Geoffrey Todd West v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, et al.

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
July 2, 2012
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
_____________________________
No. 11-12911
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D. C. Docket No. 4:08-cv-01576-IPJ-RRA
GEOFFREY TODD WEST,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER,
ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
WARDEN, HOLMAN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF ALABAMA,
Respondents-Appellees.
_________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
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(July 2, 2012)
Before EDMONDSON, BARKETT, and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM:
This appeal is from the denial of Section 2254 relief to a state prisoner
sentenced to death. This appeal raises claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Briefly stated, three claims are presented:
1. Did the district court properly deny habeas relief on Petitioner’s claim
that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Petitioner being
required to wear a stun belt at trial?
2. Did the district court properly deny habeas relief on Petitioner’s claim
that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present
mitigation evidence at the penalty phase?
3. Did the district court properly deny habeas relief on Petitioner’s claim
that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that petitioner had no
significant prior criminal history?
The district court denied relief in a comprehensive, coherent order that relied on a
variety of alternative and cumulative grounds. West v. Allen, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___,
2011 WL 8138284 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 26, 2011). In the light of the deference
required by both the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and by
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), we see no
reversible error in the district court order.
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We rely upon the lack of showing of prejudice as the ground for our
affirming the district court’s decision. Put differently, even if we suppose that the
Petitioner can overcome the various technical and procedural hurdles to having the
merits of his claims considered by federal courts and even if we suppose that his
trial counsel performed in an objectively unreasonable way, Petitioner has entirely
failed to show -- as is required by the Strickland test -- how Petitioner was
prejudiced by his counsel’s supposed inadequate performance. We accept that the
pertinent decisions of the Alabama courts represent reasonable determinations of
the facts. And we accept that those state decisions represent the reasonable
application of clearly established Federal law as set out by the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States.
AFFIRMED.
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