P. v. Sprewell

Filed 6/29/18 P. v. Sprewell CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
RULIE CHEVEZ SPREWELL,
Defendant and Appellant.
B280027
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA092429)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Judith L. Meyer, Judge. Affirmed.
Nancy J. King, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Margaret E. Maxwell, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Marc A. Kohm, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.

-- 1 of 28 --

2
A Los Angeles County jury convicted defendant and
appellant Rulie Sprewell (defendant) on multiple counts of
pimping and pandering, and three counts of forced oral
copulation. The jury deadlocked on a charge of human
trafficking, and the prosecution later dismissed the charge. We
consider whether defendant’s conviction must be reversed
because his retained attorney—who defendant unsuccessfully
attempted to relieve on the eve of trial because of a payment
dispute—provided ineffective assistance of counsel during trial.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Initial Proceedings
The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged
defendant in an eight-count information with violations of Penal
Code section 236.1, subdivision (a)1 (human trafficking involving
a minor); section 266h, subdivision (b)(1) (pimping a minor over
age 16); section 266i, subdivision (b)(1) (pandering by
encouraging a minor over age 16); section 288a, subdivision
(c)(2)(A) (forcible oral copulation—three counts); section 266h,
subdivision (a) (pimping); and section 266i, subdivision (a)(1)
(pandering by procuring).
Defendant was represented by retained counsel at the
preliminary hearing on the charges. Later, a bar panel attorney
took over defendant’s defense. Then, in September 2014, nearly
two years after the initiation of criminal proceedings, defendant
elected to represent himself after being advised of the dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation. Almost a year after
that, in August 2015, defendant retained C. Reginald Taylor
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

-- 2 of 28 --

3
(Taylor) to represent him and relinquished his self-represented
status.
Roughly six months later, when the parties appeared in
court the day before trial was to begin, Taylor asked the court to
continue the trial. Taylor conceded he had not filed a written
motion for a continuance, but he told the court he was not
prepared because he had been out of town the past week. The
trial court concluded Taylor had not shown good cause, denied
the continuance request, and ordered the parties to return the
following day for trial.
In court the next morning, defendant asked to speak to the
trial court outside the presence of the prosecution. Defendant
stated he was “at an impasse” with Taylor because defendant
owed Taylor “quite a bit of money.” As defendant explained it,
Taylor was “not really angry, you know, but it’s—it’s
business . . . so I don’t think it would be wise to . . . proceed with
him where maybe his . . . mind wouldn’t be totally on my
case . . . .” Defendant asked the court to reappoint counsel. The
trial court asked Taylor if he wished to respond, and Taylor
replied, “I have nothing to add.”
With the prosecutor back in the courtroom, the court
advised defendant was requesting reappointment of counsel. The
prosecutor objected, arguing the request was untimely and
highlighting all the various changes in counsel that had occurred
during the three-plus years the case had been pending. The
prosecutor also emphasized she had a material witness in
custody who would be prejudiced by continuing the case. The
court again invited Taylor to make “any comments you wish to
add to the record” and Taylor declined to comment. The trial
court then denied defendant’s request for reappointment of

-- 3 of 28 --

4
counsel and ordered Taylor “to stay on this case and to do this
trial.”2
B. Trial
1. Jury selection
Before the parties began jury selection, defendant asked
the court to move him “into custody in the back” of the
courthouse, explaining he did not “agree with any of this” and
was “not going to be peaceful in here.” The court informed
defendant he was welcome to stay in the courtroom and told
defendant that if he wanted to “go into the back” that was up to
him.
Defendant made no election, and the prospective jurors
entered the courtroom. At that point, defendant exclaimed: “Get
me out of here. Lies and—and bullshit— [¶] . . . [¶] A bunch of
lies and stuff. Believe all these lies. That’s why I don’t want to
be part of this because they’re lying and—and railroading people
here. This is a railroad system. You people should wake up and
see it for what’s going on.” Following this outburst, defendant
was escorted out of the courtroom and jury selection proceeded.3
2 After the court denied defendant’s request for
reappointment of counsel, defendant asked to reassert his right
to represent himself. The court asked defendant if he was ready
for trial, and defendant said he was not. The court denied the
self-representation request as untimely, and defendant does not
challenge this ruling.
3 On two occasions during the ensuing voir dire of the
prospective jurors, Taylor and the court’s bailiff spoke to
defendant and he confirmed he did not want to be present.

