P. v. Campbell CA2/6 filed 8/3/26

Filed 8/3/26 P. v. Campbell CA2/6
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SIDNEY CAMPBELL,

Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B334456
(Super. Ct. No. TA058243)
(Los Angeles County)

OPINION FOLLOWING ORDER VACATING PRIOR OPINION

In 2003, Sidney Campbell was convicted by jury of second degree murder after he and his brother shot and killed a 15-year-old boy. The jury was not instructed on felony murder or natural and probable consequences. In 2022, appellant filed apetitionfor resentencing pursuant to Penal Codesection 1172.6. The trial court summarily deniedthepetition at the prima facie stage, finding appellant “is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.”
On appeal, appellant argued the trial court erred in summarily denying his petition because, pursuant to People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi), People v. Powell(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689 (Powell), and People v. Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257 (Maldonado), decisions that identified potential ambiguities in the aiding and abetting and murder instructions, he may have been convicted of second degree murder on an imputed malice theory.
In an unpublished opinion, we affirmed the trial court’s summary denial of appellant’s petition for resentencing. (People v. Campbell (Dec. 11, 2024, B334456 [nonpub. opn.] (Campbell II).)In so doing, weconsideredseveral recent cases,namely People v. Berry-Vierwinden (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 921 (Berry-Vierwinden), People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, and People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164 (Flores), which disagreed with Maldonado andLangito the extent they had allowed an “instructional error [to] be asserted as a basis for section 1172.6 relief—even if the alleged error could have been raised on direct appeal under then-existing law . . . .” (Berry-Vierwinden, at p. 936.)We agreedwith Berry-Vierwindenand its progeny that a petitioner may not raise a claim on a section 1172.6 petition that could have been raised on direct appeal. (Campbell II, supra, B334456.)
Our Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter back to us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.5th 639, which “disapprove[d] the Burns-Flores/Berry-Vierwinden line of cases” and held that “‘[t]he mere fact that a petitioner could have raised an analogous . . . claim of instructional error at trial or in his original appeal does not render him categorically ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 . . . .’” (Lopez, at p. 658.) In this opinion, we have followed the Supreme Court’s directions.We will affirm.
Factual Background
In 1999, appellant and his brother, Christopher Campbell, shot and killed 15-year-old Kenneth Colter. Earlier that day, Colter and another boy,15-year-old Damien Culpepper, were “horse playing” and bent the bicycle tire rim of nine-year-old “Little Chris” Campbell. Little Chris went home and told his father, Christopher, what had happened.Christopher, along with his brother Clinton,angrily confronted Colter and Culpepper. After Christopher and Clinton left, Colter and Culpepper went to Culpepper’s garage to get a replacement rim. Sometime later, Christopher returned, this time with appellant. A witness, Gerrina Hawes, saw Christopher and Colter arguing and went to get Colter. Appellant, whowas standing in the area and appeared to be angry, told Hawes to mind her own business and leave.
Hawes saw Colter backing away from Christopher. She saw appellant take out a gun, motion for Colter to come to him, and start shooting.Culpepper, who was inside his house at the time, looked out his bedroom window and saw that appellant, Christopher, and Colter all had guns and were shooting them. Colter ran away from the scene but was shot in the neck and arm. He died from the gunshot wound to his neck.
In 2003, appellant was convicted by juryof second degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). The jury found true the special allegations that appellant personally used and discharged afirearmin the commission of the offense (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c)). The jury found not true the allegation that appellant intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 35 years to life.
We affirmed appellant’s conviction in a nonpublished opinion. (Campbell I, supra, B170224.)
Section 1172.6 Petition
In 2022, appellant filed a form petition for resentencing. He declared he could not presently be convicted of murder“because of changes made to [sections] 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.”The trial court appointed counsel and accepted briefing. In his briefing, appellant argued that even though the jury was not instructed on felony murder and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, he “may . . . have been convicted on a theory under which malice was imputed to him based solely on his participation in a crime” and ambiguous language in the jury instructionsfor aider and abettor liability.
Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court conducted a hearing on whether appellant had made a prima facie case for relief.
After reviewing the briefs, the jury instructions, and the prior appellate opinion, the trial court denied the petition. It explained that the jury was not instructed on CALJIC No. 8.31,the second degree implied malice murder instruction, the jurors “determined that Mr. Campbell was in fact a shooter who fired a weapon,” and “the People’s theory of liability for second-degree murder was based solely on aiding and abetting.” The trial court concluded, “for those reasons, Mr. Campbell is not entitled to resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6.”
Discussion
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) amended the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, “to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)
