Alvarez v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan CA2/7 filed 8/18/26

Filed 8/18/26 Alvarez v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

MARI ALVAREZ,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, INC.,et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

B334937

(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STCV36048)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of LosAngeles County, Timothy Patrick Dillon, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of David R. Denis, David R. Denis and Armando M. Galvan for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Cole Pedroza, Kenneth R. Pedroza, Scott M. Klausner, Amy E. Rankin; GBG, Amanda Bolliger and Christina C.K. Semmer for Defendants and Respondents.
________________________
Mari Alvarez appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court granted the motion for summary judgmentfiled byKaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, and Lu-Shonda Johnson (collectively, Kaiser).In2020,after Alvarez resignedfrom her employment at Kaiser, she filed this lawsuit asserting causes of action under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code, §12900 etseq.) for disability discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and related claims. Alvarez also alleged causes of action for constructive discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court granted summary judgment, finding Alvarez had failed to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact that she had been subject to an adverse employment action. The court also found no triable issues of material fact as to each of her causes of action. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Alvarez’s Employment at Kaiser and Kaiser’s Procedures for Requesting Sick Leave
Alvarez started working at Kaiser in 1996 as a medical assistant. She held several positions in different departments over the years, and in April 2016 she became a claims processor in the claims-intake department.
During the relevant time period (from 2017 to 2020), Kaiser had several options available to employees who needed to take time off work for medical reasons and/or doctor’s appointments. One option was for an employee to take unpaid time off through the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA; 29 U.S.C. §§2601-2654) or the CaliforniaFamily Rights Act (CFRA; Gov. Code, §12945.2).Alvarez acknowledged that Kaiser had a policy for an employee to take time off to address a medical condition under the FMLA or CFRA. The employee would need to have a doctor fill out a certification form and then obtain approval from human resources (HR) for the leave. However, once the leave wasapproved, the employee could “call off” fromwork by calling the Kaiser attendance line,with no prior notice.Alvarez understood thistype of leave could be taken in one continuous block or intermittently over a period of time for “a day here [or] a day there.”
Employees also had the option of taking time off as paid sick leave. Time off for sick leave did not need to be scheduled orapproved in advance and could be used for pre-planned doctor’s visits or unexpected sick days. To use sick leave, employees would “simply call[] out” (by calling the attendance line) and state they were taking sick leave for the day.
Employees could alternatively request time off using the Time Off Request Tracking (TORT) system on a computer. When requesting time off through the TORT system, an employee would designate the purpose of the request, such as unpaid personal timeoff or time off for a doctor’s appointment. If an employee is requesting time off for a doctor’s appointment, the employee can request unpaid or paid time off. An employee’s request for time off for a doctor’s appointment is placed on an “exception log” (also called the alternate calendar), not the vacation calendar. However, a TORT system request, even for a doctor’s appointment,can be denied if there is an operational need, such as if too many employees are already scheduled to be out on a given day. The TORT system was not used for requests for sick leave or FMLA/CFRA leave requests.
Alvarez’s Requests for Time Off in 2017 and 2018
In 2017 Alvarez was diagnosed with anemia and hemoglobin deficiency, which required periodic iron infusions. At that time, Johnson was her supervisor. In July 2017 Alvarez requested several days off through the TORTsystem for treatments, but her request was denied. Alvarez emailed Johnson on July 5, explaining the time off she requested for July 18 was for “treatments that are a medical necessity and affect my livelihood.” She stated that if her TORT requests“continue to get denied,” she wouldneed to take “extended time and be on medical leave”to receive the treatments. Further, she intended to have her doctor complete “a Medical Family Leave request” in the meantime. She added that she hoped Johnson “can work with” her so she could go to her treatments and return to work the next day after the side effects had subsided. Johnson responded 30minutes later, stating that “[i]f the calendar is booked it is protocol for the request to be denied.”But Johnson told Alvarez to speak with her so they could “work something out.”
Johnson and Alvarez then spoke, and Johnson told Alvarez that if Alvarez notified her that her TORT requests were for infusions, Johnson would approve the time off. Alvarez sent a follow-up email to Johnson stating:“I have re-requested my TORT requests, [and] in the future, I will notify you of my appointments if the calendar is full so that we can work something out to get them approved.”Alvarez testified in her deposition that she was satisfied with this outcome. Further, Alvarez confirmed that she did not have any problems with Johnson denying her time-off requests before the July2017 request.
In July 2018 Alvarez submitted aTORT request for threedays off in August,but she was approved for only oneday and was “placed on the alternate calendar” for the other twodays. Alvarez notified Johnson of the denial and requested that Johnson approve one of the two days that had been denied, noting that only two people would be off that day. Johnson did not approve the request,and Alvarez made a complaint to the Kaiser complaint hotline.In September2018 an HR employee followed up with Alvarez regarding her complaint. According to Alvarez’s declaration, Alvarez and the HR employee“agreed that at this point [in September], the issue has passed and we would consider the issue resolved about the time off [in August].” Alvarez further stated that she believed her time off request was denied because Johnson was “playing ‘favorites’” by giving the available time off to a “black/African American” woman instead of to Alvarez, who is “Hispanic/American.”
In October 2018 Alvarez submitted a TORT request for fivedays off in October and Novemberfor infusion appointments. She was initially approved for only one and a half days. However, she was able to attend all five appointments after she submitted a doctor’s note and had two grievance meetings with Johnson’s supervisor and union representatives.After the grievance meetings, Johnson’s supervisor, Antronette Moore-Mohead, told Alvarez she should apply for FMLA leave so that she could attend her future infusion appointments without needing to request leave through the TORT system.
