Gardner v. Cal. Victim Comp. Bd.

Filed 4/29/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

CHRISTOPHER GARNER,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CALIFORNIA VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARD,

Defendant andRespondent;

THE PEOPLE,
Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

B330418

(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.22STCP02382)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, James Chalfant, Judge. Affirmed.
Pavone & Fonner and Benjamin Pavonefor Plaintiff andAppellant Christopher Garner.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Iveta Ovsepyan, Assistant Attorney General, Jessica R. Marek and Parry A. Black, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent California Victim Compensation Board.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Jessica C. Leal, Jonathan M. Krauss, and SethP. McCutcheon, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party inInterestand Respondent The People.
________________________________
In 2007, a jury convicted Christopher Garner of murder ona theory of implied malice that, as a result of the enactment ofSenate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437),the law no longer recognizes. (See Pen. Code, §§ 188, 189, as amend. by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §4, eff. Jan. 1, 2019.)Penal Code section 1172.6 permits vacatur of such convictions if the prosecution cannot prove to a trial court that the defendant isguiltybeyond a reasonable doubt under current murder law.A court vacated Garner’s murder conviction under section 1172.6, resentenced him to a prison term approximately eight years shorter than he had already served, and ordered him released from custody.
Section 4900 permits “inmates who are exonerated oftheircrimes [to] apply to [the California Victim Compensation Board] for compensation for the time they were erroneously imprisoned.” (Gonzales v. California Victim Compensation Bd. (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 427, 433 (Gonzalez); see§4900, subd. (a).) Garner sought such compensation from the California Victim Compensation Board (the Board),alleging entitlement on the basisthat he is not guilty under the current definition of murder.
The Board deniedGarner’s application. It concluded he had failed to state a legally cognizable section 4900 claim because he didnot allege he was innocent of murder as the law defined the crime in 2007.The Board also rejected Garner’s argument that hewas entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his application, citingtheCalifornia Code of Regulations, title 2, section 642 (California Code of Regulations section 642), which creates amotion-to-dismiss type procedure for section 4900 applications. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 642.)
Garner filed apetition for administrative writ of mandamus challenging the Board’s denial and the validity of California Code of Regulations section 642. The court denied the writ. Garner appealed.
On appeal, Garner argues the Board misappliedsection 4900. We disagree. The plain language of section 4900requires, inter alia, an “erroneous conviction.” The Legislature’s prospective redefinition of “murder” in 2019does not establish that the previous conviction, valid when decided, was erroneous. Rather, the change in the law was a legislative act of lenity, not the correction of any error.
Garner further argues thatCalifornia Code of Regulations section 642 exceeds the Board’s rulemaking authority. Again, wedisagree. Garner has not established, as is his burden, that thisregulation is either inconsistent with the Board’s authorizing statuteor not reasonably necessaryfor the Board to carry out itsstatutory mandate.
Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
A.Criminal Proceedings
On January 15, 2006, Garner and two men drove toBlake Crawford’s home to steal marijuana from Crawford. Garner waited in the car while one of the men entered Crawford’s home, took his marijuana, and shot him. The shooter returned to the car and Garner drove them home.
In 2007, a jury convicted Garner of the first degree murder of Crawford. The jury also convicted him of robbery and burglary,and the court sentenced Garner to 26 years to life in prison.
We affirmed the judgment. (People v. Garner (Apr. 7, 2008, B197920) [nonpub. opn.].) We concluded substantial evidence supported: “that a plan to steal the marijuana was formulated inGarner’s apartment before the offenses and on the drive to Crawford’s residence; that the plan contemplated the use of force againstCrawford”; that the shooter “possessed a gun for that purpose,”which the jury could have inferred Garner knew;that Garnerparticipated in developing the plan and “accordingly, hadadvance knowledge of the unlawful purpose”; and “that Garner encouraged, facilitated and aided in the commission of the [robbery and burglary] by approving the plan, accompanying [the shooter] to the scene of the offenses, waiting for [the shooter]tocomplete the plan, and driving away after the offenses toavoiddetection or arrest.” (Ibid.) We held these findings sufficient to “support[]Garner’s conviction for murder under both aiding and abetting and conspiracy theories.” (Ibid.)