-- 4 of 28 --

5
During voir dire, the trial court examined the prospective
jurors, partly through the use of a short juror questionnaire, and
allotted 10-15 minutes (per each group of jurors examined) for
counsel to ask questions if either side so chose. The prosecution
elected to ask questions of the prospective jurors. Taylor did not,
but he raised several objections to certain questions and
statements by the prosecution and the court concerning his
client’s absence from the courtroom (the objections were
overruled). When it came time to challenge jurors, for cause and
peremptorily, Taylor raised multiple for-cause challenges and
exercised ten peremptory strikes.4
Before the jury was impaneled, and outside the presence of
the prospective jurors, the trial court asked Taylor if he would
like to move to bifurcate trial as to the prior convictions alleged
against defendant. Taylor responded, “Not at this time, Your
Honor.” The court asked Taylor, “Why would you not make a
motion for bifurcation?” Taylor responded, “I’m not making any
comments at this time.” This response triggered an
admonishment from the court, warning Taylor the court could
start contempt proceedings if it felt he was willfully violating or
neglecting his duty to his client. Taylor then made a motion to
bifurcate the trial, which the court granted.
4 During later post-trial proceedings, the trial court
remarked Taylor “did not take a single note during the entire
trial, nor during jury voir dire . . . .” The court, however, also
observed Taylor’s performance during jury selection indicated he
was able to recall what the various individual jurors said “almost
with a photographic memory.”

-- 5 of 28 --

6
Defendant returned to the courtroom before opening
statements (the prosecution made a statement; Taylor reserved)
and continued to be present for the remainder of the trial.
2. The evidence of crimes against P.D.
a. P.D.’s testimony
At the outset of P.D.’s testimony, she confirmed she worked
as a prostitute “a long time ago” but professed to have a lack of
memory when asked for various specifics, including her age at
the time.5 The prosecution confronted P.D. with a handwritten
statement, bearing an August 2010 date, that she authenticated
as her own. P.D. reviewed what she wrote and acknowledged it
was true, but she stated she could not remember what happened
to her in 2010 without looking at the statement. Over Taylor’s
multiple objections, the trial court permitted the prosecution to
read P.D.’s written statement to the jury.
According to P.D.’s statement, she met a man named
“Bossy Ross” (whom P.D. later identified in court as defendant)
when she was 15 or 16 years old. They became friends, and
defendant asked her to work for him as a prostitute but she
refused. A couple of weeks after she turned 18, however, another
prostitute working for defendant asked P.D. to come home with
her and she agreed. P.D. worked for defendant as a prostitute
thereafter, and he instructed her on how much to charge for
5 The prosecution, for instance, asked whether P.D.
remembered “jumping into a car, asking a man for help, and that
man turning out to be a police officer.” Taylor objected to the
question as leading, the objection was overruled, and P.D.
answered “no.”

-- 6 of 28 --

7
various sex acts. P.D.’s statement identified the location where
she and defendant lived at the time and the type of car defendant
drove. The statement also described defendant’s violent behavior
toward P.D. including on the day she wrote the statement:
“[Defendant] always pushed and shoved me so he wouldn’t have
to hit me in my face, but early this morning around 1:30 a.m., he
swung, and I put my arm up so he wouldn’t hit my face. I was
tryin’ [to] block him from hitting . . . my face because he already
gave me marks on my arm, and he been doing this since he found
out I was pregnant.”
During the remainder of the prosecution’s direct
examination after being confronted with her written statement,
P.D. confirmed she engaged in sex acts for money and gave the
money she made to defendant because “he was [her] pimp” and
she “had to.” She also provided additional details concerning her
work for defendant as a prostitute, including where and when she
would solicit customers. P.D. also confirmed that on the date she
wrote her statement in August 2010, she got into a car, asked the
man driving for help, and the man turned out to be a police
officer. P.D. testified the officer took her to a police station, and a
short time later, P.D. identified defendant in a “six-pack”
photographic lineup.6
Taylor made various objections during the prosecution’s
direct examination of P.D., some of which were sustained and
others overruled. When invited to cross-examine P.D., Taylor
6 The photographic lineup police showed to P.D.—bearing
her identification of defendant as the person who made her
commit sex acts for money—was admitted as an exhibit at trial.

