P. v. Raouf

Filed 9/20/18 P. v. Raouf CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JOSEPH PIERRE RAOUF,
Defendant and Appellant.
B276258
Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA089323
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mark E. Windham, Judge. Affirmed.
Elizabeth K. Horowitz, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey and Robert M. Snider,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________________

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INTRODUCTION
Defendant Joseph Pierre Raouf was charged with
numerous crimes stemming from two robberies. Following a
bench trial, the court found defendant guilty of nine counts,
including one count of making criminal threats and two counts of
resisting an executive officer. The court also found true several
firearm and prior conviction allegations and sentenced defendant
to 27 years in prison. On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the
court erred in admitting statements he made to investigating
officers during a post-arrest interview conducted at the hospital
and which form the basis for his criminal threats conviction; (2)
insufficient evidence supports his conviction for criminal threats;
and (3) insufficient evidence supports one of his convictions for
resisting an executive officer. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July 2015, the People charged defendant with the
following crimes: three counts of second degree robbery (Pen.
Code,1 § 211; counts 1, 6, and 7); three counts of resisting an
executive officer (§ 69; counts 2, 3, and 132); one count of battery
by gassing of an officer (§ 243.9, subd. (a); count 4); one count of
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 5);
one count of attempted second degree robbery (§§ 664/211; count
9); one count of assault with a deadly weapon other than a
firearm (§ 245, subd. (c); count 10); one count of criminal threats
(§ 422, subd. (a); count 11); and one count of misdemeanor battery
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The People amended the information during trial to add count 13.

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(§ 243, subd. (b); count 12). As to counts 1, 6, 7, and 9, the People
alleged a principal in the robbery was armed with a firearm (§
12022, subd. (a)(1)), and, as to counts 6 and 9, the People alleged
defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). As to
counts 1 through 7 and 9 through 11, the People alleged
defendant had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and
had suffered two prior serious or violent felony convictions (§ 667,
subds. (b)-(j)), one for a criminal threats conviction in California
in 2011 and the other for a terrorist threat conviction in New
York in 2014.
In January 2016, the court found defendant incompetent to
stand trial. He was transferred to Metropolitan State Hospital,
where he remained until March 2016, when the court found his
competency had been restored.
In May 2016, the court dismissed count 2 pursuant to
section 995. The court also struck the prior strike allegation
relating to defendant’s 2014 terrorist threat conviction in New
York.
In June 2016, defendant and the People waived their rights
to a jury trial. Defendant changed his plea from not guilty to a
dual plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.
Defendant also agreed to submit some of the evidence for the
guilt phase of trial based on portions of the transcript from the
preliminary hearing, and he waived his right to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses whose testimony would be admitted
through the preliminary hearing transcript. Prior to trial, the
People dismissed count 9.
A bench trial commenced on June 22, 2016. After the
People rested, the court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss
count 4 pursuant to section 1118. The court found defendant

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guilty of counts 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, and 13. As to counts 1 and
7, the court found true the allegations that a principal was armed
with a firearm during the robberies; the court found not true the
firearm allegations as to count 6. The court also found true the
prior strike, prior serious or violent felony, and prior prison term
allegations. Following a bifurcated bench trial on the issue of
sanity, the court found defendant was sane at the time he
committed the charged offenses.
The court sentenced defendant to a total term of 27 years,
consisting of the following consecutive terms: 11 years for count
1; 1 year and 4 months for count 5; 2 years for count 6; 2 years
and 4 months for count 7; 2 years and 8 months for count 10; 1
year and 4 months for count 11; 1 year and 4 months for count
13; and 5 years for the prior strike conviction under section 667,
subdivision (a)(1). The court stayed the sentences for counts 3
and 12 under section 654.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.3
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1. The Robberies
On November 18, 2014, Mohammed Rahmin was working
at a convenience store in Los Angeles when defendant
approached the counter with another man. Defendant displayed a
3 Defendant also filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing
the trial court coerced him into waiving his right to a jury trial when
he entered his dual plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of
insanity. We ordered defendant’s writ petition to be considered at the
same time as this appeal. We have denied the petition in a separate
order.