In a 2018 uncontested habeas proceeding, a court reduced Garner’s murder conviction from first to seconddegree based on People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 158–159, which modified accomplice liability for first degree premeditated murder. The court resentenced Garner to 16 years to life in prison.
B.Garner’s Section 1172.6 Petition
In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437, which prospectively redefined the crime of murderand provided a procedure under section 1172.6 to obtain retroactive relief based on the new definition.
On August 23, 2019, the trial court vacated Garner’s murder conviction pursuant to section 1172.6. The courtresentenced Garnerto a total of seven years in prison for hisrobbery and burglary convictions.Because Garner had been inprison approximately eight yearslonger than this revised sentence required, the court ordered him released from prison.
C.Requestsfor Section 4900 Compensation and Related Relief
1.Section 4900 Compensation
Under section 4900,any person imprisoned forafelony conviction whois “innocent” of the charged crime because “the crime . . . was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by the person” may “present a claim against thestate to [the Board] for the injury sustained by the person through theerroneous conviction and imprisonment or incarceration.” (§4900, subd. (a).)
Under California Code of Regulationssection 642, requests “that are untimely or are otherwise not in compliance with . . . sections 4900 and 4901 will be rejected by a hearing officer and will not be heard or considered by the Board.” (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 642, subd. (a).)Before such rejection, however, the hearing officer must give the claimant an opportunity to cure thedeficiency with new evidence or argument. (Id., § 642, subd.(b).) If the claimant cures the deficiency, the claim is deemed “filed” and the Board will consider it on the merits.(Id.,§§ 640, subd.(d), 642, subd. (c).)
In most cases, hearing a claim on the merits begins withthe Board providingthe Attorney General the opportunity tosubmit a written response. (See § 4902.) The Boardthen holdsan informaladversarial hearing, at which the parties maypresent evidence of innocence and injury. (See §4903.) Under certain special circumstances, however—for example, when a court previously made a finding of factual innocence undersubdivision (b) of section1485.55—section 4900 requires the Board to granta compensation request without a hearing.(See §4900, subds. (a) & (b).)
2.Garner’s Request for Finding of Factual Innocence
Garner filed a motion in the superior courtfor a section1485.55, subdivision (b) innocence finding, claiming hewas innocent because his murder conviction was vacated under section 1172.6.The court denied the motionbecause this “remedy does not apply in these circumstances.” Garner does not challenge this decision.
3.Garner’s Section 4900 Claim
On January 25, 2022, Garner submitted asection 4900 application and supporting memorandum to the Board. Based on the statutory rate of $140 per day (see § 4900, subd. (a)), Garner requested $391,860 for the 2,799 days he spent in custody beyond his revised seven-year sentence.
On January 27, 2022, the Boardhearing officer notified Garner that“it appear[ed] [the Board] lacks jurisdiction to consider [his] application” because it “fail[ed] to raise a valid claim... [¶] . . . [¶] . . . due to the absence of any allegation that Garner isfactually innocent of murder under the laws in effect atthetime of the crime. Instead, it appearsthe application onlyassertsthat Garner is innocent under the current definition formurder asrevised by [Senate Bill No.] 1437 in 2019.”Citing California Code of Regulations section 642, thehearing officer informed Garner he had 30 days to “submit written proof and argument to cure the identified jurisdictionaldeficiencies,” andthat if he failed to do so, his “application [would] be deemed rejected and returnedunfiled.”
Garner did not provide additional allegations. Instead, heresponded that the Board was incorrectly interpreting section4900and challenged the facial validity of California Code of Regulations section 642 as well asthe Board’s application of it to his claim. Garner disavowed any claim based on his innocence under 2007 law.
In a 13-page final decision, the hearing officer denied Garner’s application. The decision explains “[theBoard] lack[ed] jurisdiction to approve” a request “solely based upon [Garner’s] dismissed conviction pursuant to... [section1172.6], without any allegation of factual innocence under the law in effect at the time the charged offense occurred.” The decisionexplained theterm “jurisdiction” was “a shorthand expression that the claim... fails to state facts upon which relief may be granted under section 4900[,]... [¶] . . . regardless ofwhat terminology best describes this procedural mechanism.”
