Earl Crownhart v. Shield Foundation; Daniel Smith; Annie Migill Collins

21-1077Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit16 de set. de 2021

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
_________________________________
EARL CROWNHART,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
SHIELD FOUNDATION; DANIEL
SMITH; ANNIE MIGILL COLLINS,
Defendants - Appellees.
Nos. 21-1077 & 21-1230
(D.C. No. 1:21-CV-00544-LTB)
(D. Colorado)
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before HOLMES, KELLY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Pro se litigant, Earl Crownhart, appeals the district court’s dismissal of the
civil action he filed in the District of Colorado against the Shield Foundation and
individuals Daniel Smith and Annie Collins. The district court dismissed the suit
without prejudice, noting that it has permanently enjoined Mr. Crownhart from filing
pro se civil actions in the District of Colorado without first obtaining permission
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
September 16, 2021
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
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from the court. Because Mr. Crownhart did not comply with the district court’s
restrictions, the court dismissed his complaint.
Mr. Crownhart also appeals the district court’s denial of a post-judgment
motion he filed in the same case. After being warned that additional filings in the
case would be stricken, Mr. Crownhart filed a motion two months after judgment had
been entered. Also before this court are eleven additional submissions from
Mr. Crownhart in Appeal No. 21-1077 and seven additional submissions from
Mr. Crownhart in Appeal No. 21-1230.
Mr. Crownhart is well-known to this court. This court has previously taken
notice of Mr. Crownhart’s “ever-growing heap of federal-court filings.” Crownhart v.
May, 556 F. App’x 758, 760 n.3 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished). Earlier this year, we
estimated that his federal court filings “span[] fifteen-plus years and total[] well over
fifty suits.” Crownhart v. T-Mobile Wireless Customer Serv., 840 F. App’x 368, 369
(10th Cir. 2021) (unpublished). Since the beginning of this year alone, this court has
denied two nearly identical filings by Mr. Crownhart. See Crownhart v. McDonald’s
Corp., 846 F. App’x 711, 713 (10th Cir. 2021) (unpublished); T-Mobile Wireless
Customer Serv., 840 F. App’x at 371. In 2020, we denied four. See Crownhart v.
McIntyre Rentals, 809 F. App’x 551, 551–52 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished);
Crownhart v. Graham, 809 F. App’x 553, 554 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished);
Crownhart v. Mason, 800 F. App’x 675, 676 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished);
Crownhart v. Jones, 790 F. App’x 174, 175 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished).
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These appeals all follow a clear pattern. In 2013, due to Mr. Crownhart’s
“lengthy and abusive” history of repeated filings, the District of Colorado issued an
order enjoining him from filing future pro se civil actions without first obtaining
leave from the court. T-Mobile Wireless Customer Serv., 840 F. App’x at 369. This
order has not deterred Mr. Crownhart. Despite the order, Mr. Crownhart has
“continued to file suits in district court and then appeal them to our court after their
dismissal” for failure to obtain leave from the district court without addressing the
underlying issue—his failure to comply with the district court’s filing restrictions.
Id.; see also McDonald’s, 846 F. App’x at 713 (“[O]n appeal, [Mr.] Crownhart
repeats the arguments he made to the district court concerning the merits of his
discrimination claim instead of addressing the district court's reasoning for
dismissing his action.”); Mason, 800 F. App’x at 676 (“Further, [Mr.] Crownhart fails
to address on appeal the district court’s reasons for dismissing his initial action.”).
This is precisely what has happened here. This action was dismissed by the
district court “because [Mr. Crownhart] failed to comply with the sanction order
restricting his ability to file pro se actions in this Court.” ROA Vol. 1 at 51. On
appeal, Mr. Crownhart does not address the reasons for the district court’s dismissal.
Instead, he continues to press the merits of his claim. He argues the district court
“didn’t review the complaint thoughly [sic]” and dismissal was “unconstitutionally
wrong” because “the claims were not frivolous or malicious.” Aplt Br. Case
No. 21-1077 at 4. However, he never addresses his failure to follow the district
court’s filing restrictions.
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This appeal is clearly part of a larger pattern where Mr. Crownhart makes little
or no attempt to satisfy the district court’s filing restrictions and then appeals to this
court without ever addressing the reasons for the initial dismissal. Given this pattern
of behavior, and the resultant drain on judicial resources from these frivolous
appeals, this court warns Mr. Crownhart that additional filings of this nature will
result in an order restricting him from appealing in forma pauperis the dismissal of
cases in which he makes no effort to comply with the district court’s filing
restrictions.
As to this court’s decision on Mr. Crownhart’s immediate appeals, we first
address whether Mr. Crownhart may proceed IFP in this instance. Because the district
court denied Mr. Crownhart’s application to proceed IFP and certified that any appeal
would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), Mr. Crownhart
is not entitled IFP status unless this court concludes that his appeal contains a
nonfrivolous argument. See Rolland v. Primesource Staffing, L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1077,
1079 (10th Cir. 2007). While Mr. Crownhart has demonstrated financial inability to
pay the required filing fees, no nonfrivolous argument exists to support either of his
appeals.
Because Mr. Crownhart fails to address the underlying reasons for the district
court’s dismissal—namely, his failure to comply with the district court’s filing
restriction—this court concludes that no nonfrivolous argument exists to support his
appeal of the district court’s dismissal.
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His second appeal is similarly meritless. Two months after the district court
dismissed Mr. Crownhart’s case and issued a judgment, Mr. Crownhart filed a
document captioned “Motion to File Leave to File to Compell [sic] to Add a Second
Amended Partie [sic] . . .” which was stricken by the court because the action had
been closed. ROA Vol. 1 at 67. The district court had previously warned
Mr. Crownhart that additional filings in the case would be stricken. Id.
Mr. Crownhart filed a timely appeal of the district court’s decision on his post-
judgment filing. Appeal No. 21-1230.
Again, however, Mr. Crownhart fails to address on appeal the reasons for the
district court’s decision to strike the motion—specifically, that the case had long
been closed. Instead, Mr. Crownhart focuses on the dismissal of the original case,
“Lewis T. Babcock striking a person’s actions and dismissing a case violates the First
Amendment right under the right to petition the government.” Aplt Br. Case 21-1230
at 4. That original order is not before us here. Because Mr. Crownhart has failed to
present a nonfrivolous argument that addresses either the filing restrictions or the
post-judgment nature of his motion, we deny his petition to proceed IFP on appeal.
Even if this court allowed Mr. Crownhart to proceed IFP on these appeals, this
court would affirm both district court decisions on the merits for the same reasons
articulated above.
We review a district court's application of a previously imposed filing
restriction for abuse of discretion. See In re Peterson, 338 F. App’x 763, 764 (10th
Cir. 2009) (unpublished). We are satisfied that the court did not abuse its discretion
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because Mr. Crownhart failed to abide by the district court’s restrictions, neither
obtaining representation nor seeking leave of court before filing the action. He
presents no explanation on appeal as to this failure. The district court’s denial of
Mr. Crownhart’s post-judgment motion was similarly appropriate.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the action and its
denial of Mr. Crownhart’s post-judgment motion. We additionally DENY
Mr. Crownhart’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. All other pending
motions are therefore also DENIED.
Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh
Circuit Judge
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