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gun and told Rahmin to give him money. Rahmin gave defendant
money from both of the store’s registers.
On December 1, 2014, defendant entered a bank in Beverly
Hills. He passed a bag to one of the tellers along with a note that
read, “Fill the bag with hundred dollar bills. Hurry up. We have
guns!” The teller put several thousand dollars’ worth of bills and
a GPS tracking device in the bag.
Around 4:00 p.m. on December 1, 2014, Sergeant Robert
Maycott and Officer Matthew Stout of the Beverly Hills Police
Department received a tip that one of the robbery suspects had
entered a hotel about a block and a half away from the bank. As
he entered the hotel, Officer Stout saw defendant standing near
the registration desk. Defendant turned and began to run toward
the hotel’s entrance, and Officer Stout followed. As defendant
ran, he tripped and fell to the ground. When defendant landed on
his back, Officer Stout saw what he believed to be a semi-
automatic handgun in the waistline of defendant’s pants.
Defendant then reached toward his waist, at which point Officer
Stout fired one round from his own gun, striking defendant in the
right side of his chest.
After defendant was placed in handcuffs and treated for his
wound, officers discovered that the item in defendant’s waistline
was a pellet-gun replica of a semi-automatic handgun. The
officers also recovered a .38-caliber handgun from defendant’s
shirt pocket and a magazine containing two rounds of live
ammunition from defendant’s pants pocket. Defendant was
arrested and taken to the hospital for additional medical
treatment.

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2. The Hospital Interview
On December 2, 2014, shortly after undergoing surgery for
his gunshot wound, defendant was interviewed in his hospital
room in the intensive care unit by Detective George Elwell, a
Detective Coulter, and another officer from the Beverly Hills
Police Department.4 Defendant was receiving pain medication
throughout the interview,5 and, at the beginning of the interview,
he was wearing an oxygen mask. A nurse was in the hospital
room attending to defendant during parts of the interview.
The interview started with Detective Coulter asking
defendant if there was anyone he wanted to call. Defendant
replied, “The Islamic Republic of Iran.” After Detective Coulter
asked defendant whether he and the person he wanted to call
spoke Farsi, defendant exclaimed, “I’m telling you your officer
really should’ve killed me. There’s gonna be a lot of problems on
their hands.” Detective Coulter asked defendant what he meant,
to which defendant responded, “You’ll see. I don’t need to explain
myself.”
Detective Elwell then told defendant that the officers would
“[l]ike to talk to you about what happened and your arrest. What
I need to do is read you some things here.” Defendant
immediately replied, “I don’t want to talk to any of you guys.”
4 We have read the transcript, and listened to the audio recording, of
defendant’s interview.
5 There is no evidence in the record showing what type of pain
medication defendant was receiving at the time the officers
interviewed him. There is also no evidence of any specific dosage of
medication defendant was receiving, other than a statement by an
attending nurse recorded during defendant’s interview that defendant
was receiving a “low dose.”

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Detective Elwell explained that he needed to advise defendant of
his Miranda6 rights and started to read defendant those rights
when defendant interjected, “Get the fuck outta my face. How
about that? Get the fuck outta my face.” When Detective Coulter
asked defendant whether he wanted to “tell [the officers] his side
of the story,” defendant replied, “No. Get the fuck outta my face.
How about that[?] … [¶] and have you guys killed. How about
that?”
As Detective Elwell continued to read defendant his
Miranda rights, defendant claimed he was “gonna have—the cop
that shot me slaughtered” and have “US government officials
killed all over the world.” After defendant told the officers to “Get
the fuck outta his face” four more times, Detective Elwell replied,
“Ok. We’re done then.” Defendant immediately responded, “Get
the fuck outta my face before I have your mother raped—before I
have your daughter raped—have your daughter raped.” When
Detective Coulter told defendant he was “a tough guy,” defendant
continued, “[H]ave your daughter raped. How about that? Have
your fucking daughter raped, and your mother raped. Get them
impregnated. How about that? Raped. Have the officer’s mother
raped—the daughter raped.” When Detective Coulter asked
defendant, “Why would you do that,” defendant replied, “Record
it. The judge killed. Have his daughter raped.”
Detective Elwell then started to re-advise defendant of his
Miranda rights. After Detective Elwell advised defendant that he
has the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney,
Detective Coulter started asking defendant questions about the
bank robbery, the altercation with Officer Stout, and whether
6 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).