Alvarez testified she had applied for personal time off through the TORT system rather than requesting FMLA leave because Johnson had “always approved” her time-off requests, so Alvarez “never bothered asking for FMLA.” In addition, she did not request to take sick days because “I just didn’t want to use my sick time,” which was paid time off.
In December 2018 Johnson emailed Alvarez asking about a day on which she had arrived latein November. Alvarez responded that the tardy was “Workers Comp related.”Johnson replied, “Please provide me the note releasing you to return or indication that your time away was workers comp related, so I can make sure I’m following the proper protocol for a worker’s comp related matter.” Johnson copied someone from HR on the email and asked her, “[C]an you please assist me with this case. I have no record of a disability case. I know that I asked several months ago to assist me in obtaining the workers comp records for this employee but never received anything. I need to know if this workers comp time is for an old case or a new case and how I’m to handle it in the future.”
Alvarez believed Johnson’s denial of her time-off requests was in retaliation for an incident in 2018 relating to a charitable donation. Johnson had asked Alvarez to handle a donation of school supplies to a school at which Johnson’s brother worked even though Kaiser had originally approved the donation to a different school. Alvarez was concerned there might be a conflict of interest and raised the issue with HR. Alvarez stated that after this incident Johnson “became hostile” toward her and “began her discrimination and retaliation . . . by among other things, denying my TORT requests.”
Alvarez also believed she was not permitted to take on certain roles with increased pay due in part to her disability. In September2017 Johnson informed Alvarez she could no longer be a back-up lead for the department. In an email memorializing their conversation, Johnson told Alvarez, “[Y]ou have a lot of commitments as well and I don’t want to overwhelm you because the lead role is a lot. Never said that your medical condition is the reason you can’t be the lead. Said that with all your required time away with other commitments and you need time off for medical purposes it will be a lot and the expectation of the role is very demanding as well.” In October2018 Alvarez was asked by a project manager to work on a temporary project, which would have increased Alvarez’s pay, but Johnson did not approve Alvarez working on the temporary project.
In December 2018 Alvarez was approved for intermittent FMLA leave for up to three days per month until October2019.

Alvarez’s 2019Assignment to the Union and Subsequent Resignation
In January 2019 Alvarez began a one-year position as a contract specialist with her union. During this time Alvarez remained a Kaiser employeebut was not performing claims processing duties, and her day-to-day supervisors were union employees. Johnson was still responsible for processing Alvarez’s time-off requests.At some point in early2019 Alvarez requested that another Kaiser employee, Allison Cahee, handle her time-off requests. Moore-Mohead agreed to let Cahee handle Alvarez’s time-off requests while Alvarez was assigned to the union because Alvarez was not performing claims processing duties and Johnson was on leave around that time.
In February 2019, although Alvarez had requested that Cahee oversee her time-off requests, Johnson approved a TORT request submitted by Alvarez with the notation, “Please provide Workers Comp case information for future appts. proof prior to approval.” Alvarez sent an email to HR attaching Johnson’s notation to the approved time-off request, stating, “[Johnson] is continuing with her harassment and retaliation . . . . [¶] [Johnson] approved my request last minute.. . with contingencies that are not Kaiser Policy related, just simply her own demands.” Alvarez wrote that she had called HRand confirmed that there “is NO HR policy that requires for me to provide proof of a doctors appointment prior to an appointment. Iam only required to provide proof after an appointment. . . . [¶] At this point, I feel that I am working under a hostile work environment, where I am being harassed and retaliated against, by [Johnson] continuously.” Alvarez later acknowledged that the TORT approval from Johnson in February2019 was the only contact she had with Johnson in 2019 or 2020.
In August 2019 Alvareztook a leave of absence due to a medical condition.In February2020 Alvarez informed Kaiser that her leave was extended until March2020, at which point Alvarez learned her time-off requests and leave paperwork would again be handled by Johnson. Alvarez emailed Moore-Mohead to request that Cahee continue handling her time-off requests. Alvarez wrote, “Given our last incident[,] I would feel best; if [Cahee] continue[s] to manage my time as per my request and you granted the last time. [¶] I do not want any further retaliation or discrimination by [Johnson] and I feel that would alleviate some of my anxiety . . . .”Moore-Mohead declined Alvarez’s request. In her declaration, Moore-Mohead explained that she consulted with HR, and they collectively decided that once Alvarez was again working as a claims processor, Johnson should manage all aspects of Alvarez’s employment.
Alvarez’s FMLA leave was again extended to May2020.However, Alvarez did not return to work, instead resigning in June2020. Alvarez stated in her declaration that she was “forced to resign” because “I could not get past that Johnson will always try to look for a way to get me in trouble somehow or impact my physical health, and all because she has resentment against me [for consulting HR and being a union steward].”(Brackets in original.) Alvarez continued, “I felt suicidal and severely depressed.”