-- 7 of 28 --

8
declined, telling the trial court he had no questions for the
witness.
b. police officer testimony
Michael Klee, the undercover Los Angeles Police
Department officer whom P.D. asked for help, also testified at
trial. He told the jury P.D. approached his unmarked car one
early morning in August 2010 and, while crying, told him she
needed to get out of the area because her pimp had just hit her
because she was four months pregnant. P.D. got into Officer
Klee’s car, and Klee initially thought P.D. might just be
attempting to get a free car ride. P.D. seemed adamant about
getting defendant arrested, however, so Klee identified himself as
a police officer and asked P.D. where her pimp was. P.D.
identified defendant’s car in a nearby 7-Eleven parking lot,7 and
he was arrested. A subsequent search of defendant’s vehicle
turned up women’s clothing and condoms.
Taylor cross-examined Officer Klee. He first asked
questions in an attempt to elicit testimony that the district
attorney’s office initially refused to file charges against defendant
due to witness credibility issues. The prosecution objected and
the trial court sustained the objection and directed Taylor not to
further inquire on that topic. Cross-examination resumed, and
Taylor asked questions (1) to establish Officer Klee saw no marks
7 Officer Klee testified that when P.D. identified defendant’s
car, she told him (Officer Klee) that if defendant found her he
would kill her. As discussed post, defendant contends Taylor was
constitutionally ineffective in part because he did not object to
this testimony as hearsay.

-- 8 of 28 --

9
or bruises on P.D. that would corroborate her account of having
been hit, and (2) to emphasize Officer Klee’s testimony that he
initially thought P.D. might simply have been trying to get a free
ride, which was something that Officer Klee agreed “happens”
when working undercover to investigate prostitution.
3. The evidence of crimes against V.R.
a. V.R.’s testimony
Another young woman, V.R., also testified as a prosecution
witness. She first worked as an underage prostitute for another
pimp, but when she was 16 years old, defendant approached her
outside of a McDonald’s. V.R. recognized him as “Bossy Ross”
based on his reputation on the streets and because she recognized
the car he was driving. Defendant asked V.R. if she wanted to
work for him as a prostitute, and she agreed and got in his car.
V.R. explained she felt scared and “forced” to get in defendant’s
car because of “the aggression in his tone” of voice.
Defendant drove V.R. to a street corner, and she got out of
the car at his direction and stood on the corner trying to “catch a
date” (which V.R. defined as “do[ing] an exchange for sex and
money”). V.R. did so because she was scared defendant would
beat her if she refused.
After that day, V.R. worked as a prostitute for defendant
for three months. Defendant determined how much V.R. charged
for certain sex acts, the hours she worked every day, and where
she worked to solicit customers. Each time V.R. made money
from performing a particular sex act, V.R. gave the money to
defendant immediately and kept none for herself. V.R. had a
“quota” or “trap,” meaning a set amount of money she was

-- 9 of 28 --

10
supposed to make each day, and defendant hit V.R. in the face
with either an open or closed hand if she did not meet her quotas.
During the three months V.R. worked for defendant in
2011, she also engaged in sex acts with defendant at his
insistence. She testified she orally copulated defendant more
than once per week while she was with him. V.R. was afraid
defendant would hit her if she refused to comply with his
demands for sex.
V.R. ceased working for defendant when she was arrested
by the police. While in custody, she provided information to law
enforcement about defendant and her experience with him.
Investigating officers drove V.R. to one of the motels where she
said she stayed with defendant, and upon arriving, V.R.
identified defendant’s green Mercedes in the parking lot. Police
officers also showed V.R. a photographic lineup and she circled
defendant’s picture to indicate he was the “Bossy Ross” for whom
she worked as a prostitute.
During the prosecution’s direct examination of V.R., Taylor
made over 30 objections, many of which were sustained. Taylor
also cross-examined V.R. at significant length, focusing mainly on
V.R.’s year-plus work for her prior pimp, the initial meeting
between V.R. and defendant at McDonald’s (including why she
felt forced to go with defendant despite being outside in a public
area), and whether V.R. was “on automatic,” meaning engaging
in prostitution without compulsion from a pimp.
b. police officer testimony
Long Beach Police Department Detective Satwan Johnson
testified as an expert on human trafficking and prostitution; he
also described his interactions with V.R. after she was arrested.