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defendant had committed any other robberies. Defendant claimed
that he robbed the bank to fund terrorist organizations in Saudi
Arabia, and he continued to threaten the officers and their
families.
After the officers asked defendant at least seven questions
about the crimes they were investigating, defendant told them
twice to “[g]et the fuck outta [his] face.” Detective Coulter replied,
“I think you figured out we’re not gonna get out of your face.” The
officers continued to try to discuss the underlying crimes and the
shooting involving Officer Stout, asking defendant about 30 more
questions before defendant again threatened Officer Stout and
his family: “What that I’m gonna have the officer slaughtered. I’m
gonna have—his mother raped and killed. Make sure you have
that recorded.” The officers asked defendant several more
questions about the robbery and the altercation with Officer
Stout before concluding the interview.
While defendant was detained in the hospital, Officer
Matthew Handlos was assigned to guard defendant’s room.
Defendant testified that he did not want Officer Handlos in his
room, so he asked the officer to leave. When Officer Handlos
refused to leave, defendant grabbed a bed pan and vomited into
it. He then threw the pan at Officer Handlos, which struck
Officer Handlos’s right leg and splattered some of defendant’s
vomit onto Officer Handlos’s leg, torso, and arm.
At trial, Officer Stout testified that he had been informed
about defendant’s threats to “slaughter” him and his family.
Officer Stout was aware that defendant was in the hospital and
being treated for his gunshot wound when he made the threats,
but Officer Stout did not know how long defendant had been out
of surgery when the officers interviewed him or whether

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defendant was on pain medication throughout the interview.
According to Officer Stout, defendant’s statements took a “great
toll” on his family, and he was concerned for the safety of his
child and wife as well as his own safety. Officer Stout’s wife
sought psychological counseling, and Officer Stout paid over
$3,000 to install new security equipment at his home. Officer
Stout started to drive different routes to work and to take his
child to school. Officer Stout was aware of defendant’s criminal
record as well as his history of “swatting”7 people. As of the time
of trial, Officer Stout remained concerned for the safety of his
family and had maintained the security equipment at his home.
DISCUSSION
1. Admission of Defendant’s Hospital Interview
Defendant contends the court erred in admitting the
statements he made at the hospital, which form the basis for his
criminal threats conviction. Specifically, he argues the
statements were obtained in violation of Miranda because he
invoked his right to remain silent when he told the officers he did
not want to speak to them, and the officers never obtained a valid
waiver of those rights before they continued questioning him.
Defendant further contends his statements were involuntary
because he had recently come out of surgery, was on pain
medication, and was still being treated in the intensive care unit
at the time of his interview. Although we agree that some of
defendant’s statements should have been excluded, the error was
7 According to Officer Stout, “swatting” involves “[m]aking false
telephone calls or some means of communication that cause … great
panic at a location.”

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harmless. We also conclude that defendant’s statements were
voluntary.
1.1. Relevant Proceedings
During trial, the People sought to admit the recording of
defendant’s hospital interview to prove the criminal threats
charge. Defense counsel objected to the admission of the
recording, arguing any incriminating statements defendant made
during the interview were inadmissible because he invoked his
Miranda rights when he told the officers he did not want to speak
to them, and the officers never obtained a valid waiver of those
rights before they continued questioning him. The People argued
any incriminating statements defendant made with respect to the
criminal threats charge were not protected by Miranda because
they were spontaneous, did not incriminate defendant with
respect to any crimes the officers were investigating, and were
not made in response to any questions likely to elicit
incriminating answers.
The court overruled defendant’s objection, reasoning his
statements were admissible because they were spontaneous and
could form the basis for a new crime unrelated to any of the
crimes the officers were investigating. Later, the court clarified
that it would admit defendant’s statements only to the extent
they were relevant to defendant’s sanity defense and establishing
that he uttered criminal threats when he threatened to kill
Officer Stout and his family. The court stated it would not
consider any of defendant’s statements that incriminated him in
the robberies of the convenience store and the bank.
Defense counsel never objected to the admission of
defendant’s statements on the ground that they were
involuntary.

