P. v. Super. Ct.

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Filed 4/20/09 P. v. Superior Court CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yuba)
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THE PEOPLE,
Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF YUBA COUNTY,
Respondent;
ANGELIC LOUISE RAMPONE,
Real Party in Interest.
C060522
(Super. Ct. No. CRF050000699)
After a jury acquitted Michael Huggins of felony murder but
found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter for killing two men,
real party in interest Angelic Rampone argued that collateral
estoppel barred the People from prosecuting her for felony
murder for the same killings. The superior court ultimately
agreed and ordered that Rampone could not be prosecuted for
felony murder on the theory that the killings occurred during
the commission or attempted commission of robbery or burglary.

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On the People’s writ petition, we conclude the superior
court erred in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel to
the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we will issue a
writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order
precluding the prosecution of Rampone for felony murder.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We take the relevant facts from the People’s petition, the
trial court documents submitted in support of that petition, and
the appellate record in a related case of which we have taken
judicial notice.1 Before we do so, however, we pause to address
two procedural matters.
The first matter relates to the allegations in the People’s
petition. The respondent superior court did not file a return
to the alternative writ this court issued, and Rampone, as real
party in interest, filed only an “opposition,” asserting she was
“not legally obligated to answer the specific allegations of the
Petition” because she is not the respondent. Rampone is
partially correct -- she was not “obligated to answer” the
allegations of the petition, but then neither was the respondent
court. The pertinent rule provides that “[i]f the court issues
an alternative writ . . . , the respondent or any real party in
interest, separately or jointly, may serve and file a return by
demurrer, verified answer, or both.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
1 At the People’s request, we have taken judicial notice of
the record in Huggins’s appeal from his convictions for
voluntary manslaughter (case No. C056765).

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8.487(b)(1), italics added.) Technically, an “opposition” is
permissible only “[i]f the court notifies the parties that it is
considering issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance”
(ibid.), which did not happen here. Thus, while Rampone was not
obligated to answer the petition, her only other option was to
file a return by way of demurrer.
Because no one filed an answer denying any of the
allegations in the People’s petition, we must accept the facts
alleged in the petition as true. (Titmas v. Superior Court
(2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 738, 741; Shaffer v. Superior Court (1995)
33 Cal.App.4th 993, 996, fn. 2.) Thus, in effect, Rampone’s
“opposition” is actually a return by demurrer, because a
demurrer admits the facts pleaded in a writ petition. (See
Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. v. Superior Court (1995) 38
Cal.App.4th 141, 143.) Thus, we treat the facts alleged in the
petition as true.2
The second procedural matter relates to the superior court
documents the People submitted in support of their petition. A
petition for a writ of mandate must be verified. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1086; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.486(a)(4).) In
2 Fortunately for Rampone, those “facts” do not include the
People’s allegations in the seventh paragraph of their petition,
which allege “[t]he respondent Superior Court exceeded its
jurisdiction in precluding the People from trying real party for
felony murder. The offenses were properly charged and are not
barred by collateral estoppel.” That paragraph does not allege
facts, but legal conclusions, which a demurrer does not admit.
(See Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)

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addition, “A petition that seeks review of a trial court ruling
must be accompanied by an adequate record, including copies of:
[¶] (A) The ruling from which the petition seeks relief; [¶]
(B) All documents and exhibits submitted to the trial court
supporting and opposing the petitioner’s petition; [and] [¶]
(C) Any other documents or portions of documents submitted to
the trial court that are necessary for a complete understanding
of the case and the ruling under review.” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.486(b)(1).)
Because the petitioner’s right to relief will ordinarily
“be resolved upon the parties’ verified papers” (Star Motor
Imports, Inc. v. Superior Court (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 201, 205),
without the taking of additional evidence, it is important that
the verification encompasses not only the allegations of the
petition but also the authenticity and accuracy of the exhibits
submitted in support of the petition. (See ibid. [“A valid
petition for mandate and such exhibits as may be referenced or
incorporated therein will ordinarily state facts, verified as
required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1086, calling for
judicial relief,” (italics omitted)]; 1 Appeals and Writs in
Criminal Cases (Cont.Ed.Bar 3d ed. 2008) § 8.42, pp. 421-422
[“The record should be verified by specific reference in the
verified petition, by separate declaration, or by
certificates”].)
Here, the petition does not allege that the exhibits
submitted in support of it are true and correct copies of
documents submitted to the superior court and/or contained in

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the superior court’s file in this matter, nor did the People
submit a separate declaration attesting to the authenticity and
accuracy of their exhibits.3
Because Rampone has not challenged the accuracy of any of
the People’s exhibits, we will treat them as though they were
properly authenticated and verified. In the future, however,
the People would be well-advised to properly authenticate and
verify the documents they submit to this court in support of
their writ petitions.
With these procedural matters concluded, we turn to the
relevant facts of this case.
At a joint preliminary hearing in August 2006, the People
offered evidence that in September 2005, Huggins and Rampone and
several individuals they lived with concocted a plan to steal
marijuana from a house in Olivehurst at gunpoint. Rampone was
the driver, and Huggins was to point the gun at the victims.
Unfortunately, the plan went awry and Huggins ended up shooting
the victims, Scott Davis and Christopher Hance, to death.
At the end of the preliminary hearing, Huggins and Rampone
were each held to answer on two charges of first degree murder.
In an amended information filed in December 2006, Huggins
was charged with first degree murder on the theory the killings
3 The four exhibits that are copies of reporter’s transcripts
of relevant oral proceedings in the case do include copies of
reporter’s certificates certifying the completeness and accuracy
of the transcriptions, but nowhere is it alleged or attested
that these copies are true and correct copies of the original
transcripts or certificates.