-- 10 of 28 --

11
Detective Johnson interviewed V.R. at juvenile hall, and she
described her history with defendant and with the pimp she
worked for previously. He later took V.R. out of juvenile hall and
drove her around in an attempt to identify locations where she
worked and the motel where she stayed with defendant.
Detective Johnson confirmed V.R. identified the motel where she
and defendant stayed, as well as defendant’s car, which happened
to be parked at the motel at the time. The detective spoke to the
motel’s clerk and obtained copies of the motel registration card
and driver’s license associated with that car, both of which were
in defendant’s name and introduced in evidence at trial.
Taylor cross-examined Detective Johnson. He elicited
testimony that there were two motel clerks on duty and a phone
in the clerks’ office (presumably to establish V.R. could have
sought help while staying at the motel). Taylor also asked
questions, invoking the detective’s training and experience, to
establish both that it was not unusual for prostitutes to ask
customers for help (again, presumably to establish V.R. could
have left defendant if she wanted to) and that V.R. was “already
indoctrinated in the game” by the time she met defendant.
4. Taylor’s closing argument and the jury’s
verdicts
At the close of all the evidence (there was no defense case),
Taylor made a motion to dismiss several of the charges against
defendant pursuant to section 1118.1. The trial court denied the
motion. The attorneys and the trial court conferred concerning
jury instructions, and the trial proceeded to closing argument.
Taylor began his closing argument with a rather long
recitation of dialog from a scene in The Godfather, one where a

-- 11 of 28 --

12
man whose daughter is beaten asks Don Corleone for “justice”
beyond the criminal sentence imposed on the culprits and Don
Corleone refuses. Taylor told the jury that the prosecution of
defendant was similar; the prosecution was seeking punishment
beyond that called for by defendant’s actions.
Taylor conceded defendant had pimped both women. He
told the jury: “I’m not going to come in here and insult your
intelligence and say, ‘This man is not a pimp.’ [¶] He’s a pimp.
It’s what he does. That’s how he earns his money. He’s charged
with pimping. He’s charged with pandering. And as [the
prosecutor] mentioned, I didn’t ask questions–any questions
about that because he’s a pimp. That’s what he does.” Taylor
also stated defendant “maybe” or “probably” forced V.R. to orally
copulate him.
But Taylor argued the “number of crimes” charged by the
prosecution against defendant was “too much” and “government
excess.” Taylor argued the testimony concerning the oral
copulation charges was unclear and the prosecution was inviting
the jury to “speculate” it occurred three separate times over three
months to support the “wide net in the way it’s charged” (i.e., as
three separate counts rather than just one charge). And Taylor
specifically attacked the prosecution’s case on the human
trafficking charge, contending the jury should go through the
elements carefully because defendant had not deprived V.R. of
her liberty and charging him with human trafficking was “going
too far.” Taylor acknowledged defendant was not a “socially-
honorable person” but emphasized: “[D]espite the fact that we

-- 12 of 28 --

13
might not like him or not like what he does, we’re looking for
justice. We don’t . . . want to exceed the bounds.”8
The jury found defendant guilty on the charges of pimping
(counts two and seven), pandering (counts three and eight), and
forced oral copulation (counts four through six).9 The jury,
however, was unable to reach a verdict on count one, the human
trafficking charge (with the jurors divided ten to two in favor of
guilt), and the prosecution later dismissed the charge. The trial
court found true a prior conviction alleged to come within the
meaning of both the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i),
1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
8 Immediately after the attorneys completed closing
argument and the jury left the courtroom to deliberate, the trial
court remarked: “I just want to say thank you to the attorneys. I
was exceptionally impressed by both of you throughout this trial,
and exceptionally impressed by the closing arguments by both
sides, for whatever that’s worth.”
9 Prior to delivering their verdicts, the jurors sent two
questions to the trial court, both of which corresponded to points
made during the defense closing argument. The first asked “why
is it a[n oral copulation] count for each month [rather
than] . . . for each act,” and the second asked what verdict the
jury should return on the human trafficking count if all the jurors
could not agree whether defendant deprived V.R. of her personal
liberty. The court answered the questions after consulting
counsel for both sides.

-- 13 of 28 --

14
C. Motion for New Trial Arguing Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel
Immediately after the prior conviction trial, the trial court
relieved Taylor and granted defendant’s request to again
represent himself. The court designated the same bar panel
attorney defendant had previously as standby counsel, and
eventually, defendant relinquished his self-represented status
and the court appointed standby counsel to take over as counsel
of record.
Prior to sentencing, appointed counsel filed a motion for
new trial. Among other arguments, the motion contended Taylor
provided constitutionally deficient assistance during trial.
Appointed counsel and defendant submitted declarations with
the new trial motion contending Taylor was ineffective, among
other reasons, for failing to personally voir dire the prospective
jurors, declining to question P.D., apparently opting not to take
notes during trial, and conceding defendant’s guilt on some of the
charges during closing argument. No declaration from Taylor
was submitted with the new trial motion.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion for new trial. As
to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court
acknowledged it had to have a “strong, stern conversation with
[Taylor] about ineffective assistance of counsel” at the outset in
connection with his initial failure to make a motion to bifurcate
trial, but Taylor ultimately made the motion and the court
concluded his performance thereafter did not fall beneath
constitutional standards. As to jury selection, for example, the
trial court noted it “give[s] a pretty thorough voir dire” and the
prosecution’s voir dire was “extremely thorough,” such that
Taylor may have reasonably concluded he did not need to do any