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1.2. Standard of Review
The prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a
preponderance of the evidence that, under the totality of the
circumstances of the interrogation, the defendant’s waiver of his
Miranda rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and that
the defendant’s incriminating statements were voluntarily made.
(People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1176 (Linton).) “ ‘ “ ‘On
appeal, the trial court’s findings as to the circumstances
surrounding the confession are upheld if supported by
substantial evidence, but the trial court’s finding as to the
voluntariness of the confession is subject to independent
review.’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘ “[W]hen a reviewing court
considers a claim that a confession has been improperly coerced,
if the evidence conflicts, the version most favorable to the People
must be relied upon if supported by the record. [Citations.]” ’
[Citation.]” (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 993.)
1.3. Although two sets of statements defendant made
during the hospital interview were obtained in
violation of Miranda, the court’s erroneous
admission of those statements was harmless.
Defendant argues the court should have excluded the
statements he made during his hospital interview because he
unequivocally asserted his right to remain silent before the
officers extracted those statements. He argues that once he told
the officers he did not want to talk to them, they were required to
cease their interrogation, and any statements he made after that
point in the interview were obtained in violation of Miranda.
Under Miranda, police may not subject a suspect to
custodial interrogation unless the suspect knowingly and
intelligently waives the right to remain silent, the right to the

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presence of an attorney, and, if indigent, the right to appointed
counsel. (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 751.) The
prosecution is prohibited from using any statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, that stem from the suspect’s custodial
interrogation unless it shows the suspect has been advised of his
Miranda rights and has knowingly and intelligently waived
them. (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 179–180.) “ ‘Once
warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If
the individual indicates … that he wishes to remain silent, the
interrogation must cease.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Case (2018)
5 Cal.5th 1, 20 (Case).) “To end the interrogation, the suspect
must invoke the right to silence unambiguously.” (Ibid.)
Interrogation is defined as “ ‘ “express questioning, or
words or actions on the part of the police that “are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” ’
[Citations.]” (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 387.)
Interrogation, therefore, includes investigation-related
questioning initiated by the police or its functional equivalent,
not statements or conversation volunteered by the defendant.
(Ibid.) “ ‘ “Clearly, not all conversation between an officer and a
suspect constitutes interrogation. The police may speak to a
suspect in custody as long as the speech would not reasonably be
construed as calling for an incriminating response.” ’ [Citations.]”
(People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 198.)
“Spontaneous statements are not the product of
interrogation and therefore are not violative of Miranda.
[Citation.]” (People v. Mobley (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 761, 791–792
(Mobley), disapproved of on other grounds by People v.
Trujillo (2006) 40 Cal.4th 165.) In addition, “ ‘[a] defendant has
not invoked his or her right to silence when the defendant’s

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statements were merely expressions of passing frustration or
animosity toward the officers, or amounted only to a refusal to
discuss a particular subject covered by the questioning.’
[Citations.]” (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 433
(Williams).)
As a preliminary matter, we note that defendant does not
separately address each of the statements he made during the
hospital interview that form the basis for his criminal threats
conviction. Instead, he claims generally that the court should
have excluded all of the statements he made during that
interview on Miranda grounds.8 This approach makes it difficult
to evaluate defendant’s challenge to the court’s ruling because he
made numerous threatening statements directed at Officer Stout
and the interviewing officers before and after he stated he did not
want to speak to the officers, and before and after they asked him
any questions concerning the crimes they were investigating. And
defendant’s statements are reflected in a 13-page transcript.
Nevertheless, we have separately analyzed the statements
defendant made during the hospital interview. As we explain
below, the court erred in admitting two sets of statements
defendant made after the officers asked him numerous questions
related to their investigation despite defendant’s invocation of his
right to remain silent. We conclude, however, the court’s error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the statements
that should have been excluded were nearly identical to, and
therefore cumulative of, other statements that were properly
admitted.
8 At best, defendant contends the interview should have ended the first
time he told the officers he didn’t want to talk to them, or before he
was given his Miranda rights.

