Ryan Anderson v. Jason W. Pollard

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
_________________________________
RYAN ANDERSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JASON W. POLLARD,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 21-5019
(D.C. No. 4:20-CV-00314-JED-JFJ)
(N.D. Okla.)
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before BACHARACH, MURPHY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Appearing pro se, Plaintiff Ryan Anderson alleges Defendant Jason W. Pollard
intentionally caused him emotional distress by blocking his communications with a
potential lover. This civil action marks Plaintiff’s third attempt to hold Defendant
liable for emotional distress. The district court, like the two times before, dismissed
Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Our jurisdiction arises under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 10, 2021
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
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According to Plaintiff, he was friends with Defendant and Defendant’s
then-wife (“wife”) when, at some point, the couple lost Plaintiff’s phone number and
communication stopped. Plaintiff and wife tried to reconnect after losing touch, but
Defendant repeatedly blocked her attempts and ignored Plaintiff’s requests to keep
the “communication lines open.”
Before filing this lawsuit, Plaintiff sued Defendant two other times on this
same set of facts—Anderson v. Pollard, 18-CV-686 (E.D. Va. March 1, 2019)
(“Anderson I”) and Anderson v. Pollard, 18-CV-582, 2019 WL 10813621, at *1
(N.D. Okla. April 8, 2019) (“Anderson II”). In Anderson I, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in
forma pauperis and dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint sua sponte as frivolous and for
failure to state a claim. In Anderson II, Plaintiff tried again in the Northern District
of Oklahoma. That district court allowed Plaintiff’s suit to go forward despite
Plaintiff filing a photocopy of his complaint from Anderson I. Defendant moved to
dismiss for failure to state a claim and the district court granted the motion.
Anderson II, 2019 WL 10813621, at *1.
Unassuaged, Plaintiff filed this third suit against Defendant based on the same
facts as his prior lawsuits. Plaintiff’s hand-written complaint alleges Defendant’s
actions deprived him of a potential lover, wife, and “child-bearer” and requests
damages of seventy-five million dollars, “or more practically,” two-and-a-half
million dollars. The district court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, but determined claim preclusion barred his action. As a result, the district
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court dismissed for frivolity and failure to state a claim. 1, 2 See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
Section 1915(e)(2)(B) mandates dismissal if the court determines the action or
appeal is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted. A complaint fails to state a claim when “it is obvious that the plaintiff
cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an
opportunity to amend.” Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir.
1999) (citation omitted). We review the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a
claim and its ruling on claim preclusion de novo. Perkins, 165 F.3d at 806;
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Horne, 698 F.3d 1295,
1301 (10th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
1 Plaintiff claims the district court erred in four ways. First, the district
court erred when it found his suit frivolous and without merit. Second, the district
court erred when it held Plaintiff failed to state a claim. Id. Third, the district court
erred by “allowing the guilty or liable off the hook improperly.” Plaintiff specifies
that the district court’s dismissal of his case, its failure to send his summons,
complaint, request for admissions, and interrogatories to Defendant, and its failure to
award money damages, let Defendant “off the hook.” Fourth, the district court failed
to adequately consider all of Plaintiff’s arguments.
2 Plaintiff also accuses Defendant of perjury in this lawsuit. We agree with the
district court that Defendant committed no perjury because he provided no testimony
in Anderson II, and in any event, no cause of action for perjury exists under either
federal or Oklahoma law. See Cooper v. Parker-Hughey, 894 P.2d 1096, 1100 (Okla.
1995) (concluding “no Oklahoma statute specifically allows a civil cause of action
against one who commits perjury”); Morgan v. Graham, 228 F.2d 625, 627 (10th Cir.
1956) (“[A]n unsuccessful litigant who has lost his case because of perjured
testimony may not maintain a civil action for damages against the person who
commits the perjury.”).
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An action barred under the doctrine of claim preclusion fails to state a claim
for which relief can be granted. See Johnson v. Spencer, 950 F.3d 680, 693–94 (10th
Cir. 2020) (affirming district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim on grounds
of claim preclusion against the defendant). For claim preclusion to bar an action,
three elements must exist: (1) “a [final] judgment on the merits in an earlier action”;
(2) the same “identity of parties or privies in the two suits”; and (3) the same
“identity of the cause of action in both suits.” 3 Id. at 693 (alteration in original)
(quoting Lenox MacLaren Surgical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 847 F.3d 1221, 1239
(10th Cir. 2017)).
The district court’s decision in Anderson II bars Plaintiff’s claim here. First,
the district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
3 Although an exception applies for parties resisting claim preclusion if a court
denied them a “full and fair opportunity to litigate” their previous action, that
exception does not apply here. Johnson, 950 F.3d at 693 (citation omitted). The full
and fair opportunity standard applies when a deficiency exists in a prior action “that
would undermine the fundamental fairness of the original proceedings.” Id. at 709
(internal quotations and citation omitted). Courts typically ask whether “significant
procedural limitations [existed] in the prior proceeding, whether the party had the
incentive to litigate fully the issue, or whether effective litigation was limited by the
nature or relationship of the parties.” SIL-FLO, Inc. v. SFHC, Inc., 917 F.2d 1507,
1521 (10th Cir. 1990).
In his previous actions, Plaintiff asserted three counts: (1) lowering quality of
life and opportunity loss; (2) money laundering and tax evasion; and (3) intentional
emotional abuse. Anderson II, 2019 WL 10813621, at *1. The district court
recognized that no private cause of action exists for count two, and Plaintiff failed to
satisfy the requirements of counts one and three. Id. at *2–3. Because we see no
significant procedural limitations, limitations on effective litigation, or any
disincentives to litigate in Plaintiff’s prior actions, we conclude the exception does
not apply here.
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And under Rule 41(b), if a court grants a defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, it is a final judgment on the merits. See Stan Lee Media, Inc. v. Walt
Disney Co., 774 F.3d 1292, 1298 (10th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Second,
Plaintiff sued the same defendant in both actions. And third, Plaintiff identified the
same cause of action—intentional infliction of emotional distress for blocking
communications with a potential lover—in both cases. 4 Because claim preclusion
bars Plaintiff’s action, the district court correctly dismissed his Complaint.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Joel M. Carson III
Circuit Judge
4 Plaintiff admits “his complaint is a ‘refiling’ of the previous action.”
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