Geiser v. Kuhns

Filed 8/30/18 Geiser v. Kuhns CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
GREGORY GEISER,
Plaintiff, Appellant, and
Cross-Respondent,
v.
PETER KUHNS et al.,
Defendants, Respondents,
and Cross-Appellants.
B279738
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos. BS161018,
BS161019, BS161020)
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Armen Tamzarian, Judge. Affirmed.
Dinsmore & Sandelmann, Frank Sandelmann and Brett A.
Stroud, for Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-Respondent.
Law Office of Matthew Strugar, Matthew Strugar; Law
Office of Colleen Flynn, Colleen Flynn, for Defendants,
Respondents, and Cross-Appellants.

-- 1 of 31 --

2
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Gregory Geiser filed petitions for civil harassment
restraining orders against defendants Peter Kuhns and spouses
Mercedes and Pablo Caamal, after defendants demonstrated at
plaintiff’s place of business and in front of his residence in an
attempt to prevent the Caamals’ eviction from their home. In
response, defendants moved to strike the civil harassment
petitions as strategic lawsuits against public participation (anti-
SLAPP motions). After plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his civil
harassment petitions, the trial court awarded defendants
attorney fees as the prevailing parties on the petitions. The trial
court denied defendants’ attorney fees on their anti-SLAPP
motions, ruling they would not have prevailed on the motions.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s determination that
defendants were the prevailing parties on the civil harassment
petitions and, alternatively, the calculation of the attorney fees
award. Defendants appeal the trial court’s determination that
they would not have prevailed on their anti-SLAPP motions. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is the founder, President, and Chief Executive
Officer of Wedgewood LLP, which is in the business of
purchasing, rehabilitating, and selling distressed properties. On
September 23, 2015, through a non-judicial foreclosure sale, a
Wedgewood subsidiary purchased from Wells Fargo a triplex Ms.
Caamal owned (the property) for $284,000. Wedgewood then
obtained an eviction judgment for one of the units.
According to Ms. Caamal, on December 17, 2015, she and
her husband, along with a group of concerned citizens, went to

-- 2 of 31 --

3
Wedgewood’s office building and requested a meeting with
plaintiff to attempt to prevent their eviction and to negotiate a
repurchase of her home. The concerned citizens included Kuhns
and persons involved with the Alliance of Californians for
Community Empowerment (ACCE), an entity whose various
missions include saving homes from foreclosure and fighting
against displacement of long-term residents. Kuhns is the Los
Angeles Director for ACCE. The group set up a tent in
Wedgewood’s lobby and disrupted its business.
Plaintiff was not present. Wedgewood’s Chief Operating
Officer Darin Puhl and its General Counsel Alan Dettelbach went
to the lobby. Dettelbach attempted to move the tent and was
shoved by one of the demonstrators. The police were called. No
one was arrested or cited.
Puhl spoke with the Caamals and learned they were
interested in repurchasing the property. He offered to meet with
them in private if the demonstrators left the building. The
Caamals agreed. In the meeting, the Caamals told Puhl they
could afford to repurchase the property. Puhl agreed to hold off
enforcement of Wedgewood’s eviction judgment on the triplex’s
first unit (an unlawful detainer trial was set for January 2016 for
the other two units) for several weeks so the Caamals could meet
with a lender to assess whether they could qualify for a loan.
Although Puhl “gave [the Caamals] an idea of the value [of the
property] according to similar properties in the area,” they did
not discuss a purchase price.
The Caamals subsequently submitted to Wedgewood a
prequalification letter apparently with a purchase price of
$300,000. In early January 2016, Puhl again met with the
Caamals. Puhl informed them that Wedgewood believed the

-- 3 of 31 --

4
property was worth $400,000 according to real estate websites
and $300,000 was unacceptable. Wedgewood offered to sell them
the property for $375,000.
The Caamals asked for additional time to obtain a home
loan, agreeing to vacate the entire property within 60 days—by
March 20, 2016—if they could not obtain financing. On March
18, 2016, the Caamals sent Wedgewood a prequalification letter
with a $300,000 purchase price. Wedgewood deemed the
prequalification letter unacceptable because it was not for the
purchase price of $375,000 and it expressly stated that it did “not
constitute loan approval.”
The Caamals did not vacate the property by the date
agreed upon, and, on March 23, 2016, they, Kuhns, and persons
involved with ACCE returned to Wedgewood’s office building
seeking to meet with plaintiff. Mr. Caamal allegedly stated,
“‘[Y]ou’re not getting me out of this property alive.’” The Caamals
and their supporters left the premises either because the police
were called and removed them or because Puhl agreed to review
the Caamals’ “prequalification” documents.
Because the Caamals had not arranged to purchase the
property by the date agreed upon, Wedgewood had the San
Bernardino Sheriff’s Department evict them on March 30, 2016.
Later that night, defendants and persons involved with ACCE
went to plaintiff’s residence. According to defendants, the
Caamals and their supporters staged a residential picket on the
sidewalk outside of plaintiff’s home. They held signs, sang songs,
chanted, and gave short speeches. The demonstration lasted for
about an hour—from about 9:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. Officers from
the Manhattan Beach Police Department were present, but did