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occurred during the commission or attempted commission of
robbery or burglary (felony murder). In May 2007, the jury in
Huggins’s case found him not guilty of the felony murder charges
but guilty of two counts of the lesser included offense of
voluntary manslaughter (on the theory he acted with the intent
to kill or with conscious disregard for human life).
Originally Rampone had been charged with first degree
murder on the theory the killings were deliberate and
premeditated. In May 2007, however, a week after the verdicts
in Huggins’s case, the People amended the information against
Rampone to charge her with felony murder on the same theory they
had prosecuted Huggins -- that the killings occurred during the
commission or attempted commission of robbery or burglary.
Relying on People v. Taylor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 686, Rampone
filed a motion, based on the acquittal of Huggins, for an order
preventing the People from prosecuting her for felony murder or
murder on any theory of vicarious liability. The superior court
originally denied the motion. Two months later, however, at a
hearing in July 2007 involving a similar motion by another one
of the participants in the scheme (Sparks), the court announced
its intention to reconsider its collateral estoppel ruling
against Rampone. In August 2007, Rampone filed a motion for
reconsideration. But by that time this court had stayed further
trial court proceedings in the case in connection with a writ
petition the People filed on another issue. (People v. Superior
Court (Rampone) (C056008, stay issued July 26, 2007, pet. denied
and stay vacated Feb. 8, 2008).)

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In August 2008, after the lifting of the stay, Rampone
raised the collateral estoppel issue again by filing another
motion for reconsideration. Following a hearing in September,
the superior court issued its ruling reversing its position on
that issue. Relying on Taylor, the court concluded the People
were “collaterally estopped from pursuing a conviction for
homicide . . . on the basis the homicides allegedly occurred
during the commission of a robbery, burglary, or an attempt of
either crime.”
The People commenced this proceeding by filing a petition
for writ of mandate to compel the superior court to vacate its
order barring the prosecution of Rampone for felony murder. In
January 2009, we issued an alternative writ and stayed further
trial court proceedings in the matter.
DISCUSSION
The People contend the verdict in Huggins’s case “should
not be given binding effect in Rampone’s” case because “[p]ublic
policy generally permits disparate verdicts for an aider and a
perpetrator.” The People further argue that “[a]ssuming the
continuing vitality of Taylor, its narrow exception to the
general rule [allowing disparate verdicts] does not apply to
this case” because “[t]he evidence in Rampone’s trial will be
very different from that in Huggins’s trial . . . .” We agree

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that, even assuming Taylor remains good law,4 it cannot be
applied here to bar prosecution of Rampone for felony murder.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes a party from
relitigating matters litigated and decided in a prior
proceeding. (People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 477.) The
doctrine can apply if: (1) the issue is identical to the one
which is sought to be relitigated; (2) the prior proceedings
resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party
against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in
privity with a party at the previous proceedings. (People v.
Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 691.) The issue of whether
collateral estoppel applies is a question of law that we review
de novo. (Jenkins v. County of Riverside (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th
593, 618.)
Relying on Taylor, the trial court found that collateral
estoppel applied here because it would “promote judicial
economy” by precluding a “third trial on these same facts”5 and
would prevent inconsistent judgments, “eliminat[ing] the risk of
undermining the integrity of the justice system.”
4 The continuing validity of Taylor is presently before the
California Supreme Court in another case arising from the same
incident underlying this case. (People v. Superior Court
(Sparks), review granted Sept. 17, 2008, S164614.)
5 In addition to Huggins, another participant in the scheme
to steal the marijuana (Griffin) was prosecuted for felony
murder; he, too, was found not guilty of that crime.