To that end, Senate Bill 1437 amended section 188 by adding a requirement that, when the felony-murder rule does not apply, a principal in the crime of murder “shall act with malice aforethought” and “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
Senate Bill 1437 also enacted section 1172.6, which created a procedural mechanism for defendants who could not be convicted of murder or attempted murder under the amended laws to seek retroactive relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).)
Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended section 1172.6to expand eligibility for resentencing to include not only those “convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine,” but also those convicted of murder under any “other theory which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a), as amended byStats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)
In deciding whether a petitioner has made a prima facie showing for relief, “‘“the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. . . .”’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) In making this determination, courts may examine portions of the record of conviction but may not engage in “‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion’” or make “credibility determinations.” (Id., at pp. 971, 974.) “At this preliminary stage, denial of a section 1172.6 petition is proper only ‘[i]f the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief.’” (Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p.658; see People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 731 [“In assessing section 1172.6 petitions from individuals convicted following jury trials, the jury instructions will be critical”].)
We independently review a trial court’s determination on whether a petitioner has made a prima facie showing. (People v. Harden (2022)81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
Appellant is Ineligible for Relief as a Matter of Law
Appellantmakes several arguments as to why the trial court erred in summarily denying his petition for resentencing.
Appellantfirst contends the trial court engaged in “judicial factfinding” at the prima facie stage. It did not. The trial court examined the record of conviction to determine if that record conclusively established that appellant wasineligible for relief as a matter of law.This did not require the trial court to make “evidentiary findings” and was entirely permissible under Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970-972. Any reference to the appellate opinion and the undisputed factual summary therein was harmless based on the jury’s findings in this case.
Appellant next contends, “contrary to the People’s argument and the superior court’s ruling,” the jury was instructed on implied malice. The People agree that the jury was instructed on implied malice, which remains a valid theory, and was not instructed on imputed malice. Relying on Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th 972, appellant contends he “may have been convicted on an imputed malice theory”given the ambiguity in the prior standard instructions regarding aiding and abetting a second degree implied malice murder.
In his supplemental brief, appellant notes that the Supreme Court in Lopez“endorsed” the potential ambiguity that wasfirst recognized in Powell, which later gave rise to both Langi and Maldonado. (Citing Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 655.) Appellantcontends, consistent with those decisions, this case should be remanded with directions for the superior court to issue an order to show cause and conduct further proceedings pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d).
The People respond that Lopezhas no impact on the this case, and given the instructions as a whole, it was not reasonably likely that the jury would have construed the instructions as allowing for imputation of malice. (Citing People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, 947-948 (Estrada); see Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 670 [declining to address the “reasonably likely standard” as outside the scope of the question presented].) The People contend thatLangi is distinguishable, in any event. We agree.
In Langi, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder as an aider and abettor after he and three other men beat and robbed the victim, who died after a punch caused him to fall and hit his head. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 975-977.) On appeal from the summary denial of Langi’s section 1172.6 petition, the appellate court considered whether a petitioner convicted of second degree murder established a prima facie case for relief based on the jury instructions given in that case. For example, the jury was instructed withCALJIC No. 3.00, setting forth that each principal in a crime, “‘regardless of the extent or manner of participation[,] is equally guilty.’” (Langi, at p. 981, fn. 8.)The jury was also instructed with CALJIC Nos. 3.01 (aiding and abetting) and 8.31 (second degree murder).(Langi,at pp. at pp. 980-982.)
The Court of Appealconcluded that Langi was not categorically ineligible for relief pursuant to section 1172.6 based on the facts of that case. Relying on Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 712-714, a direct appeal case, the Langi court reasoned that “the standard aiding-and-abetting instructions are ill suited to the crime of second degree murder.” (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at 982.)Asthe Powell court had determined, when standard aiding and abetting instructions are combined with second degree murder instructions and are not tailored to the facts of a specific case, a jury must find “the perpetrator intended to commit the crime, the aider and abettor intending to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime, and that, by words or conduct, the aider and abettor in fact aided the perpetrator's commission of the crime.” (Powell, at p. 714.) Powellconcluded this creates a potential ambiguity because the actus reus and mens rea requirements for aiding and abetting a second degree murder do not turn on aiding in an underlying crime but aiding in the commission of the life-endangering act. (Ibid.; see also People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990–992 [approving Powell’s reasoning that for aiding and abetting murder liability, “‘[t]he relevant act is the act that proximately causes death’”]; Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 654 [so noting].)