-- 4 of 31 --

5
not order the demonstrators to disburse or intervene to stop the
demonstration. No one was arrested or cited.
According to Gilbert Saucedo, a National Lawyers Guild
legal observer, ACCE organized the demonstration to protest the
unfair and deceptive practices Wedgewood and its agents used to
purchase Ms. Caamal’s triplex and to evict the Caamals. He
estimated there were 25 to 30 demonstrators and described the
demonstration as “peaceful.”
Plaintiff viewed the demonstration at his home differently.
Two days after the demonstration, he filed petitions for civil
harassment restraining orders against defendants. In his
petitions, plaintiff stated that around 9:00 p.m., a “mob” of about
30 persons arrived at his residence and chanted, “Greg Geiser,
come outside! Greg Geiser, you can’t hide!” Plaintiff called the
police. His wife sneaked out the back door and hid at a
neighbor’s house.
Plaintiff further recounted the incident in his declaration in
support of restraining orders as follows: “Sometime before
midnight, as a result of discussions with the police and
Wedgewood’s lawyer, the mob disbanded. My wife and I were left
shaken by the escalating campaign of harassment that has
followed me from work to my home. In view of the mob actions
combined with the direct verbal threats, we are in fear for our
safety. We have arranged for private security to stand guard
outside both our place of business and our house.
“I further understand from conversations Wedgewood’s
general counsel had with the police the night the mob assaulted
my home that police require a court order to keep the mob away
from my house by any meaningful distance. This is why we are
seeking this Court’s assistance in issuing an order for these

-- 5 of 31 --

6
respondents to stay away from my wife and me, my business, and
my home, by at least 100 yards.”
The trial court issued temporary restraining orders. The
orders required defendants to stay at least 50 yards from
plaintiff, his wife, and Wedgewood for the following three weeks.
Defendants responded to the civil harassment petitions by
filing anti-SLAPP motions. They claimed plaintiff was
attempting to stifle their free speech and expressive activity.
In addition to the civil harassment petitions, plaintiff
sought to prevent further demonstrations in front of his home
through the Manhattan Beach City Council. The day after the
demonstration, plaintiff spoke with a city council member. Based
on that conversation, the council member proposed an ordinance
to the Manhattan Beach City Council that would prohibit
targeted residential picketing.
On July 5, 2016, plaintiff spoke at the Manhattan Beach
City Council meeting at which the proposed ordinance was
addressed.1 During a break in the meeting, Manhattan Beach
Police Department Chief Eve Irvine approached plaintiff and
assured him that what had happened at his home on March 30
would never be allowed to happen again. She explained the
police department had received additional training about how to
enforce the city’s existing laws in those types of situations. If the
demonstrators returned to his home, the police department would
do everything in its power to make sure that his home, family,
and neighbors were protected. Following that meeting, plaintiff
had several phone conversations with other members of the
1 On August 17, 2017, the City Council tabled a motion to
approve the ordinance.

-- 6 of 31 --

7
Manhattan Beach Police Department and members of the
Manhattan Beach City Council during which he was assured that
if a similar demonstration happened, he could expect a “full
response” from the police department.
On August 4, 2016, plaintiff dismissed without prejudice
the three civil harassment petitions.2 He dismissed the petitions
because, based on his July 5, 2016, conversation with Chief
Irvine, he “felt reassured” the police department would respond
appropriately if the demonstrators returned. Also, it had become
clear to plaintiff from ongoing settlement negotiations with the
Caamals that they were not going to repurchase their property
and he believed it would be easier to list and sell the property
without pending litigation.
When plaintiff dismissed the civil harassment petitions, the
trial court had not ruled on defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions.
Defendants moved for an award of $84,150 in attorney fees (a
$56,100 lodestar with a 1.5 multiplier) and $370 in court costs as
the prevailing parties under the mandatory attorney fees
provision of the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16,
subd. (c)(1)3) and, alternatively, as the prevailing parties under
the discretionary attorney fees provision of the civil harassment
2 Plaintiff and Wedgewood had also filed a civil action
against defendants and ACCE relating to essentially the same
conduct giving rise to the civil harassment petitions (case number
BC615987). We grant plaintiff’s request to take judicial notice of
plaintiff’s dismissal of that action on July 14, 2016, and otherwise
deny his request for judicial notice.
3 All statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

-- 7 of 31 --

8
statute (§ 527.6, subd. (s)) (attorney fees motion).4 The trial court
ruled that defendants would not have prevailed on the anti-
SLAPP motions, but found they were the prevailing parties on
the civil harassment petitions. The trial court thus awarded
defendants $40,000 in attorney fees and court costs. In declining
to award the full amount sought by defendants, the trial court
found that the hourly rates defendants’ attorneys requested were
high in light of their experience and the nature and difficulty of
the litigation. The trial court also found that large parts of the
requested attorney fees related to unsuccessful settlement
negotiations and the anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court
concluded would not have succeeded.
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff’s Appeal
Plaintiff appeals the award of attorney fees and costs,
claiming the trial court erred by: (1) excluding evidence that was
crucial to determine that plaintiff was the prevailing party on the
civil harassment petitions; (2) ultimately concluding that
defendants were prevailing parties; and (3) miscalculating the
amount of fees.
A. “Exclusion” of Evidence
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred when it excluded as
hearsay his declaration testimony that Chief Irvine assured him
4 Defendants did not separately request attorney fees for
work performed on the anti-SLAPP motion and for work
performed on the civil harassment petition. Instead, they sought
an award of attorney fees for all work performed in the litigation.

