P. v. Dunn

Filed 11/29/06 P. v. Dunn CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JAMAHL TRAVOUGH DUNN,
Defendant and Appellant.
B181660
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA061859)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Arthur Jean, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Dennis L. Cava, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Mary
Sanchez and Peggie Bradford Tarwater, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.

-- 1 of 16 --

2
BACKGROUND
Appellant was charged with 11 counts of robbery, arising from the armed
robbery by two men of the Long Beach 99 Cents Only Store on June 21, 2004.
During the robbery, 10 of the store’s employees were made to lie or kneel on the
floor of the attached warehouse, where one of the two robbers kept them at
gunpoint. The other, also armed, took the assistant manager to open the safe in the
office, from which he took approximately $3,000 before returning the assistant
manager to the other employees. Appellant was convicted on all 11 counts, and
the jury found true the special allegation made in each count that he personally
used a handgun in the commission of the crime, within the meaning of Penal Code
section 12022.53, subdivision (b). On March 8, 2005, appellant was sentenced to
26 years in prison, and he timely filed a notice of appeal the same day.
DISCUSSION
1. Appellant’s Contentions
Appellant makes four assignments of error. He contends that the trial court
erred in denying his motion for a pretrial lineup; that there was insufficient
evidence of constructive possession of the store’s money by each of the
10 employees to support separate robbery convictions; that the trial court erred in
failing to define actual and constructive possession of property stolen in the course
of a robbery; and that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to impeach
him with his prior conviction of felon in possession of a firearm.
2. Denial of Motion for Lineup
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a
pretrial lineup. The trial court found that appellant’s motion had failed to reach the
“threshold set by the Evans case and its progeny,” referring to the due process

-- 2 of 16 --

3
requirement that “in an appropriate case . . . an accused, upon timely request
therefor, be afforded a pretrial lineup in which witnesses to the alleged criminal
conduct can participate.” (Evans v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 617, 625
(Evans).) The “threshold” set forth in Evans required appellant to show that (1) the
request was timely; (2) eyewitness identification was a material issue; (3) there
was a reasonable likelihood of a mistaken identification; and (4) a lineup would
tend to resolve any issue of mistaken identification. (People v. Farnam (2002)
28 Cal.4th 107, 184.) “The questions whether eyewitness identification is a
material issue and whether fundamental fairness requires a lineup in a particular
case are inquiries which necessarily rest for determination within the broad
discretion of the magistrate or trial judge. [Citations.]” (Evans, at p. 625.)
Eyewitness identification was a material issue. The employees in the store
at the time were Olivia Garcia (the assistant manager), Carlos Rivera, Benita
Gonzalez, Tomasa Ruan, Maria Martinez, Ana Herrera, Irma Devenegas, Jose
Salvatierra, Walter Lopez, Freddie Gerado, and Julio Sanchez. The robbery took
place between approximately 5:15 a.m. and 6:00 a.m., and later that morning,
Garcia, Salvatierra, Rivera, Herrera, and Devenegas were taken separately to a
field showup where all identified appellant as one of the robbers.1
1 Devenegas was unable to identify appellant in court, and she denied having
identified appellant in the field, claiming that one of the men in custody resembled
one of the robbers and was similarly dressed, but she was too nervous to recognize
anyone. Long Beach Police Officer Jennifer Roque testified, however, that she
questioned Devenegas and transported her to the field showup, where she looked at
appellant and said in Spanish, “Yes, it’s him.” It was appellant’s burden to
challenge the field identifications as unduly suggestive. (See People v. Cooks
(1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 224, 305-306.) Because he did not do so and does not
claim unfairness on appeal, we assume that the field identifications were fair.