Applying Powell’s logic, theLangi court agreed with the petitioner that “under the instructions that were given, the jury was entitled to conclude that, to be guilty as an aider and abettor of second degree murder, [Langi] need only have intended to encourage the perpetrator’s intentional act—in this case, punching [the victim]—whether or not [Langi] intended to aid or encourage [the victim’s] killing, and whether or not he personally knew of and disregarded the risk of such a killing.¶ The instructions should have explained that, to be guilty as a direct aider and abettor of second degree murder, an accomplice must have acted with the mental state of implied malice.” (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 983.)
Langi was followed by Maldonado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th 1257. Maldonado was convicted of first degree murder and the jury was not instructed on the natural and probable consequences or felony-murder doctrines. (Id., at p. 1259.) Maldonado sought resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6, arguing that he could have been convicted on a theory under which malice was imputed to him based solely on his participation in a crime. (Ibid.) In so arguing, he relied on “the jury instructions for aiding and abetting, implied malice, and lying-in-wait murder, and on the analysis in People v. Langi . . . .” (Ibid.) The Maldonado court remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing after concluding that the jury instructions created an ambiguity, similar to Langi and Powell, such that the defendant could have been convicted on a theory of imputed malice. (Id. at pp. 1264-1267, 1269.)
But the ambiguity identified in Powell, Langi and Maldonado is not presentin this case.The only offense charged here was murder—there was no other crime alleged (e.g., battery) and no theory under which malice was not a requirement. The jury was instructed with CALJIC Nos. 3.00 (principals-defined),3.01 (aiding and abetting), 8.10 (murder-defined), 8.11 (malice aforethought-defined), CALJIC No. 8.20 (deliberate and premeditated murder), and 8.30 (unpremeditated murder of the second degree).To find appellant guilty of murder, the jury had to find he personally harbored malice either as the perpetrator or as a direct aider and abettor. The jury rejected the first degree murder option and convicted appellant of second degree murder. As instructed, the jury could not have found appellant guilty of second degree murder without finding he personally harbored a malicious mental state.
The Peoplealso argue that Langi was wrongly decided because it did not apply the “reasonable likelihood” standard—that is, whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury understood the instructions to support a conviction on a now-invalid theory of murder, an argument that has not been disturbed by Lopez.(See Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 670; Boyde v. California (1990)494 U.S. 370, 380.)
We conclude that as a matter of law, the jury instructions did not allow the jurors to convict appellant based on imputed knowledge.Moreover, it is not “reasonably likely” the jurors construed the instructions in that matter.(See, e.g., People v. Allen (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 389, 397; Estrada, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 947-948; People v. Ervin(2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 107-109; Maldonado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1267-1269; but see Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 984 [evidentiary hearing is required when the record “does not conclusively negate the possibility” that the jury found petitioner guilty based on imputed malice].
Based on the foregoing, appellant’s contention that he “may have been convicted on an imputed malice theory” fails.
Finally, appellant contends the trial court erred in relying on the jury’s true findings on the firearm use and discharge allegationsat the prima facie stage because those findings did not require a finding of malice aforethought. (Citing People v. Offley (2020)48 Cal.App.5th 588, 597-599.)Although it is true Offleyheldthat “an enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d) does not in itself preclude a petitioner from obtaining relief,” (id., at p. 592, italics added),the trial court here did not rely exclusively on thefirearm findingsas dispositive proof of appellant’s ineligibility for relief. Moreover, Offley is distinguishable because the jury therereceived aninstructiononthe natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Id.at p. 593.)
Having reconsidered the matter in light ofLopez, supra,19 Cal.5th 639, we concludeappellant is not entitled to resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6 as a matter of law.
Disposition
The order summarily denying appellant’s section 1172.6 petition for resentencing is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

We concur:

BALTODANO, J.

CODY, J.
Laura R. Walton, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
_____________________________

Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising Deputy AttorneyGeneral, and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.