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With respect to the statements defendant made at the
beginning of the interview, when he told the investigating officers
that the officer who shot him “really should have killed him” and
that the officer was going to have “a lot of problems on [his]
hands,” they were made in response to routine questions. That is,
those threatening statements were made in response to questions
that were akin to booking questions, such as whether defendant
wanted to call anyone and whether he spoke Farsi. Consequently,
those statements are not protected by Miranda. (See People v.
Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150, 159 [police may ask a suspect
routine booking questions before advising the suspect of his
Miranda rights]; see also Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 433
[spontaneous expressions of frustration or animosity toward
interviewing officers do not constitute an invocation of a suspect’s
Miranda rights].)
Similarly, the statements defendant made toward the
beginning of the interview in which he threatened to “slaughter[]”
the officer who shot him and have that officer’s mother and
daughter “raped,” and told officers to “record” what he was
saying, were not obtained in violation of Miranda. To be sure,
defendant invoked his right to silence before making these
threatening statements, when he told the officers he did not want
to talk to them and demanded that they “get the fuck outta [his]
face.” But none of these threatening statements were made in
response to any questions likely to elicit incriminating responses.
For example, defendant made the first statement threatening to
slaughter Officer Stout immediately after Detective Elwell told
defendant he needed to advise defendant of his Miranda rights
and that defendant could refuse to speak to the officers after
Detective Elwell had finished reading the advisement. And

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defendant spontaneously threatened to rape Officer Stout’s
mother and daughter, and told the officers to record what he was
saying, immediately after Detective Elwell finished advising
defendant of his Miranda rights. (See Mobley, supra, 72
Cal.App.4th at p. 792; Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 433.)
The other two sets of statements defendant made
threatening to harm Officer Stout and his family were, however,
obtained in violation of Miranda. Those statements came later in
the interview, after the officers had explicitly refused to honor
defendant’s requests to stop the interrogation. Defendant made
the first of those statements—again stating he was going to have
the officer who shot him “slaughtered”—after the interviewing
officers had asked him about 18 questions related to the crimes
they were investigating and defendant’s altercation with Officer
Stout. Defendant made the second of those statements—that he
would have the officer who shot him killed, that he would have
that officer’s mother raped and killed, and that he hoped the
officers were recording his statements—after the interviewing
officers had asked him about 20 additional questions related to
their investigation (or nearly 40 total questions concerning their
investigation). All of these statements were made after defendant
had unambiguously invoked his right to silence, after the officers
explicitly refused to honor defendant’s request to terminate the
interview, and in response to questions related to the crimes the
officers believed defendant had committed as well as defendant’s
altercation with Officer Stout, questions that were likely to elicit
incriminating responses. Consequently, the court should have
excluded those statements under Miranda.
Although the court erred in failing to exclude the last two
sets of threatening statements defendant directed toward Officer

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Stout and his family, that error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. “ ‘The erroneous admission of a defendant’s
statements obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment is
reviewed for prejudice under the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18. … That
test requires the People … “to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained.” ’ [Citation.]” (Case, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 22.)
The two sets of defendant’s statements the court should
have excluded were nearly identical to other statements
defendant made that the court properly admitted. For example,
the court properly admitted the statements defendant made
immediately before and after Detective Elwell advised defendant
of his Miranda rights. In those earlier statements, like the later
statements that should have been excluded, defendant
threatened to have Officer Stout “slaughtered” and have the
officer’s wife and daughter “raped,” and he told the interviewing
officers to “record” those statements. Because the statements the
court should have excluded were virtually identical to defendant’s
earlier statements, they were cumulative of other evidence that
the court properly admitted. As a result, any error in admitting
defendant’s statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
(See People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 709 [erroneous
admission of evidence that violates a defendant’s constitutional
rights may be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if that
evidence is cumulative of other evidence that was properly
admitted].)
1.4. Defendant’s statements were voluntary.
Defendant alternatively contends his hospital interview
should have been excluded because his statements were