-- 14 of 28 --

15
additional voir dire.10 As to Taylor’s decisions in questioning
witnesses and delivering closing argument, the court believed
Taylor made reasonable tactical decisions and “pick[ed] his
battles” because the victims were “very credible” and the
“evidence was overwhelming.” With regard to closing argument
in particular, the court opined that “sometimes a very strong
tactical decision is you’ve got to concede some things” and Taylor
“made a very strong tactical decision—one that I think is difficult
to do as a defense attorney, but I think it is one that I thought
actually was an appropriate tactic in this case . . . .”
The trial court sentenced defendant to 58 years and four
months in prison. The sentence was comprised of a high term of
16 years each, consecutive, for the three forced oral copulation
10 The court elaborated: “What I’ve also found—again, the
record can’t reflect this, but it was something that I noticed
distinctly during this trial—because you’re right . . . all
throughout this trial, in the back of my mind, is ineffective
assistance of counsel. [¶] There’s a difference between
ineffective assistance and maybe just not hiring the best attorney
in the world. So in my mind, I won’t deny I was concerned, and
you’re right, I did not see—and [defendant] is right in his
declaration . . . Taylor [did not] write any notes, and I found that
concerning and disturbing. [¶] However, I also found, very
interesting, that when he asked to approach for cause, that he
could recite—almost with a photographic memory—everything
that juror had said, and I was surprised by that. And it was
something that I realized—at least in my mind—based on
observations and although the record doesn’t show it—he was
clearly listening to each juror and knew everything about them.
[¶] Hard to reflect in a record, distinctly an observation of this
court, one I wouldn’t share or put part of this record if I didn’t
sincerely feel that.”

-- 15 of 28 --

16
convictions (as the result of doubling pursuant to the Three
Strikes law), plus two midterm consecutive sentences of two
years and eight months for each of the pimping convictions, plus
two midterm concurrent sentences of eight years for the
pandering charges, plus five years for the section 667, subdivision
(a)(1) prior conviction allegation.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant’s sole challenge to the judgment of conviction is
the claim that Taylor provided ineffective assistance of counsel
during trial. Defendant does not challenge the trial court’s ruling
on the motion for new trial per se; rather, he presents the claim
as a freestanding argument for reversal. We apply the well-
established framework for evaluating such an ineffective
assistance claim on direct appeal and conclude defendant’s
arguments fail under that governing standard.
Specifically, defendant challenges four aspects of Taylor’s
performance at trial. He states Taylor was ineffective for (1)
failing to take notes or question prospective jurors during jury
selection; (2) opting not to cross-examine P.D., nor to object to
related hearsay testimony given by Officer Klee; (3) conceding
defendant’s guilt on some of the charges during closing argument;
and (4) being discourteous during trial, or as defendant puts it,
engaging in “misconduct.” For reasons we shall describe,11 we
believe there could be valid tactical reasons for all or nearly all of
these identified actions or omissions, and that conclusion is fatal
11 By organizational imperative, we discuss these points
individually. The result we reach, however, accounts for their
collective impact at trial.

-- 16 of 28 --

17
to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised on direct
appeal. Furthermore, for many of these specific claims,
defendant makes no showing of how he was prejudiced by
counsel’s performance, or raises at most a generalized assertion
of prejudice. That too is reason to reject his appellate
contentions.
A. The Law Governing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims on Direct Appeal
“‘In assessing claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel, we consider whether counsel’s representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms and whether the defendant suffered prejudice
to a reasonable probability, that is, a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome. (Strickland v. Washington
(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694[ ]; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d
171, 217[ ].)’” (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1189
(Carter).) We presume “‘counsel’s performance fell within the
wide range of professional competence and that counsel’s actions
and inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial
strategy. Defendant thus bears the burden of establishing
constitutionally inadequate assistance of counsel. [Citations.]’”
(Ibid.)
Here, no declaration from Taylor accompanied defendant’s
motion for new trial. We are thus left with a record identical to
the records we often find in cases raising ineffective assistance of
counsel arguments on direct appeal—one that does not reveal
why trial counsel pursued certain courses of action and not
others. Under these circumstances, it is “particularly difficult”
for a defendant to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel

