C.s. Robledo v. Executive Director of Cdoc; the Attorney General of the State of Colorado

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
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C.S. ROBLEDO,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF CDOC;
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF COLORADO,
Respondents - Appellees.
No. 25-1151
(D.C. No. 1:24-CV-02430-LTB-RTG)
(D. Colo.)
_________________________________
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
_________________________________
Before BACHARACH, KELLY, and EID, Circuit Judges.
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C.S. Robledo, proceeding pro se,1 seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to
appeal from the district court’s denial of Robledo’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas application.
We deny a COA and dismiss this matter.
A Colorado jury convicted Robledo of stalking, harassment, and violating a
protection order. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, and the
Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari review. Robledo then filed a § 2254 habeas
* This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1 We construe Robledo’s filings liberally. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 15, 2026
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
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application in federal court, claiming that (1) the stalking conviction violated the First
Amendment; (2) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by opening the door to
evidence of Robledo’s criminal history; (3) the trial court improperly admitted
criminal-history evidence; and (4) the prosecution violated the Fifth Amendment’s
Double Jeopardy Clause by introducing evidence from a previous trial.2 The district
court denied claims two, three, and four as untimely. The court denied claims one and
four as unexhausted and procedurally barred.3
Robledo cannot appeal without first obtaining a COA. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1)(A). To do so, Robledo must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” § 2253(c)(2). When, as here, the district court denies a habeas
application on procedural grounds, the prisoner must show that reasonable jurists could
debate whether the application states a valid constitutional claim and whether the district
court’s procedural ruling was correct. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). We
need only consider the procedural ruling. See id. at 485.
In the combined COA application and opening brief, Robledo makes no argument
addressing the district court’s dismissal of the habeas application on procedural grounds.
Robledo has therefore waived any argument that we should grant a COA. See Davis v.
McCollum, 798 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir. 2015) (concluding COA applicant’s failure to
2 In claims two and three, Robledo also alleged that trial and appellate counsel
were ineffective for failing to challenge the Colorado stalking statute’s constitutionality.
3 The court also denied as unexhausted and procedurally barred the parts of claims
two and three alleging ineffective assistance based on the failure to challenge the stalking
statute’s constitutionality.
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challenge district court’s procedural ruling in the opening brief waived the issue). Still,
having reviewed the district court’s rulings in light of the record and the applicable law,
we conclude that reasonable jurists would not debate the correctness of the district court’s
procedural ruling.
We grant Robledo’s motion to proceed without prepaying costs or fees. We deny
the application for a COA and dismiss this matter.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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