-- 3 of 16 --

4
“The broad discretion vested in a trial judge or magistrate includes the right
and responsibility on fairness considerations to deny a motion for a lineup when
that motion is not made timely. Such motion should normally be made as soon
after arrest or arraignment as practicable.” (Evans, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 626.)
Appellant did not file his motion until October 13, 2004, nearly four months after
his arrest and field identification, more than one month after the preliminary
hearing, and three weeks after his arraignment. “The value of a pretrial lineup is
substantially diminished once a preliminary examination has been conducted and a
direct confrontation between a defendant and his accusers has occurred.” (People
v. Baines (1981) 30 Cal.3d 143, 148.) Because appellant was represented by the
same counsel at preliminary hearing and trial, he was required to justify his failure
to make the motion prior to arraignment. (See id. at p. 149.)
In support of the motion, counsel submitted his declaration in which he
suggested that it was not filed prior to the preliminary hearing because Garcia, the
only witness who appeared at the hearing, testified that “she had trouble making an
identification of the defendant without the hood over his head [and] once the hood
was put on over his head she then made her identification of him.”2 Counsel
admitted in the declaration, however, that he had reviewed the police reports, and
he discerned from them that the other witnesses had identified appellant because he
was dressed in clothing similar to what one of the robbers wore (black hooded
sweatshirt, Converse “All Stars” shoes). Counsel’s argument at the hearing on the
motion -- that many people dressed in a similar fashion in that neighborhood --
suggests that he could have made the motion sooner. He told the court that he
advised appellant against it, however, explaining that it would not make sense,
2 Garcia testified, “At first I couldn’t recognize him that well. But then later
on, yes, it was him.” Defense counsel then asked, “With the hood on?” Garcia
replied, “Yes.”

-- 4 of 16 --

5
because five people had already identified him. Counsel changed his mind when
he heard Garcia’s testimony at the preliminary hearing, because it corroborated his
belief that the witnesses had identified appellant “on the clothes.”
“When the question on appeal is whether the trial court has abused its
discretion, the showing is insufficient if it presents facts which merely afford an
opportunity for a difference of opinion. An appellate tribunal is not authorized to
substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge. [Citation.] . . . In other words,
discretion is abused only if the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the
circumstances being considered. [Citation.]” (People v. Stewart (1985)
171 Cal.App.3d 59, 65.) The trial court’s “discretion must not be disturbed on
appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of
justice. [Citations.]” (People v. Jordan (1986) 42 Cal.3d 308, 316.) It is the
appellant’s burden to demonstrate that the trial court’s decision was irrational,
arbitrary, or not “‘grounded in reasoned judgment and guided by legal principles
and policies appropriate to the particular matter at issue.’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977.)
Appellant has not shown that the trial court’s denial of the motion was
irrational, arbitrary, capricious, or not guided by appropriate legal principles.
Counsel’s explanation justified neither a delay of more than a month after the
preliminary hearing, nor a failure to bring the motion prior to arraignment.
Moreover, appellant has not shown that he was justified in waiting until after the
preliminary hearing. Indeed, he has established his untimeliness by admitting that
the motion was based upon counsel’s impression of information in the police
reports, which was simply corroborated by Garcia’s testimony, causing him to
reconsider his decision not to bring the motion.

-- 5 of 16 --

6
Appellant’s showing that there existed a reasonable likelihood of a mistaken
identification consisted of counsel’s assertion that the witnesses identified
appellant because of his clothes, not his physical appearance, and upon his
argument that a guilty man would not have gone back to the scene of the crime
dressed in the same clothes. However, appellant’s premise -- that the witnesses
identified the clothing, not the physical features -- falls short of showing a
reasonable likelihood of a mistaken identification. Although the burden to produce
evidence to support his motion was upon appellant (see People v. Yonko (1987)
196 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1009), he did not place the police reports in evidence, and
trial testimony shows that he exaggerated the witnesses’ reliance upon similar
clothing. Garcia testified that she had no doubt about appellant’s identity,
“[b]ecause those faces were stamped in my head.” She explained that at the field
showup, she recognized appellant before she asked the police to put his hood up,
but was not sure enough to say so to the police until after they had done so. Rivera
identified appellant at the field showup as one of the robbers, explaining that he
had no doubt, not only because of his black sweater, but also because he
recognized appellant’s goatee. Herrera was taken to a field showup by
Long Beach Police Officer Robert Trout, and she recognized appellant as the
robber with the goatee who had threatened to shoot her in the back room unless she
stopped looking at him. Trout quoted her as having said, “I know by his eyes and
cheeks. He is also wearing the same shoes.” Devenegas, who claimed she was not
able to identify appellant in the field, did give Roque a physical description close
to appellant’s, confidently describing him as a Black male, approximately 6’2” to
6’4”, thin build, wearing a black hooded sweatshirt with a zipper in front, dark
pants, perhaps shorts, and black canvas shoes with white soles. Appellant is 6’0”
or 6’1” tall, weighed 180 pounds when arrested, and was wearing a black hooded
sweatshirt and black canvas shoes with white soles.

