Marva R. Bell v. Coleman Younger

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
_________________________________
MARVA R. BELL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COLEMAN YOUNGER,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 26-3045
(D.C. No. 5:26-CV-04007-HLT-BGS)
(D. Kan.)
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before MATHESON, MURPHY, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Marva Bell appeals the dismissal of her pro se complaint alleging legal
malpractice by her former counsel, Coleman Younger. We exercise jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.1
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may
be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and
10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1 Because Ms. Bell appears pro se, “we liberally construe [her] filings, but we will
not act as [her] advocate.” James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013).
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 19, 2026
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
Appellate Case: 26-3045 Document: 20-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 1

-- 1 of 5 --

2
I. BACKGROUND
Ms. Bell alleged that Mr. Younger settled her personal injury case for an
amount that failed to cover her medical treatments. Her complaint included multiple
versions of the complaint forms provided for pro se litigants, and she attached more
than 150 pages of exhibits. The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge.
The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) to dismiss
Ms. Bell’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a
claim that complies with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. She concluded that (1)
Ms. Bell did not allege “violations of any federally-protected rights or statutes” that
would implicate federal-question jurisdiction and (2) “both she and [Mr. Younger]
have addresses in Kansas,” defeating diversity jurisdiction. ROA at 197. And, even
if Ms. Bell could establish subject-matter jurisdiction, the magistrate judge concluded
the factual allegations in her 187-page complaint failed to comply with Rule 8, which
requires “a short and plain statement” of the claim for relief. Id. at 198-200 (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
The magistrate judge’s R&R notified Ms. Bell that
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed R. Civ. P. 72, and
D. Kan. Rule 72.1.4, Plaintiff shall have fourteen (14) days
after service of a copy of these proposed findings and
recommendations to serve and file with the U.S. District
Judge assigned to the case, any written objections to the
findings of fact, conclusions of law, or recommendations
of the undersigned Magistrate Judge. Plaintiff’s failure to
file such written, specific objections within the 14-day
period will bar appellate review of the proposed findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and the recommended
disposition.
Appellate Case: 26-3045 Document: 20-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 2

-- 2 of 5 --

3
Id. at 201.
Ms. Bell did not file any objections,2 so the district court concluded that she
waived her right to de novo review. The court adopted the R&R and dismissed
Ms. Bell’s complaint. She appeals the dismissal.
II. DISCUSSION
We review a district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction de
novo, Mukhtar v. Lambrecht, 172 F.4th 836, 841 (10th Cir. 2026), and for failure to
comply with Rule 8 for abuse of discretion, Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E.
Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1162 n.3 (10th Cir. 2007). We may affirm on any ground
supported by the record. Morphew v. Chaffee Cnty., 172 F.4th 802, 821 n.18 (10th
Cir. 2026).
Under the firm-waiver rule, “the failure to timely object to a magistrate
judge’s finding and recommendations waives appellate review of both factual and
legal questions.” Klein v. Harper, 777 F.3d 1144, 1147 (10th Cir. 2015) (quotations
omitted). “This rule does not apply, however, when (1) a pro se litigant has not been
informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences of failing to object,
or when (2) the interests of justice require review.” Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418
F.3d 1116, 1119 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). For the latter, we consider
“[1] a pro se litigant’s effort to comply, [2] the force and plausibility of the
2 Ms. Bell moved for appointment of counsel within the 14-day period but did not
object to the magistrate judge’s R&R. The district court denied Ms. Bell’s motion.
Appellate Case: 26-3045 Document: 20-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 3

-- 3 of 5 --

4
explanation for his failure to comply, and [3] the importance of the issues raised.”
Johnson v. Reyna, 57 F.4th 769, 778 (10th Cir. 2023) (quoting Casanova v. Ulibarri,
595 F.3d 1120, 1123 (10th Cir. 2010)). Neither exception applies here.
First, the magistrate judge informed Ms. Bell that she had 14 days to file
specific objections to the R&R and that failure to do so would waive appellate
review. Despite the clear warning, Ms. Bell filed no objections.
Second, as for the interests of justice, Ms. Bell does not argue she made any
efforts to object. Instead, she contends her “learning disabilities combined with the
lack of legal representation . . . prevented [her] from understanding or responding to
the [report and recommendation].” Aplt. Br. at 2. Her pro se status does not excuse
noncompliance with court rules and deadlines, see, e.g., Garrett v. Selby Connor
Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005), and if she had adequately
explained her failure to object to the R&R, the issues raised do not warrant ignoring
the firm waiver rule. Our review of the complaint confirms the district court properly
dismissed it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Theede v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab.,
172 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying firm waiver rule because “after our
review of the record and the law, we are convinced that on the merits Theede’s
claims are suspect at best”); Saleh v. Kimo, 821 F. App’x 915, 918 (10th Cir. 2020)
(unpublished) (applying firm waiver rule because “[o]ur own review of the record
Appellate Case: 26-3045 Document: 20-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 4

-- 4 of 5 --

5
reveals . . . the district court did not commit any plain error in its determination that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction” (quotations omitted)).3
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s judgment.
Entered for the Court
Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
Circuit Judge
3 Unpublished cases are not binding precedent, but we may consider them for their
persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
Appellate Case: 26-3045 Document: 20-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 5

-- 5 of 5 --