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In Taylor, three men (Daniels, Smith, and Taylor) planned
to commit a liquor store robbery. (People v. Taylor, supra, 12
Cal.3d. at p. 689.) Taylor (like Rampone here) was the getaway
driver. (Ibid.) During the course of the robbery, one of the
victims shot and killed Smith. (Id. at p. 690.)
In a pretrial writ proceeding, the Supreme Court held that
Taylor could not be prosecuted for felony murder (because the
killing was committed by a victim), but “could be found guilty
of murder on a theory of vicarious liability.” (Taylor v.
Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 578, 582.)
While the writ proceeding was pending in the Supreme Court,
“Daniels was separately tried and convicted of the robbery but
was acquitted of the murder charge.” (People v. Taylor, supra,
12 Cal.3d at p. 691.) Taylor, however, was subsequently
convicted of murder. (Id. at p. 689.) On review, the Supreme
Court determined that under “the particular circumstances of the
instant case where an accused’s guilt must be predicated on his
vicarious liability for the acts of a previously acquitted
confederate,” the People were barred by the doctrine of
collateral estoppel from relitigating the issue of whether
Daniels or Smith “entertained the requisite malice aforethought”
necessary to convict Taylor for murder on a theory of vicarious
liability. (Id. at pp. 691, 698.)
Whether Taylor remains good law is subject to some doubt.
For example, in determining that collateral estoppel should
apply in that case, the Supreme Court noted that among the
“persuasive related cases which favor the application of

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collateral estoppel to foreclose the conviction of an accused
based on his vicarious responsibility for the acts of a
previously acquitted confederate” were “criminal conspiracy
cases which, like the instant case, involve criminal
responsibility for other than purely unilateral conduct.”
(People v. Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 694.) Citing an
earlier California Court of Appeal case -- People v. Reeves
(1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 490 -- the Supreme Court observed that
collateral estoppel had been applied “to preclude the conviction
of an alleged conspirator when all other alleged coconspirators
have been acquitted.” (Taylor, at pp. 694-695.) More recently,
however, in People v. Palmer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 856, the
California Supreme Court disapproved of Reeves and other similar
cases and “conclude[d] that the rule of consistency is a vestige
of the past with no continuing validity,” and therefore “[i]f
substantial evidence supports a jury verdict as to one
defendant, that verdict may stand despite an apparently
inconsistent verdict as to another defendant.” (Taylor, at
pp. 858, 861, 867.)
It is not for us to decide, however, whether Taylor remains
valid. For us, it is enough to conclude that Taylor does not
justify the application of collateral estoppel here for two
reasons.
First, the Supreme Court expressly limited its holding in
Taylor “to the particular circumstances of [that] case” (People
v. Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 698), which involved whether
collateral estoppel precluded the People, who had previously

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failed to establish that either of the robbers in the liquor
store entertained the requisite malice aforethought, should be
allowed to relitigate that issue in prosecuting the getaway
driver for murder on a theory of vicarious liability. The
Supreme Court in Taylor specifically observed that felony murder
was not at issue there because that doctrine had been held
inapplicable in the earlier writ proceeding. (Id. at p. 690.)
Thus, construed narrowly, Taylor does not stand for the
proposition that collateral estoppel can be applied to preclude
prosecution of the getaway driver for felony murder just because
another jury has acquitted the shooter of felony murder.6
Second, the Supreme Court in Taylor implicitly limited
application of collateral estoppel, even in the circumstances
then facing the court, to situations in which there were no
“differences in evidence” at the trials. (People v. Taylor,
supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 698.) The Taylor court stated, “Contrary
to the contention of the People the inconsistency in the results
of Daniels’ trial and defendant’s trial cannot be explained by
differences in evidence” because (1) “[t]he description of
Daniels’ conduct given by the prosecution witnesses was
substantially the same in both trials”; (2) the jury in
Daniels’s case “did not believe his [contrary] account of the
6 Because Rampone was charged only with felony murder, and
the trial court’s order precluded her prosecution only on those
charges, this case does not raise any question of whether
Rampone could be prosecuted for murder on a theory other than
felony murder notwithstanding Huggins’s acquittal.

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occurrences in the liquor store,” while Taylor did not dispute
the People’s version of the events in the store; and (3) both
defendants were caught in falsehoods and forced to admit they
lied in pretrial statements. (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
Here, because Rampone has not yet been tried, it is not
possible to determine whether the evidence in her case will be
identical to the evidence in Huggins’s case. For example,
Rampone claims it was Huggins’s testimony that he had abandoned
the plan to steal the marijuana before he shot the two victims
that led to his acquittal for felony murder. She has also
argued, however, that the jury in her case will not hear
Huggins’s testimony, while the People have argued that it is
uncertain whether he is going to be a witness in the case.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that Taylor does not
compel or justify the application of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel to bar the People from prosecuting Rampone for felony
murder based on the theory that the killings occurred in the
commission or attempted commission of robbery or burglary.7
Accordingly, the superior court erred in concluding otherwise.
DISPOSITION
The petition is granted. Let a peremptory writ issue
directing the superior court to: (1) vacate its order
precluding the People from trying real party in interest Rampone
7 This is not to say that collateral estoppel can only be
applied after the second trial has occurred. But where, as
here, there is a substantial question whether the evidence will
be the same in both trials, we believe Taylor does not apply.

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for felony murder; and (2) enter a new order denying Rampone’s
motion. Having served its purpose, the alternative writ is
discharged. Upon finality of this opinion, the stay previously
issued is vacated.
ROBIE , J.
We concur:
SCOTLAND , P. J.
CANTIL-SAKAUYE , J.

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