-- 6 of 16 --

7
Appellant contends that an important factor indicating the possibility of
misidentification was the difference in testimony regarding the color of his gloves.
One witness thought appellant was wearing black gloves during the robbery; two
witnesses testified that they were gray. Whatever the significance of the gloves’
color, the information was available to appellant prior to the preliminary hearing.
Counsel admitted that the foundation for his arguments was found in the police
reports prior to the preliminary hearing, and the discrepancy in glove color was
noted in those reports. Officer Roque saw appellant wearing gray gloves just
before he ran from her, and Officer Riordan recovered gray gloves as he chased
appellant. Appellant told Detective Steve Prell the day of the robbery that he threw
down brown gloves when he ran.3 Thus, because appellant’s attempt to show there
was a reasonable likelihood of a mistaken identification establishes that he had
sufficient information to bring the motion prior to the preliminary hearing and the
arraignment, his motion was untimely. We conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for a lineup.4 (Evans, supra,
11 Cal.3d at p. 626; People v. Baines, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 148-149.)
3 Appellant claims that no witness was asked to identify the gloves in
evidence, but appellant testified and identified them as his.
4 As the trial court did not err, there is no need to consider appellant’s claim
that error caused a miscarriage of justice. We would reject it in any event.
Appellant contends that prejudice is established by the likelihood of mistaken
identification shown by the witnesses’ inability to pick his booking photo from a
photo spread shown to them by a defense investigator one week prior to trial. A
fairly conducted field identification soon after the crime was committed is
generally considered more accurate than an identification made months later. (In
re Richard W. (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 960, 970.) Further, we observe that appellant
does not suggest that his booking photo is a better likeness than his live person.
Garcia, Salvatierra, and Rivera all identified appellant in court as the robber who
stayed with the other employees when the other robber took Garcia to the safe; all
testified that they had no doubt. Herrera identified appellant in court as looking

-- 7 of 16 --

8
3. Multiple Robbery Victims
Appellant was convicted of 11 counts of robbery, count 1 naming Garcia as
the victim and each of the remaining 10 counts naming one of the other employees
forced at gunpoint to remain in the warehouse while Garcia was taken to the safe.
Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions
on all but count 1, because there was no evidence that any employee other than
Garcia had actual or constructive possession of the stolen money.
“Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of
another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished
by means of force or fear.” (Pen. Code, § 211.) “To constitute robbery the
property must be removed from the possession and immediate presence of the
victim against his will . . . .” (People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553, 589.)
Possession may be actual or constructive. (People v. Nguyen (2000) 24 Cal.4th
756, 761 (Nguyen).) “‘“Robbery is an offense against the person; thus a store
employee may be the victim of a robbery even though he is not its owner and not at
the moment in immediate control of the stolen property.” [Citation.]’” (Id. at
p. 761.) Robbery convictions have been upheld upon a finding of constructive
possession of an employer’s property by security guards, janitors, a store truck
driver, and others who do not have the responsibility of handling the property
which was stolen. (Ibid.)
Here, the 11 employees in the store at the time of the robbery were Garcia,
the assistant manager; stocking clerks Rivera, Herrera, and Devenegas; delivery
truck driver Salvatierra and his assistant, Lopez; and five other employees --
very much like the man who stayed in the storeroom with the employees, but later
in her testimony, she identified appellant as the man who threatened to shoot her.
We therefore reject appellant’s contention that a reasonable likelihood of mistaken
identification is shown by the witnesses’ failure to recognize appellant’s booking
photo more than six months after the crime.

