing to AlignerCo’s supporting attachment 14, she maintains AlignerCo sought costs for copying. She misreads this attachment. It is titled “14. Fees for electronic filing or service of documents thrugh [sic] an electronic filing service provider.” (Italics added & boldface omitted.) It then lists a host of documents that were served or filed. These are variously described. Some are preceded by the word “File” (e.g., “File Motion to Strike”), others are preceded by the word “copy” (e.g., “Copy of Motion w Dept One,” “Courtesy Copy of Motion to Dept”). The point is, by all appearances, these were either documents that werefiled or documents (or copies thereof) that were served. That is plainly what the trial court concluded, and Miri presented nothing to undermine the facial validity of these claimed costs.
Miri also asserts attachment 14 was rife with duplicative filing and service costs, pointing again to the shorthand descriptors used. But it is no surprise, for example, that there are repeated references to service of a “motion.” Moreover, each listed document is accompanied by a date, i.e., the date of filing or service, and there is nothing in this litany that suggests duplication. Again, it is apparent that the trial court, which was fully familiar with the case, concluded the list of filed or served documents was accurate and reasonable.
Ability to pay. Miri’s final argument is that she should not bear costs, in any event, because she does not have the ability to pay them. The law, however, is to the contrary. (LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2018) 25Cal.App.5th 1116, 1124–1125 [losing litigant’s ability to pay is not a factor considered under Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5]; see Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1395, 1397 [rejecting losing party’s contention that trial court abused its discretion in not considering the parties’ respective financial positions in awarding costs pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 1032].)
DISPOSITION
The order dated August 11, 2025, granting in part and denying in part appellant’s motion to tax costs is AFFIRMED. Parties to bear their own costs on appeal.

_________________________
Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________
Humes, P.J.

_________________________
Smiley, J.

A174362, Miri v. AlignerCo Corp.