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involuntary. Specifically, he claims he was “vulnerable, on heavy
pain medication, and still feeling the effects of anesthesia” at the
time the officers questioned him. Defendant forfeited this
argument because he did not seek to exclude the statements on
that basis in the trial court. (See People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th
452, 482; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 667.)
Nevertheless, defendant claims his counsel was ineffective
by failing to raise this issue in the trial court. To prevail on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show:
(1) counsel’s performance was deficient, such that it “fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms”; and (2) that defendant was prejudiced by
counsel’s omission—i.e., “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986,
1009.) “Counsel’s failure to make a futile or unmeritorious motion
or request is not ineffective assistance.” (People v. Szadziewicz
(2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 823, 836.)
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution “ ‘precludes the admission of any involuntary
statement obtained from a criminal suspect through state
compulsion.’ [Citation.]” (People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th
1063, 1086.) “ ‘ “A statement is involuntary if it is not the product
of ‘ “a rational intellect and free will.” ’ [Citation.] The test for
determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether the
defendant’s ‘will was overborne at the time he confessed.’ ” ’
[Citations.] [¶] ‘ “A confession may be found involuntary if
extracted by threats or violence, obtained by direct or implied
promises, or secured by the exertion of improper influence.
[Citation.] Although coercive police activity is a necessary

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predicate to establish an involuntary confession, it ‘does not itself
compel a finding that a resulting confession is involuntary.’
[Citation.] The statement and the inducement must be causally
linked. [Citation.]” [Citation].’ [Citation.] A confession is not
rendered involuntary by coercive police activity that is not the
‘motivating cause’ of the defendant’s confession.” (Linton, supra,
56 Cal.4th at p. 1176.)
Here, defendant relies on Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S.
385 (Mincey), to contend the statements he made to the officers at
the hospital were involuntary. In Mincey, the defendant was shot
during a raid of his apartment. (Id. at p. 387.) The defendant was
rushed to the emergency room, where he received treatment for
his wounds. (Id. at p. 396.) “He had sustained a wound in his hip,
resulting in damage to the sciatic nerve and partial paralysis of
his right leg. Tubes were inserted into his throat to help him
breathe, and through his nose into his stomach to keep him from
vomiting; a catheter was inserted into his bladder. He received
various drugs, and a device was attached to his arm so that he
could be fed intravenously. He was then taken to the intensive
care unit.” (Ibid.)
A detective went to the hospital about four hours after the
shooting to talk to the defendant. (Mincey, supra, 437 U.S. at p.
396.) The detective told the defendant that he was under arrest
for the murder of a police officer, advised him of his Miranda
rights, and asked him questions about the raid. (Ibid.) The
defendant could not talk because he had a tube in his mouth, so
he responded to the detective’s questions by writing answers on
pieces of paper. (Ibid.) Although the defendant repeatedly
requested counsel, the detective questioned him for almost four
hours. (Ibid.)