-- 8 of 31 --

9
the police department would protect him and his family in the
event of further demonstrations at his home. The ruling was
error, plaintiff argues, because the testimony was offered to show
that plaintiff acted in reliance on that assurance when he
dismissed his civil harassment petitions, and not for the truth of
the matter asserted—i.e., that the police would protect him.
Plaintiff contends the error was prejudicial because it was crucial
to the trial court’s prevailing party determination. The trial
court did not err.
We review a trial court’s rulings on evidentiary objections
for an abuse of discretion. (Carnes v. Superior Court (2005) 126
Cal.App.4th 688, 694.) “Discretion is abused only when in its
exercise, the trial court ‘exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the
circumstances before it being considered.’” (Shaw v. County of
Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 281 (Shaw).) An
appellant bears the burden of establishing an abuse of discretion
when challenging a trial court’s discretionary rulings. (Ibid.)
In the declaration he submitted in opposition to defendants’
attorney fees motion, plaintiff stated that Chief Irvine, other
members of the Manhattan Beach Police Department, and
members of the Manhattan Beach City Council assured him the
police department would protect him if the demonstrators
returned to his home. Defendants objected to those parts of
plaintiff’s declaration as hearsay.
The trial court ruled, “[Plaintiff] claims he obtained the
relief he sought outside of court after he received an assurance
from Manhattan Beach Police Chief Eve Irvine that ‘what happed
at [his] home on the night of March 30 would never be allowed to
happen again.’ This statement and similar alleged statements by
Chief Irvine and other city officials, however, are inadmissible

-- 9 of 31 --

10
hearsay.” In a footnote appended to the ruling, the trial court
stated, “[Plaintiff] argues that the statements are admissible to
show what his state of mind was when he dismissed the petitions.
The court agrees. (See Evid. Code, § 1250.) But petitioner’s state
of mind is of marginal relevance to the issue of who was the
prevailing party in this litigation and the other issues the court
must decide to adjudicate [defendants’] motions.”
Later, in a section addressing defendants’ evidentiary
objections, the trial court sustained hearsay objections to the
statements made by other members of the Manhattan Beach
Police Department and by Manhattan Beach City Council
members. With respect to the statements attributed to Chief
Irvine, the trial court sustained the hearsay objection, explaining
that “Chief Irvine’s statements are hearsay to the extent they are
offered for the truth of the matter asserted.”
Plaintiff’s appeal concerns only the trial court’s ruling on
Chief Irvine’s alleged statements. His argument that the trial
court erred by excluding the statements as hearsay fails because
the trial court did not exclude the statements for all purposes.
The trial court’s ruling is clear. It excluded the police chief’s
statements to the extent they were offered for the truth of the
matter asserted, but admitted them to explain why plaintiff
dismissed his civil harassment petitions—the very reason
plaintiff argues on appeal they were admissible. Accordingly, we
find no error with respect to the trial court’s evidentiary ruling.
B. Prevailing Party
Plaintiff contends the trial court abused its discretion when
it determined that he was not the prevailing party under section
527.6. He argues that he prevailed because he “obtained the

-- 10 of 31 --

11
object of the litigation, namely assurances from representatives
of the City of Manhattan Beach that future harassment would be
prevented.” We disagree.
We review a trial court’s prevailing party ruling under
section 527.6 for an abuse of discretion. (Adler v. Vaicius (1993)
21 Cal.App.4th 1770, 1777; Elster v. Friedman (1989) 211
Cal.App.3d 1439, 1443 (Elster).) As stated above, a trial court
abuses its discretion “only when in its exercise, the trial court
‘exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it
being considered.’” (Shaw, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 281.)
“‘A plaintiff will be considered a prevailing party when the
lawsuit ‘“was a catalyst motivating defendants to provide the
primary relief sought’” or succeeded in ‘“activating defendants to
modify their behavior.’” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Elster, supra,
211 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1443-1444 [section 527.6 action].)
Ordinarily, when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses an action, the
defendant is the prevailing party. (See Coltrain v. Shewalter
(1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 94, 100, 107 [alleged SLAPP suit dismissed
without prejudice].) However, “a court may base its attorney fees
decision on a pragmatic definition of the extent to which each
party has realized its litigation objectives, whether by judgment,
settlement, or otherwise.” (Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th
599, 622 [contract action].)
The trial court ruled that defendants were the prevailing
parties, finding that “they obtained what they wanted out of the
litigation—[plaintiff] dismissed his actions and did not get
restraining orders or any other relief.” It rejected plaintiff’s claim
that he was the prevailing party because he achieved what he
sought outside of court through Police Chief Irvine’s assurances
that what happened at his home would not be allowed to happen