-- 17 of 28 --

18
claim. (People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1212; see also
People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198 [when the record on
appeal does not explain why counsel chose to act as he or she did,
“a reviewing court has no basis on which to determine whether
counsel had a legitimate reason for making a particular decision,
or whether counsel’s actions or failure to take certain actions
were objectively unreasonable”]; People v. Mendoza Tello (1997)
15 Cal.4th 264, 266-268.) That is to say, “an appellate claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected unless counsel
was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or there
simply could be no satisfactory explanation.’ [Citation.]” (Carter,
supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1189.) Furthermore, “[i]f it is easier to
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of
sufficient prejudice, which . . . will often be so, that course should
be followed.” (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p.
697.)
B. Jury Selection
Taylor asked no questions of the prospective jurors, and all
indications are he took no notes during jury selection. He did,
however, challenge several potential jurors for cause and exercise
peremptory challenges. In doing so, as the trial court put it, he
was able to recite “almost with a photographic memory” what the
various jurors said. And as the trial court emphasized in ruling
on defendant’s new trial motion, the examination of the
prospective jurors—albeit without a contribution from Taylor—
was thorough.
We need not analyze whether there could be no satisfactory
explanation for Taylor’s limited participation in jury selection
because defendant has not carried his burden to demonstrate

-- 18 of 28 --

19
Strickland v. Washington prejudice. Defendant identifies no
prospective juror who was chosen to serve on the jury, who Taylor
did not challenge, but who would have been excluded, or at least
challenged, by competent counsel. Rather, defendant offers only
the generalized complaint that “problems were evident . . . even
before the trial started with jury selection,” coupled with a quasi-
concession that “[i]t is impossible to state with certainty what the
outcome of the trial would have been if defense counsel had
properly prepared for and presented the case.” This is
insufficient.12 (See People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 480
[holding, even in a case unlike this one where the defense had
identified a particular juror of concern, that “the decision
whether to accept a jury as constituted is obviously tactical, and
nothing on the appellate record demonstrates counsel’s tactical
choice here was either unreasonable or prejudicial”] (Lucas).)
C. Cross-examination of P.D. and the Absence of a
Hearsay Objection
Taylor did not cross-examine P.D., but he did raise
objections on various grounds during her direct examination.
Reviewing the record on appeal, we cannot say Taylor’s decision
to forego cross-examination of P.D. is without conceivable tactical
justification. Indeed, we can conceive of at least two reasons that
would permissibly explain Taylor’s choice.
12 Defendant’s citation to People v. McGraw (1981) 119
Cal.App.3d 582 is unavailing. The attorney in that case was
completely absent during voir dire and “did not even appear pro
forma.” (Id. at p. 595.)

-- 19 of 28 --

20
First, P.D. was a reluctant witness at the outset of her
testimony and she professed to be unable to remember many
details of her interaction with defendant. However, after being
confronted with her written statement and as the direct
examination wore on, P.D.’s memory improved and her testimony
became more damaging to the defense. Taylor may have
reasonably thought, under the circumstances, that P.D.’s
testimony would have become even more incriminating the longer
she was on the witness stand, even if on cross-examination.
Second, Taylor may have determined before or during trial
that the prosecution’s evidence of pimping and pandering was
quite strong (recall the trial court described the victims as “very
credible” and the evidence as “overwhelming”). Consistent with
his approach later during closing argument, Taylor may have
concluded it made strategic sense to focus the defense solely on
the oral copulation and human trafficking charges—both of which
pertained to V.R., not P.D. This is a determination that is within
the realm of reasonable tactical choices for an attorney to make,
and in that light, cross-examining P.D. would have presented
little, if any, anticipated benefit but significant risk (i.e.,
alienating jurors with an unnecessary attack on an alleged
victim). We accordingly cannot say Taylor’s decision to forego
cross-examination is tactically unjustifiable.
In a related vein, defendant further protests Taylor was
deficient for failing to object to certain hearsay testimony by
Officer Klee, including the officer’s testimony that P.D. told him
defendant “would kill her” if he found her. That statement may
well have been admissible because it explained P.D.’s reluctance
to testify. But even assuming for argument’s sake that Taylor
could have no reasonable explanation for opting not to object to