Alvarez’s Complaint
On October 19, 2020 Alvarez filed a complaint against Kaiser Foundation Hospitals and related entities with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH)(now called the Civil Rights Department), alleging violations of FEHA and CFRA. Alvarez filed an amended complaint on September20, 2021, adding Johnson as a respondent. After receiving a right to sue letter, Alvarez filed a complaint against Kaiser on September 30, 2021, alleging causes of action for (1)discrimination in violation of FEHA based on disability; (2)harassment in violation of FEHA based on disability and medical condition; (3) retaliation in violation of FEHA; (4)failure to participate in the interactive process; (5) failure to provide reasonable accommodation; (6)failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation; (7) violation of CFRA; (8)retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 98.6; (9) retaliation in violation of Labor Code section1102.5; (10) constructive discharge; and (11)intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Kaiser’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication
On April 18, 2023 Kaiser filed an amended motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication. In support of the motion Kaiser submitted deposition testimony, declarations, and other evidence relating to Alvarez’s employment, requests for time off, and resignation. Kaiser argued, in part, that Alvarez’s discrimination, harassment, and retaliationcauses of action failed because any claims based on conduct prior to January 1, 2019 were time-barred under the former one-year statute of limitations;Alvarez had not alleged any adverse employment action that occurred after January1, 2019; and Alvarez had not alleged conduct sufficiently severe to constitute harassment.In addition, Alvarez had not alleged intolerable working conditions that would support a finding of constructive discharge, nor had she alleged extreme and outrageous conduct to support a finding of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In opposition to the motion, Alvarez submitted declarations, deposition testimony, and other evidence and argued there were disputed questions of material fact whether she was subjected to discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and constructive discharge. Alvarez further argued her claims were timely because they were subject to the continuing violations doctrine.

The Trial Court’s Ruling
After a hearing, on November 6, 2023 the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Kaiser. The court ruled Alvarez’s causes of action for discrimination; harassment; retaliation; failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation; and violations of the Labor Code failed because Kaiser did not engage in any unlawful conduct during the “statutory time period” (after January1, 2019). Further, the continuing violation doctrine did not apply because there was no adverse employment action after January1, 2019, noting that Alvarez argued she was passed over for a promotion and denied the ability to work on a higher-paying temporary project, but those actions were taken prior to January1, 2019.
The trial court also determined that Alvarez’s claims for failure to participate in the interactive process and to provide a reasonableaccommodation failed because Kaiser had accommodated Alvarez’s need to take time off for medical appointments and Alvarez could have taken sick leave or FMLA leave. Likewise, the CFRA claim failed because Alvarez’s requests for CFRA leave were granted, and therefore, there was no adverse employment action. Finally, the court found Alvarez’s constructive discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims failed because the undisputed evidence showed Alvarez’s fears regarding future mistreatment were speculative and her treatment was not extreme or outrageous as a matter of law.
On November 27, 2023 the trial court entered judgment in favor of Kaiser. Alvarez timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate only if there are no triable issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., §437c, subd.(c); Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618; Delgadillo v. Television Center, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1078, 1085.) “‘“‘“We review the trial court’s decision de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposing papers except that to which objections were made and sustained.”’ [Citation.] We liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”’” (Hampton v. County of San Diego (2015) 62Cal.4th 340, 347; accord, Husman v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1168, 1179.)“‘[S]ummary judgment cannot be granted when the facts are susceptible [of] more than onereasonable inference . . . .’” (Husman, at p.1180.)
In evaluating claims of discrimination under FEHA, California courts apply the burden-shifting approach set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411U.S. 792. (Harrisv. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 214; Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354.) The same approach is applied in evaluating claims of retaliation under FEHA and CFRA. (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042 (Yanowitz); Bareno v. SanDiego Community College Dist. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 546, 560 (Bareno).)
Under this approach, as applied in the summary judgment or summary adjudication context, the employer has the initial burden to present evidence that one or more elements of a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation is lacking, or the employer acted for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. (Wawrzenski v. United Airlines, Inc. (2024) 106Cal.App.5th 663, 685 (Wawrzenski); Martin v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 149, 162; Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1, 32, 63.) A legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is one that is unrelated to the prohibited bias and, if true, would preclude a finding of discrimination or retaliation. (Guzv. Bechtel National, Inc., supra, 24Cal.4th at p. 358.)
If the employer satisfies its initial burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to present evidence creating a triable issue of fact showing the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for unlawful animus in order to avoid summary judgment or adjudication. (Wawrzenski, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p.685; Martin v. Board of Trustees of California State University, supra,97Cal.App.5th at p. 162; Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 32.)“The plaintiff’s evidence must be sufficient to support a reasonable inference that discrimination [or retaliation] was a substantial motivating factor in the decision. [Citations.] The stronger the employer’s showing of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the stronger the plaintiff’s evidence must be in order to create a reasonable inference of a discriminatory [or retaliatory] motive.” (Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1159; accord, Wawrzenski, at p.685 [plaintiff must show that discriminatory animus “‘was a “substantial motivating factor”’” for adverse employment action; “[u]ltimately, ‘an employer is entitled to summary judgment if, considering the employer’s innocent explanation for its actions, the evidence as a whole is insufficient to permit a rational inference that the employer’s actual motive was discriminatory.’”].)
The Statute of Limitations for FEHA Claims and the Continuing Violations Doctrine
Prior to January 1, 2020, “[a] plaintiff suing for violations of FEHA ordinarily [could not] recover for acts occurring more than oneyear before the filing of the DFEH complaint.”(Jumaane v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 241Cal.App.4th 1390, 1400 (Jumaane); see former § 12960, subd. (d).) Effective January1, 2020 this period was extended to threeyears. (§ 12960, subd.(e)(5); Stats. 2019, ch. 709, § 1.) In enacting the longer limitations period, the Legislature stated, “This act shall not be interpreted to revive lapsed claims.” (Stats. 2019, ch.709, §3; see Quarry v. Doe I (2012) 53Cal.4th 945, 955 [“legislative enlargement of a limitations period does not revive lapsed claims in the absence of express language of revival”].) Accordingly, any FEHA claims that accrued before January1, 2019 necessarily lapsed by January 1, 2020 and are not revived by the enlarged statute of limitations. (See Wawrzenski, supra, 106Cal.App.5th at p.694.)