-- 11 of 31 --

12
again. The trial court found that plaintiff “did not obtain this
alleged promise by Chief Irvine as a result of these lawsuits.” It
reasoned that plaintiff could have sought Chief Irvine’s
commitment without filing the civil harassment petitions.
Moreover, the trial court recognized the substantial difference
between what plaintiff did achieve outside of the lawsuit, i.e., “a
commitment by Chief Irvine to enforce existing law─whatever
that is worth,” and the “gravity” of what plaintiff sought through
the lawsuit, i.e., “remedies that would have limited [defendants’]
liberty, namely their freedom of movement and communication,”
as well as “a court finding that they engaged in socially
unacceptable behavior.”
We agree with the trial court. The objective of plaintiff’s
civil harassment petitions was to obtain orders restraining
defendants from, among other things, harassing or contacting
him or his wife, and requiring defendants to stay 100 yards
award from him, his wife, his home, and his workplace—i.e.,
Wedgewood. Plaintiff failed to achieve that objective, and
obtaining Chief Irvine’s assurances fell short of such objective.
Moreover, to the extent obtaining Chief Irvine’s
commitment to enforce the law can be characterized as having
obtained plaintiff’s objectives in bringing suit, there is no
evidence that plaintiff’s civil harassment petitions motivated
Chief Irvine to give her assurances or even that Chief Irvine
knew of the petitions. In this regard, we reject plaintiff’s
contention the trial court impermissibly “required” a nexus
between plaintiff’s filing the petitions and Chief Irvine’s actions.
The trial court never stated such a nexus was necessary for
plaintiff to be a prevailing party. Rather, the trial court’s
consideration of the lack of any causation between the lawsuit

-- 12 of 31 --

13
and Chief Irvine’s assurance to plaintiff was a valid (if not
dispositive) factor in the exercise of its discretion. We likewise
reject plaintiff’s suggestion that the absence of evidence that his
civil harassment petitions were not a motivating factor for the
police department means we should infer the petitions were a
motivating factor. That suggestion fails to acknowledge that
plaintiff bears the burden of showing the trial court’s prevailing
party determination exceeded the bounds of reason. (Shaw,
supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 281.)
For the foregoing reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in
the trial court’s determination that defendants were prevailing
parties.
C. Attorney Fees Calculation
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in calculating
defendants’ attorney fees award on the civil harassment
petitions. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate error.
“A trial court’s exercise of discretion concerning an award
of attorney fees will not be reversed unless there is a manifest
abuse of discretion. [Citation.] ‘“The ‘experienced trial judge is
the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his
court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it
will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that
it is clearly wrong[’]—meaning that it abused its discretion.
[Citations.]”’ [Citation.] Accordingly, there is no question our
review must be highly deferential to the views of the trial court.
[Citation.]” (Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233,
1239 (Nichols).)

-- 13 of 31 --

14
In their attorney fees motion, defendants requested $84,150
in attorney fees and $370 in court costs.5 The trial court awarded
a reduced amount—$40,000—finding defendants’ attorneys’
hourly rates were too high and a large amount of time was spent
on unsuccessful settlement negotiations and the anti-SLAPP
motion, which would not have succeeded.
Plaintiff contends the trial court disregarded its findings in
reducing the requested attorney fees and court costs by $44,520
because time spent on the anti-SLAPP motion alone accounted
for $43,230 of the initial request. Thus, plaintiff concludes, the
trial court essentially reduced the attorney fees award by the
amount spent on the anti-SLAPP motion with no reductions for
the attorneys’ unreasonably high hourly rates or fruitless
settlement negotiations.
Plaintiff does not explain how he arrived at the $43,230
figure. His opening brief cites his opposition to defendants’
attorney fees motion, which in turn does not explain how plaintiff
arrived at the unmodified lodestar of $28,820 ($28,820 x 1.5 =
$43,230) for work on the anti-SLAPP motion referenced in the
opposition. “Counsel is obligated to refer us to the portions of the
record supporting his or her contentions on appeal.
[Citations.] . . . [W]e will not scour the record on our own in
search of supporting evidence. [Citation.] Where, as here,
5 In their reply in support of their motion, defendants
increased their request for attorney fees to $100,525, the
adjustment reflecting attorney time responding to plaintiff’s
opposition. The trial court based its attorney fees award on the
$84,150 figure in defendants’ attorney fees motion and not on the
$100,525 figure in their reply. Defendants do not claim on appeal
that the trial court erred.

-- 14 of 31 --

15
respondents have failed to cite that evidence, they cannot
complain when we find their arguments unpersuasive.
[Citation.]” (Sharabianlou v. Karp (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1133,
1149.) Plaintiff has failed to show the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding defendants’ attorney fees and court costs.
(Nichols, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1239.)
II. Defendants’ Cross-Appeal
Defendants contend the trial court erred in denying
attorney fees related to their anti-SLAPP motions on the ground
that defendants would not have prevailed on such motions.
Specifically, they argue the trial court erred in finding that the
anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to plaintiff’s civil harassment
petitions because defendants failed to establish the first step in
bringing a successful motion—i.e., that defendants engaged in
protected activity. Because defendants’ challenged activity
concerned a purely private issue and not a public issue or an
issue of public interest, the trial court did not err.6
“A SLAPP suit—a strategic lawsuit against public
participation—seeks to chill or punish a party’s exercise of
constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the
government for redress of grievances. [Citation.] The
Legislature enacted . . . section 425.16—known as the anti-
SLAPP statute—to provide a procedural remedy to dispose of
lawsuits that are brought to chill the valid exercise of
constitutional rights.” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048,
6 Accordingly, we do not reach defendants’ second contention
that plaintiff would not have prevailed on his civil harassment
petitions.