-- 8 of 16 --

9
Gonzalez, Ruan, Martinez, Gerado, and Sanchez -- whose job titles were not in
evidence, but who shared the responsibility to prepare the store prior to opening.
Each was named as a victim in a separate count, resulting in 11 separate robbery
convictions.
Appellant asks that we apply People v. Frazer (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1105
(Frazer), which enunciated a “standard to determine whether a robbery conviction
can be sustained as to an employee who does not have actual possession of the
stolen property . . . .” (Id. at p. 1115.) The Frazer standard requires a fact-based
inquiry to determine “whether the circumstances indicate the employee has
sufficient representative capacity with respect to the owner of the property, so as to
have express or implied authority over the property.” (Ibid.) Applying that
standard, the court upheld the multiple convictions after concluding that “to the
extent nonmanagerial employees could access the cash registers and/or product
inventory in order to service the customers, they could reasonably be deemed in
constructive possession of the money in the safe via their access to the manager.
That is, the entire retail team could reasonably be viewed as having implied
authority over whatever property was necessary to handle the sales, including the
money in the safe through the manager.” (Id. at p. 1119.)
Appellant urges that we reject, as the Frazer court did (see Frazer, supra,
106 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1114-1115), the broader standard of People v. Jones (2000)
82 Cal.App.4th 485, under which “business employees -- whatever their function --
have sufficient representative capacity to their employer so as to be in possession
of property stolen from the business owner.” (Id. at p. 491.) The court in People
v. Jones relied in part upon an earlier Jones -- People v. Jones (1996)
42 Cal.App.4th 1047. (See People v. Jones, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 491.)
Although the two are unrelated, the earlier case has been called Jones I, and the

-- 9 of 16 --

10
later case, Jones II. (See, e.g., Frazer, at p. 1114.) We shall do the same.5 In
Jones I, the appellant asserted that he could not be convicted of robbing a truck
driver who was a store employee present in the cash register area of the store
where the robbery occurred. (See Jones I, at p. 1052.) During the robbery, the
truck driver “was ordered to the ground by the robbers and kicked and forced into
the break room with the customers and other store employees. He was not a
witness at the trial and there was no testimony the robbers removed any of his
personal property from his possession during the robbery.” (Id. at p. 1053.) After
reviewing authorities on constructive possession, the court concluded that
“employees such as the store truck driver here . . . have sufficient representative
capacity with respect to the owner of the property to be the victim of robbery.”
(Id. at p. 1054.)
The Jones I and the Jones II courts rejected what appears to be a contrary
holding in People v. Guerin (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 775 (Guerin). (See Jones II,
supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 491; Jones I, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 1055.) The
Guerin court held that in order to sustain multiple convictions, there must be
multiple takings and, as an additional reason to reverse a separate robbery count
naming a box boy as the victim, the court found “nothing, other than that he was a
co-employee of the other three, to suggest that he had any dominion or control
whatsoever over any money.” (Guerin, at p. 782.) A decade later, the Supreme
Court overruled Guerin’s holding that in order to sustain multiple convictions,
there must be multiple takings, but the court made no mention of its box boy
observation. (People v. Ramos, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 589.) The Jones I court
concluded that “Guerin is wrong and even a market box boy has sufficient
5 The conflict between Frazer and Jones II is now before the California
Supreme Court in People v. Scott (July 16, 2005, C044964) (nonpublished
opinion), review granted November 16, 2005, S136498 .