However, “when an employer engages in a continuing course of unlawful conduct under the FEHA . . . the statute of limitations begins to run, not necessarily when the employee first believes that his or her rights may have been violated, but rather, either when the course of conduct is brought to an end, as by the employer’s cessation of such conduct or by the employee’s resignation, or when the employee is on notice that further efforts to end the unlawful conduct will be in vain.” (Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 823; accord, Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1192 [“The continuing violation doctrine aggregates a series of wrongs or injuries for purposes of the statute of limitations, treating the limitations period as accruing for all of them upon commission or sufferance of the last of them.”].)
In applying the continuing violation doctrine, “we consider whether ‘the employer’s . . . actions [were] (1) sufficiently similar in kind—recognizing . . . that similar kinds of unlawful employer conduct, such as acts of harassment or failures to reasonably accommodate disability, may take a number of different forms [citation]; (2)have occurred with reasonable frequency; (3)and have not acquired a degree of permanence.’” (Yanowitz,supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1059; accord, Wawrzenski,supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at pp. 694-695.) Accordingly, the continuing violation doctrine “require[s] that at least one act of harassment or retaliation [or discrimination] occur during the limitations period to make the continuing violation doctrine applicable.” (Trovato v. Beckman Coulter, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 319, 327; accord, Jumaane, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p.1402 [“the continuing violation doctrine permits a plaintiff to recover for unlawful practices occurring outside the limitations period if the practices continued into that period”].)
The plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate that his or her claims are founded on a pattern or practice of employer conduct that continued into the limitations period. (Jumaane, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1402.)

Alvarez Failed To Raise a Triable Issue of Fact as to Her FEHA Discrimination and Retaliation Claims
FEHA prohibits an employer from subjecting an employee to discrimination “in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”based on the employee’s protected status, including his or her physical disability or medical condition. (§12940, subd.(a).) To prevail on her FEHA discrimination claim, Alvarez needed to show “‘(1) [s]he was a member of a protected class, (2)[s]he . . . was performing competently in the position [s]he held, (3)[s]he suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4)some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.’”(Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2Cal.5th 1057, 1067-1068.)
“‘[T]o establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FEHA, a plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a “protected activity,” (2)the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action.’” (Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 908, 942; accord, Glynn v. Superior Court (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 47, 55.) Protected activity includes “any practices forbidden under [FEHA] or because [Alvarez] has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under [FEHA].” (§ 12940, subd.(h).)
“[F]or both discrimination and retaliation claims, an adverse employment action is one that ‘materially affects the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.’” (Bailey v. SanFrancisco Dist. Attorney’s Office (2024) 16Cal.5th 611, 637 (Bailey); § 12940, subd. (a).) “[T]he phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges’ of employment must be interpreted liberally and with a reasonable appreciation of the realities of the workplace in order to afford employees the appropriate and generous protection against employment discrimination that the FEHA was intended to provide.” (Yanowitz, supra, 36Cal.4th at p.1054.) “‘Minor or relatively trivial adverse actions or conduct by employers or fellow employees that, from an objective perspective, are reasonably likely to do no more than anger or upset an employee cannot properly be viewed as materially affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment and are not actionable . . . .’ [Citation.] But adverse treatment that is reasonably likely to impair an employee’s job performance or prospects for advancement in their career falls within the reach of FEHA’s antiretaliation [and antidiscrimination] provision[s].” (Bailey, at pp.637-638.)
Alvarez contends Kaiser discriminated against her based on her disability and retaliated against her by, among other things, failing to promote her, denying her time off for medical appointments, and constructively discharging her. Kaiser met its initial burden to show that Alvarez could not make a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation because there was no actionable conduct after January 1, 2019;Alvarez failed to demonstrate there was a triable issue of fact.Most of the alleged adverse actions Alvarez relies on occurred prior to January 1, 2019. As discussed, any claims based on unlawful conduct prior to 2019 have lapsed under the prior one-year statute of limitations unless Alvarez can show there was at least oneunlawful act as part of a continuing course of conduct that occurred after January1, 2019. (See Jumaane, supra, 241Cal.App.4th at p. 1402; Trovato v. Beckman Coulter, Inc.,supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 327.)
Alvarez cannot meet this burden. It is undisputed that the record reflects only threeincidents of alleged discrimination and/or retaliation that occurred after January1, 2019: (1)the February2019 communication by Johnson approving Alvarez’s TORT request and asking Alvarez to provide workers’ compensation paperwork prior to approval of future time off for medical appointments; (2)Moore-Mohead’s February2020 denial of Alvarez’s request that Cahee handle her time-off requests; and (3)the June2020 alleged constructive termination based on Alvarez’s need to resign to avoid Johnson’s hostility against her.
None of the three incidents constituted an unlawful adverse employment action. It is undisputed that these actions upset Alvarez. However,“‘conduct by employers or fellow employees that, from an objective perspective, are reasonably likely to do no more than anger or upset an employee cannot properly be viewed as materially affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment and are not actionable.’”(Bailey, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 637; accord McRae v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 377, 386 [“‘A change that is merely contrary to the employee’s interests or not to the employee’s liking is insufficient [to constitute an adverse action].’”].)