-- 15 of 31 --

16
1055-1056; § 425.16, subd. (b)(1)7.) The anti-SLAPP statute is to
be construed broadly, but not so broadly as to apply to purely
private transactions. (Garretson v. Post (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th
1508, 1524 (Garretson).) We review an order denying an anti-
SLAPP motion de novo. (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299,
325-326.)
“Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps.
First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim
arises from activity protected by section 425.16. [Citation.] If the
defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a
probability of success.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376,
384.)
At the first step, “[t]he moving defendant’s burden is to
demonstrate that the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains
were taken ‘in furtherance of the [defendant]’s right of petition or
free speech under the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue,’ as defined in the statute.
(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause,
Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.) Section 425.16, subdivision (e) sets
7 Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) provides, “A cause of
action against a person arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under
the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion
to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the claim.”

-- 16 of 31 --

17
forth four categories of conduct the anti-SLAPP statute protects.8
Defendants argue their demonstrations were conducted “in
connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest”
within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(3) and
(e)(4) because they were directed at plaintiff and his company
and were “related to the company’s residential real estate
business practices that displace residents and gentrify working-
class neighborhoods.” Further, the demonstrations concerned the
root causes of the great recession—large scale fix-and-flip real
estate practices.
“‘“The definition of ‘public interest’ within the meaning of
the anti-SLAPP statute has been broadly construed to include not
only governmental matters, but also private conduct that impacts
a broad segment of society and/or that affects a community in a
manner similar to that of a governmental entity.” [Citation.]’
(Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified
Port Dist. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1233, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 57;
8 Section 425.16, subdivision (e) provides, “As used in this
section, ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free
speech under the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral
statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or
judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by
law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement
or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in
connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other
conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right
of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection
with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”

-- 17 of 31 --

18
see Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th
468, 479, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 205.) ‘[T]he precise boundaries of a
public issue have not been defined. Nevertheless, in each case
where it was determined that a public issue existed, “the subject
statements either concerned a person or entity in the public eye
[citations], conduct that could directly affect a large number of
people beyond the direct participants [citations] or a topic of
widespread, public interest [citation].” [Citation.]’ (Hailstone v.
Martinez (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 728, 736-737, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d
347.)” (USA Waste of California, Inc. v. City of Irwindale (2010)
184 Cal.App.4th 53, 65 (USA Waste of California, Inc.).)
Defendants’ demonstrations at Wedgewood’s office building
and plaintiff’s residence focused on coercing Wedgewood into
selling back to Ms. Caamal her triplex at a reduced price. That
was a private matter concerning a former home owner and the
corporation that purchased her former home and not a public
issue or an issue of public interest. (Garretson, supra, 156
Cal.App.4th at p. 1524; USA Waste of California, Inc., supra, 184
Cal.App.4th at p. 65.) The private nature of the demonstrations
is made clear in defendants’ own declarations submitted in
support of the anti-SLAPP motions.
In Ms. Caamal’s declaration, she described the motivation
for the demonstrations at Wedgewood’s office building. As to the
first demonstration, she stated that she and her husband “and a
group of concerned citizens seeking to assist us, went to
Wedgewood’s office building in Redondo Beach and requested a
meeting with [plaintiff] to attempt to prevent the impending
eviction and negotiate a re-purchase of m[y] home.” (Italics
added.) As to the second demonstration, she stated that “as
Wedgewood was attempting to lock me and my husband from our

-- 18 of 31 --

19
home and continuing to ignor[e] letters from both myself and my
attorney, my husband and I, as well as another group of citizens
supporting our effort to repurchase our home, returned to
Wedgewood’s office and again requested a meeting with
[plaintiff].” (Italics added.) She said nothing about Wedgewood’s
residential real estate business practices displacing residents and
gentrifying working-class neighborhoods or about large scale fix-
and-flip real estate practices being a root cause of the great
recession.
Consistent with his wife’s stated purpose for the first
demonstration, Mr. Caamal stated in his declaration, “I
“accompanied my wife to Wedgewood’s office building . . . to
obtain an answer as to why Wedgewood was refusing to
negotiation [sic] with my wife in her attempt to repurchase our
home.” (Italics added.) Kuhns likewise stated in his declaration,
“I and others involved with ACCE accompanied Mr. and Ms.
Caamal to Wedgewood’s office building . . . to obtain an answer as
to why Wedgewood was refusing to negotiation [sic] with the
Camaals in their attempt to repurchase their home.” (Italics
added.) Neither Mr. Caamal nor Kuhns says anything in his
respective declaration about the purpose of the demonstrations
relating to issues of displacement of residents due to residential
real estate business practices, gentrification, or large scale fix-
and-flip real estate practices leading to the great recession.
Even a third-party participant, Saucedo, the National
Lawyers Guild legal observer, described in his declaration the
purpose for the demonstration at plaintiff’s residence as a private
matter limited to the Camaal’s dispute with Wedgwood. He
stated that ACCE organized the demonstration at plaintiff’s
residence “to protest unfair and deceptive practices used by

