Jeannine V. Duchateau v. Camp, Dresser & McKeee, Inc.

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-10838
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D.C. Docket No. 0:10-cv-60712-RSR
JEANNINE V. DUCHATEAU,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
CAMP, DRESSER & MCKEE, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(April 9, 2013)
Before TJOFLAT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and ROTHSTEIN,∗ District Judge.
PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
This appeal requires that we decide whether direct estoppel bars a claim of
pregnancy discrimination under state law when a jury found at trial that the
∗Honorable Barbara J. Rothstein, United States District Judge for the Western District of
Washington, sitting by designation.
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plaintiff, Jeannine DuChateau, suffered no adverse employment action regarding
her claim of retaliation for exercising her right to maternity leave under federal
law. DuChateau filed a complaint that her former employer, Camp, Dresser &
McKee, Inc., discriminated against her after she became pregnant. DuChateau
alleged that Camp removed her from a project for Lockheed Martin and failed to
restore her to the project after she gave birth to her child and returned to work.
DuChateau alleged that these events gave rise to three claims for relief against
Camp: (i) pregnancy discrimination under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992,
Fla. Stat. §§ 509.092, 760.01–760.11, (ii) interference with her rights under the
Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654, and (iii) retaliation for
exercising her rights under the Leave Act. The district court granted a partial
summary judgment in favor of Camp on the first two claims. At a trial on the third
claim of retaliation, the jury found that DuChateau had not suffered an adverse
employment action when Camp removed her from the Lockheed Martin project.
Because DuChateau is directly estopped from relitigating whether she suffered an
adverse employment action when she was removed from the project for Lockheed
Martin, we affirm the summary judgment against her claim of pregnancy
discrimination.
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I. BACKGROUND
DuChateau worked as a “project lead” in the Management Consulting
Division of Camp. In 2008, DuChateau and other Camp employees began work on
an environmental project for Lockheed Martin. While she worked on the
Lockheed project, Camp was considering her for the position of overall project
manager. In August 2008, DuChateau announced her pregnancy and her intention
to take maternity leave in January 2009.
Later that August, DuChateau overheard Steve Brewer, the manager of
Lockheed customer relations at Camp, tell another Camp employee that
DuChateau was “irresponsible” for getting pregnant when she was supposed to
manage the Lockheed project. DuChateau complained about Brewer’s comments
to Phil Chernin, one of her supervisors. DuChateau also spoke with Brewer.
Although Brewer did not give DuChateau the apology she sought, he did ask
DuChateau to remain on the Lockheed project. Brewer made no further comments
with regard to DuChateau’s pregnancy, but he ignored emails from DuChateau and
failed to give her access to the electronic project-management tools.
In September 2008, Camp hired Nancy Wheatley to be the project manager
for the remediation program of Lockheed, which included oversight of
DuChateau’s Lockheed project. After Wheatley undertook her new position, it
was determined that DuChateau would serve as deputy program manager of the
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Lockheed project, a position that did not affect her compensation, benefits, or the
terms of her employment.
During the fall of 2008, those individuals who worked on the Lockheed
project were critical of DuChateau’s work. Wheatley expressed concern about
DuChateau’s ability to manage the Lockheed project. Wheatley believed
DuChateau was incompetent and lacked the “big picture perspective” necessary to
manage the project. DuChateau stated that Lockheed had never expressed
concerns about her work before Wheatley joined Camp.
On December 22, 2008, Stanley Plante, one of DuChateau’s supervisors,
told DuChateau that she had been removed from the Lockheed project. DuChateau
alleges that Wheatley was the person who removed her from the project, but
Wheatley denies that she made that decision. Plante told DuChateau that she
should resign from the project and that other work would be found for her. After
DuChateau’s conversation with Plante, several Camp employees, including
DuChateau, held a conference call about the Lockheed project. Brewer announced
that Tom Pedersen, who had assisted with strategic development for the Lockheed
project, would serve as interim deputy project manager during DuChateau’s
maternity leave. During the call, DuChateau interrupted Brewer and asked if she
would be allowed to return to the project after her leave. DuChateau alleges
Brewer did not respond to her.