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The United States Supreme Court concluded the
defendant’s statements to the detective were involuntary.
(Mincey, supra, 437 U.S. at p. 398.) The Court described the
defendant as “a seriously and painfully wounded man on the edge
of consciousness.” (Id. at p. 401.) The defendant had arrived at
the hospital “ ‘depressed almost to the point of coma’ ” mere hours
earlier, was seriously wounded and still in the intensive care
unit, and was “evidently confused and unable to think clearly
about either the events of that afternoon or the circumstances of
his interrogation, since some of his written answers were on their
face not entirely coherent.” (Id. at pp. 398–399.) The Court also
observed the defendant was questioned while “lying on his back
on a hospital bed, encumbered by tubes, needles, and breathing
apparatus.” (Id. at p. 399.) Despite his “debilitated and helpless
condition,” the defendant made numerous requests to stop the
interrogation to retain counsel. (Ibid.) According to the Court,
“the undisputed evidence ma[de] clear that [the defendant]
wanted not to answer [the detective]. But [the defendant] was
weakened by pain and shock, isolated from family, friends, and
legal counsel, and barely conscious, and his will was simply
overborne.” (Id. at pp. 401–402.)
Although some of the circumstances surrounding
defendant’s hospital interview in this case are similar to those
surrounding the interview in Mincey, there are critical
distinctions between the two cases. First, unlike the interview in
Mincey, which lasted about four hours, defendant’s interview was
relatively short, lasting only about thirty minutes.
Second, although defendant sought to terminate the
interview in its early stages, he reinitiated the conversation on
multiple occasions, frequently berating and threatening the

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officers without provocation, and he never requested the
assistance of an attorney.
Third, the record is devoid of any evidence that defendant
was in debilitating pain. Although he was receiving pain
medication at the time of the interview, the attending nurse
indicated that defendant was receiving a “low dosage,” and
defendant never complained that he was in pain nor did he
request to cease the interview because of his physical condition.
Finally, the record contains no evidence that the officers
used physical or psychological pressure to elicit statements from
defendant. (See People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 248–
249.)
We also reject defendant’s contention that his bizarre
statements during the hospital interview—for example, that he
sold white women to Saudi Arabia or that he could have
government officials killed—demonstrate that they were
involuntary. While bizarre, many of these statements are
consistent with other statements defendant made at various
court hearings occurring months after the hospital interview. For
example, defendant claimed at the preliminary hearing that he
represented “the Islamic State in California.” Thus, there is
nothing in the record indicating any of the statements defendant
made during the hospital interview were the result of defendant’s
medical treatment or condition.
In short, the record does not support a finding that
defendant’s statements forming the basis for his criminal threats
conviction were involuntary. Consequently, defendant cannot
show he was prejudiced by any failure of his trial counsel to seek
to exclude those statements on that basis.

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2. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Defendant’s
Convictions for Criminal Threats and Resisting an
Officer
Defendant next contends insufficient evidence supports his
convictions for criminal threats and resisting an officer. As we
explain below, substantial evidence supports both convictions.
2.1. Standard of Review
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in
the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether
any rational trier of fact could have found the evidence proved
the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v.
Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87.) We draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the judgment and do not resolve credibility
issues or evidentiary conflicts. (Ibid.)
2.2. Criminal Threats
To support a conviction for criminal threats under section
422, the People must prove: (1) the defendant willfully
threatened to commit a crime which would result in death or
great bodily injury; (2) the defendant made the statement with
the intent that it be taken as a threat; (3) the threat, on its face
and under the circumstances in which it was made, was so
unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey
to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate
prospect of execution of the threat; and (4) the threat caused the
other person reasonably to be in sustained fear for his own safety
or for the safety of his immediate family, regardless of whether
the defendant actually intended to carry out the threat. (People v.
Butler (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 745, 753 (Butler).)

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“[I]t is the circumstances under which the threat is made
that give meaning to the actual words used.” (Butler, supra, 85
Cal.App.4th at p. 753.) Thus, “ ‘[t]he determination whether a
defendant intended his words to be taken as a threat, and
whether the words were sufficiently unequivocal, unconditional,
immediate and specific they conveyed to the victim an immediacy
of purpose and immediate prospect of execution of the threat can
be based on all the surrounding circumstances and not just on
the words alone. The parties’ history can also be considered as
one of the relevant circumstances. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Id. at
p. 754.)
“Section 422 does not require that a threat be personally
communicated to the victim by the person who makes the threat.”
(In re Ryan D. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 854, 861.) But “where the
accused did not personally communicate a threat to the victim, it
must be shown that he specifically intended that the threat be
conveyed to the victim.” (Ibid.)
In this case, substantial evidence supports the court’s
finding that defendant violated section 422 when he threatened
Officer Stout and his family. First, defendant threatened to
commit a crime that would result in death or great bodily
injury—he threatened to kill Officer Stout and rape Officer
Stout’s daughter and mother.
Second, there is evidence that defendant intended his
statements be taken as threats and that the interviewing officers
communicate those threats to Officer Stout. Defendant made the
threats against Officer Stout less than 24 hours after Officer
Stout shot him, at a time when defendant was still upset about
that altercation. (See In re Ryan D., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p.
863 [“usually threats that are made to, or in the presence of, an