-- 19 of 31 --

20
Wedgewood . . . and its agents in acquiring the real property of
Pablo and Mercedes Caamal, and evicting them from their home.”
(Italics added.) That motivation was purely personal to the
Caamals and did not address any societal issues of residential
displacement, gentrification, or the root causes of the great
recession.
Based on this record, we agree with the trial court’s
conclusion that defendants’ activities were not in connection with
a public issue or an issue of public interest.9 In this regard,
Thomas v. Quintero (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 635 (Thomas) is
instructive. Defendants argue that Thomas supports their claim
they engaged in protected activity because the Thomas court
found that protest activities against a landlord by a tenant and a
group of activists were covered by the anti-SLAPP statute in that
particular case. But the facts of Thomas demonstrate precisely
why defendants’ activities here were not protected.
In Thomas, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at page 654, defendant
Quintero was a tenant in a building owned by plaintiff Thomas.
They became “embroiled in a number of landlord-tenant disputes,
which culminated in an eviction proceeding.” (Ibid.) Quintero
was then put in touch with a group called Campaign for Renters
Rights (CRR) through which he met many other former tenants
of Thomas. (Ibid.) Quintero thus learned that Thomas was “a
‘notorious landlord’ whose pattern of unjust evictions throughout
9 The dissent (post at p. 4) agrees that assisting the Caamals
was “the most immediate objective” of the defendants’ activities
but posits it was not “the only objective.” The record, however,
lacks evidence that would satisfy defendants’ burden to
demonstrate they had some other objective “with connections to
broader issues of interest to the public,” as the dissent surmises.

-- 20 of 31 --

21
Oakland was ‘the first big public case of the campaign in Oakland
for a Just Cause of Eviction Ordinance.’” (Ibid.) Indeed, CRR
previously “had helped to organize 21 former tenant families who
were allegedly owed more than $35,000 in unpaid security
deposits by Thomas” and “claim[ed] to have contacted more than
100 former tenants of Thomas’s.” (Id. at pp. 654-655.) According
to CRR materials, “Thomas had filed evictions against 142
families over a five-year period,” and “he was successfully sued by
the City of San Rafael for $19,000 when he failed to initiate
repairs of rental units he owned there.” (Id. at p. 655.) After
Quintero and a group appeared at Thomas’s church to protest,
Thomas petitioned for a civil restraining order, claiming that
Quintero and his group “harassed church members, blocked
entrances, and trespassed on church property, with the stated
purpose of causing extreme embarrassment and severe emotional
distress” to him. (Id. at p. 654.)
The court in Thomas, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at page 661,
held that Quintero’s activities were protected by the anti-SLAPP
statute, finding that, “while his private interests were certainly
in issue, there were much broader community interests at stake
in the protests.” Specifically, the court reasoned that the protests
involved issues of public interest because Thomas was “accused of
wrongfully evicting and improperly retaining the security
deposits of more than 100 tenants” and was “accused of a pattern
of refusing to make needed repairs to his rental properties,
allegedly resulting in legal action being taken against him by
several municipalities.” (Ibid.) The court found that such
“allegations against Thomas implicate both a concern for the
stability of the rental market in the affected community, as well
as intimate the threat of potential urban blight associated with

-- 21 of 31 --

22
the failure to make necessary repairs to buildings in the
neighborhood.” (Ibid.) Moreover, the court noted that the
“protest activities were not an end to themselves, but were
coupled with a genuine effort to engage the members of Thomas’s
congregation in discussing and finding a solution to the disputes,”
namely, “there was a direct call for public involvement in an
ongoing controversy, dispute, or discussion with respect to
Thomas’s past and continued property management practices.”
(Ibid.)
Here, by contrast, we do not find in the record any basis to
conclude plaintiff was a public figure or had gained widespread
notoriety throughout the community for his real estate activities.
Nor do we find any basis to believe the Caamals’ private dispute
with plaintiff was one of many similar disputes shared in
common with members of the community.10 The record is also
10 In their cross-appeal reply brief, defendants state plaintiff’s
company “has been accused of unlawful conduct throughout the
state” and claim “the record includes accusations” that the
company harassed and evicted “many” immigrant working class
families, directed its employees to aggressively target foreclosed
homes and refrain from repairing them, and participated in
various unlawful and fraudulent schemes. To support that claim,
however, defendants cite only to two civil complaints filed by two
separate homeowners involving two individual properties located
in San Francisco. Those complaints are appended as exhibits to a
request for judicial notice, which it appears the trial court never
granted. Even if properly before this court, these two additional,
isolated instances do not transform the Caamals’ private dispute
into a public one. (See Rivero v. American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (2003) 105
Cal.App.4th 913, 925 (Rivero) [supervisor’s conduct toward eight

