P. v. Seastrong

1
Filed 6/30/10 P. v. Seastrong CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
MALACHI SEASTRONG,
Defendant and Respondent.
E048552
(Super.Ct.No. RIF144818)
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Edward D. Webster,
Judge. Affirmed.
Rod Pacheco, District Attorney, and Alan D. Tate, Deputy District Attorney, for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Amanda F. Benedict, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Respondent.

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This is an appeal by the District Attorney of Riverside County from the dismissal
of a misdemeanor prosecution on speedy trial grounds. (Pen. Code, § 1382.)1
The calendar court judge found that there were no courtrooms available to hear the
last-day case in a timely manner and that there was not good cause to continue the case.
The district attorney contends that the court committed legal error and failed to exercise
its discretion to determine whether to continue the case because the calendar court judge
followed the court‟s “inflexible” policy of refusing to use courtrooms devoted to civil,
family law, juvenile and probate matters for criminal cases rather than determining
whether any particular civil case or special proceeding should be delayed in order to give
priority to the criminal case.2 We hold that the trial court did exercise its discretion, that
it did not do so arbitrarily, and that it did not commit legal error.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
Defendant was charged with one count of carrying on his person a concealed “dirk
and dagger” in violation of section 12020, subdivision (a)(4), a felony. On motion of the
prosecution, the court reduced the charge to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 17,
subdivision (b)(4). The case was set for a jury trial.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 The issues the district attorney raises are on review in People v. Wagner (2009)
175 Cal.App.4th 1377, review granted September 30, 2009, S175794, and related cases.
3 The facts related to the underlying offense are omitted as unnecessary to the
issues we address.

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On March 26, 2009, defendant announced ready for trial. The prosecution asked
to trail the trial to March 30, 2009. On April 1 and 2, 2009, the court continued to trail
the case on its own motion because no courtroom was available. On April 3, 2009,
defendant again stated he was ready to proceed to trial. However, the prosecution
requested a continuance to April 6, 2009, which was then the last day for trial.
On April 6, 2009, both parties were prepared to proceed. However, at 4:05 p.m.,
the calendar judge, Judge Edward D. Webster, informed them that no courtrooms were
available. Defendant objected to any further delays.
Judge Webster stated that at the beginning of the day, there had been 31 last-day
cases ready for trial, and that all but the final eight had been sent out. He stated that he
would incorporate into each of the remaining eight cases the so-called “dismissal script”
adopted by the court on October 10, 2008. The script explains the court‟s policy on using
civil and special proceedings courtrooms, including temporary facilities, for criminal
trials.4 Judge Webster then explained that the presiding judge, Judge Cahraman, had
4 The “dismissal script” incorporated into the record read as follows:
“It is now 4:00 p.m. and we have criminal case(s) that have answered ready for
trial and are on their last day. We have checked civil and criminal courts countywide and
we have no available courtrooms to send a criminal jury trial. There are some types of
courts where we will not send a criminal jury trial; Family Law Court, Juvenile Court,
Guardianship Court, Probate Court.
“The Judges in Family Law have full calendars. The public focuses on their job of
handling dissolutions, but one of their most important jobs is to protect young children.
The children of divorcing families are frequently in need of protection from some of the
emotional things that parents who are in divorce situations are doing to each other. If a
Family Law Judge is required to handle a criminal jury trial, there is no one to replace
that Judge in Family Law. Taking away the Judge that protects these children would be
[footnote continued on next page]