The hearing officer also rejectedGarner’s facial and asapplied challenges to the California Code of Regulations section 642motion-to-dismiss type procedure. The officer found theprocedure was a proper exercise of the Board’s rulemaking discretion and enabled a hearing officer to reject any claim that the Board lacked authority to approve as a matter of law.
D.Writ Proceedings Below
Garner filed a petition for a writ of mandateto (1)compelthe Board to pay him $391,860 under section 4900 and(2) declare California Code of Regulations section 642 facially invalid.
The court agreed with the Board’s interpretation ofsection4900 and its view of California CodeofRegulations section 642 as a valid regulation.
Garner appealed.
DISCUSSION
Garner’s appeal does not affect a fundamental right. (SeeTennison v. California Victim Comp. & Government ClaimsBd.(2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1181–1182.) Therefore, inreviewing denial of the writ, we “step into thetrial court’sshoes” and scrutinize the Board’s decision using thesamecriteriaa trial court must apply. (Gonzales, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p.441.) We reverse where the agency decision reflects a “prejudicial abuse of discretion.” (Code Civ. Proc., §1094.5, subd. (b).) This occurs when, inter alia, the agency “has not proceeded in the manner required by law.” (Ibid.) Whether the agency did so is an issue we review de novo. (See Gonzales, supra, at p. 441.)
Garner contends the Board did not proceed in the mannerrequired by law in two ways. First, he argues the Boardincorrectly interpreted section 4900 as requiring him toestablish his innocence under the law applicable at the time ofhis conviction.Second, he challenges the Board’s use of themotion-to-dismiss type procedure in California Code of Regulations section 642, which he argues is invalid. He also argues the current version of that regulation is invalid. We disagree on allpoints.
A.Garner Did Not Allege a Cognizable Section4900Claim
Garner argues his entitlement to section 4900 compensation depends entirely on current law: If he cannot befound guilty of murder under current law, he is “innocent”forpurposes of section 4900, and his murder conviction is“erroneous.” (§ 4900, subd. (a).)
We need look no further than the plain language of the statute to reject Garner’s interpretation.(See Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783, 803 [“‘“If the statute’s text evinces an unmistakable plainmeaning, we need go no further”’”]; accord,Washington v. County of San Diego (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 874, 879.)
Section 4900contemplates compensation for“the injury sustained by [a] person through...erroneous conviction and imprisonment or incarceration.” (§ 4900, subd. (a).) A claim cognizable under section 4900 thusrequires, inter alia, an “erroneous conviction.” (Ibid.; see also § 4903, subd. (d).) Asamatter of “common[ ]sense” (Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc.(2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 724), afactfinder’s failure to apply a definition of murdernot yet in existence at the time oftrial and conviction does not render the resulting verdictand conviction erroneous.
Garner argues—but cites no authority supporting—that theLegislature’s decision to revise the definition of murder implies the previous definitionapplied in convicting Garner was erroneous.We disagree.
Garner’s 2007 conviction under a law that was valid in 2007 is not erroneous simply becausethe Legislature later decided a different version ofthat law should apply going forward. (See People v. Lamoureux (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 241,256 [Senate Bill No. 1437’s changes to murder law were prospective].) The Legislature has the general power to amend or repeal laws without identifying any error or deficiency in existing law. (See, e.g.,People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 943.) And the “Legislature retains the constitutional authority to preserve criminal sanctions for acts committed prior to repeal” of a statute that criminalized conduct for which a defendant was convicted.(People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 303; see Gov. Code, § 9608 [“[t]he termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar tothe... punishment of an act already committed in violation ofthe law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to barsuch... punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law”].)
That a court vacated Garner’s murder conviction pursuantto section 1172.6 also does not suggest it was erroneous. Section1172.6 creates relief the Legislature crafted in “‘an act oflenity’ that requires, under specified circumstances, reduction of the offense for which [a defendant] was properly convicted.” (People v. James (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 604, 609.)The section1172.6 vacatur of Garner’smurder convictiondoes not change that he “wasproperly convicted of... murder under thelaw thatwas in effect at the time of his offense.” (James, supra, at p.609; see ibid. [describing underlying conviction after successful section1172.6 petition].) Again, Garner provides no authority to the contrary.