-- 22 of 31 --

23
devoid of any governmental complaints, actions, or disputes with
plaintiff or his company, which might be indicative of a broader
public issue with respect to plaintiff’s house-flipping conduct.
Further, as discussed above in defendants’ declarations, the
purpose of the protests was to assist the Caamals in getting their
house back, not to engage other members of the community or to
call for public involvement in finding a solution to purported
issues concerning real estate practices. These important
differences from the circumstances in Thomas, supra, 126
Cal.App.4th 635, underscore exactly why the demonstrations
regarding the Caamals’ home was not protected activity
concerning a public issue or issue of public interest.
Finally, defendants contend that the “wide-spread” media
attention their demonstrations received shows that the
demonstrations were matters of public interest. While the fact of
media coverage may be indicative of a public matter, “[m]edia
coverage cannot by itself . . . create an issue of public interest
within the statutory meaning.” (Zhao v. Wong (1996) 48
Cal.App.4th 1114, 1121, disapproved on other grounds in Briggs
v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106;
see also Rivero, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 926 [“If the mere
publication of information in a union newsletter distributed to its
numerous members were sufficient to make that information a
matter of public interest, the public-issue limitation would be
substantially eroded, thus seriously undercutting the obvious
goal of the Legislature that the public-issue requirement have a
limiting effect”].) For the reasons discussed above, defendants’
protests concerned the Caamals’ private dispute with plaintiff
custodians in the union did not rise to the level of a public issue
involving unlawful workplace activity].)

-- 23 of 31 --

24
and his company. The fact that it attracted some media attention
did not convert a purely private matter into one of public interest.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed. The parties are to bear their own
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
KIN, J.
I concur:
MOOR, J.
 Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

-- 24 of 31 --

Geiser v. Kuhns et al.
B279738
BAKER, Acting P. J., Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
We hear a substantial number of appeals involving anti-
SLAPP challenges to lawsuits that are not core, paradigmatic
SLAPPs. (Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 809,
815-816 [“[W]hile SLAPP suits ‘masquerade as ordinary lawsuits’
the conceptual features which reveal them as SLAPP’s are that
they are generally meritless suits brought by large private
interests to deter common citizens from exercising their political
or legal rights or to punish them for doing so”] (Wilcox),
disapproved on another ground in Equilon Enterprises v.
Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53; Sen. Com. on
Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 515 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) as
amended May 1, 2003, pp. 5-6 [quoting Wilcox and describing it
as “set[ting] forth a description of the quintessential SLAPP
suit”].) But here we appear to have one, and yet the majority
does not recognize it for what it is.
Most of the key facts that reveal plaintiff Gregory Geiser’s
civil harassment suits targeted free speech and petitioning rights
are undisputed. It is undisputed the lawsuits Geiser filed against
former homeowners Pablo and Mercedes Caamal, as well as Peter
Kuhns, the Los Angeles Director of a local organization Alliance

-- 25 of 31 --

2
of Californians for Community Empowerment (ACCE),1 arose
from their decision to organize and participate in a public protest
on the sidewalk outside Geiser’s home.2 There is no dispute that
it was not just the Caamals who participated in the protest, but
some 25 to 30 others as well, including ACCE members and a
legal observer from the National Lawyers Guild. There is no
dispute that months after Geiser filed his petitions seeking to
restrain any further “harassment,” his own company put out a
press release decrying ACCE’s “portray[al of] the Caamal family
as victims, while exploiting a very emotional issue without any
serious attempt . . . to resolve the situation.” And there is no
dispute that after the Caamals and Kuhns responded to Geiser’s
lawsuits by filing anti-SLAPP motions, Geiser dismissed the suits
rather than seeking vindication on the merits in court. These are
many of the hallmarks of vintage SLAPP conduct.
The majority opinion concludes otherwise because it does
not adhere to the statutory command, and our Supreme Court’s
repeated direction, that the anti-SLAPP statute (and its
descriptions of protected activity) must be construed broadly.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (a); Barry v. State Bar of
California (2017) 2 Cal.5th 318, 321; City of Montebello v.
Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 419-420.) The majority
acknowledges Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 provides an
1 ACCE, according to Kuhns, is an entity whose various
missions include “sav[ing] homes from foreclosures and the fight
against displacement of long[-]term residents in our
communities.”
2 Kuhns describes the protest as a one-hour “residential
picket” during which the participants “held signs, sang songs,
chanted, and gave short speeches, all from the sidewalk.”

-- 26 of 31 --

3
anti-SLAPP remedy to those engaged in making “any written or
oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a
public forum in connection with an issue of public interest.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subds. (b)(1), (e)(3).) But the majority
reasons the protest on the sidewalk outside Geiser’s home was
not undertaken “in connection with” an issue of public interest
because it was about “a private matter”—pointing to snippets of
declarations submitted by the Caamals and Kuhns that discuss
efforts made days before the protest to get Wedgewood LLC
(Wedgewood)—Geiser’s distressed home purchasing company—to
cease eviction efforts and permit the Caamals to repurchase the
property. The majority’s rationale is unpersuasive for at least
two reasons.
First, as already foreshadowed, the Kuhns and Caamal
declarations on which the majority relies describe the motivation
for earlier visits to Wedgewood’s offices rather than the protest
outside Geiser’s home. There is good reason to think the 25 to 30
person group protesting outside Geiser’s home would have had
broader aims than the groups that participated in the earlier
office visits. Indeed, the National Lawyers Guild representative
who was present for the sidewalk protest (not the earlier office
visits) tends to confirm this; his declaration states ACCE
organized the demonstration [outside Geiser’s home] “to protest
unfair and deceptive practices used by Wedgewood, LLC . . . and
its agents in acquiring the real property of [the Caamals], and
evicting them from their home.” The reference to “practices”
indicates conduct that includes but extends beyond the Caamals’
own situation, especially when combined with Kuhns’s
description of ACCE’s mission (noted ante).