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[footnote continued from previous page]
very unfortunate for the children and for society. We will not reallocate a Family Law
Judge to do a criminal jury trial.
“The Judges in Juvenile Court have full calendars. They have two very important
jobs. One is under 602 Welfare and Institutions Code and the other is under 300 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code. Under 602, the Judge handles youths who have
committed crimes. The time deadlines are strict. If a Judge is not available to conduct the
hearings the youth is released. Some youth commit very serious crimes such as
carjackings, robberies, etc. If these youth are released this would be a public safety issue.
We would be exposing the public to unnecessary danger. Under 300, a Judge handles
children from homes where they are abused or neglected. If the Judge were not available
to oversee these children, they would be in great danger. If a Juvenile Court Judge is
required to handle a criminal jury trial, there is no one to replace that Judge in Juvenile
Court. Taking away the Judge that protects these children and society would be very
unfortunate for the children and for society. We will not reallocate a Juvenile Court
Judge to do a criminal jury trial.
“The Judicial Officer who handles Guardianships is not available. Guardianships
are for children or the severely disabled who have no one to care for them, for example,
the parents have passed away and there are no available relatives. We are not going to
abandon those least able to care for themselves. If the Guardianship Judicial Officer is
required to do a criminal jury trial, there is no one to replace that person. We will not
reallocate the Guardianship Judicial Officer to do a criminal jury trial.
“The Judicial Officer who handles Probate is not available. Probate Court handles
cases where the assets of those who have passed away or are disabled are protected. We
are not going to abandon those unable to tend to their own assets or those who have
passed on but have relied on the Courts to handle their assets appropriately. If the
Probate Judicial Officer is required to do a criminal jury trial, there is no one to replace
that person. We will not reallocate the Probate Judicial Officer to do a criminal jury trial.
“Civil Courtrooms are frequently available for criminal jury trials. We use most
civil courtrooms for both civil and criminal matters. We will not interrupt an ongoing
civil jury trial except in the rarest and most exigent of circumstances. The civil
departments that volunteer for criminal jury trials still handle a full load of civil matters.
Thus, their scheduling needs must be taken into account.
“There are four visiting Judges assigned to do civil jury trials in temporary
facilities. One of those facilities is the Hawthorne Elementary School. Another such
facility is in the desert area. These facilities have insufficient security. It would be
unsafe for jurors, for the DA, for the defense counsel and for the witnesses, if criminals
and criminal trials were assigned to these facilities. Theoretically, one of these Judges
could be moved to a secure courtroom in the Hall of Justice. But, the Chief Justice and
the Administrative Office of the Courts assigned these Judges to Riverside County for the
specific purpose of doing civil trials. We will not change the assignment parameters
[footnote continued on next page]

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more recently decided that Riverside County‟s “huge backlog” of civil cases needed to be
addressed and that civil litigants have a constitutional right to access to the courts. He
explained that two judges who would otherwise have been available for criminal trials
had been assigned to civil matters and were not available. He stated that Judge
Tranbarger was available, but confirmed on the record that the district attorney‟s office
would continue its policy of “affidavitting” Judge Tranbarger.
Judge Webster then allowed one of the deputy district attorneys to state the
office‟s position on the proposed dismissals of the eight cases. The deputy district
attorney stated, “It is the position of the People that 1050 PC sets forth a preference for
[footnote continued from previous page]
unless the Chief/AOC or the Court of Appeals orders us to do so. We will not assign a
criminal trial to these temporary facilities or take a Judge from these facilities to move
elsewhere to do a criminal trial.
“We have one Civil Judge who is available to do criminal trials. If he is not in a
civil jury trial, criminal cases are assigned to him. The District Attorney files a 170.6
CCP against him every time that a criminal case is assigned to him. This is not
unexpected since the DA‟s Office has announced publicly that they will „paper‟ that
particular Judge at every opportunity. Therefore, if a case is assigned to him, and if he is
„papered‟, an additional „last day‟ is not created.
“We have Calendar Courts, each of which handle hundreds of cases, each day. If
the Judicial Officer were not there, then cases would be dismissed. We have no spare
Calendar Judges. If they are not present, no one will be available to do the Calendar. We
will not reallocate a Calendar Judge to do a criminal jury trial.
“We have informed the Chair of the Judicial Counsel, pursuant to section 1050 of
the Penal Code, that we are in danger of dismissing cases.
“Therefore, we have done everything possible to find a place for the last remaining
case(s). No courtroom is available. The defense motion to dismiss will be heard on the
next business day at 8:30 a.m. Each defendant is ordered back to this courtroom at 8:30
tomorrow morning. Each defendant and defense counsel and prosecutor is ordered to
stay in this courtroom until 4:30 p.m. today, just in case a courtroom becomes available
for jury trial.”