-- 10 of 16 --

11
representative capacity vis-a-vis the owner so as to be in ‘possession’ of the
property stolen from the store owner.” (Jones I, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1055.)6 The Jones II court characterized Guerin as “an anomaly in light of
evolving case authority broadening the permissible range of robbery victims.”
(Jones II, supra, at p. 491.) Frazer is the only published case to follow Guerin’s
definition of constructive possession as excluding employees who are not shown to
have had authority to control the property stolen from the employer. (See Frazer,
supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 1113.)
As the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the issue, we must await
its opinion in People v. Scott, for a resolution; however, we are not without some
indication of the court’s leaning. In Nguyen, while rejecting a separate robbery
conviction as to a mere visitor who had been held at gunpoint with the store’s
employees, the court observed that “the theory of constructive possession has been
used to expand the concept of possession to include employees and others as
robbery victims.” (Nguyen, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 762.) Neither the appellant nor
the court questioned the validity of the remaining robbery convictions naming
employee victims, notwithstanding that only three employees testified that their
money and property had been taken, a fourth was not asked, and the remaining five
did not testify. The court pointed out that it had previously held that “‘“a store
employee may be the victim of a robbery even though he is not its owner and not at
the moment in immediate control of the stolen property.”’” (Id. at p. 761, quoting
People v. Miller (1977) 18 Cal.3d 873, 880.) In addition to citing Jones I, the court
listed numerous other authorities illustrating its observation, including People v.
6 The dissent in Jones I cited Guerin, not in support of a “dominion and
control” rule of constructive possession, but to urge a requirement that the
circumstances show the employee had implied authority over the property. (See
Jones I, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 1057 (dis. opn. of Johnson, J.).)

-- 11 of 16 --

12
Masters (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 509, 519-520 (waitress was also a robbery victim,
although the cook was closer to the cash register); People v. Arline (1970)
13 Cal.App.3d 200, 202, disapproved on another ground in People v. Hall (1986)
41 Cal.3d 826, 834 (gas station attendant was a victim of robbery although another
employee had the key to the cash box); People v. Downs (1952) 114 Cal.App.2d
758, 765 (two night janitors were victims of robbery of money in employer’s safe).
(Nguyen, at pp. 761-762.)7
The Frazer court rejected as dicta the Supreme Court’s discussion in Nguyen
of the history of constructive possession. (Frazer, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1114.) We discern from its exhaustive analysis in Nguyen, however, that the
court has embraced the more expansive concept of constructive possession as
including mere employment by the owner of the stolen property. When the
Supreme Court has conducted an elaborate review of authorities indicating a long
acquiescence in the legal principal discussed, we feel bound to follow its dictum.
(Hubbard v. Superior Court (1997) 66 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1169; see 9 Witkin, Cal.
Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 947, p. 989.) This is particularly so where, as
in Nguyen, the entire court has unanimously concurred in the opinion. (People v.
Nelson (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 696, 706.)
Recently, another appellate court has followed Jones II’s conclusion that
“‘[b]usiness employees -- whatever their function -- have sufficient representative
capacity to their employer so as to be in possession of property stolen from the
business owner,’” by upholding robbery convictions where the victims were two
janitors, although other employees, including an assistant manager, were still
working in the store. (People v. Gilbeaux (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 515, 521,
quoting Jones II, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 491.) We agree with Gilbeaux,
7 Jones II was published July 20, 2000; the Supreme Court published Nguyen
on December 28, 2000.

-- 12 of 16 --

13
Jones II, and Jones I. All 11 victims in this case were employees of the 99 Cents
Only Store when appellant robbed it, and all were forced into the warehouse at
gunpoint and made to kneel or lie on the floor while their employer’s money was
stolen. Whatever their function, they were the representatives of their employer
and on their employer’s premises, which gave them constructive possession of the
employer’s property. (See Gilbeaux, at p. 521; Jones II, at p. 491; Jones I, supra,
42 Cal.App.4th at p. 1054.) As all were shown to be employees, the finding that
they were all victims is supported by substantial evidence.
4. Failure to Instruct on Distinction between Actual and Constructive
Possession
The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 9.40. The portion of the
instruction relating to possession as read by the court provides: “Every person who
takes properties in the possession of another, against the will and from the person
or immediate presence of that person, accomplished by means of force or fear, and
with the specific intent permanently to deprive that person of the property, is guilty
of the crime of robbery. [¶] The words ‘takes’ or ‘taking’ require proof of, one,
taking possession of the property, and carrying it away for some distance, slight or
otherwise. [¶] Immediate presence means an area within the alleged victim’s
reach, observation or control so that he or she could, if not overcome by violence
or prevented by fear, retain possession of the subject property.”
Appellant contends that the court should have given an instruction defining
constructive possession following a question by the jury during deliberation.8
8 Among other things, the jury asked, “Does the count of robbery apply to
employees of a store who do not have the means or access to the ‘property’ or
‘cash?’”