Alvarez has not explained how Johnson’s management of her time was unlawful or had any impact on her employment. Alvarez did not show how Johnson’s request for worker’s compensation paperwork prior to a future doctor’s appointment would have negatively affected Alvarez’s employment. In fact, Johnson approved the timeoff that Alvarez requested in February2019, and Alvarez did not thereafter submit any requests for time off. Nor did Alvarez submit any time-off requests after Moore-Mohead denied Alvarez’s February 2020 request to have Cahee oversee Alvarez’s time-off requests. Alvarez’s subjective concerns that Johnson would deny Alvarez’s time-off requests in the future at most raised the specter of future discrimination or harassment at some unknown time. Such fears cannot constitute evidence of an adverse employment action for purposes of summary judgment. (See Brown v. Ransweiler (2009) 171Cal.App.4th 516, 525 [issue of fact “‘is not created by “speculation, conjecture, imagination or guess work”’”or by “‘“cryptic, broadly phrased, and conclusory assertions” [citation], or mere possibilities’”].) Thus, the 2019 communication from Johnson and the decision to have Johnson resume administering Alvarez’s time-off requests did not constitute unlawful adverse employment actions on which a FEHA claim could be based, nor did they support application of the continuing violation doctrine to support her lapsed claims.
Alvarez’s argument that her alleged constructive discharge constituted an adverse employment action is likewise unavailing. Constructive discharge occurs “when the employer coerces the employee’s resignation, either by creating working conditions that are intolerable under an objective standard, or by failing to remedy objectively intolerable working conditions that actually are known to the employer.”(Mullins v. Rockwell Internat. Corp. (1997) 15Cal.4th 731, 737; accord, Simers v. LosAngeles Times Communications LLC (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1248, 1269.)“The conditions giving rise to the resignation must be sufficiently extraordinary and egregious to overcome the normal motivation of a competent, diligent, and reasonable employee to remain on the job . . . .” (Turnerv. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7Cal.4th 1238, 1246.) “‘Where a plaintiff fails to demonstrate the severe or pervasive harassment necessary to support a hostile work environment claim, it will be impossible for her to meet the higher standard of constructive discharge: conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would leave the job.’”(Holmes v. Petrovich Development Co., LLC (2011) 191Cal.App.4th 1047, 1062.)
Alvarez submitted evidence she felt forced to resign because the prospect of having Johnson manage her time made her feel suicidal and depressed. However, at the time of her resignation, Alvarez had not had any contact with Johnson for more than a year. Thus, Alvarez could not show that she was subject to objectively intolerable working conditions at the time of her resignation, and as discussed, her fear of future speculative harm was insufficient to create a triable issue of fact that she suffered an adverse action. While we have no reason to doubt that the prospect of submitting time-off requests to Johnson was subjectively distressing for Alvarez, there is no evidence that having Johnson continue to manage Alvarez’s time-off requests created objectively extraordinary or egregious conditions such that no reasonable employee would remain on the job. (See Turnerv. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,supra,7Cal.4th at p. 1246.) Accordingly, Alvarez has not raised a triable issue of fact that she was constructively discharged, and her resignation, therefore, did not constitute an unlawful act that could support a FEHA discrimination or retaliation claim, nor is it a basis for application of the continuing violation doctrine.
Alvarez Failed To Raise a Triable Issue of Fact as to Her Constructive Discharge Cause of Action
For the same reasons that Alvarez’s resignation was not a constructive discharge that could support her causes of action for discrimination and retaliation, Alvarez has not raised a triable issue of fact that Kaiser created or failed to remedy conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would have felt coerced to resign. (See Holmes v. Petrovich Development Co., LLC, supra, 191Cal.App.4th at p. 1062.)
Alvarez Failed To Raise a Triable Issue of Fact as to Her FEHA Harassment Claim
Under FEHA, it is unlawful “[f]or an employer . . . or any other person, because of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, [etc.,] to harass an employee . . . .”(§12940, subd. (j)(1).) “‘“[H]arassment consists of conduct outside the scope of necessary job performance, conduct presumably engaged in for personal gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or for other personal motives.’”” (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47Cal.4th 686, 707; accord, Reno v. Baird (1998) 18Cal.4th 640, 645-646.) “Hostile work environment harassment is a type of harassment that ‘“has the purpose or effect of either interfering with the work performance of an employee, or creating an intimidating workplace.”’”(Wawrzenski,supra, 106Cal.App.5th at p.692.) “‘FEHA makes the employer strictly liable for harassment by a supervisor.’” (Id.at p.694.)
To prevail on a cause of action for hostile work environment harassment under FEHA, an employee must show he or she was “subjected to ‘offensive comments or other abusive conduct’ that [was] (1)based on a ‘protected characteristic’ and (2)‘sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of [her] employment.’” (Doe v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation(2019) 43Cal.App.5th 721, 736; accord, Bailey, supra, 16Cal.5th at p. 627.) “Whether a work environment is reasonably perceived as hostile or abusive ‘is not, and by its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test.’[Citation.] ‘The working environment must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances.’ [Citation.] ‘“These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”’” (Bailey,at p.628.) “A single incident of harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue regarding the existence of a hostile work environment if the harassing conduct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s work performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.” (§12923, subd.(b); see Bailey,at p.629 [“‘a single racial epithet can be so offensive it gives rise to a triable issue of actionable harassment’”]; Wawrzenski, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p.693.) “The objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.” (Bailey, at p.629; accord, Miller v. Department of Corrections(2005) 36Cal.4th 446, 462; Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club (2017) 18Cal.App.5th 908, 940.)
Alvarez contends she has raised triable issues of fact whether Johnson harassed her due to her disability. As with her other FEHA claims, the majority of the conduct Alvarez complains of occurred prior to January 1, 2019 and is therefore untimely absent application of the continuing violations doctrine. The only harassing conduct Alvarez alleges to have occurred within the relevant statutory period is Johnson’s request for her worker’s compensation paperwork in February 2019. However, Johnson’s request that Alvarez submit paperwork with her timeoff requests going forward was nothing more than a “‘“[c]ommonly necessary personnel management action[],”’” which generally “‘“do[es] not come within the meaning of harassment.”’” (Roby v. McKesson Corp., supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 707, 709;see alsoThompson v. City of Monrovia (2010) 186Cal.App.4th 860, 879 [“The [employer’s] statements and personnel decisions concerning Thompson [including a no-eating policy during briefing and requiring overtime] do not create a material factual dispute as to harassment because ‘[h]arassment is not conduct of a type necessary for management of the employer’s business or performance of the supervisory employee’s job.’”].)