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criminal cases over any civil matters or proceedings. The court has, as it noted,
designated two courtrooms, Judge Hopp of Indio, and Judge Trask of Riverside[,] to do
solely civil cases. [¶] We believe that expressly goes against 1050 PC, and object to that
here. We believe the court should also look to family law, probate, guardianship and
other specifically designated non-criminal departments for a home for these jury trials.
We disagree with the court‟s policy of not checking those courtrooms to determine if any
of them are available to hear one of these jury trials. [¶] We believe the Judicial
[Council] also cannot order this court to deviate from 1050 PC, therefore, we believe that
all the Hawthorne and Palm Springs court judges should be used to hear one of these
cases. They can use one of our courtrooms if necessary for security. [¶] Finally, it is the
position of the People [that if] the court has done everything required of it to find a
courtroom and none appear available, then that would constitute good cause, and the case
should be continued for one day. The People hereby object to any dismissals that occur
on these cases because of what is termed, quote, a lack of available courtrooms, end
quote.”
After the deputy district attorney finished his statement, Judge Webster informed
the defendants that their cases would be dismissed the following day. On April 7, 2009,
Judge Webster dismissed defendant‟s case.
The district attorney filed a timely notice of appeal.

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LEGAL ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
“The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right. [Citation.] It is guaranteed by
the state and federal Constitutions. [Citations.] The Legislature has also provided for „“a
speedy and public” trial as one of the fundamental rights preserved to a defendant in a
criminal action. [Citation.]‟ [Citation.] To implement an accused‟s constitutional right
to a speedy trial, the Legislature enacted section 1382. [Citation.]” (Rhinehart v.
Municipal Court (1984) 35 Cal.3d 772, 776.) “Section 1382 provides statutory deadlines
for bringing a criminal defendant to trial. If these deadlines are not met, and no good
cause is shown, then a defendant has a statutory right to have the claims against him
dismissed.” (Baustert v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1275.)
The District Attorney acknowledges that a determination of good cause to
continue a trial beyond the statutory speedy trial period is evaluated under an abuse of
discretion standard. (See People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 852; Baustert v.
Superior Court, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1275.) He contends, however, that he is
“not challenging exercises of discretion, but the calendar judge‟s refusal to give actual
consideration to the use of certain courtrooms to prevent the dismissal of this last-day
criminal trial matter.” He contends that this is primarily an error of law, to be reviewed
de novo based on the uncontradicted facts presented in the court below. (People v.
Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 730 [an appellate court independently reviews a trial
court‟s resolution of pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact that are

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predominantly legal].) However, in reality, the District Attorney argues both that the
calendar judge committed legal error and that he abused his discretion in failing to
consider the use of noncriminal courtrooms.
As we discuss below, section 1050 subdivision (a) (hereafter section 1050(a))
afforded the court ample discretion to determine whether any courtrooms were available
to try defendant‟s case. We therefore review the court‟s determination that no
courtrooms were available for an abuse of discretion. (§ 1050(a).) We then address
whether the court abused its discretion in determining that the lack of an available
courtroom did not constitute good cause to continue the case, indefinitely, until a
courtroom became available. (§ 1382.)
Section 1050(a) afforded the court ample discretion to determine whether a
courtroom was available to try defendant’s case.
Section 1050(a) states, in pertinent part, that criminal cases “shall be set for trial
and heard and determined at the earliest possible time,” and expedited “to the greatest
degree that is consistent with the ends of justice. In accordance with this policy, criminal
cases shall be given precedence over, and set for trial and heard without regard to the
pendency of, any civil matters . . . .”5 Despite the statute‟s use of the phrase “without
5 Section 1050(a) states in full: “The welfare of the people of the State of
California requires that all proceedings in criminal cases shall be set for trial and heard
and determined at the earliest possible time. To this end, the Legislature finds that the
criminal courts are becoming increasingly congested with resulting adverse consequences
to the welfare of the people and the defendant. Excessive continuances contribute
substantially to this congestion and cause substantial hardship to victims and other
witnesses. Continuances also lead to longer periods of presentence confinement for those
[footnote continued on next page]