-- 13 of 16 --

14
Neither party requested such an instruction, but appellant contends the trial
court should have given one sua sponte. We reject this contention, because
instructing the jury on the more expansive definition of constructive possession
could not have assisted the defense, but would instead have made the prosecution’s
case easier as to the 10 nonmanagement employees, as CALJIC No. 9.40 suggests
a more restrictive standard of immediate observation and control.9 Thus, appellant
was not prejudiced by the omission, whether measured under the standard of
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (more favorable result probable
without omission), or under the stricter standard of Chapman v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 18, 24 (harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
5. Prior Convictions Admitted to Impeach Appellant’s Credibility
Appellant contends the court erred in admitting, for impeachment purposes,
evidence of his 2002 conviction for violation of Penal Code section 12021, felon in
possession of a firearm. Appellant moved to exclude both his felon-in-possession
conviction and his 2003 conviction for violation of Penal Code section 666, petty
theft with a prior. At the motion hearing, defense counsel argued at length that
neither conviction should be allowed, and that the prejudicial effect of such
impeachment outweighed any probative value. The court expressly denied the
motion as to the theft conviction, but deferred ruling on the firearm conviction
pending determination whether the latter constituted a crime of moral turpitude.10
9 The Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) defines possession as “holding
or having something (material or immaterial) as one’s own, or in one’s control;
actual holding or occupancy, as distinct from ownership.” (See Oxford English
Dict. Online (2d ed. 1989)<http://www.oed.com>[as of Nov. 20, 2006].)
10 The court’s statement that the firearm conviction “may be more probative
than prejudicial” does not, as appellant asserts, demonstrate uncertainty. Taken in
context, the court’s comment makes clear that it had completed the weighing

-- 14 of 16 --

15
There is no further hearing or ruling on the record. However, appellant testified
and submitted to cross-examination -- including impeachment with both prior
convictions -- without further objection.
There is no dispute that the crime of felon in possession of a firearm is one
of moral turpitude. (People v. Littrel (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 699, 702-703.) So
long as the felony is one of moral turpitude, its admissibility to impeach a witness
in a criminal proceeding is subject only to the trial court’s exercise of discretion
under Evidence Code section 352. (People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 316-
317.)
Appellant does not dispute that his firearm conviction was one of moral
turpitude, or that the court had the discretion to admit it. Instead, he contends the
court did not engage in the weighing process required by Evidence Code section
352. Specifically, appellant claims the court was required to state on the record its
evaluation of the four factors outlined in People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441.11
We disagree. There is no requirement that the court expressly articulate every
reason for its decision to admit a prior conviction for impeachment, so long as it is
clear that the court understood the weighing process required by section 352 and
engaged in it. (See People v. Montiel (1985) 39 Cal.3d 910, 924.) On the record
before us, it is clear the court did. We conclude the trial court properly exercised
its discretion.
process and was deferring ruling on admissibility solely to determine whether the
firearm offense qualified as one of moral turpitude.
11 The four factors are “(1) whether the prior conviction reflects on honesty
and integrity; (2) whether it is near or remote in time; (3) whether it was suffered
for the same or substantially similar conduct for which the witness-accused is on
trial; and, (4) finally, what effect admission would have on the defendant’s
decision to testify.” (People v. Castro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 307.)

-- 15 of 16 --

16
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
MANELLA, J.
We concur:
EPSTEIN, P. J.
SUZUKAWA, J.

-- 16 of 16 --