L.A. v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton

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Filed 8/12/09 L.A. v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
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L.A.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF
STOCKTON et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
C057895
(Super. Ct. No. CV031343)
Plaintiff, who has been designated the fictitious name
L.A., appeals from a judgment following the sustaining of a
demurrer, without leave to amend, to her complaint for damages
against defendants The Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton, the
Pastor of Presentation Church, and the Pastor of St. Anne Church
(collectively, defendants). The allegations of the complaint
are, in all material respects, identical to those of the
plaintiff in a related case before us, D.D. v. The Roman
Catholic Bishop of Stockton, C057260 (D.D.).
Our opinion in D.D., which we are filing contemporaneously
with this decision, governs the disposition of this appeal. We

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shall therefore affirm the judgment for the reasons set forth in
our lengthy discussion in that case.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Since this is an appeal following an order sustaining a
demurrer, we summarize and accept as true all well-pleaded
material allegations of the complaint. (Hensler v. City of
Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 8, fn. 3; Shoemaker v. Myers (1990)
52 Cal.3d 1, 7.) We exercise our independent judgment in
reviewing a demurrer to determine whether the factual
allegations of the complaint state a cause of action. (Schmidt
v. Foundation Health (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706.)
The complaint
Plaintiff alleges she was the victim of horrific and
continuous acts of sexual abuse by Doe 6, a priest, teacher and
agent of defendants. The abuse occurred between 1981 and 1984,
when plaintiff was between the ages of seven and nine.
Defendants and their employees knew of the abuse and concealed,
condoned, and otherwise failed to protect plaintiff from Doe 6,
despite actual or constructive notice that he had abused other
minors and was a chronic child molester.
Plaintiff, now well into adulthood, “immediately repressed
all memories of said harassment, abuse, and molestation as a
direct result of the trauma inflicted by [Doe 6], and had no
awareness of the actions, injury, or wrongfulness of such acts”
at the time they occurred.

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On December 20, 2004, plaintiff recovered her memory of the
sexual abuse when, while riding in an elevator, she smelled a
certain mixture of body odor and cologne, which triggered her
childhood memories of being molested. During this elevator
ride, plaintiff “discovered that her psychological injuries
and/or illness, were actually caused by the childhood sexual
harassment, molestation and abuse she suffered at the hands of
DOE 6, while she was a minor parishioner and student.”
Plaintiff seeks damages against defendants based on a
number of legal theories, including negligent supervision,
negligent hiring and retention, failure to warn, constructive
fraud, sexual battery, assault, and sexual harassment.
Procedural history
Plaintiff filed her complaint on December 6, 2006.
Defendants demurred, inter alia, on the ground that the
complaint was time-barred. The trial court agreed with
defendants and sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.
The court’s order states in pertinent part:
“IT IS ORDERED that the Demurrer be, and is hereby,
sustained without leave to amend . . . on the ground that: [¶]
1) Hightower v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Sacramento (2006)
142 Cal.App.4th [759] is applicable. Plaintiff’s claim lapsed
prior to January 1, 2003. Plaintiff enjoyed a one-year revival
window, and she did miss it. Further, her claims against non-
direct perpetrators are barred by the statute of limitations[,
section] 340.1[, subdivision] (c). [¶] 2) Assuming a tolling

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of the statute of limitations based on repressed memory,
plaintiff is barred by the one-year statute for personal injury
claims that existed at the time her cause of action accrued--
December 20, 2004--old C[ode of] C[ivil] P[rocedure] section
340.”
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff’s Arguments for Reversal Are Without Merit
Plaintiff’s arguments are indistinguishable from those
raised by the plaintiff in D.D. We reject each of them for the
reasons we have fully explained in our opinion in that case.
II. Hightower Controls
Plaintiff also asserts that the trial court incorrectly
relied on Hightower v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Sacramento
(2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 759 (Hightower) in ruling that her claim
was time-barred because she did not avail herself of the revival
window that opened in 2003 under section 340.1, subdivision (c).
She points out that, unlike Hightower, who was aware of the
sexual abuse at the time it was perpetrated, she pleaded that
she had no awareness of the sexual abuse until she recovered her
repressed memory in late 2004.
However, as we point out in D.D., the part of the Hightower
opinion upon which plaintiff relies was dictum. The essence of
Hightower’s holding was that in creating the one-year revival
window, “[t]he Legislature . . . drew a clear distinction
between claims that were time-barred and those that were not,”
and that permitting application of the delayed discovery

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provision of section 340.1, subdivision (a) to Hightower’s case
“would obliterate that distinction.” (Hightower, supra,
142 Cal.App.4th at pp. 767-768.) That holding remains equally
applicable to plaintiff’s claim here.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants shall recover costs
on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
BUTZ , J.
We concur:
SCOTLAND , P. J.
BLEASE , J.

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