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regard to,” the statute does not state an absolute rule that criminal trials must always take
precedence over pending noncriminal matters regardless of the circumstances. Rather,
section 1050(a) affords courts discretion in determining whether to give a criminal case
trial preference over noncriminal matters.
In People v. Osslo (1958) 50 Cal.2d 75 (Osslo), the defendant‟s case was assigned
for trial to a criminal courtroom which was then engaged in another matter. The court
stated that the defendant‟s case would be continued “half a day at a time” until the
courtroom became available. The case was continued multiple times over the
defendant‟s objections. In overruling the defendant‟s objection to one continuance, the
court explained that the delays were caused by the court‟s congested calendar, the fact
that there were several judges out on assignment, the juvenile calendar was very
congested, another department was handling the case of a person who was confined as
mentally ill, and that there were three criminal trials going on. It also rejected the
[footnote continued from previous page]
defendants in custody and the concomitant overcrowding and increased expenses of local
jails. It is therefore recognized that the people, the defendant, and the victims and other
witnesses have the right to an expeditious disposition, and to that end it shall be the duty
of all courts and judicial officers and of all counsel, both for the prosecution and the
defense, to expedite these proceedings to the greatest degree that is consistent with the
ends of justice. In accordance with this policy, criminal cases shall be given precedence
over, and set for trial and heard without regard to the pendency of, any civil matters or
proceedings. In further accordance with this policy, death penalty cases in which both
the prosecution and the defense have informed the court that they are prepared to proceed
to trial shall be given precedence over, and set for trial and heard without regard to the
pendency of, other criminal cases and any civil matters or proceedings, unless the court
finds in the interest of justice that it is not appropriate.”

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defendant‟s objection to the continuance on the ground that there were civil trials
occurring in other departments. (Id. at pp. 104-106.)
The defendant contended that continuing his case while civil cases were being
conducted violated former section 681a and former section 1050. Former section 681a
provided, “„The welfare of the people of the state of California requires that all
proceedings in criminal cases shall be heard and determined at the earliest possible time.
It shall be the duty of all courts and judicial officers and of all district attorneys to
expedite the hearing and determination of all such cases and proceedings to the greatest
degree that is consistent with the ends of justice.‟” (Osslo, supra, 50 Cal.2d at p. 106.)
The version of section 1050 then in effect provided, “„Criminal cases shall be given
precedence over all civil matters and proceedings.‟” (Osslo, at p. 106.)6 The Supreme
Court held that the trial court‟s order was not an abuse of discretion: “It does not appear
that the policy of [former section 681a and former section 1050] was disregarded. [The
trial court‟s] explanation of the condition of the calendar shows that defendants were not
being deprived of precedence over civil cases for any arbitrary reason . . . . Rather, it
appears that the orderly administration of a crowded calendar required the continuances
to enable trial of the case in a proper department. The precedence to which criminal
cases are entitled is not of such an absolute and overriding character that the system of
6 In 1959, the Legislature amended section 1050 to include the language in former
section 681a and repealed former section 681a. (Stats. 1959, ch. 1693, §§ 1, 2, pp. 4092-
4093.)

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having separate departments for civil and criminal matters must be abandoned.” (Osslo,
at p. 106.)
Osslo establishes that the provisions of current section 1050 are not absolute and
that a trial court is afforded the discretion to determine which cases are to be given
priority, as long as it does not do so in an arbitrary manner.7 Accordingly, the court in
this case had the discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be given trial
preference over noncriminal matters in light of the court‟s overall workload and the
relative interests of criminal and noncriminal litigants having cases pending before the
court.
The court did not abuse its discretion in determining there were no courtrooms
available to try defendant’s case.
The district attorney argues that the court abused its discretion in determining that
there were no courtrooms available to try defendant‟s case, because it “refus[ed] to give
actual consideration” to transferring this last-day criminal case to a courtroom hearing
probate or family law cases, or another noncriminal department, instead relying on its
“inflexible” dismissal policy. Quoting People v. Russel (1968) 69 Cal.2d 187, 195, and
citing People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 348, footnote 8, and People v. Superior
7 Although in Osslo the trial court granted the continuance of the case to be heard
in an available criminal department so as not to disrupt a courtroom conducting a civil
trial, the reasoning equally applies to the situation here where the trial court denied the
continuance. As discussed, post, subsequent to Osslo, the Supreme Court has found that
chronic court congestion does not constitute good cause for a continuance, but the court
has never changed its interpretation that section 1050 is discretionary.