-- 27 of 31 --

4
Second, and more fundamentally, it is no surprise the
declarations include language that describes the support of
“concerned citizens” for the Caamals and a desire to help them
avoid eviction—that was the most immediate objective of the
protest outside Geiser’s home. That is not to say it was the only
objective, however, and prior anti-SLAPP decisions have
recognized protected speech and petitioning activity is often
undertaken in service of individual causes but with connections
to broader issues of interest to the public. (See, e.g., Hunter v.
CBS Broadcasting Inc. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1527 [“[T]he
proper inquiry is not whether CBS’s selection of a weather anchor
was itself a matter of public interest; the question is whether
such conduct was ‘in connection with’ a matter of public
interest”]; Hecimovich v. Encinal School Parent Teacher
Organization (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 450, 454-455 [fourth grade
basketball coach’s suit arising from parent coaching complaints
implicates an issue of public interest]; Cross v. Cooper (2011) 197
Cal.App.4th 357, 371, 375 [current home tenants’ disclosure to
prospective home purchaser that a sex offender lived nearby was
speech undertaken in connection with an issue of public
interest].) That is the case here, and the presence of at least
several people with no discernible preexisting relationship to the
Caamals for a protest at 9:00 p.m. on a Wednesday evening bears
this out.3 This was a community protest where the only apparent
shared tie among everyone present was the desire to engage in or
facilitate public speech directed at those believed to be engaged in
3 Even Wedgewood’s own press release tends to confirm the
broader connections to issues of public interest. It stated that for
ACCE, “making headlines and political gain[ ] far outweighs
helping the Caamals return to their home.”

-- 28 of 31 --

5
unfair (or at least greedy and callous) practices that displace
long-term community residents. When construed broadly, that is
activity “in connection with an issue of public interest.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subds. (b)(1), (e)(3).)
The conclusion I draw here is not novel. To the contrary,
the legal ground in this case has already been plowed by the First
District Court of Appeal, which reached a conclusion opposite the
majority’s on notably similar facts. (Thomas v. Quintero (2005)
126 Cal.App.4th 635 (Thomas).) In Thomas, the Court of Appeal
found the anti-SLAPP statute applied to a civil harassment
petition filed by a landlord against a tenant who, with the help of
a community renters’ organization, organized a sidewalk protest
against the landlord. (Id. at pp. 653-655.) In arriving at its
holding, the Thomas court found it particularly significant that
the tenant “did not act alone, but in conjunction with planned
demonstrations against [the landlord] by a nonprofit group
purportedly dedicated to upholding tenant rights. Thus, [the
court concluded,] while [the tenant’s] private interests were
certainly in issue, there were much broader community interests
at stake in the protests.” (Id. at p. 661.)
The majority attempts to distinguish Thomas on its facts,
arguing there was evidence the landlord there was accused of
wrongful behavior beyond the tenant in question. The attempt is
unpersuasive. There is likewise evidence in this case that
Wedgewood was named in complaints filed by other homeowners,
which the majority mentions in a footnote, and quibbling about
precisely how much other wrongful conduct evidence there is here
as compared to Thomas unjustifiably elevates insignificant

-- 29 of 31 --

6
factual distinctions over the many salient factual similarities
between that case and this one.4
I see no need to elaborate further. Our Supreme Court has
granted review in a case that will likely provide further guidance
on the scope of the Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(3) category of protected activity (Rand Resources,
LLC v. City of Carson (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1080, review
granted Sept. 21, 2016, S235735 (Rand)), and the decision in
Rand may well require us to reconsider the result here. It
suffices for present purposes to state (a) the majority correctly
rejects Geiser’s challenges to the attorney fees award the trial
court made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, (b)
the trial court’s determination that the anti-SLAPP motions
would not have succeeded for lack of statutorily protected activity
should be reversed, and (c) the case should be remanded so that
the trial court can consider in the first instance the question that
4 Insofar as the result reached by the majority can be
attributed to a concern about the need for appropriate limits on
the “issue of public interest” criterion (Code Civ. Proc, § 425.16,
subd. (e)(3))—i.e., foreclosing the possibility that “public interest”
might be defined so broadly that essentially any speech in public
would be swept in for protection—the concern is unfounded on
these facts. It is undisputed that, in addition to Wedgewood’s
own press release, several established media organizations
reported on the controversy involving the Caamals’ home. There
is no suggestion this media attention was attributable to
anything other than editorial judgments that the matter
involving Wedgewood’s practices and the Caamals represented an
“issue in which the public is interested” (Nygård, Inc. v. Uusi-
Kerttula (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1042). The evidence of
such attention cabins the scope of Code of Civil Procedure section
425.16, subdivision (e)(3).

-- 30 of 31 --

7
arises at the second step of anti-SLAPP analysis—and to
recalculate the attorney fees award if it finds Geiser had no
probability of prevailing on the civil harassment suits he opted to
dismiss.
BAKER, Acting P. J.

-- 31 of 31 --