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The next day, DuChateau had a phone conversation with Wheatley that
Wheatley described as “unpleasant.” Wheatley stated that DuChateau was
“ranting” throughout the conversation and said that she would not work on the
Lockheed project again. After the conversation, Wheatley believed that
DuChateau had resigned from the project. DuChateau argues that she never
voluntarily resigned from the project. DuChateau stated that Wheatley asked her if
she was going to resign from the project throughout the conversation, and
DuChateau responded that she had already been removed from the project. On
December 29, 2008, DuChateau wrote an email to Plante stating that she no longer
wanted to work on the Lockheed project. DuChateau stated that she wrote this
email only after Plante informed her that she was removed from the Lockheed
project and instructed her to resign from it.
In January 2009, DuChateau began her maternity leave. Meanwhile, the
Management Consulting Division of Camp experienced a significant decrease in
its workload. Camp began layoffs, furloughs, and hour reductions for employees
of the division. The role Camp played in the Lockheed project was also
substantially reduced after new management at Lockheed decided to have their
own personnel perform much of the work. Lockheed reduced the budget for Camp
from $1.6 million to less than “several hundred thousand dollars.”
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In April 2009, DuChateau returned to work at Camp in the same position.
Neither her duties, pay, nor benefits were changed. Pedersen, in his position as
deputy program manager for the Lockheed project, asked DuChateau if she wanted
to work on the project. Pedersen claims that DuChateau declined the offer, but
DuChateau testified that she offered to help with any work available on the
Lockheed project.
In June 2009, during an overall slowdown in the Management Consulting
Division, DuChateau’s hours were reduced from 40 hours a week to 32 hours a
week. Her hours were later reduced from 32 hours a week to 24 hours a week.
DuChateau received an offer from a competitor of Camp and contacted Plante to
see if Camp was conducting any voluntary layoffs. DuChateau and Plante agreed
that DuChateau would be laid off to allow her to receive a severance package.
DuChateau received a severance package she considered “very fair.” A week later,
she began work at her new job.
In April 2010, DuChateau filed a complaint against Camp in a circuit court
of Florida, and Camp removed the action to the district court. Count one of
DuChateau’s complaint alleged that Camp discriminated against her when it
“remov[ed] her from the Lockheed Martin project because of her pregnancy and
impending maternity leave.” Count three of DuChateau’s complaint alleged that
Camp retaliated against her in violation of the Leave Act when it “demot[ed] her
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shortly before her leave was scheduled to begin . . . and [when it] fail[ed] to restore
her to the position on the Lockheed Martin project she occupied prior to scheduling
her [Leave Act] leave.” Both DuChateau and Camp consented to a magistrate
judge presiding over the action.
Camp moved for a summary judgment against DuChateau’s complaint. The
magistrate judge concluded that the Florida Act provided no cause of action for
pregnancy discrimination and that Camp restored DuChateau to her previous
position after she returned from maternity leave. The magistrate judge granted a
partial summary judgment in favor of Camp on DuChateau’s claims for pregnancy
discrimination under the Florida Act and interference under the Leave Act. At a
trial of DuChateau’s claim of retaliation under the Leave Act, a jury returned a
verdict in favor of Camp and found that DuChateau had not suffered an adverse
employment action.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review a district court’s grant or denial of summary judgment de novo.”
Brown v. Sec’y of State of Fla., 668 F.3d 1271, 1274 (11th Cir. 2012).
III. DISCUSSION
DuChateau argues that the Florida Act provides a cause of action for
pregnancy discrimination, but we need not decide that issue because the jury
verdict against her claim of retaliation directly estops her claim of pregnancy
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discrimination. “Direct estoppel” is a form of issue preclusion that arises “within
the confines of a single claim or cause of action.” 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur
R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4418 (2d ed.