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Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977, the district attorney argues that the court
necessarily abused its discretion because it failed to apply the “„legal principles and
policies appropriate to the particular matter at issue.‟”
As discussed above, section 1050(a) affords courts discretion to determine
whether a criminal case should be given trial preference over noncriminal matters, in
view of the court‟s overall workload and the interests of both criminal and noncriminal
litigants having cases pending before the court. In addition, section 1050(a) does not
require courts to abandon their practice of designating separate departments to handle
criminal and noncriminal matters. (Osslo, supra, 50 Cal.2d at p. 106.) The sole
limitation on this discretion is that the court must not exercise its discretion in an
arbitrary manner. (Ibid.)
The Riverside Superior Court‟s “dismissal policy” is neither arbitrary nor
inflexible as the district attorney maintains. Instead, the policy reflects a well-reasoned
and well-considered exercise of the court‟s discretion in view of its overall workload and
the general importance of noncriminal matters pending before the court at any given time.
(Osslo, supra, 50 Cal.2d at pp. 104-106.) The policy first provides that criminal jury
trials will not be assigned to the family law, juvenile, guardianship, probate, or master
calendar courts, under any circumstances, and explains why. Each of these courts
conducts important business that affects the lives of children or other members of the
public. The judges in the family law court, for instance, have “full calendars” and protect
the needs of children of divorcing families. If a family law judge is required to handle a

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criminal jury trial, there is no one to replace that judge in family law court. The policy
states similar reasons for not requiring the juvenile or probate court judges, or the sole
judicial officer handling guardianships, to abandon their busy calendars in order to
conduct criminal jury trials. Nor will the court assign criminal jury trials to its calendar
courts, because these courts “handle hundreds of cases each day,” and the cases would be
dismissed if the calendar judge were not there to handle them. There is nothing arbitrary
about these aspects of the court‟s dismissal policy.
The policy further states that there are four “visiting Judges” assigned for the sole
purpose of conducting civil jury trials in two temporary facilities, one at Hawthorne
Elementary School in Riverside and the other in the “desert area.” The policy provides
that these four judges and two facilities will not, under any circumstances, be used for
criminal jury trials because the facilities have inadequate security; hence, conducting
criminal jury trials in them would be unsafe for jurors, the district attorney, defense
counsel, and witnesses. And, although one of these four judges could “theoretically” be
moved to a secure courtroom in the Riverside Hall of Justice, the court would not do so
because the Administrative Office of the Courts had assigned all four of the judges to
Riverside County “for the specific purpose” of conducting civil trials. Thus, unless
ordered to do so, the court would not use any of the four judges or two temporary
facilities to conduct criminal jury trials.
There is nothing arbitrary about this aspect of the policy either. As indicated in
People v. Flores (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th Supp. 9, 22, very few civil cases were being

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tried in Riverside County before the Hawthorne judges were appointed. In addition, the
court had already given “extraordinary precedence to criminal trials over traditional civil
matters,” and still lacked the resources necessary to try all criminal cases in a timely
manner. (Id. at p. Supp. 23.) In view of the ongoing backlog of civil cases in the county
and the lack of permanent judges and facilities to try them, the court‟s policy of
designating the temporary judges and facilities solely to try civil cases was reasonable
and well considered.
Lastly, the policy states that the court‟s civil courtrooms—apparently courtrooms
other than the temporary facilities—are “frequently” made available for criminal jury
trials, and most civil courtrooms are used for civil and criminal matters.8 The policy also
states: “We will not interrupt an ongoing civil jury trial except in the rarest and most
exigent of circumstances.” This aspect of the policy is certainly not arbitrary:
Interrupting an ongoing civil jury trial will almost certainly waste the civil litigants‟
resources to their detriment or “actual prejudice.” Still, this aspect of the policy is
flexible because it allows for the possibility that an ongoing civil trial may be interrupted
so that, for example, an important last-day criminal case could be sent to that courtroom
8 On the date at issue, the court had in fact assigned 23 out of the 31 last-day
cases, despite the fact that only two courtrooms were open at the beginning of the day.
Presumably, some of those 23 cases went to courtrooms which ordinarily try civil cases.