-- 20 of 28 --

21
hearsay testimony by Officer Klee (but see People v. Williams
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 215 [“‘[w]hether to object to inadmissible
evidence is a tactical decision . . . [and] failure to object seldom
establishes counsel’s incompetence’”]), defendant still makes no
attempt to show how any such testimony could be prejudicial. In
light of P.D.’s own testimony—describing how she feared
defendant in light of his violent behavior toward her—we see no
reasonable probability that any hearsay testimony influenced the
jury’s verdict.
D. Closing Argument
“‘[R]eversals for ineffective assistance of counsel during
closing argument rarely occur; when they do, it is due to an
argument against the client which concedes guilt, withdraws a
crucial defense, or relies on an illegal defense.’” (People v.
Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 265.) This case involves the
former of these circumstances: Taylor outright conceded
defendant’s guilt on the pimping and pandering charges, and he
told the jury defendant “probably” committed an act of forced oral
copulation while challenging the jury to reject the prosecution’s
decision to bring three separate oral copulation charges. On the
record before us, we cannot say Taylor could have had no rational
tactical purpose for making the concessions he did.
“Defense counsel must not argue against his or her client
[citation], but it is settled that it is not necessarily incompetent
for an attorney to concede his or her client’s guilt of a particular
offense.” (Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 446; accord, People v.
Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 611-612.) Where the incriminating
evidence is strong and defense counsel offers some other choice in
a defendant’s favor, our Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected

-- 21 of 28 --

22
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (See, e.g., People v.
Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 630-631 [citing cases] (Hart); People
v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 498 [“Recognizing the
importance of maintaining credibility before the jury, we have
repeatedly rejected claims that counsel was ineffective in
conceding various degrees of guilt”].)
That is the circumstance here. The prosecution’s
evidence—credible victim testimony corroborated by officer
testimony and exhibits—was strong. Taylor might have decided
his best hope of achieving a favorable result for his client was to
give ground on the pimping and pandering charges but stand fast
on the more serious human trafficking charge and the multiple
charged violations of the forced oral copulation statute. This
strikes us as a reasonable tactical judgment, and indeed, it
appears to have succeeded when considering the questions the
jury asked during deliberations and (to a lesser degree) the
verdicts it returned, which ultimately led to the dismissal of the
most serious human trafficking charge.
We are unpersuaded by defendant’s suggestion that Taylor
conceded too much in light of penalties his client faced under the
charged statutes. Human trafficking, under former section 236.1,
called for a 4, 6, or 8 year prison sentence, as well as a possible
$100,000 fine. (Former § 236.1, subds. (c), (g) (2010).) The oral
copulation charges were punishable by 3, 6, or 8 years in prison
(§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)(A)), and the pimping and pandering charges
were punishable by 3, 4, or 6 years (§§ 266h, subd. (b)(1), 266i,
subd. (b)(1)). By contesting the human trafficking charge and the
decision to charge multiple violations of section 288a, defendant
would have faced a drastically reduced sentence had the jury
fully adopted the defense position—especially in light of the

-- 22 of 28 --

23
possibility the trial court would impose concurrent rather than
consecutive sentences. Thus, for purposes of the record before us,
the Hart court’s conclusion is apposite: “Counsel’s decision to
acknowledge defendant’s culpability—but to a lesser extent than
that urged by the prosecution, in an effort to spare his client from
[greater punishment]—was not a tactical choice that could not be
satisfactorily explained. No deficiency appears.”13 (Hart, supra,
20 Cal.4th at pp. 631-632.)
E. Taylor’s Discourtesy During Trial
1. Additional background
On a handful of occasions during trial, most outside the
presence of the jury, Taylor was discourteous and sometimes
outright rude to the trial judge. We highlight those occasions we
have not already mentioned, proceeding chronologically in the
order they occurred during trial.
During Taylor’s cross-examination of Officer Klee, he asked
a question apparently intended to reveal the case against
defendant was originally rejected by the district attorney’s office.
The following exchange ensued between the court and Taylor at
sidebar:
The Court: All right. Is that where you want
to go with this?
Mr. Taylor: It’s a question.
The Court: Huh?
Mr. Taylor: It’s just a question.
13 A recent decision in a capital case, McCoy v. Louisiana
(2018) ___ U.S. ___ [138 S.Ct. 1500, 1505], does not aid
defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim on this record.