2002). When a party contests the pretrial dismissal of a claim and a jury rendered
a verdict against the party on another claim, “[t]he jury’s valid resolution of
common issues is binding at trial of the untried claim, and may forestall the need
for any further trial.” Id. For example, in Freeman v. Chicago Park District, 189
F.3d 613 (7th Cir. 1999), the district court had entered a judgment on the pleadings
against a claim of racial discrimination in contracting, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, but
allowed a claim of racial discrimination in employment, id. § 2000e, to proceed to
trial. Freeman, 189 F.3d at 616. The jury found that the employee’s termination
was not racially motivated. Id. Because both the untried claim and the tried claim
required the plaintiff to prove a common issue of racial discrimination, the Seventh
Circuit held that it need not “consider whether the district court correctly granted
judgment on the pleadings” against the untried claim. Id. at 618. “The Seventh
Amendment prohibits a second jury from being given the opportunity to render a
verdict inconsistent with a prior jury’s verdict.” Id.
The finding by the jury that DuChateau suffered no adverse employment
action in her claim of retaliation bars a trial before another jury of her claim of
pregnancy discrimination. Even if there were a cause of action for pregnancy
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discrimination under the Florida Act, it would be construed in the same manner as
a cause of action for pregnancy discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. See Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th
Cir. 1998) (“The Florida courts have held that decisions construing Title VII are
applicable when considering claims under the Florida [] Act, because the Florida
[A]ct was patterned after Title VII.”). We have held that, to establish a prima facie
claim of pregnancy discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must establish that
“(1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she was qualified for her position;
(3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) employment or disciplinary
policies were differently applied to her.” Chapter 7 Tr. v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683
F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2012). The jury verdict against her claim of retaliation
estops DuChateau from relitigating the common issue whether she suffered an
adverse employment action. DuChateau’s untried claim of pregnancy
discrimination described the removal from the Lockheed project before she left for
maternity leave as the adverse employment action, and her claim of retaliation
described both her removal from the Lockheed project and the failure to restore her
to the Lockheed project as her adverse employment action. When the jury returned
its verdict in favor of Camp and found that she had not suffered an adverse
employment action, the jury necessarily found that neither DuChateau’s removal
from the Lockheed project nor the failure to restore her to the Lockheed project
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was an adverse employment action, and direct estoppel bars DuChateau from
retrying that issue of fact to another jury. See Freeman, 189 F.3d at 618. If a
second jury were to find in a trial of her claim of pregnancy discrimination that
DuChateau had suffered an adverse employment action when she was removed
from the project, the verdicts of two juries would be “insurmountabl[y]
inconsisten[t].” See Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1489 (11th Cir.
1983).
At oral argument, DuChateau argued that the phrase “direct estoppel” is not
used by this Court, but this argument misunderstands our precedents. In United
States v. Shenberg, 89 F.3d 1461 (11th Cir. 1996), we explained that, although
“courts generally refer to the estoppel principles as collateral estoppel,” “[i]n the
context of a retrial,[] the term ‘collateral estoppel’ is a misnomer . . . [and] the term
‘direct estoppel’ more appropriately characterizes the application of estoppel
principles,” id. at 1478 (internal citation omitted). But our analysis “remains the
same, whether we refer to the application of estoppel principles as ‘direct’ or
‘collateral.’” Id. In Shenberg, we referred “to the estoppel principles collectively
as collateral estoppel” to avoid confusion. Id. In United States v. Gil, 142 F.3d
1398 (11th Cir. 1998), we cited Shenberg for the proposition that, “[a]lthough the
term ‘direct estoppel’ would perhaps be more accurate, this court has used the term
‘collateral estoppel’ to avoid confusion,” id. at 1400 n.3. But neither decision
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rejects the principle of direct estoppel, nor do they require us to avoid that term
when, as here, the use of the term is not confusing.
DuChateau also argues that Camp retaliated against her in violation of the
Florida Act, but she failed to plead that claim. DuChateau’s complaint asserted
three claims: (1) pregnancy discrimination under the Florida Act; (2) interference
with her rights under the Leave Act; and (3) retaliation under the Leave Act. She
failed to allege a claim of retaliation under the Florida Act. “[A]n issue not raised
in the district court and raised for the first time in an appeal will not be considered
by this court.” Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th
Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the grant of a partial summary judgment in favor of Camp for
DuChateau’s claim of pregnancy discrimination under the Florida Act.
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