Even if Alvarez is correct that worker’s compensation paperwork need not be submitted at the time of the request but may be submitted after the fact, Johnson’s request still does not constitute harassment. The single request was not sufficiently extreme or offensive. (Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club,supra,18Cal.App.5th at p.940[“Four comments over several months does not establish a pattern of routine harassment creating a hostile work environment, particularly given that the comments were not extreme.”]; cf. Bailey, supra, 16Cal.5th at p.634[concluding “there is a triable issue of fact whether [co-worker’s] one-time use of the N-word was, under the totality of the circumstances, sufficiently severe so as to create a hostile work environment”].) Nor was the request sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute harassment based on disability. The evidence does not show behavior that a reasonable person working under the same conditions “‘“would [have found] severely hostile or abusive.”’” (Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 283.)
Alvarez Failed To Raise a Triable Issue of Fact as to Her Cause of Action for Failure To Provide a Reasonable Accommodation
Under FEHA, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to fail to make reasonable accommodation for the known physical or mental disability of an . . . employee” unless the accommodation would cause “undue hardship” to the employer. (§ 12940, subd. (m)(1); see Green v. State of California (2007) 42 Cal.4th 254, 262; Featherstone v. SouthernCalifornia Permanente Medical Group, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1166.) The elements of a failure to accommodate claim are “‘(1) the plaintiff has a disability under the FEHA, (2) the plaintiff is qualified to perform the essential functions of the position, and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff’s disability.’” (Swanson v. Morongo Unified School Dist. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 954, 969; accord, Lui v. City and County of SanFrancisco (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 962, 971.) The plaintiff bears the burden of showing he or she was able to perform the job with a reasonable accommodation. (Green,at p. 262; Lui, at p. 971.)
“An employee is not required to specifically invoke the protections of FEHA or speak any ‘magic words’ in order to effectively request an accommodation under the statute. [Citations.] However, the employee must engage in the interactive process and ‘“‘can’t expect the employer to read his mind and know he secretly wanted a particular accommodation and sue the employer for not providing it.’”’” (Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 570, 598 (Soria).)
As a threshold matter, many of Alvarez’s allegations of failure to accommodate occurred prior to January2019, and they are therefore time-barred (for example, her request for an ergonomic assessment sometime between March2013 and March2015 and Johnson’s alleged interference with Alvarez’s requests for time off for medical appointments in 2017 and 2018).
The only alleged failure to accommodate that occurred after January 2019 was Moore-Mohead’s refusal to allow Cahee to manage Johnson’s time-off requests in early 2020. However, even assuming that having a different person oversee Alvarez’s requests for time off was an appropriate accommodation, Alvarez had other options available to obtain time off for her medical appointments. As discussed, she could have taken paid sick leave without advance approval, simply calling the attendance line to say she was taking sick leave for the day. Or she could have taken leave under the FMLA, which required a one-time approval from HR (not Johnson) with a doctor’s certification of a medical need for the leave. Alvarez testified she was aware of these options, and she had recently taken FMLA leave, but she did not want to use her paid sick time or FMLA leave for her medical appointments.
The availability of options for Alvarez to take time off for medical appointments through FMLA or sick leave without needing Johnson’s approval was a reasonable accommodation. The fact that Alvarez was unhappy with this accommodation does not give rise to an actionable claim. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11068, subd. (e) [“The employer . . . shall consider the preference of the . . . employee to be accommodated, but has the right to select and implement an accommodation that is effective for both the employee and the employer.”]; see Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 228[“The employer is not obligated to choose the best accommodation or the accommodation the employee seeks.”].) Further, after Moore-Mohead told Alvarez that Johnson would resume managing her time, there is no evidence that Alvarez informed Kaiser that she required an additional accommodation or that she felt having Johnson approve her TORT requests was unacceptable. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the cause of action for failure to accommodate.
Alvarez Failed To Raise a Triable Issue of Fact as to Her Cause of Action for Failure To Participate in the Interactive Process
FEHA requires an employer to participate in a good faith interactive process with a disabled employee in order “to determine effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee.”(§ 12940, subd. (n).) The employer must engage in this process “to explore the alternatives to accommodate the disability. [Citations.]. . . Failure to engage in this process is a separate FEHA violation independent from an employer’s failure to provide a reasonable disability accommodation.”(Wysinger v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2007) 157Cal.App.4th 413, 424; accord, Soria, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p.600.)“Both the employer and the employee are responsible for participating in the interactive process. Typically, the employee must initiate the process ‘unless the disability and resulting limitations are obvious.’” (Soria, at p. 600.)
However, an “‘employer cannot be held liable for failing to engage in [the] interactive process when the employee was in fact offered a reasonable accommodation.’” (Miller v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 282; accord, Hansonv. Lucky Stores, Inc.,supra,74 Cal.App.4th at p. 229.) As discussed, Alvarez was provided a reasonable accommodation: the ability to take FMLA leave or paid sick leave without requiring Johnson’s approval. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary adjudication on the failure to engage in the interactive process cause of action.