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authority figure are made when the threatener is in a rage, is
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or is attempting to serve
an immediate purpose, such as dissuading a witness”].) When the
officers asked defendant to clarify what he meant when he said
Officer Stout was going to have a lot of problems on his hands,
defendant replied that he “[didn’t] need to explain [himself]”
because they would “see” what would happen, indicating he
intended to carry out the threats. In addition, immediately after
telling the interviewing officers that he would have Officer
Stout’s mother and daughter raped, defendant told the officers to
record his statements, which supports an inference that
defendant intended the officers to relay those statements to
Officer Stout.
Third, defendant’s statements were clearly unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate, and specific. This is not a case where
defendant used only cryptic, equivocal, or ambiguous language or
some form of non-verbal communication. Rather, defendant
explicitly threatened to kill Officer Stout and rape members of
his family. The circumstances surrounding the threats and the
history between defendant and Officer Stout further bolster the
immediacy of defendant’s threats: at the time defendant made
the threats, less than 24 hours had passed since Officer Stout
shot him.
Defendant argues his threats toward Officer Stout lacked
immediacy and a gravity of purpose because it appears the
officers who interviewed him did not take the threats he directed
at them seriously. But defendant was not charged with issuing
criminal threats against those officers. Thus, whether those
officers were concerned for their own safety is irrelevant in
determining whether defendant’s threats toward Officer Stout

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carried the requisite specificity and gravity of purpose. In any
event, the evidence supports an inference that the interviewing
officers viewed defendant’s threats as immediate and specific:
they were aware of defendant’s recent altercation with Officer
Stout and they relayed defendant’s statements to Officer Stout.
Finally, there was sufficient evidence to conclude
defendant’s threats caused Officer Stout reasonably to be in
sustained fear for his and his family’s safety. Officer Stout
testified that he was concerned for his and his family’s safety
after the other officers told him about defendant’s threats. And
Officer Stout acted on that fear by installing new security
equipment at his home and by changing the routes he drove to
work and to his child’s school. Officer Stout’s fear was also
reasonable because defendant had a motive to carry out his
threats: Officer Stout had shot defendant less than 24 hours
before defendant was interviewed by the police.
2.3. Resisting an Officer
Section 69 makes it a crime to “attempt[], by means of any
threat or violence, to deter or prevent an executive officer from
performing any duty imposed upon the officer by law,” or to
“knowingly resist[], by the use of force or violence, the officer, in
the performance of his or her duty.” A police officer is included in
the definition of “ ‘ “executive officer.” ’ ” (People v. Orloff (2016)
2 Cal.App.5th 947, 952.) To violate section 69, the defendant
must have “ ‘a specific intent to interfere with the executive
officer’s performance of his duties. …’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that
defendant violated section 69 when he threw a pan full of vomit
at Officer Handlos. Officer Handlos testified that he was assigned
to keep watch over defendant in defendant’s hospital room.

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Defendant testified he asked Officer Handlos to leave his room
because he did not want a police officer present. Defendant also
testified that he decided to throw the pan of vomit at Officer
Handlos when the officer refused to leave the room. This evidence
amply supports the court’s finding that defendant intended to
deter Officer Handlos from performing his official duty—i.e.,
guarding defendant’s hospital room—by throwing the pan of
vomit at the officer.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
LAVIN, Acting P.J.
WE CONCUR:
EGERTON, J.
KALRA, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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