-- 23 of 28 --

24
The Court: Is that a “yes” to my question?
Mr. Taylor: I don’t know where I’m going.
The Court: Well then, it’s not relevant, so
sustained.
Later, when Taylor was cross-examining V.R., there was
further back and forth between Taylor and the trial court, this
time in the presence of the jury:
Q. [to V.R. by Taylor]: But you never met this
individual before, . . . and you just did what he told
you to do. You just got into his car, he dropped you
off on the corner, you stood there for an hour and a
half, didn’t try to leave, didn’t have any interactions
with any other people?
The Court: All right. Counsel, if there’s
actually a question in there, that would be great.
Mr. Taylor: That was a question.
The Court: No, that wasn’t.
Mr. Taylor: That was—
The Court: That was a dissertation.
Mr. Taylor: Oh, it was? [¶] May I take a—
may I have a recess?
The Court: No, sir.
Mr. Taylor: Okay. Are you going to help me
along like you helped [the prosecutor] along with her
questions or can I—can I conduct my cross-
examination?
The Court: Please do so, sir.
Just moments later, the court reporter stated she could not
understand what Taylor was saying:

-- 24 of 28 --

25
Q [by Taylor]: Okay. So you—you started
prostitution for a year and a half prior to—
The reporter: Excuse me. I—
The Court: Counsel—
The reporter: —I can’t understand him.
The Court: All right. Now, you can be rude to
me, and I’ll suck it up, but you cannot be rude to my
court reporter. If she interrupts you, you stop.
Mr. Taylor: Thank you, Your Honor.
The Court: Please rephrase your question
slower.
Q. By Mr. Taylor: You—began—prostitution—
or—working—as—a—prostitute—approximately—
a—year—and—a—half—before—you—encountered—
an—individual—at—McDonald’s; correct?
Shortly thereafter, the trial court asked both attorneys to
step into the hallway outside the courtroom and said the
following:
The Court: I understand, Mr. Taylor, you don’t
want to be doing this case, and I get you’re not being
paid, but decorum has to be maintained. I have been
forgiving you of being late every single appearance
because I’ve heard through another judge that things
are going on and how far you live; but quite frankly, I
could have imposed sanctions anywhere along the
way, but I’m trying to just be nice as pie, so
everybody can get this case along.
You want to lodge an objection or lodge an
appeal to a ruling of mine, you go ahead, but if you’re

-- 25 of 28 --

26
snotty to me one more time in court, I’m going to
sanction you.
Now, as far as the witness is concerned and
everything goes, I cannot have any more
interruptions. All I’m trying to do is keep a record,
and you rolling your eyes at me and stuff like that in
court is getting old, so I’m going to tell you right now,
you are now on notice, so knock it off with being rude.
Thank you.
2. Anaylsis
There is no reason to think the jury would have returned a
more favorable verdict absent discourteous exchanges between
Taylor and the trial court that the jury did not hear or see. Thus,
we focus on the one instance of discourtesy identified by
defendant that occurred in the presence of the jury: the above-
quoted back and forth in which Taylor suggested the trial court
was assisting the prosecution and then apparently acted in a
rude manner toward the court reporter.
We are not convinced there could be no valid tactical reason
for Taylor’s behavior. At the outset of jury selection, defendant
exclaimed the case against him was a “bunch of lies and stuff”
and the court proceedings were “a railroad system.” Stuck with
his client’s decision to engage in such an outburst, Taylor may
have reasonably concluded he had no choice but to play the hand
his client dealt him by (improperly) attempting to garner
sympathy and suggest in the presence of the jury that the trial
judge was unjustifiably favoring the prosecution. Regardless,
even if it were true there could be no tactical reason for Taylor’s
discourtesy, there is still no reasonable probability, in light of the

-- 26 of 28 --

27
strength of the evidence against defendant and his own in-court
behavior, that this single extended exchange between the court
and Taylor is what caused the jury to refrain from returning a
more favorable verdict.
At bottom, this is not a case like those defendant cites:
People v. Shelley (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 521 (Shelley) and People
v. McKenzie (1983) 34 Cal.3d 616 (McKenzie). Both of those cases
involved attorneys who refused to participate in trial apart from
sitting next to their clients at counsel table. (Shelley, supra, at p.
524 [after receiving adverse rulings, counsel stated he would not
“raise any objections, cross-examine witnesses, discuss
instructions, argue or present a defense or participate in any way
other than being physically present in the trial”]; McKenzie,
supra, at p. 625 [defense counsel “flatly refused to participate in
the trial beyond appearing in court and sitting next to his
client”].) Here, Taylor’s behavior during trial was occasionally
petulant, and that is lamentable. But overall, the record before
us demonstrates he was an active trial participant and his
discourtesy neither impaired constitutionally adequate
performance nor provides reason to believe the jury punished
defendant for Taylor’s behavior.

-- 27 of 28 --

28
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, J.
We concur:
KRIEGLER, Acting P.J.
KIM, J.

Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

-- 28 of 28 --