Alvarez Failed To Raise a Triable Issue of Fact as to Her Cause of Action for Failure To Prevent Discrimination, Harassment, and Retaliation
Section 12940, subdivision (k), provides it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring.” Further, retaliation is a form of discrimination actionable under section 12940, subdivision (k). (Department of Fair Employment & Housing v. M&NFinancing Corp. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 434, 445 [“an employer who has retaliated against an employee has necessarily discriminated against that employee and has failed to prevent discrimination, within the meaning of section 12940, subdivision (k)”].)
To prove a claim for failure to prevent, a plaintiff must show (1) the plaintiff was subjected to discrimination, harassment, or retaliation; (2) the defendant failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination, harassment, or retaliation; and (3) the failure caused plaintiff to suffer injury, damage, loss, or harm. (See Caldera v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 31, 43-44.)
A claim for failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, or retaliation is derivative of a claim for the underlying violation. (See Featherstone, supra, 10Cal.App.5th at p.1166.) Because Alvarez’s underlying causes of action for discrimination, harassment, and retaliation fail, so does her cause of action for failure to prevent. (Dickson v. Burke Williams, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1318 [“There cannot be a claim for failure to take reasonable steps necessary to prevent sex discrimination under section 12940, subdivision (k) if actionable sex discrimination has not been found.”]; Thompson v. City of Monrovia, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 880 [“the employee has no cause of action for a failure to investigate unlawful harassment or retaliation, unless actionable misconduct occurred”]; Scotch v. Art Institute of California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1021 [“Because we affirm summary judgment on all of Scotch’s FEHA causes of action, we also affirm summary judgment on the failure to provide an environment free from discrimination cause of action.”].)

Alvarez Failed To Raise a Triable Issue of Fact as to Her Cause of Action for Violation of CFRA
CFRA “‘is intended to give employees an opportunity to take leave from work for certain personal or family medical reasons without jeopardizing job security.’”(Soria, supra, 5Cal.App.5th at p. 600; accord, Moore v. Regents of University of California (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 216, 233.) CFRA provides that a qualified employee of an employer with five or more employees may take up to 12weeks of family care and medical leave in any 12-monthperiod. (§ 12945.2, subd. (a).) CFRA prohibits an employer from taking any adverse employment actionagainst an individual because of his or her exercise of the right to family care and medical leave (§ 12945.2, subd. (k)(1)) and frominterfering with an employee’s right to take leave (id., subd. (q)). (See Bareno,supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 560; Soria, at pp.600601.)“‘Interference’ claims prevent employers from wrongly interfering with employees’ approved leaves of absence, and ‘retaliation’ or ‘discrimination’ claims prevent employers from terminating or otherwise taking action against employees because they exercise those rights.” (Richey v. AutoNation, Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 909, 920.)
A CFRA interference claim “‘“consists of the following elements: (1) the employee’s entitlement to CFRA leave rights; and (2)the employer’s interference with or denial of those rights.”’”(Soria, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 601; accord, Moore v. Regents of University of California, supra, 248Cal.App.4th at p.250.) “‘Interfering with’ the exercise of an employee’s rights includes, for example, refusing to authorize CFRA leave and discouraging an employee from using such leave.”(Cal. Code Regs., tit.2, § 11094, subd. (a).)
With respect to Alvarez’s interference claim, it is undisputed that Alvarez understood the Kaiser CFRA leave policy and she applied and was approved for FMLA/CFRA leave for intermittent absences for late 2018 through early 2019. Alvarez also applied for and was approved for continuous FMLA/CFRA leave beginning in August2019. There is no evidence of Kaiser denying or otherwise interfering with Alvarez’s right to CFRA leave. Accordingly, her CFRA interference cause of action fails.
In order to prove a claim for retaliation or discrimination in violation of CFRA, a plaintiff must prove: “‘“(1) the defendant was an employer covered by CFRA; (2) the plaintiff was an employee eligible to take CFRA [leave]; (3) the plaintiff exercised [his or] her right to take leave for a qualifying CFRA purpose; and (4)the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, fine, or suspension, because of [the] exercise of [his or] her right to CFRA [leave].”’” (Bareno,supra, 7Cal.App.5th at p.560; accord, Soria, supra, 5Cal.App.5th at p.604.)
Alvarez’s CFRA claim for retaliation and discrimination also fails because, as discussed, she has not identified any adverse employment action subsequent to her exercise of her CFRA rights. Thus, she has not raised a triable issue whether she “‘“suffered an adverse employment action . . . because of [the] exercise of her right to CFRA [leave].”’” (Bareno, supra, 7Cal.App.5th at p. 560.)

Alvarez Failed To Raise a Triable Issue of Fact as to Her Retaliation Causes of Action Under the Labor Code
Labor Code section 98.6 states that an employer “shall not discharge an employee or in any manner discriminate, retaliate, or take any adverse action against any employee... because of the exercise by the employee... of any rights afforded them.” (Lab. Code, § 98.6, subd. (a).) Labor Code section 98.6, subdivision(b)(3), states: “In addition to other remedies available, an employer who violates this section is liable for a civil penalty not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per employee for each violation of this section, to be awarded to the employee or employees who suffered the violation.”
Labor Code section 1102.5 for whistleblower retaliation prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee “for disclosing information . . . to a government or law enforcement agency [or] to a person with authority over the employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance . . . if the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation.” (Lab. Code, §1102.5, subd. (b).) Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (f)(1), provides: “In addition to other remedies available, an employer is liable for a civil penalty not exceeding tenthousand dollars ($10,000) per employee for each violation of this section to be awarded to the employee who was retaliated against.”
The Labor Code does not specify a limitations period for claims alleging violations of sections 98.6 and 1102.5. We therefore look to the general statutes of limitations in the Code of Civil Procedure. Code of Civil Procedure section340imposes a one-yearlimitations period for “action[s] upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (a)), and section338 imposes a three-year limitations period for “action[s] upon a liability created by a statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture” (id., § 338, subd. (a)).