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for trial. It is reasonable, however, for the court to require that an ongoing civil jury trial
will be interrupted only “in the rarest and most exigent of circumstances.”9
The district attorney asserts that section 1050(a) requires the calendar court to
compare the seriousness of actual matters pending in noncriminal courts with the
seriousness of the charges in the criminal case to determine whether to dismiss the
criminal case. He contends that this is not a matter of discretion but a determination of
fact necessary to the informed exercise of discretion pursuant to section 1050(a). We
disagree. This would be an insurmountable task, and it is not required by section
1050(a). Nor is it required by Osslo. (Osslo, supra, 50 Cal.2d at p. 106.) Moreover, the
court‟s dismissal policy demonstrates that the court reasonably determined that
noncriminal matters would generally be prejudiced if interrupted or suspended so that a
criminal jury trial could be conducted in courtrooms previously designated to handle
those matters.
In sum, the court‟s dismissal policy is not arbitrary; it is well considered and
reasonably accounts for the interests of criminal defendants and all other persons having
business before the court or interests the court is charged with protecting. The policy is
also flexible in at least one respect: It allows for the possibility that an ongoing civil jury
9 The policy further states there is “one [c]ivil [j]udge,” apparently Judge
Tranbarger, whom the Riverside County District Attorney routinely “papers” or
peremptorily challenges pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 every time a
criminal case is assigned to him. The policy states that if a criminal case is assigned to
this judge and he is peremptorily challenged, “an additional „last day‟ is not created,”
meaning there will not be good cause to continue the case to another day. The People do
not challenge this aspect of the policy, so we do not address it here.

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trial in a permanent and secure courtroom may be interrupted to conduct a criminal jury
trial, albeit “in the rarest and most exigent of circumstances.” Here, however, the
prosecutor made no effort to argue that “rare and exigent” circumstances required the
court to interrupt a civil jury trial so that defendant‟s misdemeanor case could be tried.
The court did not abuse its discretion in determining good cause had not been
shown to continue defendant’s case.
The deputy district attorney argued to the court that the lack of an available
courtroom constituted good cause to continue the eight cases “for one day.” The district
attorney concedes that court congestion is not, in general, good cause for continuing a
criminal case beyond the statutory speedy trial period. (See People v. Johnson (1980) 26
Cal.3d 557, 571-572 [court congestion will constitute good cause to deny a section 1382
motion to dismiss only when the congestion is attributable to exceptional
circumstances].) However, he contends that the calendar court‟s alleged legal error in
failing to find good cause to continue the case, combined with court congestion,
constituted an exceptional circumstance. The logic of this argument escapes us. The
continuance was denied and the case dismissed based on the trial court‟s policy
pertaining to last-day criminal cases. The policy is a response to the chronic congestion
of the Riverside County Superior Court, which results from the inadequacy of the
resources provided by the state to meet the demand for trials in that court. By definition,
chronic court congestion resulting from the state‟s failure to provide resources sufficient
to meet the demand for trials is not an exceptional circumstance which constitutes good

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cause for a continuance in last-day cases. (People v. Johnson, supra, at pp. 571-572
[applied to individuals in custody awaiting trial]; see also Rhinehart v. Municipal Court,
supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 782 [applied to individuals not in custody].) The court‟s denial of
the continuance based on its asserted failure to give “actual consideration” to utilizing a
noncriminal courtroom does not elevate this chronic circumstance to an exceptional one.
In any event, as we have discussed, the court‟s policy with respect to the
assignment of last-day criminal cases is not an abuse of discretion. Consequently, the
court‟s application of the policy in this case was neither an abuse of discretion nor a legal
error. Thus, the court properly determined that the lack of an available courtroom to try
defendant‟s case did not constitute good cause to continue the case.10
10 The district attorney cites People v. Yniquez (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d Supp. 13, in
which the court held that court congestion is good cause for continuing a case beyond the
statutory speedy trial period. (Id. at pp. Supp. 19-20.) However, that case and others
which assume that court congestion necessarily constitutes good cause were called into
question by the California Supreme Court in People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557,
and it was implicitly overruled on that point when the court held that chronic court
congestion does not constitute good cause. (Id. at pp. 571-572; see also Rhinehart v.
Municipal Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 781-783.)

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DISPOSITION
The order of dismissal is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
/s/ McKinster
J.
We concur:
/s/ Ramirez
P.J.
/s/ Miller
J.

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