Garner’s argumentsfor a contrary interpretation of section4900focuson the reference in subdivision (a) toinnocence of the “crime... charged.”He arguesthis languagerefers to thedefinition of the crime under current law. Even ifGarner iscorrect—and we are not concluding he is—section 4900 also requires an “erroneous conviction.” (See In re Anthony(2015) 236Cal.App.4th 204, 209 [section 4900 claim requires bothof these elements].)As discussed above, Garner’s conviction is noterroneous. Garner’s arguments interpreting the “crime... charged” language thus do not provide even a potential basis for relief.
In sum, the actions the jury found Garner to have committed constituted murder under the law’s definition of thatcrime at the time of his conviction. The conviction was thusnot erroneous. Because Garner failed to allege an erroneous conviction in seeking compensation from the Board, Garner failed to state a legally cognizable claim.
B.Garner Has Not Established California Code ofRegulations Section 642 Is Invalid
“[A] regulation adopted by a state agency is presumed valid.” (Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. Dept. ofIndustrial Relations(2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 243, 266.) Accordingly, “the burden is on the party challenging the regulation to establish its invalidity.” (Ibid.)A regulation is invalid if it is inconsistent or “ ‘ “in conflict with”’ the provision that authorizes it” or if it is not “reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the authorizing law.” (In re Gadlin (2020) 10 Cal.5th 915, 926; see also § 4906 [authorizing the Board“tomake all needful rules and regulations consistent withthe lawfor the purpose of carrying into effect this chapter”]; Gov. Code, §§ 13920 & 13909, subd. (b) [authorizing Board tomake regulations “governing any matter over which it has jurisdiction” and to delegate “any statutory power” of the Board to its staff upon a majority vote].)
Garner challenges as inconsistent with the law (1) the procedure California Code of Regulations section 642 createsfordismissing claims without ahearing, and (2) a provision added to thatregulation after the Board denied Garner’s claim.
The new provision Garner challenges deems any claim “solely based upon a conviction that was vacated due to a change in the legal definition of the crime, for example pursuant to . . . section 1172.6” not legally cognizable under section 4900.(Cal.Code Regs., tit. 2, § 642, subd. (a)(3).)Garner contends thisreflects an incorrect interpretation of section 4900. We have already rejected this argument and, therefore, need not further discuss it.
In support of his argument that the Board was required tohold a hearing,Garner cites the following language in section4903: “Except [in situations requiring theBoard to granta request for compensation without a hearing,] the [B]oard shall fix a time and place for the hearing ofthe claim.” (§ 4903, subd.(a), italics added.) Garner interpretsthislanguage as requiring the Board to hold a hearing on acompensation request regardless of the basis it alleges forseeking relief. Thus, Garner argues,California Code of Regulations section 642’s procedure fordenying a hearing basedon failure to allege a cognizable claim“create[s] a remedy for theagency that the [L]egislature...withheld” in section 4903.(Citing California Teachers Assn. v. Commissionon Teacher Credentialing(1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1469, 1475.)But section 4903 presupposes the existence of a “claim,” which, under section 4900, subdivision (a), must allege“injury . . . [from an] erroneous conviction” suffered by an individual who is innocent of the “charged... crime.”To the extent a request for compensation does not allege both elements, it is not a“claim” onwhich, under section 4903, the Board “shall” hold ahearing. California Code of Regulations section 642 is not inconsistent with section 4903.
We also are not persuaded by Garner’s arguments thatuseof the term “jurisdiction” in California Code of Regulations section 642 changes this analysis or provesinvalidity. We agreewith the Board that useof theterm“‘jurisdiction’is ofnomoment....[T]he Board’s determination that it lacks jurisdiction is a shorthand expression that the claimeither fails to allege sufficient facts under section4900 orisuntimely under section 4901.... Under either scenario, theBoard lacks authority to grant relief.”
Garner thus fails to establish that California Code ofRegulations section 642 is inconsistent with the law. Hedoesnot argue the regulation is not reasonably necessary fortheBoard toaccomplish its statutory obligation to process section4900 compensation requests.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

WEINGART, J.

M. KIM, J.