In her complaint Alvarez sought both damages and statutory penalties for her Labor Code claims. Kaiser argues that because Alvarez seeks civil penalties, the one-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340 applies notwithstanding the fact Alvarez also seeks economic damages. Alvarez contends that although she seeks statutory penalties, her claims for economic damages are subject to the three-yearstatute of limitations found in section 338.
Alvarez’s attempt to split her Labor Code causes of action into separate claims for economic damages and civil penalties is not supported by California law. Both Labor Code sections 98.6 and 1102.5 impose mandatory penalties, as evidenced by the identical language in both sections that “[i]n addition to other remedies available, an employer is liable for a civil penalty.” (Lab. Code, §§ 96.6, subd. (b)(3), 1102.5, subd. (f)(1), italics added.) Thus, regardless of whether Alvarez also sought economic damages, her Labor Code claims were necessarily claims for civil penalties, and therefore, the one-yearstatute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340 applies. (See Shamsian v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 967, 977-978 [applying one-year statute of limitations to action filed under Health & Saf. Code, § 25249.7, explaining that Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (a), “exclude[s] causes of action for civil penalties from the scope of section 338” and “[g]enerally, section 340, subdivision (a) applies if a civil penalty is mandatory”]; see also The TJX Companies, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 163Cal.App.4th 80, 85[explaining in applying one-year limitations period under Code of Civ. Proc., § 340, subd (a), to claim under Civ. Code, § 1747.08, that “[i]n determining which statute of limitations applies, ‘[t]he key question is whether the penalty is mandatory or discretionary, not whether the provisions awarding damages and imposing civil penalties are found in separate subdivisions of the statute’”].)
Alvarez relies on Minor v. FedEx Office & Print Services (N.D.Cal. 2016) 182 F.Supp.3d 966 and Ayala v. Frito Lay, Inc. (E.D.Cal. 2017) 263 F.Supp.3d 891 to support her position. We do not find the reasoning in those cases persuasive. In Minor, the district court found that actions pursuant to Labor Code section1102.5 were subject to the three-year statute of limitations unless“the suit seeks the civil penalty provided in [section] 1102.5(f),” in which case the one-year statute of limitations applied. (Minor, at p. 988.) In Ayala, the District Court held that because the plaintiff did not seek civil penalties under Labor Code section1102.5, subdivision (f), the one-year limitations period did not apply because the lawsuit was not one for a “‘penalty or forfeiture.’” (Ayala, at p. 917.) The court in Ayala reasoned (without authority) that claims under Labor Code section1102.5 and 1102.5, subdivision (f), “seek to redress different harms.” (Ayala, at p.917.)
The reasoning in Minor and Ayalaignores the Legislature’s decision to make civil penalties mandatory regardless of whether a plaintiff also seeks economic damages. We note that multiple other district court cases have rejected the reasoning in Minor. (See, e.g., Feast-Williams v. Merrill Lynch Fenner Pierce & Smith Incorporated (C.D.Cal. Dec. 18, 2018)U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2303330 [“mandatory civil penalty for violation of [Lab. Code] section 1102.5 ensures that a one-year statute of limitations applies to Section 1102.5 claims” even though plaintiff sought damages and not civil penalties]; Delgado v. MillerCoors LLC (C.D.Cal. Mar. 16, 2017), 2017 U.S. Dist. Lexis 43482 [“the Minor court did not analyze the statutory scheme; rather, it sidestepped the question because the Minor plaintiff's claim was barred under either the one-year or three-year limitations period”].) Further, although federal court decisions interpreting state law may be persuasive, they are not binding on state courts. (Brakke v. Economic Concepts, Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 761, 770.)
To prevail on her Labor Code claims, Alvarez needed to show that she was subject to an adverse employment action as a result of protected activity. (See St. Myers v. Dignity Health (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 301, 314; Ross v. County of Riverside (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 580, 592.) However, as discussed, Alvarez has not raised a triable issue of fact that she was subject to an adverse employment action within a year of filing her complaint. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary adjudication on the Labor Code claims.
Alvarez Failed To Raise a Triable Issue of Fact as to Her Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘“‘“(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.”’”’[Citations.] A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘“‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’”’[Citation.] And the defendant’s conduct must be ‘“‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’”’”(Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051.) “‘“[B]ehavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant . . . abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff’s interest . . . .”’” (Smith v. BPLubricants USA Inc. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 138, 147.)
The statute of limitations for intentional infliction of emotional distress is two years. (Wassmann v. South OrangeCounty Community College Dist. (2018) 24Cal.App.5th 825, 852-853; Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1.) The statute begins to run on the date of the “last act of emotional abuse.” (Pugliese v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1450.) Because Alvarez filed the complaint on September 30, 2021, she needed to raise a triable issue of fact that extreme and outrageous conduct occurred after September 30, 2019.
Alvarez alleged in her cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress that Johnson engaged in the following “extreme and outrageous conduct” after October 2019: Johnson “impos[ed] onerous and differential standards” prior to granting time-off requests (the workers’ compensation paperwork requirement) and she “forc[ed] Plaintiff to resign due to her disability [and] for requesting reasonable accommodations.” However, as discussed, neither Johnson’s request for worker’s compensation paperwork to support future time-off request nor the circumstances leading to Alvarez’s resignation were unlawful or were so extreme as to exceed the bounds of what is tolerated in a civilized community. The trial court therefore properly granted summary adjudication on this cause of action.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Kaiser is to recover its costs on appeal.

FEUER, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

STONE, J.